Tagged: death penalty

January 8, 2023

Law 29: Demonetizing Bin Laden

Buddhism is the true religion of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Let me explain. Gautama opposed the caste system and was attacked – although not persecuted – by the Brahmins. Since then, Savarkar (1883-1966) and other proponents of Hindutva ideology have played down the caste system, to the point of presenting it as a deviation from true Hinduism or Hindutva. Therefore, as they oppose the caste system, they must be Buddhists, unless they are Westernized revisionist brains.

Demonetizing Bin Laden

“Center [Indian Government] had justified the decision of demonetization stating it was taken to crack down on fake currency, black money and terror financing.” (Hindustan Times, YouTube, Jan 2, 2023)

Some governments can’t take any action without justifying it by a necessity to fight terrorism. A potent justification as far as illiterate mobs are concerned, certainly. In 2019, EU stopped issuing its 500-euro banknotes, the highest euro note; these were called “Bin Ladens” because they were allegedly used in criminal transactions (and Western media know of no other criminal than Bin Laden, although mafias have been thriving all over the place for decades). 500 euros is about 45,000 Indian rupees, and one can understand that transactions that must remain cash (because they are unlawful) need high-value notes, but what proportion of “Bin Ladens” were used by Al-Qaeda compared to mafias? – India fighting terrorism with excavators (demolishing for encroachment the property of alleged terrorists running free [see Law 28: “Bulldozer Crackdown”]) and demonetization…

However, Modiji demonetized 1,000 INR notes to replace them with 2,000 notes†, that is, he replaces high-value notes by even higher-value notes. Criminals need cash for their high-value criminal transactions. You and I need cash for groceries; for more expensive purchases we usually make bank transfers. The 2,000 note is evidence that the demonetization has nothing to do with war against crime.

“People seeking to exchange their banknotes had to stand in lengthy queues, and several deaths were linked to the rush to exchange cash. … The move reduced the country’s industrial production and its GDP growth rate. It is estimated that 1.5 million jobs were lost.” (Wkpd: Indian banknote demonetization) Congratulations, Modiji!

†To be quite precise, demonetized 500 and 1,000 INR notes were replaced by new 500 and 2,000 notes.

The Delhi Car Drag Case

“Delhi erupts in rage after car drags woman for 7 kilometers; Murder or accident?” (Hindustan Times, YouTube, Jan 2023)

(i)
Some constitutional considerations

“Delhi chief minister demanded death penalty for the accused.” In all countries, it would be senseless for a member of the executive to tell courts what their decision should be, at any stage. But to demand death penalty is even more senseless in India, where, although death penalty exists, only eight executions have been carried out since 1996, that is, death penalty in India is a mockery.

Delhi CM’s demanding a death sentence for what has been said, so far, to be an accident, is senseless. But given Indian Supreme Court (SC)’s decision Bachan Singh v State of Punjab (1980), even if it is, in fact, a gruesome murder, the demand would still not be in line with actual law, that is, said decision, which limits death sentence to “rarest of rare crimes.” These include crimes involving the “security of the state” and I therefore disagree with SC’s ruling. There exists no reason to make a difference between crimes based on state security. Such a line simply cannot be drawn, unless it means that the life of a public official has more value than ordinary citizens’ lives, or something like that – an abhorrent idea.

Delhi CM talks in the present case of “rarest of rare crime” indeed, the condition for a death sentence. According to the Indian Supreme Court, there is a rarest of rare crime when, to begin with, a “murder is committed in an extremely brutal, grotesque, diabolical, revolting or dastardly manner so as to arouse intense and extreme indignation of the community.” This cannot be a valid definition. Murders committed in anger or fear are usually more brutal and violent and dastardly than premeditated murders committed in cold blood, and yet it is a well-established principle that premeditation makes a crime more heinous. By emphasizing the graphic element of a crime, the definition overlooks other major aspects, just like a mob reacting to a crime.

In fact, the attempt by SC to define “rarest of rare” contrives a definition that denies the very name “rarest of rare”: “[I]f the motive betrays depravity and meanness, or if a backward or minority community member is killed not for personal reasons but to arouse social wrath, the accused should get death. Other crimes which technically fall into the rarest of rare cases are bride burnings and dowry deaths, a child victim, the assassination of a public figure for political reasons [security of the state, discussed above], or killing a defenseless person because of old age or infirmity.” Hate crimes, political crimes, infanticides, etc. Such a large definition for rarest of rare?! – Given that among the only eight people executed since 1996 in India, we find rapists who later killed their victim, one is bound to think, unfortunately, that rarest or rare are the cases properly brought before a court.

(ii)
The facts

Two female friends, Anjali and Nidhi, left a hotel at 1:30 am on a scooter. Later, street cameras show Anjali’s body dragged by a car. Crowds rioted in anger when they learnt police reported the incident as an accident.

It looks like an accident, but even so the men in the car would be culpable of hit-and-run and manslaughter.

a/ Hit-and-run

Had the men stopped the car after the accident, the car would not have dragged the body. It remains to be seen if a car can drag a body with the occupants not noticing at once; experts will tell.

a-a) Passengers’ v. driver’s responsibility

There is 1) the accident but also 2) the hit-and-run. The other occupants of the car beside the driver would have to convince a court they did their best to prevent the hit-and-run, otherwise they are accomplices in it. If they failed to report the incident, in all likelihood complicity will be retained.

If a car passenger does not report to police after the incident (without good reason), he will be presumed to have supported the hit-and-run. What if they are all caught while still in the car? Obviously, a passenger cannot stop the driver without risking an accident, so if one passenger urges the driver to stop and the driver won’t listen, there is probably not much else the passenger could do; in this case, I think the passengers should not be presumed accomplices. Passengers can stop a driver but there is always a risk of accident, as the driver is in control of the car.

If all passengers were stoned from alcohol or otherwise, and didn’t even realize there was an accident, then again, they are not accomplices.

When actor Salman Khan’s chauffeur was found guilty of a hit-and-run while Salman, as passenger, got away with it, I assume the court had good reasons for a decision I find counterintuitive, because Salman was the boss, and the chauffeur his employee, so at first I would assume Salman gave his chauffeur the order to keep driving rather than the chauffeur took Salman “hostage.” But perhaps the chauffeur was so afraid of the consequences of the accident that he did not listen to his boss urging him to stop the car. Possibly.

b/ Manslaughter

This is not only an accident but also a hit-and-run, and not only a hit-and-run but also manslaughter. The difference with murder is that the driver and passengers probably didn’t intend to kill Anjali by dragging her, they had rather hoped the body would detach, alive, from under the car so they could drive away, released from this “burden.” However, the drag was an act of violence causing injuries that resulted in death: the definition of manslaughter.

