Tagged: saffron bikini
Law 32: Hate-speech-law countries v. free-speech countries
Hate speech laws in so-called “free-speech” countries
How free speech is contrived to allow governments
to discriminate at will in hate-speech-law countries
Two examples: Sweden and India, with discussion of recent incidents
1/ Quran burning and incitement against religion in Sweden
2/ Saffron bikini and defilement of religion in India
1/ Quran burning and incitement against religion in Sweden
“Turkish protesters have expressed outrage in Istanbul after a far-right politician burned a Quran in front of the Turkish embassy in Stockholm.” (Al Jazeera English, YouTube, Jan 22)
As there is no freedom of speech in Europe, the request to ban and punish this kind of act/speech, Quran burning, is a legitimate demand of nondiscrimination. Swedish law criminalizes hate speech out of consideration for communitarian feelings. Therefore, the failure of Swedish authorities to prosecute such acts is contemptuous: not attending to this particular community’s feelings while they claim to attend to communitarian feelings sends the message that this community is not worth attending to, according to Swedish authorities. They simply do not want this community to be protected by Sweden’s hate speech laws, and this is blatant discrimination.
My message to Swedish authorities: You are contemptible. What are your hate speech laws for? Stop discriminating against Muslims and prosecute Quran burning as hate speech.
Where is the Swedish law that bans freedom of speech out of consideration of a religion’s belief?
It is where everybody can find it. “Hets mot folkgrupp blev olagligt 1949. På den tiden var det enbart härstamning och trosbekännelse som var grunder för hets mot folkgrupp. Detta ändrades 1970 till ras, hudfärg, nationellt eller etniskt ursprung eller trosbekännelse. År 2002 tillkom sexuell läggning och år 2019 könsöverskridande identitet eller uttryck.” (Wikipedia: Hets mot folkgrupp) The important word for the asked question is “trosbekännelse,” which means religious belief. Translation: “Incitement against groups became illegal [in Sweden] in 1949. At that time, descent and creed [trosbekännelse = religious belief] were the only grounds for incitement against groups. This was changed in 1970 to race, skin color, national or ethnic origin, or creed [again]. In 2002 sexual orientation was added and in 2019 gender identity or expression.”
Who are you to dictate how I dispose of my property?
You’ll have to ask this question to the Swedish legislator. – The technical answer, however, is that you can’t criminally dispose of your property. If you dispose of your property by making a hate speech of it, you’ll be prosecuted for hate speech by Swedish authorities.
So what forms of disposal are not hate speech? Presumably, burning is ruled out.
All disposal is not in the form of calling people’s attention. – If you ask me how they dispose of their old Quran copies in Muslim countries, I don’t know. All I know is that, if a person disposes of a Quran copy in Sweden and one finds it in his trash can, or if he burns it in his backyard, this is not hate speech. But what happened in front of the embassy is blatant hate speech (against a group based on its members’ creed or religious belief) and the negligence of authorities to act accordingly proves they discriminate against Muslims. It’s not too late.
The answer from the Swedish authorities so far has been, to sum it up: “The act was very insensitive, but we are a free-speech country.” This is not true. Sweden is a hate-speech-law country: “Incitement against groups became illegal in 1949. At that time, descent and creed were the only grounds for incitement against groups. This was changed in 1970 to race, skin color, national or ethnic origin, or creed. In 2002 sexual orientation was added and in 2019 gender identity or expression.” The Swedish authorities are bound by their legislation to prosecute the wrongdoer; by their obdurate negligence to do it, they show that, as a principle, they refuse to comply with their hate speech legislation when the targeted group is Muslims. They thus discriminate against Muslims. On the one hand, they tell their national communities, their “groups” (folkgrupp), that Sweden protects them from hate speech by criminalizing hate speech; on the other hand, they claim they guarantee freedom of speech when one of these groups in particular is wronged by hate speech. You don’t need to be a Muslim to feel contempt for such malfeasance.
2/ Saffron bikini and defilement of religion in India
For a better understanding of the following, read “Saffron bikini v. national flag bikini” in Law 29.
Film Pathaan, with a saffron bikini dancing scene, was released this month amid protests. I support the protests. As the authorities disregard the outrage over saffron bikini, they should apologize to and compensate all people who have been convicted for tricolor (national flag) bikinis and other tricolor trappings, and I’m told they are not few. You’ll perhaps say in reply that India is a secular country and authorities have a mandate to ensure respect for the tricolor symbol, not for the saffron symbol, which is religious. There exist stringent laws about incitement and respect for community feelings in India: Why the negligence? Does secularism mean that a secular, atheistic elite will be granted the privilege to offend religious feelings, while the people is gagged?
No matter how Hindutva the government is, outrage over saffron bikinis is disregarded, the problem does not exist for them. They will keep focusing on hunting tricolor bikinis and other tricolor trappings. The numerous tricolor precedents, the stringent provisions of incitement laws, constitutional protection of communities’ feelings, are of no avail to a Hindutva government against the privileged few who bought a never-ending license to outrage religious feelings.
What about sadhus who wear a single saffron loincloth?
The comparison is misguided. Although there exist laws against nudity in India, they do not apply to sadhus, because a sadhu’s nudity is not the same as a paid actress’s nudity, the aim of which is to attract or arouse prurient interest. By the same token, a sadhu wearing saffron is not the same as an actress whose body is used as an object for making money through prurient interest, adding an insult to religion through saffron symbolism.
The good news is that Bollywood needs to be saved, that is, it is heading toward irreversible collapse. “Can Pathaan save the Bollywood?” (Mirror Now) You’re asking too much of a saffron bikini.