Someone (a YouTube user) said “[accused] having knowledge” is enough in Indian law to characterize murder, “not only mens rea” (a legal term for “intent”). Knowledge of what, he did not tell, but I think I can connect the dots, and that puzzles me because it means Indian law has no proper distinction between murder and manslaughter, which, if true, would be a shortcoming. In the present case, for instance, the men probably knew they were committing a violent, potentially lethal act, but death was not their intent (mens rea); their intent was more likely to have the body released from the car or the car released from the body, although, in their recklessness, they were certainly aware this could provoke death.

Delhi CM, who demands a death sentence for them, seems to have another appreciation of the facts; he may think they dragged a person unknown to them with the purpose of taking her life, that they had a design to choose a random prey to torture and kill her or took the opportunity of an unexpected traffic accident to satisfy murderous instincts and they enjoyed it. But neither the chief minister nor I is a judge of the facts. The jury will settle it. In the meantime, as the chief minister talks his mind, I assume I can talk my mind too.

The facts of the case as known so far from reports by Indian media seem to point to manslaughter rather than murder, unless the men knew the victim, a point the police said they are investigating. If the men knew the victim, the police may find biographical elements in their relationships that could constitute a plausible mens rea for murder, for instance if they bore her a grudge for some reason or other. Absent a previous relationship, there seems to be no other possible mens rea other than, for instance, a murderous mindset oriented toward random gruesome acts (but if the men don’t have a criminal record, this will hardly obtain, unless a psychiatric report points to the same) or a hatred for women that would make the case a femicide, a hate crime (which the Commission for Women has hastily presumed without, in my opinion, good reason, if not the assumption that Indian males, or all males, are prone to roaming streets for killing women – but is this assumption or prejudice? To be sure, Anjali’s clothes were torn by the long drag, and this could make think of rape.)

c/ Police conduct

As for police conduct, which has been questioned, we heard that a first police report talked of an accident, and this triggered street demonstrations or riots. If there was only “accident” in this report, then truly the report seems light, as a hit-and-run was also obvious. But a hit-and-run is not yet, per se, a murder/manslaughter either. Assuming the report was about accident and hit-and-run, one could still be puzzled and ask: How did the men not notice there was a body under their car? I have been watching Indian channels on YouTube these last days, and since the Anjali case surfaced, already two other car drag incidents occurred in India, as in Hardoi (Uttar Pradesh) yesterday, Jan 6, when a cyclist was dragged by a car over one kilometer before the driver stopped. On videos, we see pedestrians rushing toward the vehicle to alert the driver that he was dragging somebody; apparently, the driver had not noticed it at once. In the Delhi case, I read some people say a “decent” driver’s not noticing is impossible, but is it so certain? For one, it probably depends on the condition of the roads: where a car ceaselessly bounces up and down due to the road’s unevenness, it probably takes longer to notice the presence of a dragged burden under one’s car. Nevertheless, in case police did sloppy work, this is not evidence of coverup yet rather than incompetence or neglect. Even if police try to protect a politician among the car passengers (or is he the driver? – One of the accused is a local BJP politician), Nidhi’s interview in front of cameras can be of no help in that regard, as far as I can see, contrary to what is said by some: Nidhi’s testimony as we know it (see iii) can’t cast the least shadow of a doubt on the main facts, unless something escapes me. If the testimony can’t change nothing in that respect, I fail to see why police would have staged it.

Assuming police are trying to protect the BJP politician, their best asset for this at the present stage would be Nidhi, that is, they would shift attention from the men to Nidhi. She would be the one responsible for the accident and the men would have noticed nothing, neither the accident nor the drag, they’re cleared. If police staged Nidhi’s interview, as some suggest, they would have knowingly induced her to tell lies, such as “Anjali was drunk and I wasn’t, and yet she insisted to drive” which would, unanticipated by her, later be dispelled by forensic expertise (no alcohol found by the postmortem) and cast serious doubts on her personality. Therefore, if the claim is police interference, insistence on charging Nidhi is not quite consistent, because Nidhi’s words may have been staged: apparently an attempt to clear herself but in fact a trap diabolically laid for her by police.

(iii)
The victim’s friend

Nidhi was witness to a hit-and-run that would likely result in homicide, seeing Anjali dragged away under a car. She probably ran for her life, thinking: “If these monsters notice me, a witness to their crime, they’ll want to kill me too, so indifferent are they to strangers’ life.” Then she went back home. Why not to the police? At 2 am in the morning, the safest was straight home. Perhaps she didn’t even know where the police station is, nor was there anybody around to tell her, or she didn’t dare ask, for that would have shown she was helpless and men could have raped her. And she didn’t have police number on her phone: who cares about that at 20 something? So, Hindustan Times says she went home, probably thinking of asking for advice. She then did nothing for the next two days: if this means she reported on her own initiative after three days, then she finally reported. Why so long? Perhaps the first day she was completely out of her mind, then the second day she thought it was already too late and she hoped she would escape investigation, and the third day she had remorse and reported.

But Nidhi’s behavior is a secondary and minor question, just as the accident is secondary in importance to the possible crimes, hit-and-run and manslaughter. Absent further elements that may surface later, in the previous paragraph I attempt an explanation. Some added in the meantime elements about her criminal record (drugs), and the hypothesis that she hid for two days to allow time to erase traces of alcohol or drugs in her blood (she would have been the one intoxicated and not, as she said, Anjali). But all in all, it is not clear how her behavior could be of great relevance to the main issue, unless one nurtures the idea of a premeditated murder of Anjali in which Nidhi would be implicated. Even if Nidhi were found liable for not reporting and/or the accident (cf. the allegation that cameras show she had her hands on the handle a few moments before the accident), that wouldn’t change the elements regarding hit-and-run and manslaughter.

(iv)
The Commissions for Women

Does the National Commission for Women make a statement each time a woman dies a violent death in India or is there something special here?

The Commissions for Women, national commission and Delhi commission, add fuel to the fire; I now suspect one or the other instigated or incited the riots, or at least provoked them by making provocative statements. Who first claimed it was a femicide, with rape and what not, in defiance of the police report? (Anjali’s clothes were torn due to, according to expertise, the drag, but as the body was half-naked people at the CW thought it likely was a case of rape and murder.)