“Pathaan 1 – Saffron Brigade 0.” Why the sarcasm? Is it proper of a news media? In a country where tricolor brigades are terrorizing tricolor bikinis and other tricolor trappings, such disregard for religious feelings by the authorities is as offensive as the offense itself. And don’t tell me this is a victory for free speech: the tricolor brigade is watching you.
Their apathy will remain a stain on Indian authorities. If you think a tricolor bikini is an insult, and Indian law seems to think it is (see Gehna Vashisht and other cases), then a saffron bikini is blatant hate speech (Sections 153 and 295 of the Indian penal code). Negligence to act accordingly on the part of authorities is discriminatory remiss.
Section 295: “Whoever destroys, damages or defiles any place of worship, or any object held sacred by any class of persons with the intention of thereby insulting the religion of any class of persons or with the knowledge that any class of persons is likely to consider such destruction, damage or defilement as an insult to their religion, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.” (Emphases ours.)
Let us examine what a saffron bikini is, according to the wording of the law. We are talking about defilement, as sacredness is purposefully associated with pruriency in the form of scant clothing and lascivious dancing. The object is not a bikini in itself but a bikini purposefully made saffron. We do not have to prove that the wrongdoing is purposeful, as Hindus’ reverential feelings for saffron are well-known. Rather it is the accused who must prove they did not do the wrongdoing on purpose; they must provide convincing evidence that none of them had realized that the saffron bikini could upset Hindus’ feelings. In the words of the law, they must prove that they had no “knowledge that any class of persons [was] likely to consider such defilement as an insult to their religion,” and good luck with that: were these people brought before a court, I don’t think they could provide the least convincing evidence of ingenuity, unless, perhaps, they wriggled on the ground like worms and cried, because where in the world is saffron known for its religious symbolism if not in India? Think about it: these people, instead of being removed behind bars for two years, are going scot free, protected by a Hindutva BJP-led coalition government.
“A battle for freedom of speech”? I didn’t see journalists battle for free speech when a FIR (first information report by police) was filed against half a dozen people dancing with Aurangzeb’s poster in Maharashtra, a few days ago (see Law 31: Aurangzeb’s Ghost). Sections 95, 153, 295 etc. of the ICP are the law. Journalists do not oppose it, they only oppose its application to defilements of religion by Bollywood.
At the same time that the Indian union government refuses to listen to its grassroots militants on Pathaan, and asks them to stop the stir, it bans a BBC documentary about the 2002 Gujarat riots in which hundreds of Muslims were murdered by mobs.
The ban is either legal or illegal. If it is illegal, there is no question of opportunity. If it is legal, there is no question of opportunity either, because the executive power is not allowed to pick up laws it will carry out from laws it will not carry out. The government must execute the whole legislation (hence its name: executive). Those who discuss the ban from the opportunity angle are wrong. If they disagree with the ban, they should, assuming the ban is lawful or constitutional, voice criticism against the law that allows such a ban, that is, they should ask to remove legislation that allows the authorities to ban this kind of speech. Let me know if they do. I assume they all discuss the opportunity and not the legality issue, because they are the opposition that wants to be the majority, and as the new majority they will want: 1) discretionary, not just executive power, 2) to ban criticism. They are all of a kind and form the political cartel.
I disagree with the idea that the executive should be granted even a minimal discretionary power: all decisions based on opportunity are discriminatory, by preventing expected benefits or sanctions of the law. Even though the idea is as commonplace as the practice, neither the idea nor the practice are constitutional, and they cannot be, as this would mean actual suspension of the separation of powers, and of checks and balances.
Despite their commonalities, both cases illustrate two different situations. In the Swedish case, one religious minority is discriminated against by the authorities. In the Indian case, the Hindu majority’s right to be protected by the law is disregarded by the authorities, which shield one sector of the society, namely Bollywood, from the legislation; in other words, against the religious majority, the Indian authorities discriminate in favor of this sector by elevating it above hate speech laws. Both actions are extralegal, namely, given the constitutional characterization of the executive power, illegal and unconstitutional. Through the practice, the will of the legislator is overlooked and the role of the judiciary undermined. The practice is defended on the ground that this overlook is needed and will occur only in situations where the generality of the law presents flaws that put the state at risk. The only possible arbitrator for this is the people and that supposes, therefore, that the people has an effective right to insurrection, which, absent a constitutional right to bear arms, is nonexistent. Otherwise, the practice should be set guidelines in the form of constitutional measures about the state of emergency. In the two cases we have discussed, the authorities are abusing their discretionary power without redeeming circumstances.
“[Female ex-BJP leader] Gets Gun License Citing ‘Life Threats’ Over Prophet Remarks.” (India Today, YouTube)
How long does it take to get a license? The authorities must verify the claim and that surely takes time. She seems to have had her license in no time, but is it the case for all Indian citizens? One day, you’ll hear that a man applied for a license because he was threatened, the claim was investigated by authorities, with a lot of red tape, and meantime the man was killed. Mark my words, you’ll hear about something like that, or I don’t know bureaucracy. An unconditional right to carry guns is the only correct alternative to a ban.
About current massive layoffs in big tech companies (Google, Meta, Twitter…). The revenue of a good deal of these so-called big tech companies is from advertising. Massive layoffs in big tech tell you manufacturing companies cut down their advertising spending because they are in poor condition. Badly impacted manufacturing and other companies first respond by cutting down on advertising. Big tech companies then have no other choice than cutting down on their workforce, because advertising is their main revenue. What massive layoffs in big tech tell you is the incoming massive layoffs in all other sectors, as advertising revenue dependent big tech companies are the first to cut down on the workforce.