Delhi Commission then sharply criticized Nidhi’s interview and threatened her with legal action for her “character assassination” of Anjali (who Nidhi said was drunk and yet insisted on driving the scooter). Is it character assassination when Delhi chief minister demands death penalty for the men in the car, who are still presumed innocent (like all accused before a judgment)? Is it character assassination when one or the other Commission for Women spins a femicide yarn out of thin air? Bureaucrats would be the only ones allowed to talk? – I think the Commission for Women is embarrassed by their femicide spin in defiance of the preliminary police report. So-called “character assassination” is allowed in a trial and then (in a trial) it is no slander: when you are accused of something, you are allowed to defend yourself, and that may mean to shift responsibility onto others’ shoulders. (Of course, if you are found to be lying, your defense will be disregarded.)

Saudi Raves

“Rave Parties in Saudi Arabia: Crown Prince MBS Stuns the Old Guard with Modernization Push.” (Hindustan Times, YouTube, Jan 2023)

At the same time, Italy criminalizes rave parties. In Italy now, organizing a rave party will owe you up to six years imprisonment. The law has just been passed. Italians have had enough and know better than MBS.

Rave party means hundreds or thousands of people gathered in the dark with loud music covering everything. Alcohol and drugs will circulate uncontrolled in Saudi raves because tourists are now welcome in the Kingdom, which delivered no tourist visa until a couple of years ago. But the main concern is probably the opening of the land of Islamic holy sites to cultural forms that are increasingly considered, in the very West where they originated, as repellent and degenerate, even if rave parties did not imply invasion of property and noise pollution on several square kilometers, so much so that it’s just got banned in Italy.

I don’t know the rules about alcohol and tourists in KSA; I only know the United Arab Emirates (UAE), where tourists can get alcohol at hotels and private homes. I am told the rules are not the same. However, KSA, the new tourist destination, will likely follow UAE’s example, for you can’t invite a drunkard to your place and deprive them of their booze.

P.S. “Woman Who Went Topless After Argentina’s World Cup Win Escapes Arrest in Qatar. An Argentine woman, seen flashing in videos from the stadium, has appeared to have escaped any action.” (News18, Dec 22, 2022)

One of the strange things about the moon is that, while you need launch pad and rocket to escape Earth’s atmosphere, it only takes a little aluminum foil bug to escape the moon’s. I know gravity is not the same but you’d almost believe a man will get lost in the lunar skies instead of remaining on the lunar surface, so easy it is to escape the satellite’s atmosphere.

“China Restarts ‘Mission Nepal’ Against India. A purported China dove has been made Prime Minister.” (Firstpost, YouTube, Jan 2023)

A combined invasion of India by China and Nepal would be dramatic for India.

A medical use of cannabis was contrived as a wedge for recreational use. At Woodstock, no one said a word about medical use but they had a lot to say about recreational or existential or philosophical or whatever use. Medical use was contrived by people who had smoked weed at Woodstock and were looking for a way to make their new pastime accepted by society. That is, they perjure the Hippocratic Oath. From recreational and illegal to medical to recreational and legal.

The Air India Flight’s
Urinating and Indecent Exposure Case

“Drunk man on Air India’s New York-Delhi flight urinates on woman co-passenger.” (HT, YouTube, Jan 2023)

The regulator wants sanctions against the “negligent” cabin crew, but pay attention that the crew is also a victim of the indecent exposure (“After urinating, the man continued to stand there, exposing himself”), even if they were not urinated upon (this a crime I am unable to define legally at this stage, having no example in mind). Air hostesses and even stewards were in a state of shock, as victims themselves, and could not properly handle the passenger who was shamelessly exposing his parts to them. All in all, I think the National Commission for Women should make a statement.

The indecent exposure dimension of the incident has been completely played down so far and this is shocking in its own right. Crew hostesses have a right to damages, just like the lady who was urinated upon in addition to damages for being urinated upon. Indecent exposure is in the Indian criminal code (sadhus being outside the purview of the considered section). Therefore, you can’t sanction the crew as if they had not endured something foul themselves.

“Indian criminal code is not applicable in aircraft flying over foreign airspace. Also, if the man is a foreign citizen and he urinated when the aircraft was flying over foreign air space, then India does not have any jurisdiction. It is the country in whose airspace the aircraft was when the crime was committed, that has the right of jurisdiction and the right to conduct investigation and trial in that country’s court and punishment in that country’s jail.” (B.) – It is the Indian national regulator wants sanctions against the “negligent” crew; therefore, I assume the sanctions must be taken with due consideration to Indian legislation.

The crew evidently reported the incident to their management, and it is the managers who didn’t report. One must not confuse two different things: 1) the handling in the cabin of a crazy man who was a danger to everybody. If you think that intentionally urinating on people is common and does not betray an altered, potentially dangerous state of mind, just let us know. Then, 2) the report to authorities, and it is the management or direction’s duty, because clearly this kind of decision is deferred to the latter. I am therefore confident the company’s management or direction will be sanctioned for not reporting the dreadful incident to authorities and the cabin crew will get damages for being harassed by a sex freak.

Had a steward knocked the freak out, he would be the one prosecuted, for assault and battery. And the crew are not pledged to protect from piss a passenger’s body with their own bodies. “Preventing this [a crime] from happening,” as a YouTube user wants it, by “pinning him [the freak] down” is no more the crew’s than the passengers’ responsibility, it’s called a citizen’s arrest. If their employment contracts include arrest power, like contracts of bouncers in nightclubs, then all right, the cabin crew may be sanctioned, but I doubt the contract of an Air India hostess includes such things.

Insult To a Foreign Head of State
and French Hypocrisy

“Iran threatens France over Charlie Hebdo’s ‘offensive’ cartoons of Khamenei.” (HT, YouTube, Jan 2023)

“U.S. backs France on freedom of expression.” Why did U.S. not stand up for freedom of expression when French President Macron filed a complaint against a poster depicting him as Hitler? (See Law 27) Was there no concern about freedom of expression then? Let’s wait and see French government’s response to Iran, but if their answer is that freedom of expression is guaranteed in France, I urge the media to ask them why Macron lodged a complaint when he saw a picture of him as Hitler, and several other instances of executive attempts at stifling speech.

As far as hate speech is concerned, it tends to be permitted in France to abuse Islam, but not other communities. This is the problem, which in fact makes Iran’s overall position not contrary to freedom of speech as far as France is concerned, since their demand amounts to asking the same legal protection from hate speech for Islam as other communities have in France, that is, to stop discrimination against Islam. If France is a free-speech country, then Iran’s demand is that France be a nondiscriminatory free-speech country.

French law represses speech, make no mistake about it. As to the present controversy, there was in France a crime of insult to heads of foreign states (like Ayatollah Khamenei) until 2004, after France was condemned for this legislation by the European Court of Human Rights. But as with the specific crime of insult against the national President, which was cancelled in 2013, again after a condemnation of France by the ECHR, and replaced by the more common crime of public insult, a foreign head of state is still allowed to sue people in France for insulting them. This is to let Ayatollah Khamenei know that French laws unreservedly support his concern, and he is welcome to sue Charlie Hebdo and ask for damages.

Saffron Bikini

The saffron bikini in Pathaan movie, which has aroused anger among Hindus, is a useless provocation. Artists must pay heed. The ire was certainly anticipated by all in the business and yet they did not refrain. An excuse such as “We thought the color was nice for the dance scene” would be frivolous; another color, less charged with sensitive symbolism, would have been as fine. So why?

(ii)
Saffron bikini v. national flag bikini

Excerpts from All India Roundup, Aug 13, 2015: “10 celebrities who insulted the Indian national flag.”

“[Tennis player] Sania Mirza was pictured sitting with her bare feet that appeared to rest on a table next to an Indian flag. Isn’t [it] shameful!”

“[Cricket player] Sachin Tendulkar was accused of insulting the Indian flag, when pictures of Tendulkar celebrating his birthday on March 2010 by cutting a tricolour cake went viral.”

“Back in 2000, designer Malini Ramani also landed herself in trouble when she wore a flag dress.”

“Bollywood’s bold actress Mallika Sherawat got embroiled in legal trouble when she draped herself with the tricolour.” [She was nude but draped in the flag.]

“King [Shahrukh] Khan was booked by Pune police for allegedly insulting the national flag. He was booked on the Compliant of LJP national secretary Ravi Brahme that SRK allegedly insulted the tricolour in a video uploaded on youtube.”

“However small-time actress and model Gehna Vashisht must be severely condemned for her indecent act and was rightly taught a lesson by the people by wearing a tricolour like a bikini.” [She was assaulted by an angry mob and then arrested by police.]

“A case was filed against Bollywood star Amitabh Bachchan for covering his body with the national flag in a manner insulting the national flag.”

“Narendra Modi…has been accused of insulting the national flag by a social worker of Pondicherry, who has lodged a complaint against Modi for wiping his face using the tricolour scarf he was wearing.”

So much sensitivity over national symbols in that country, but saffron bikinis are okay even though saffron is also a symbol? If those complaining about a national flag bikini don’t see a problem in a saffron bikini, they are double-faced.

“‘I killed 25 Afghans and I am not sorry’: Prince Harry’s chilling confession.” (HT, YouTube, Jan 2023)

If HT got its content from the leaked Spanish version, I think there is a translation mistake. Prince Harry did not “serve in the army,” the army is serving him as hereditary Prince of the British Kingdom. However much I would like to think he is a citizen like the others, and a soldier like the others, the medieval concept of his hereditary function is an obstacle to such a feeling. I might not be the only one.

Prince Harry is the only one thinking he did war like the others. Come on, guys, break the news to him. – I will believe a British Prince did a soldier job when he dies on the front, but it never happens.

Any military command knowing what military intelligence is would never send such a sensitive target on a military front. Imagine the Taliban getting intelligence that Harry is in chopper #9: all Taliban rockets on the spot would be for poor Harry. No, he must have comfortably enjoyed his trip across the beautiful land.

October 25, 2019

Twi24 Vers une société de vigilance paramilitaire

My Twitter Anthology Sep-Oct 2019 FR-EN

[Le présent fil est la suite de Race et religion en droit de la presse : kif-kif bourricot sur Twi22, dont la lecture est recommandée pour la compréhension du raisonnement juridique suivant.]

L’article 32 de la loi de 1881, relatif à la diffamation, comporte mention des « groupes de personnes à raison de » (leur race, ethnie, religion, appartenance sexuelle, etc). Ce que demandait l’Organisation de la coopération islamique au Conseil des droits de l’homme de l’ONU (l’interdiction de la diffamation religieuse) est donc déjà là, en France. Très exactement.

Inutile de vous dire que cet article 32 semble n’être jamais utilisé en cas de « groupes de personnes à raison de », et pour cause : 1/ le défendeur aurait des moyens de se défendre (exceptio veritatis, ou exception de vérité, et bonne foi), et 2/ le juge devrait dire ce qu’est la vérité sur tel ou tel des groupes en question (raciaux, religieux…), ceci découlant de l’exceptio veritatis comme moyen de défense.

Vu que, pour les particuliers non rattachables à un groupe selon les propos tenus les concernant, on distingue l’injure et la diffamation, ce qui couvre tous propos offensants pour ces cas, on doit pouvoir ramener, pour les « groupes de personnes à raison de », la provocation à la haine de l’article 24 de la loi de 1881 à la diffamation. Un moyen de défense serait donc de contester systématiquement l’application de l’article 24 et de demander l’application de l’article 32.