“10 Palestinians Killed In ‘Deadliest’ Israel Raids in Years.” (NDTV, YouTube, Jan 27)
This headline is foolish. The raid is “deadliest in years” because of 10 casualties and one month ago 8, two months ago 9, three months ago 9 again, four months ago 6, and so on; something like that. About 200 Palestinians were killed in Israeli raids in 2022 alone. (212 according to the Palestinian Health Ministry.)
“Iranian drones program’s success and what are the lessons for India.” (The Print, YouTube, Jan 27)
Given the scathing indictment regarding Indian national production (“promising the moon and failing to deliver,” etc.), one should not disregard the possibility of corruption of national authorities by foreign suppliers. If decision-makers are biased toward foreign supply through corruption money, India will never develop serious programs of her own. At this stage, you may well ask the question.
Ironically, an excuse from the Indian side is that, in Iran, things are under control of the Guardians of the Revolution: “It is easier there because everything comes under the control of the Islamic revolutionary guard corps,” says a “source in Indian defense establishment.” Well, yes, the Guardians probably better enforce the country’s own anti-corruption laws, so the excuse almost sounds like an admission, or veiled whistleblowing.
La guerre par procuration expliquée par la France
Le texte suivant complète notre essai « Casus belli : Réflexions sur la guerre en Ukraine » de mai 2022 (ici).
Un article en ligne du 5 mars 2022 du Club des juristes, « La fourniture d’armes à l’Ukraine : quel cadre en droit international ? » (ici, auteur : E. Castellarin), présente le dispositif juridique utilisé par les nations de l’OTAN pour légitimer leur action de fourniture d’armes à l’Ukraine contre la Russie. Cet article appelle plusieurs remarques.
La première est que ce cadre est purement multilatéral et que le raisonnement bilatéral que j’emploie dans mon essai semble désormais exclu du champ de la pensée ; à savoir, les accords préventifs bilatéraux de défense, dont l’idée brille par son absence dans cet article, n’entrent apparemment plus dans le raisonnement des États européens, de sorte que mon argument selon lequel les États d’Europe de l’Ouest auraient pu offrir à l’Ukraine la garantie d’une intervention armée en cas d’agression russe, doit passer pour une bizarrerie désuète aux yeux des juristes avertis. Cela les regarde. Mais quid des États-Unis ? Ces derniers n’offrent-ils pas leur bouclier militaire à plusieurs pays, dont l’Arabie Saoudite ? Qu’est-ce qui les empêchait alors d’offrir le même bouclier à l’Ukraine, par exemple après l’annexion de la Crimée par la Russie ? Il semblerait que ce puisse être en partie les dispositions du droit international elles-mêmes, dans la mesure où celles-ci peuvent désormais permettre à des États de conduire une « guerre par procuration » (proxy war) sans se voir pour autant qualifiés ipso facto de parties au conflit. Examinons les différents dispositifs juridiques présentés par l’article.
« Dans l’affaire relative aux activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua, la Cour internationale de justice a été confrontée à la fourniture d’armes par les États-Unis aux contras, un groupe rebelle actif au Nicaragua. Elle a exclu que la fourniture d’armes puisse être qualifiée d’agression armée, mais elle a affirmé qu’on peut y voir une menace ou un emploi de la force (§ 195). » Ça ne commence pas très bien pour l’OTAN, du côté de la CIJ. Le § 195 de la décision de la Cour, de 1986, pourrait en effet servir à la Russie de fondement juridique à l’invocation d’un casus belli : « menace ou emploi de la force ». (Le terme même de casus belli est sans doute devenu tout aussi désuet que les contrats bilatéraux de défense territoriale évoqués dans notre précédent paragraphe, vu que cette notion simple est à présent décomposée en agression armée, d’une part, et menace ou emploi de la force, d’autre part.)
Notre juriste considère cependant que la décision de la CIJ est inapplicable au cas de l’Ukraine : « En réalité, l’analyse de la CIJ n’est pas applicable au conflit armé international en cours en Ukraine. L’armée ukrainienne a le plein contrôle, ponctuel et global, de ses actions, si bien qu’on ne peut pas analyser la fourniture d’armes un emploi indirect de la force par les États occidentaux contre la Russie. » Voire ! Il faudrait tout d’abord s’assurer que la CIJ a bel et bien prétendu que « le plein contrôle, ponctuel et global, de ses actions » par une armée excluait a priori un emploi indirect de la force par ceux qui lui fournissent des armes. Certes, l’armée ukrainienne est différente d’une organisation comme celle des contras au Nicaragua, et le conflit lui-même est différent. Mais nous ne voyons pas ce que veut dire cette réserve émise par l’auteur : en quoi les contras n’avaient-ils pas eux aussi « le plein contrôle, ponctuel et global, de [leurs] actions » ? Que signifie cette formule alambiquée ? Un tel embrouillamini peut-il se trouver dans une décision de justice internationale ? Nous en doutons. Nous mènerons cette recherche et y reviendrons. Pour le moment, nous considérons que c’est là une simple pirouette, une argutie sans queue ni tête. L’armée ukrainienne ne se distingue pas des contras sous l’angle obscur ici présenté, et, à défaut de plus ample explication, nous considérons donc que la décision de la CIJ s’applique au présent conflit. Poursuivons.