[Ajout du 8.11.2019. Tout comme ces tweets visaient à compléter un raisonnement juridique d’où certains éléments importants avaient été omis, le complément mérite à son tour d’être complété. Il n’y a pas là de quoi se désoler, lecteur, car toute situation est susceptible de se voir appliquer une quasi-infinité de dispositions juridiques, et il n’est guère possible de raisonner sur le fondement d’une connaissance exhaustive dans ce domaine. C’est d’ailleurs là ce qui fait un bon avocat : sa perspicacité lui permet d’invoquer pour la défense de son client des dispositions que personne avant lui ne pensait appliquer dans l’affaire. Pour en revenir à notre sujet, il se trouve que la « diffamation raciale », et les autres diffamations de « personnes ou groupes de personnes à raison de », n’est pas une catégorie complètement inhabituelle, malgré les arguments que j’avançai, et que je maintiens, quant à l’étrangeté de ce concept. Car il a été répondu jurisprudentiellement à l’étrangeté, par la création d’une exception, à savoir qu’en cas de diffamation raciale (et autres du même genre) la preuve de la vérité ne peut pas servir de moyen de défense. De sorte que la théorie juridique de la diffamation a été dénaturée. « Malgré le silence du texte sur ce point, il résulte de la jurisprudence de la Chambre criminelle que l’offre de preuve est impossible en matière de diffamation raciale (Crim. 11/07/1972, Bull. n° 236 ; Crim. 16/03/2004, pourvoi n° 03-82.828). Il s’agit là d’une restriction de bon sens, tant on n’[sic]imagine mal un débat portant précisément sur ce que la loi a entendu interdire. » (courdecassation.fr : lien) Je ne trouve pas cette explication satisfaisante : si le débat ne peut porter sur ce que la loi a entendu interdire en interdisant, à l’article 32 de la loi sur le droit de la presse, la diffamation raciale, le juge avoue qu’il ne sait pas ce que la loi a entendu interdire. Mais l’offre de preuve est impossible en la matière parce que le juge ne souhaite pas dire ce qu’est la vérité d’une race. Il condamne donc des propos diffamatoires sans chercher, au mépris de la théorie juridique de la diffamation, à établir la vérité. Dès lors, peuvent être condamnés pour diffamatoires des propos qu’ils soient vrais ou faux, et c’est une régression de la liberté d’expression. Reste que la théorie de la diffamation comporte un autre moyen formel de défense, la bonne foi, qui rend toujours l’article 32 préférable, pour la partie défenderesse, à l’article 24 relatif à la provocation à la haine, à moins qu’une exception existe aussi sur ce point, auquel cas je ne manquerai pas de compléter ce complément de complément.]

A Florida library once only allowed teens with parental permission to check out The Autobiography of Malcolm X, because of its ‘anti-white racism.’ (ACLU)

If the librarians had the right to act as they did (for instance because it was a privately run library and the private company had as such a First Amendment right to limit speech), the fact that they changed their minds about the autobiography of Malcolm X does not mean they don’t have other books restricted in the same fashion. What gain is this for civil liberties if a librarian has the right to implement such policies and only changes her mind about this or that book, leaving the status of all other restricted books in her library unchanged? Once, that librarian in Florida limited access to The Autobiography but then she saw the light and decided to grant her customers full access to the book. At the same time another librarian in Georgia decided to limit access to a collection of speeches by Malcom because it is his right…

Des twittos ayant l’air informé disent que la couverture médiatique de l’incendie de Lubrizol n’est pas à la hauteur, que les médias en parlent peu. Peut-être parce que les journalistes ne veulent pas se rendre sur place ?

Le bruit de fond sur ma TL [timeline] c’est qu’on ne parle que de Chirac et pas (ou trop peu) de Lubrizol. Par exemple, ce tweet de Mediapart : « Jacques Chirac : bientôt la canonisation ? Dans ce moment d’ahurissement national, reste-t-il une place pour l’esprit critique et un peu de temps pour parler d’autre chose, comme par exemple du gigantesque incendie de l’usine Lubrizol à Rouen ? »

Nan mais posez-vous la question honnêtement et en toute franchise : Vous seriez journaliste, vous iriez traîner du côté d’une usine Seveso qui vient d’exploser ?

Certains pompiers intervenus sur l’incendie de Lubrizol viennent de recevoir leurs analyses biologiques. Et les résultats ne sont pas bons. (Le Monde)

1/ Vérifier l’état de santé des pompiers avant l’intervention sur Lubrizol. (« Les pompiers étaient peut-être malades avant l’incendie de l’usine » : ça, c’est fait) 2/ Montrer que ce sont des troubles psychosomatiques provoqués par la lecture de fake news sur Twitter. 3/ Vous savez, il y a beaucoup d’escroqueries à la classification Seveso, pour obtenir des aides publiques. Nos services ont des éléments pour dire que Lubrizol n’aurait jamais dû être classée Seveso et que donc les pompiers sont malades dans leur tête.

Blague à part, un site classé Seveso présente un risque (la directive européenne parle de « substances dangereuses »). Comment se fait-il qu’on envoie des pompiers sur un site Seveso comme si c’était chez la mère Michel qui a perdu son chat ? [C’est bien ce qui s’est passé : des pompiers intervenus sur le site ont raconté n’avoir reçu aucun équipement spécial pour cette intervention.]

Je ne comprends pas pourquoi une plainte pour diffamation avec constitution de partie civile entraîne automatiquement une mise en examen. Je croyais que le droit de la presse tenait à une certaine idée de la liberté d’expression…

Le principe de la mise en examen, c’est normalement « qu’il existe à l’égard de la personne mise en cause des indices graves ou concordants de sa probable implication ». Or, en diffamation (qui relève du droit de la presse), elle est automatique !

Cette procédure de mise en examen automatique, totalement exorbitante, donne nécessairement à penser à la personne moyennement informée, qui ne connaît que le principe général venant d’être rappelé, que la diffamation est avérée dès qu’il entend parler d’une affaire de diffamation.

Les plaintes pour diffamation comme « procédures bâillons » sont le sujet d’un rapport Mazeaud de 2017, qui préconisait de créer un délit d’entrave à la liberté d’expression pour mettre fin à ces abus de procédure. Pourquoi le législateur n’a-t-il rien fait ?

« Celui qui agit en justice pour entraver la liberté d’expression peut être condamné à une amende civile d’un maximum de 15.000 euros, sans préjudice des dommages et intérêts qui seraient réclamés. » Voilà ce que proposait le rapport, à juste titre. Cela devrait être déjà dans la loi.

Hong Kong Mask Ban

Hours after Carrie Lam announced an anti-mask law to take effect tomorrow, masked protesters gather in Central (A. McN., reporter for Bloomberg)

The way toward full normalization of Hong Kong in the People’s Republic of China (2047 end of One Country Two Systems) goes through French-like anti-mask law. See Diagram: 😷🇭🇰➡️🇫🇷➡️🇨🇳✅

« Avec cette loi les journalistes ne pourront plus suivre la police car il ne leur sera pas permis de porter des masques à gaz dans des manifestations où la police se sert de gaz lacrymogène. La police pourra donc commettre davantage de violences policières. » (Ma traduction d’un tweet en anglais très pertinent d’une certaine Kate)

Heureusement, nous, on est en France ! #LoiAnticasseurs

iii

France is the true model for Carrie Lam as I guess we are the only country in the world to have not one but two antimask laws: 1/ the general 2010 law prohibiting masks on the public space; & 2/ the special 2019 law prohibiting masks in demonstrations.