« Du point de vue du droit coutumier des conflits armés, la fourniture d’armes est incompatible avec le statut de neutralité » Cela ne continue guère mieux pour l’OTAN, du point de vue du droit international coutumier. Les États fournissant des armes à l’Ukraine ne sont pas neutres. Mais sont-ils pour autant, comme un raisonnement fondé sur le principe logique du tiers exclu pourrait le laisser penser, des parties au conflit ? La réponse du droit international est, selon notre juriste, négative : « Cependant, cela signifie simplement que les États qui fournissent des armes ne peuvent pas se prévaloir des droits des États neutres, par exemple celui d’obtenir la réparation d’éventuels dommages collatéraux subis en raison d’un bombardement sur le territoire d’un État partie au conflit. En revanche, la perte du statut d’États neutres au conflit en Ukraine ne signifie pas que ces États sont devenus parties au conflit. »
Notre juriste croit donc qu’il existe, relativement « au conflit en Ukraine », des États ni neutres ni parties au conflit. « Cette situation, » de partie au conflit, « qui impliquerait notamment le droit de la Russie de cibler les forces armées de ces États, ne se produirait que si celles-ci prenaient directement part aux hostilités ». Les États de l’OTAN sont donc sortis de leur neutralité mais, comme ils ne prennent pas directement part aux hostilités, ils ne sont pas non plus des parties au conflit. Cela confirme l’analyse russe de la « guerre par procuration » menée par ces États. En effet, si ces États ne faisaient pas la guerre, ils seraient neutres, or ils ne sont pas neutres, et s’ils prenaient directement part aux opérations, ils seraient parties au conflit, or ils ne le sont pas non plus : ils font donc la guerre par procuration (proxy war). L’analyse russe est entièrement conforme à ces éléments juridiques.
La suite de l’article tend à montrer que ce comportement est « internationalement licite ». Tout d’abord, le Traité sur le commerce des armes n’est prétendument pas violé, car les États n’ont pas connaissance, au moment de fournir ses armes, qu’elles « pourraient servir à commettre » un génocide, des crimes contre l’humanité ou des crimes de guerre. Cette clause du traité est cependant suffisamment générale pour que des livraisons d’armes lors d’un conflit en cours soient susceptibles de servir à commettre de tels actes. L’article ne dit pas en effet que les fournisseurs n’ont pas connaissance que leurs armes « serviront à commettre » des crimes, une formule qui serait moins contraignante pour les fournitures d’armes. On rétorquera peut-être que, de la façon dont je l’entends, peu de fournitures d’armes resteraient licites, mais n’est-ce pas précisément l’intention des concepteurs et signataires du traité que de lutter contre la prolifération ? En l’occurrence, exclure que des crimes de guerre puissent être commis par l’une des parties lors d’un conflit en cours est ou bien de l’angélisme ou bien un parti pris belliqueux qui ne peut être conforme à l’esprit du traité.
Cependant, l’UE a souhaité se garantir à ce sujet, en introduisant une clause suspensive en cas de violation du droit international par l’Ukraine, ce qui est interprété par notre juriste comme une preuve de respect formel du traité par l’UE. Voire ! Cette clause montre au contraire, selon nous, que l’UE se doute que ces armes « pourraient » servir à commettre des crimes de guerre etc., et qu’elle n’a donc formellement pas le droit de fournir ces armes. En prétendant prévenir les crimes de guerre etc., elle avoue être consciente que de tels crimes pourraient être commis, et c’est précisément cette prise de conscience qui devrait l’empêcher de livrer des armes.
Enfin, la résolution ES-11/1 de l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies ayant qualifié l’opération russe d’agression, l’Ukraine est « indéniablement » en légitime défense. L’auteur précise certes que la résolution onusienne est « dépourvue d’effet obligatoire et silencieuse sur la fourniture d’armes » (ce qui est un peu regrettable en termes de droit positif) mais affirme que c’est une « interprétation authentique de la Charte, objectivement valable pour tous les membres ». Ce qui est objectivement valable et en même temps dépourvu d’effet obligatoire, est surtout dépourvu d’effet obligatoire, en droit. Autrement dit, la question de l’agression et de la légitime défense reste ouverte. Le traitement des minorités nationales en Ukraine invoqué par la Russie est en débat. Or c’est la légitime défense qui est le principal élément de justification des nations de l’OTAN. En légitime défense, « [l]’emploi de la force de sa part [l’Ukraine] est licite (art. 51 de la Charte des Nations Unies) et ne peut pas engager sa responsabilité (art. 21 des articles de la Commission du droit international sur la responsabilité de l’État pour fait internationalement illicite), ni celle des États qui l’aident et l’assistent. » La légitime défense est plus qu’une légitimation, selon cette présentation, c’est un véritable blanc-seing (et la présentation est donc douteuse : certaines violations du droit naturel ne peuvent recevoir aucune justification et engagent toujours la responsabilité). Mais c’est aussi un point contestable, l’Ukraine ayant peut-être conduit sur son territoire une politique contraire au droit humanitaire envers la minorité russophone, et contraire également aux intérêts fondamentaux de son voisin, comme le prétend la Russie s’agissant des régions frontalières du Donbass et autre, dont la situation extrêmement troublée avant l’intervention russe n’a échappé à personne.
Law 29: Demonetizing Bin Laden
Buddhism is the true religion of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Let me explain. Gautama opposed the caste system and was attacked – although not persecuted – by the Brahmins. Since then, Savarkar (1883-1966) and other proponents of Hindutva ideology have played down the caste system, to the point of presenting it as a deviation from true Hinduism or Hindutva. Therefore, as they oppose the caste system, they must be Buddhists, unless they are Westernized revisionist brains.
Demonetizing Bin Laden
“Center [Indian Government] had justified the decision of demonetization stating it was taken to crack down on fake currency, black money and terror financing.” (Hindustan Times, YouTube, Jan 2, 2023)
Some governments can’t take any action without justifying it by a necessity to fight terrorism. A potent justification as far as illiterate mobs are concerned, certainly. In 2019, EU stopped issuing its 500-euro banknotes, the highest euro note; these were called “Bin Ladens” because they were allegedly used in criminal transactions (and Western media know of no other criminal than Bin Laden, although mafias have been thriving all over the place for decades). 500 euros is about 45,000 Indian rupees, and one can understand that transactions that must remain cash (because they are unlawful) need high-value notes, but what proportion of “Bin Ladens” were used by Al-Qaeda compared to mafias? – India fighting terrorism with excavators (demolishing for encroachment the property of alleged terrorists running free [see Law 28: “Bulldozer Crackdown”]) and demonetization…
However, Modiji demonetized 1,000 INR notes to replace them with 2,000 notes†, that is, he replaces high-value notes by even higher-value notes. Criminals need cash for their high-value criminal transactions. You and I need cash for groceries; for more expensive purchases we usually make bank transfers. The 2,000 note is evidence that the demonetization has nothing to do with war against crime.
“People seeking to exchange their banknotes had to stand in lengthy queues, and several deaths were linked to the rush to exchange cash. … The move reduced the country’s industrial production and its GDP growth rate. It is estimated that 1.5 million jobs were lost.” (Wkpd: Indian banknote demonetization) Congratulations, Modiji!
†To be quite precise, demonetized 500 and 1,000 INR notes were replaced by new 500 and 2,000 notes.
The Delhi Car Drag Case
“Delhi erupts in rage after car drags woman for 7 kilometers; Murder or accident?” (Hindustan Times, YouTube, Jan 2023)
Some constitutional considerations
“Delhi chief minister demanded death penalty for the accused.” In all countries, it would be senseless for a member of the executive to tell courts what their decision should be, at any stage. But to demand death penalty is even more senseless in India, where, although death penalty exists, only eight executions have been carried out since 1996, that is, death penalty in India is a mockery.
Delhi CM’s demanding a death sentence for what has been said, so far, to be an accident, is senseless. But given Indian Supreme Court (SC)’s decision Bachan Singh v State of Punjab (1980), even if it is, in fact, a gruesome murder, the demand would still not be in line with actual law, that is, said decision, which limits death sentence to “rarest of rare crimes.” These include crimes involving the “security of the state” and I therefore disagree with SC’s ruling. There exists no reason to make a difference between crimes based on state security. Such a line simply cannot be drawn, unless it means that the life of a public official has more value than ordinary citizens’ lives, or something like that – an abhorrent idea.
Delhi CM talks in the present case of “rarest of rare crime” indeed, the condition for a death sentence. According to the Indian Supreme Court, there is a rarest of rare crime when, to begin with, a “murder is committed in an extremely brutal, grotesque, diabolical, revolting or dastardly manner so as to arouse intense and extreme indignation of the community.” This cannot be a valid definition. Murders committed in anger or fear are usually more brutal and violent and dastardly than premeditated murders committed in cold blood, and yet it is a well-established principle that premeditation makes a crime more heinous. By emphasizing the graphic element of a crime, the definition overlooks other major aspects, just like a mob reacting to a crime.
In fact, the attempt by SC to define “rarest of rare” contrives a definition that denies the very name “rarest of rare”: “[I]f the motive betrays depravity and meanness, or if a backward or minority community member is killed not for personal reasons but to arouse social wrath, the accused should get death. Other crimes which technically fall into the rarest of rare cases are bride burnings and dowry deaths, a child victim, the assassination of a public figure for political reasons [security of the state, discussed above], or killing a defenseless person because of old age or infirmity.” Hate crimes, political crimes, infanticides, etc. Such a large definition for rarest of rare?! – Given that among the only eight people executed since 1996 in India, we find rapists who later killed their victim, one is bound to think, unfortunately, that rarest or rare are the cases properly brought before a court.
Two female friends, Anjali and Nidhi, left a hotel at 1:30 am on a scooter. Later, street cameras show Anjali’s body dragged by a car. Crowds rioted in anger when they learnt police reported the incident as an accident.
It looks like an accident, but even so the men in the car would be culpable of hit-and-run and manslaughter.
Had the men stopped the car after the accident, the car would not have dragged the body. It remains to be seen if a car can drag a body with the occupants not noticing at once; experts will tell.
a-a) Passengers’ v. driver’s responsibility
There is 1) the accident but also 2) the hit-and-run. The other occupants of the car beside the driver would have to convince a court they did their best to prevent the hit-and-run, otherwise they are accomplices in it. If they failed to report the incident, in all likelihood complicity will be retained.
If a car passenger does not report to police after the incident (without good reason), he will be presumed to have supported the hit-and-run. What if they are all caught while still in the car? Obviously, a passenger cannot stop the driver without risking an accident, so if one passenger urges the driver to stop and the driver won’t listen, there is probably not much else the passenger could do; in this case, I think the passengers should not be presumed accomplices. Passengers can stop a driver but there is always a risk of accident, as the driver is in control of the car.
If all passengers were stoned from alcohol or otherwise, and didn’t even realize there was an accident, then again, they are not accomplices.
When actor Salman Khan’s chauffeur was found guilty of a hit-and-run while Salman, as passenger, got away with it, I assume the court had good reasons for a decision I find counterintuitive, because Salman was the boss, and the chauffeur his employee, so at first I would assume Salman gave his chauffeur the order to keep driving rather than the chauffeur took Salman “hostage.” But perhaps the chauffeur was so afraid of the consequences of the accident that he did not listen to his boss urging him to stop the car. Possibly.