Generally speaking, demonstrations take place on the public space… 🙄 The April 2019 bill was thus already included in the 2010 general law but the French legislator felt an overwhelming urge to express a thirst for repression. They wanted to make it a much severer offense to wear a mask in demonstrations than otherwise on the public space (go figure). So we have these two laws and today in a demonstration in France 😷 = 1 year prison & 15.000€ fine.

Le dernier gouverneur de Hong Kong Chris Patten dit que Carrie Lam « doit être cinglée » (must be crazy) de faire promulguer une « loi de dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public » qu’on peut aussi appeler loi anticasseurs (to make such decisions as the antimask law).

Français, ne l’écoutez pas : nos dirigeants à nous ne sont pas cinglés !

Carrie Lam counters Chris Patten: if this happens in your country, what actions would you take? (CGTN)

En réponse à Chris Patten, Carrie Lam ne prend même pas la peine de rappeler la loi anticasseurs française d’avril 2019. Elle parle à des pays civilisés, où parler de la France ferait tache.

Carrie Lam sait que la France n’est pas le pays des droits de l’homme mais le cabinet du Dr Frankenstein des droits de l’homme, le pays de la Terreur, de Napoléon, de Gaulle Deux, de l’islamophobie médiatique, de l’islamophobie d’État…

Today in Paris. We stand with Uighurs. We stand with Hong Kong. Hong Kong Protests happen in France too. [With picture showing masked protestors.]

These peaceful demonstrators are liable to prosecution under the Article 6 of April 2019 #Anticasseurs Law for concealing their faces in a demonstration. They incur one year imprisonment and 15.000 euros fine.

The #anticasseurs bill applies to demonstrations where violences occur or are susceptible to occur*, so a prosecuted person may argue, if violences did not occur, that violences weren’t susceptible to occur. He must only hope the judge won’t ask him to prove it, for who can tell beforehand that violences are susceptible to occur or not?

*(Likely to occur would be, I feel, an inadequate translation of the French ‘susceptibles de se produire.’ Events ‘susceptibles de se produire’ do not necessarily have to be likely, it is only that no condition existed that would have made their occuring impossible.)

If it turns out violences weren’t susceptible to occur in the demonstration, then the prosecuted demonstrator will only be fined a few hundred euros for concealing his or her face on the public space (2010 bill).

Non, le travail n’est pas pénible. La preuve, c’est que les gens travaillent pour des cacahouètes.

Est justifiée l’hospitalisation sous contrainte de celle qui soutient qu’elle a vu le diable et qu’elle discute régulièrement avec sa cousine et sa mère qui sont pourtant décédées. Cour d’appel de Versailles, 13 septembre 2013 (Curiosités juridiques)

Cette personne était-elle dangereuse ?

Le feng shui est une sagesse millénaire chinoise liée à la philosophie du Tao et qui rend notamment service en architecture et design. Selon cette sagesse, une arête de mur rectiligne est une « flèche empoisonnée » (cela n’existe pas dans nature). Construire un immeuble en plaçant un « flèche » face aux bureaux de ses concurrents peut être une manière d’empoisonner la concurrence. La communauté franco-chinoise est dépourvue de moyens juridiques de défense contre les attaques feng shui, et ce à cause d’un certain état d’esprit des juges illustré par l’exemple ci-dessus.

[Tweets que j’accompagne d’une vidéo de Business Insider, Why Hong Kong Skyscrapers Have Holes?, où l’on apprend que : « These holes are called dragon gates. They allow dragons to fly from the mountains to the water. This is all according to feng shui, a Chinese system for positioning buildings and objects in a way that agrees with spiritual forces &c »]

Des deux conseils pour réussir matériellement dans la vie, « Nettoie bien ton four » (feng shui) et « Lèche les bottes aux puissants », l’un est plus rationnel que l’autre. C’est aussi le plus méprisable des deux.

Le double bind comme solution simple

Passport BP : un parcours de soins innovant dédié aux personnes avec troubles bipolaires. (Lien vers le site de la société prestataire)

« la solution SimpLe, un outil digital de psychoéducation » : Je croyais que ceux qui écrivent en alternant majuscules et minuscules étaient…

En marketing, “la solution SimpLe” ressemble à du camel case, comme MasterCard, LaserJet… Seulement cela donne Simp+Le, et c’est donc incompréhensible. En psychologie, cela relève de la graphopathologie.

Vu la sophistication transcendante de “la solution SimpLe”, et vu que ce nom prétend refléter le contenu de la solution, c’est-à-dire une solution simple, et vu la situation de dépendance du patient, ça ressemble assez à du double bind à la Palo Alto. Le patient est implicitement sommé par une institution médicale dont il dépend de trouver simple ce qui ne l’est pas.

Une #ConventionCitoyenne est une mascarade dont les membres ne sont pas couverts par les immunités parlementaires qui rendraient leur parole libre vis-à-vis des lobbies qu’ils voudraient dénoncer.

PKK, terrorisme et apologie

Un film sur les combattantes du PKK kurde [Sœurs d’armes], c’est touchant, même si le PKK est sur la liste des organisations terroristes de l’Union européenne, si la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme donne raison à la Turquie quand elle condamne les médias turcs qui donnent la parole aux représentants du PKK, et si la Cour donne aussi raison à l’Allemagne quand elle condamne à une lourde amende le fait de faire circuler une pétition pour sortir le PKK de la liste des organisations terroristes de l’UE. À part ça, tout le monde est avec le PKK contre Daech…

Selon plusieurs sources, les YPG qui sont le sujet du film sont la branche syrienne du PKK : « These groups formed in 2003 as a Syrian offshoot of the PKK movement. » (Quora) Le film est donc, au sens de la loi française, une apologie du terrorisme puisque le PKK est sur liste des organisations terroristes de l’UE. Le lien organique YPG-PKK n’est peut-être pas universellement admis (par exemple, cela n’apparaît pas sur Wkpd, même si l’on y trouve mention des opérations menées par les deux ensemble contre Daech). Mais si l’on demande leur avis à nos amis du Conseil de l’Europe, les Turcs, il n’y a pas photo : c’est « YPG/PKK ».