This is not only an accident but also a hit-and-run, and not only a hit-and-run but also manslaughter. The difference with murder is that the driver and passengers probably didn’t intend to kill Anjali by dragging her, they had rather hoped the body would detach, alive, from under the car so they could drive away, released from this “burden.” However, the drag was an act of violence causing injuries that resulted in death: the definition of manslaughter.
Someone (a YouTube user) said “[accused] having knowledge” is enough in Indian law to characterize murder, “not only mens rea” (a legal term for “intent”). Knowledge of what, he did not tell, but I think I can connect the dots, and that puzzles me because it means Indian law has no proper distinction between murder and manslaughter, which, if true, would be a shortcoming. In the present case, for instance, the men probably knew they were committing a violent, potentially lethal act, but death was not their intent (mens rea); their intent was more likely to have the body released from the car or the car released from the body, although, in their recklessness, they were certainly aware this could provoke death.
Delhi CM, who demands a death sentence for them, seems to have another appreciation of the facts; he may think they dragged a person unknown to them with the purpose of taking her life, that they had a design to choose a random prey to torture and kill her or took the opportunity of an unexpected traffic accident to satisfy murderous instincts and they enjoyed it. But neither the chief minister nor I is a judge of the facts. The jury will settle it. In the meantime, as the chief minister talks his mind, I assume I can talk my mind too.
The facts of the case as known so far from reports by Indian media seem to point to manslaughter rather than murder, unless the men knew the victim, a point the police said they are investigating. If the men knew the victim, the police may find biographical elements in their relationships that could constitute a plausible mens rea for murder, for instance if they bore her a grudge for some reason or other. Absent a previous relationship, there seems to be no other possible mens rea other than, for instance, a murderous mindset oriented toward random gruesome acts (but if the men don’t have a criminal record, this will hardly obtain, unless a psychiatric report points to the same) or a hatred for women that would make the case a femicide, a hate crime (which the Commission for Women has hastily presumed without, in my opinion, good reason, if not the assumption that Indian males, or all males, are prone to roaming streets for killing women – but is this assumption or prejudice? To be sure, Anjali’s clothes were torn by the long drag, and this could make think of rape.)
c/ Police conduct
As for police conduct, which has been questioned, we heard that a first police report talked of an accident, and this triggered street demonstrations or riots. If there was only “accident” in this report, then truly the report seems light, as a hit-and-run was also obvious. But a hit-and-run is not yet, per se, a murder/manslaughter either. Assuming the report was about accident and hit-and-run, one could still be puzzled and ask: How did the men not notice there was a body under their car? I have been watching Indian channels on YouTube these last days, and since the Anjali case surfaced, already two other car drag incidents occurred in India, as in Hardoi (Uttar Pradesh) yesterday, Jan 6, when a cyclist was dragged by a car over one kilometer before the driver stopped. On videos, we see pedestrians rushing toward the vehicle to alert the driver that he was dragging somebody; apparently, the driver had not noticed it at once. In the Delhi case, I read some people say a “decent” driver’s not noticing is impossible, but is it so certain? For one, it probably depends on the condition of the roads: where a car ceaselessly bounces up and down due to the road’s unevenness, it probably takes longer to notice the presence of a dragged burden under one’s car. Nevertheless, in case police did sloppy work, this is not evidence of coverup yet rather than incompetence or neglect. Even if police try to protect a politician among the car passengers (or is he the driver? – One of the accused is a local BJP politician), Nidhi’s interview in front of cameras can be of no help in that regard, as far as I can see, contrary to what is said by some: Nidhi’s testimony as we know it (see iii) can’t cast the least shadow of a doubt on the main facts, unless something escapes me. If the testimony can’t change nothing in that respect, I fail to see why police would have staged it.
Assuming police are trying to protect the BJP politician, their best asset for this at the present stage would be Nidhi, that is, they would shift attention from the men to Nidhi. She would be the one responsible for the accident and the men would have noticed nothing, neither the accident nor the drag, they’re cleared. If police staged Nidhi’s interview, as some suggest, they would have knowingly induced her to tell lies, such as “Anjali was drunk and I wasn’t, and yet she insisted to drive” which would, unanticipated by her, later be dispelled by forensic expertise (no alcohol found by the postmortem) and cast serious doubts on her personality. Therefore, if the claim is police interference, insistence on charging Nidhi is not quite consistent, because Nidhi’s words may have been staged: apparently an attempt to clear herself but in fact a trap diabolically laid for her by police.
The victim’s friend
Nidhi was witness to a hit-and-run that would likely result in homicide, seeing Anjali dragged away under a car. She probably ran for her life, thinking: “If these monsters notice me, a witness to their crime, they’ll want to kill me too, so indifferent are they to strangers’ life.” Then she went back home. Why not to the police? At 2 am in the morning, the safest was straight home. Perhaps she didn’t even know where the police station is, nor was there anybody around to tell her, or she didn’t dare ask, for that would have shown she was helpless and men could have raped her. And she didn’t have police number on her phone: who cares about that at 20 something? So, Hindustan Times says she went home, probably thinking of asking for advice. She then did nothing for the next two days: if this means she reported on her own initiative after three days, then she finally reported. Why so long? Perhaps the first day she was completely out of her mind, then the second day she thought it was already too late and she hoped she would escape investigation, and the third day she had remorse and reported.
But Nidhi’s behavior is a secondary and minor question, just as the accident is secondary in importance to the possible crimes, hit-and-run and manslaughter. Absent further elements that may surface later, in the previous paragraph I attempt an explanation. Some added in the meantime elements about her criminal record (drugs), and the hypothesis that she hid for two days to allow time to erase traces of alcohol or drugs in her blood (she would have been the one intoxicated and not, as she said, Anjali). But all in all, it is not clear how her behavior could be of great relevance to the main issue, unless one nurtures the idea of a premeditated murder of Anjali in which Nidhi would be implicated. Even if Nidhi were found liable for not reporting and/or the accident (cf. the allegation that cameras show she had her hands on the handle a few moments before the accident), that wouldn’t change the elements regarding hit-and-run and manslaughter.
The Commissions for Women
Does the National Commission for Women make a statement each time a woman dies a violent death in India or is there something special here?
The Commissions for Women, national commission and Delhi commission, add fuel to the fire; I now suspect one or the other instigated or incited the riots, or at least provoked them by making provocative statements. Who first claimed it was a femicide, with rape and what not, in defiance of the police report? (Anjali’s clothes were torn due to, according to expertise, the drag, but as the body was half-naked people at the CW thought it likely was a case of rape and murder.)
Delhi Commission then sharply criticized Nidhi’s interview and threatened her with legal action for her “character assassination” of Anjali (who Nidhi said was drunk and yet insisted on driving the scooter). Is it character assassination when Delhi chief minister demands death penalty for the men in the car, who are still presumed innocent (like all accused before a judgment)? Is it character assassination when one or the other Commission for Women spins a femicide yarn out of thin air? Bureaucrats would be the only ones allowed to talk? – I think the Commission for Women is embarrassed by their femicide spin in defiance of the preliminary police report. So-called “character assassination” is allowed in a trial and then (in a trial) it is no slander: when you are accused of something, you are allowed to defend yourself, and that may mean to shift responsibility onto others’ shoulders. (Of course, if you are found to be lying, your defense will be disregarded.)
“Rave Parties in Saudi Arabia: Crown Prince MBS Stuns the Old Guard with Modernization Push.” (Hindustan Times, YouTube, Jan 2023)
At the same time, Italy criminalizes rave parties. In Italy now, organizing a rave party will owe you up to six years imprisonment. The law has just been passed. Italians have had enough and know better than MBS.
Rave party means hundreds or thousands of people gathered in the dark with loud music covering everything. Alcohol and drugs will circulate uncontrolled in Saudi raves because tourists are now welcome in the Kingdom, which delivered no tourist visa until a couple of years ago. But the main concern is probably the opening of the land of Islamic holy sites to cultural forms that are increasingly considered, in the very West where they originated, as repellent and degenerate, even if rave parties did not imply invasion of property and noise pollution on several square kilometers, so much so that it’s just got banned in Italy.
I don’t know the rules about alcohol and tourists in KSA; I only know the United Arab Emirates (UAE), where tourists can get alcohol at hotels and private homes. I am told the rules are not the same. However, KSA, the new tourist destination, will likely follow UAE’s example, for you can’t invite a drunkard to your place and deprive them of their booze.
P.S. “Woman Who Went Topless After Argentina’s World Cup Win Escapes Arrest in Qatar. An Argentine woman, seen flashing in videos from the stadium, has appeared to have escaped any action.” (News18, Dec 22, 2022)
One of the strange things about the moon is that, while you need launch pad and rocket to escape Earth’s atmosphere, it only takes a little aluminum foil bug to escape the moon’s. I know gravity is not the same but you’d almost believe a man will get lost in the lunar skies instead of remaining on the lunar surface, so easy it is to escape the satellite’s atmosphere.
“China Restarts ‘Mission Nepal’ Against India. A purported China dove has been made Prime Minister.” (Firstpost, YouTube, Jan 2023)
A combined invasion of India by China and Nepal would be dramatic for India.
A medical use of cannabis was contrived as a wedge for recreational use. At Woodstock, no one said a word about medical use but they had a lot to say about recreational or existential or philosophical or whatever use. Medical use was contrived by people who had smoked weed at Woodstock and were looking for a way to make their new pastime accepted by society. That is, they perjure the Hippocratic Oath. From recreational and illegal to medical to recreational and legal.
The Air India Flight’s
Urinating and Indecent Exposure Case
“Drunk man on Air India’s New York-Delhi flight urinates on woman co-passenger.” (HT, YouTube, Jan 2023)
The regulator wants sanctions against the “negligent” cabin crew, but pay attention that the crew is also a victim of the indecent exposure (“After urinating, the man continued to stand there, exposing himself”), even if they were not urinated upon (this a crime I am unable to define legally at this stage, having no example in mind). Air hostesses and even stewards were in a state of shock, as victims themselves, and could not properly handle the passenger who was shamelessly exposing his parts to them. All in all, I think the National Commission for Women should make a statement.
The indecent exposure dimension of the incident has been completely played down so far and this is shocking in its own right. Crew hostesses have a right to damages, just like the lady who was urinated upon in addition to damages for being urinated upon. Indecent exposure is in the Indian criminal code (sadhus being outside the purview of the considered section). Therefore, you can’t sanction the crew as if they had not endured something foul themselves.
“Indian criminal code is not applicable in aircraft flying over foreign airspace. Also, if the man is a foreign citizen and he urinated when the aircraft was flying over foreign air space, then India does not have any jurisdiction. It is the country in whose airspace the aircraft was when the crime was committed, that has the right of jurisdiction and the right to conduct investigation and trial in that country’s court and punishment in that country’s jail.” (B.) – It is the Indian national regulator wants sanctions against the “negligent” crew; therefore, I assume the sanctions must be taken with due consideration to Indian legislation.