Selon certains, le film porterait bien sur le PKK en tant que tel : « Peshmergas et combattants du PKK sont montrés combattant côte à côte contre les djihadistes. » (Communiqué du CCFR, Collectif des combattantes et combattants francophones du Rojava)

Je rappelle que l’apologie de terrorisme est un délit grave puisqu’il a même été retiré du « droit de la presse » pour être versé au droit pénal commun. Passer du droit de la presse au droit pénal commun, ça veut dire que le procureur peut ordonner une perquisition chez Caroline, faire défoncer sa porte si elle tarde à ouvrir, la mettre préventivement au mitard, etc. Tout ça pour un film, un article, un tweet…

Est de l’apologie de terrorisme « toute action de communication présentant sous un jour favorable des actes terroristes ou ceux qui les ont commis ». Caroline sur Europe 1 : « J’avais besoin d’être à côté, au milieu de ces combattantes, de voir leur courage, leur énergie pour gagner cette guerre. »

La Cour EDH donne raison à la Turquie : arrêt Gürbüz & Bayar c/ Turquie du 23 juillet 2019. « Poursuites pénales contre les dirigeants d’un journal pour avoir publié des déclarations d’un chef d’organisation terroriste [à savoir le PKK] contenant la menace implicite d’une reprise des violences : non-violation. » [Ces poursuites pénales ne sont pas une violation de la Convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme, selon la Cour.]

De même, dans Aydin c/ Allemagne (27 janvier 2011), la Cour EDH rejette la requête d’Aysel Aydin, condamnée en Allemagne à 1.200 euros d’amende pour avoir lancé une pétition réclamant le retrait du PKK de la liste des organisations terroristes établie par l’Allemagne et l’UE. (Wkpd français : page PKK)

iii

Au moment où Trump annonce un retrait de Syrie, il rappelle que les U.S. ont financé et équipé les Kurdes, dont la principale organisation, le PKK (dont les YPG de Caroline seraient la branche syrienne), est sur leur propre liste d’organisations terroristes, comme sur celle de l’UE.

La multiplication des organisations (écrans) kurdes résulte forcément (en partie) de la nécessité de camoufler l’implication du PKK compromis par son inscription sur les listes d’organisations terroristes des US et l’UE. Quand les US ont financé les Kurdes contre Daech, ils ne pouvaient pas ouvertement financer une organisation inscrite sur leur liste terroriste. Dans ce genre de situation, on passe par des « sociétés écrans », créées pour l’occasion ou mises à contribution comme intermédiaires.

Rétrospectivement, il est clair que des États qui laissaient le PKK sur leurs listes d’organisations terroristes ne pouvaient aider sans arrières-pensées les YPG kurdes de Syrie liés au PKK, et qu’ils entendaient les livrer aux Turcs une fois le ménage fait contre Daech.

American Defense Secretary Ashton Carter confirms [before the US Senate] “substantial ties” between the PYD/YPG and PKK. (elif) [with a video excerpt from the hearing]

I can’t understand that when the American Defense Secretary acknowledges 1/the link between the YPG and the PKK & 2/the terrorist organization status of the PKK according not only to Turkey but also to the US, the question should be “Is Turkey okay with the US arming the YPG?” [a question from Senator Graham] and not “Is the US okay with the US arming the YPG?”

To the question “Is Turkey okay with the US arming the YPG/PKK?” the answer is obvious as one can assume consistency. But to the question “Is the US okay with the US helping the YPG/PKK?” the answer is problematic as the question evidences the lack of consistency of the US.

When the US armed and otherwise helped the YPG, an organization with “substantial links” to the PKK which is on the US terror list, thus arming an organization it declares its duty to combat, the US government committed mischief toward US citizens, as the latter are liable to courts of law for supporting the PKK. When a country declares an organization ‘terrorist,’ it combats it even against its own citizens (those who would support the organization), so when that country in fact arms that organization, this means it represses its own citizenry unconstitutionally (for no reason). The US government nor any other government have a constitutional right to arm an organization at the same time that, by calling that organization ‘terrorist’ and having it placed on a terror list, it suppresses the right of the people to show support to that organization.

Arming Kurds affiliated to the PKK, an organization on the US terror list, was mischief against US citizens, for the war against terror was then waged not against the organization itself but against US citizens, by suppressing the freedom of speech of those who would support the organization, and other liberties such as the freedom to spend one’s money as one sees fit (donations to the PKK would be liable to prosecution as far as US citizens were concerned while their government was arming the PKK via the Syrian YPG).

[To be sure, I do not know the exact consequences, as far as civil liberties in the US are concerned, of having an organization placed on an US official terror list. The First Amendment might still protect the rights of US citizens to express verbal support for that organization –this has to be checked– but it is safe to assume that this listing must have some consequences on civil liberties. In France the consequences are drastic, and there is at least one French representative who publicly acknowledges the link between the YPG and the PKK: ‘’Le PKK est lié d’une manière ou d’une autre aux combattants du Rojava. Ce n’est pas tout à fait la même chose mais il y a des liens.’’ (Éric Coquerel) He then asks the removal of the PKK from the EU terror list. (As we have seen that an EU citizen can be fined for asking the very same thing, I assume he deems his utterance protected by his immunities as a representative, although these immunities actually do not extend beyond the precincts of the House.) As the PKK is on the EU terror list, EU citizens can be prosecuted for supporting a terrorist organization when they support an organization that is ‘our ally’ (according to representative Coquerel’s words) in the war against Daesh.]

Staffing Policy & Speech Police

REMINDER: One of the amicus briefs filed in our opponents’ favor literally stated that any decision in favor of not letting employers fire people for being LGBTQ “will promote sexual anarchy and gender tyranny.” (ACLU)

A private business has no discretionary power over its staffing policy (Title VII). So why is a private organization allowed to deny service to a person of color, as stated in the precedent Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis (1972)? [“The Court held that the Moose Lodge’s refusal to serve food to Irvis because he was black did not violate the 14^th Amendment. The Court found the Moose Lodge ‘a private social club in a private building,’ thus not subject to the Equal Protection Clause.”] And why has a private organization such as Facebook the right to limit free speech? If a private organization has no discretionary power over its staffing policy, I see no justification for allowing a private organization to limit or suppress free speech.

Limiting private organizations’ discretionary powers on staffing sends the signal that the rights of minorities are superior not only to the values of free enterprise but also to the values of First Amendment, when private organizations keep their power to limit free speech even though they have lost discretionary policing of their own staffing.

The standard remark that customers who object to a business’ staffing or other policy are free to stop patronizing that business, is more consistent with freedom values than the idea of ruling the staffing of private business by law.

In the US a private organization is free to limit or suppress free speech, thus the government only has to tell X or Y what speech they want to suppress (e.g. for the sake of national security) in order to fully circumvent the First Amendment. Besides, private organizations don’t decide freely about their own staffing.