The crew evidently reported the incident to their management, and it is the managers who didn’t report. One must not confuse two different things: 1) the handling in the cabin of a crazy man who was a danger to everybody. If you think that intentionally urinating on people is common and does not betray an altered, potentially dangerous state of mind, just let us know. Then, 2) the report to authorities, and it is the management or direction’s duty, because clearly this kind of decision is deferred to the latter. I am therefore confident the company’s management or direction will be sanctioned for not reporting the dreadful incident to authorities and the cabin crew will get damages for being harassed by a sex freak.
Had a steward knocked the freak out, he would be the one prosecuted, for assault and battery. And the crew are not pledged to protect from piss a passenger’s body with their own bodies. “Preventing this [a crime] from happening,” as a YouTube user wants it, by “pinning him [the freak] down” is no more the crew’s than the passengers’ responsibility, it’s called a citizen’s arrest. If their employment contracts include arrest power, like contracts of bouncers in nightclubs, then all right, the cabin crew may be sanctioned, but I doubt the contract of an Air India hostess includes such things.
Insult To a Foreign Head of State
and French Hypocrisy
“Iran threatens France over Charlie Hebdo’s ‘offensive’ cartoons of Khamenei.” (HT, YouTube, Jan 2023)
“U.S. backs France on freedom of expression.” Why did U.S. not stand up for freedom of expression when French President Macron filed a complaint against a poster depicting him as Hitler? (See Law 27) Was there no concern about freedom of expression then? Let’s wait and see French government’s response to Iran, but if their answer is that freedom of expression is guaranteed in France, I urge the media to ask them why Macron lodged a complaint when he saw a picture of him as Hitler, and several other instances of executive attempts at stifling speech.
As far as hate speech is concerned, it tends to be permitted in France to abuse Islam, but not other communities. This is the problem, which in fact makes Iran’s overall position not contrary to freedom of speech as far as France is concerned, since their demand amounts to asking the same legal protection from hate speech for Islam as other communities have in France, that is, to stop discrimination against Islam. If France is a free-speech country, then Iran’s demand is that France be a nondiscriminatory free-speech country.
French law represses speech, make no mistake about it. As to the present controversy, there was in France a crime of insult to heads of foreign states (like Ayatollah Khamenei) until 2004, after France was condemned for this legislation by the European Court of Human Rights. But as with the specific crime of insult against the national President, which was cancelled in 2013, again after a condemnation of France by the ECHR, and replaced by the more common crime of public insult, a foreign head of state is still allowed to sue people in France for insulting them. This is to let Ayatollah Khamenei know that French laws unreservedly support his concern, and he is welcome to sue Charlie Hebdo and ask for damages.
The saffron bikini in Pathaan movie, which has aroused anger among Hindus, is a useless provocation. Artists must pay heed. The ire was certainly anticipated by all in the business and yet they did not refrain. An excuse such as “We thought the color was nice for the dance scene” would be frivolous; another color, less charged with sensitive symbolism, would have been as fine. So why?
Saffron bikini v. national flag bikini
Excerpts from All India Roundup, Aug 13, 2015: “10 celebrities who insulted the Indian national flag.”
“[Tennis player] Sania Mirza was pictured sitting with her bare feet that appeared to rest on a table next to an Indian flag. Isn’t [it] shameful!”
“[Cricket player] Sachin Tendulkar was accused of insulting the Indian flag, when pictures of Tendulkar celebrating his birthday on March 2010 by cutting a tricolour cake went viral.”
“Back in 2000, designer Malini Ramani also landed herself in trouble when she wore a flag dress.”
“Bollywood’s bold actress Mallika Sherawat got embroiled in legal trouble when she draped herself with the tricolour.” [She was nude but draped in the flag.]
“King [Shahrukh] Khan was booked by Pune police for allegedly insulting the national flag. He was booked on the Compliant of LJP national secretary Ravi Brahme that SRK allegedly insulted the tricolour in a video uploaded on youtube.”
“However small-time actress and model Gehna Vashisht must be severely condemned for her indecent act and was rightly taught a lesson by the people by wearing a tricolour like a bikini.” [She was assaulted by an angry mob and then arrested by police.]
“A case was filed against Bollywood star Amitabh Bachchan for covering his body with the national flag in a manner insulting the national flag.”
“Narendra Modi…has been accused of insulting the national flag by a social worker of Pondicherry, who has lodged a complaint against Modi for wiping his face using the tricolour scarf he was wearing.”
So much sensitivity over national symbols in that country, but saffron bikinis are okay even though saffron is also a symbol? If those complaining about a national flag bikini don’t see a problem in a saffron bikini, they are double-faced.
“‘I killed 25 Afghans and I am not sorry’: Prince Harry’s chilling confession.” (HT, YouTube, Jan 2023)
If HT got its content from the leaked Spanish version, I think there is a translation mistake. Prince Harry did not “serve in the army,” the army is serving him as hereditary Prince of the British Kingdom. However much I would like to think he is a citizen like the others, and a soldier like the others, the medieval concept of his hereditary function is an obstacle to such a feeling. I might not be the only one.
Prince Harry is the only one thinking he did war like the others. Come on, guys, break the news to him. – I will believe a British Prince did a soldier job when he dies on the front, but it never happens.
Any military command knowing what military intelligence is would never send such a sensitive target on a military front. Imagine the Taliban getting intelligence that Harry is in chopper #9: all Taliban rockets on the spot would be for poor Harry. No, he must have comfortably enjoyed his trip across the beautiful land.