Forcing private employers’ choice by law borders on lunacy. Employers’ power is de facto discretionary. If they want to fire a person, where a ‘good reason’ doctrine holds the law tells them they cannot base this on discrimination, so they’ll have to find another motive, and anything goes. On the other hand minority employees are entitled to contest juridictionally any job termination as discriminatory, which makes these employees objectively toxic to the employer. At the same time it will entrench them in the job market more securely than other employees; an employer facing redundancy decisions will favor firing non-minority over minority employees because of the discrimination suit he or she would face as a result of firing a person who belongs to a protected minority.

Private organizations can refuse to serve food to black men (Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis) but, as employers, they cannot discriminate against blacks. Do you know why? Because a person can’t prove he has been discriminated against on account of his race in most cases. When you refuse service, it is plain whether you refuse service to some categories, and based on what characteristics. When you fire people, you can advance any (legal) justification: It’s the redundant employee’s word against yours.

iii

The right to free speech is the right to not be silenced by the government. Facebook is not the government.

Yes, this is First Amendment law according not to the letter of the Amendment but to precedent. My point was that I thought this interpretation of free speech by precedent was because of free enterprise but as title VII dictates their employment policies to entrepreneurs I must be wrong, it’s got to be something else, like the US government not wanting free speech on the Web.

Why would a country with a Title VII claim it defends free enterprise re speech police but not re employment policy, if not because it is so easy for the government to suppress free speech via pressuring a couple of oligopolistic business owners of internet plaforms?

Because “the government” is not using Facebook to silence anyone. Facebook is abiding by their AUP [Acceptable Use Policy]. And when employment policy appears to violate the law, we discuss it to gain clarity. (Ibid.)

Your naïveté leaves me speechless. You simply cannot dismiss the possibility that the government may pressure business groups. Governments have many ways. With your naïveté the Founding Fathers would have never written a Constitution. The essence of constitutional thinking is to never rule out the possibility of governmental mischief. You made the allegation that there is no pressure on Facebook: The onus of the proof is on you.

Vers une société de vigilance paramilitaire

« Vers une société de vigilance » : Cela veut dire que le port d’arme va être étendu en France comme aux États-Unis ? “Vigilante: A person or a member of a group that decides to force obedience to the law without official authority.”

Vers une société de vigilance paramilitaire : « Article unique : Le port d’armes est légal pour tout citoyen dès 15 ans. »

Je ne vais quand même pas dénoncer mon voisin islamiste (capable du pire) sans armes pour me défendre contre ses représailles, non ? Où dois-je déposer les statuts de ma milice ?

Quand des vigilants se seront fait égorger par les amis de leurs voisins islamistes dénoncés par civisme et patriotisme pour une société de vigilance, tout ça parce qu’on aura oublié d’armer des milices citoyennes, ne dites pas que je ne vous aurai pas prévenus.

Il est dit, dans le discours présidentiel sur la société de vigilance, que les services de l’État ne peuvent faire face à eux seuls à cette vigilance nécessaire. Mais le citoyen qu’on veut ainsi recruter informellement n’est pas armé, contrairement aux services de l’État. On veut donc mobiliser des citoyens non armés face à ce qu’on appelle une « hydre islamiste » ! Mais si c’est une hydre, s’il s’agit de « déviations dangereuses », les citoyens qui agiraient par vigilance se mettraient forcément en danger sans moyens de défense ! Il n’y a donc pas à tergiverser : devant la carence des services et de l’administration reconnue au plus haut niveau de l’État (dans le discours sur la société de vigilance), la seule solution face à une hydre islamiste, c’est la formation de milices armées citoyennes. Le nier serait d’une extrême inconséquence.

World Day Against the Death Penalty

The death penalty is racist, arbitrary, and error-prone. It normalizes the extreme sentences that are at the core of our incarceration crisis. On World Day Against the Death Penalty, join us to learn why it’s time for the US to abolish it once and for all. (ACLU, Oct 10, 2019)

Death sentences show a centennial rising tendency in the US (enclosed, p.1, document from the Bureau of Justice Statistics 1953-2010). From extremely low figures in the fifties it went to a peak in 2000 and then decreased but very slowly comparing with the ascending slope of 1975-2000. Link

We will probably agree that such a slope is steeper than that of US demographics, so if it is true that death penalty is ‘racist,’ then the figures show that, contrary to expectations, racism has been increasing in American society.

‘’It’s time for the US to abolish it once and for all.’’ “Once and for all” means the US has already progressed in the direction of abolishing the death penalty, but in fact it has gone in the opposite direction.

iii

36 US states and the federal government impose capital punishment for some crimes. That’s about three fourths of US legislatures (72.5%).

Quand un élu local RN demande qu’une accompagnatrice scolaire retire son voile islamique ou quitte l’assemblée régionale, il ne faut pas oublier la polémique persistante sur le hijab et les accompagnatrices scolaires qui émane du plus haut niveau du ministère de l’éducation nationale, c’est-à-dire du ministre. C’est parce que le ministre LREM a de façon répétée exprimé son rejet du voile pour les accompagnatrices scolaires que cet élu local s’est senti légitime à faire cet esclandre, car il a une couverture. Je vois que des personnalités médiatiques attaquent durement cet élu local RN, mais le ministre LREM qui a de façon répétée exprimé son opposition au port du voile par les accompagnatrices scolaires, est épargné par leurs flèches. Comme s’ils avaient peur d’un ministre…

L’historique du sujet « hijab et accompagnatrices scolaires » est retracé dans un document en ligne de la direction des services départementaux de l’éducation nationale des Alpes-Maritimes. Lien

Les Républicains [opposition de centre-droit] ont fait adopter en 2019, dans la loi relative à l’éducation, un amendement l’interdisant, amendement finalement rejeté au stade ultime de la discussion parlementaire, en commission mixte paritaire.

Le député RN en question, Julien Odoul, peut donc se réclamer des prises de position du ministre mais aussi de l’amendement 2019 de l’opposition de centre-droit (c’est-à-dire des positions de cette dernière), mais encore d’une circulaire Chatel de 2004 : « neutralité pour les parents d’élèves participant aux sorties scolaires (pas de voile) » [c’est ainsi que le document cité résume cette circulaire].

Le Conseil d’État a affirmé en 2013 que les accompagnatrices pouvaient porter le voile mais le ministre Peillon, socialiste, indiqua alors aussitôt que la circulaire Chatel continuait de s’appliquer ! Concrètement, les directeurs d’école peuvent refuser les accompagnatrices voilées si ça leur chante. Compte tenu que les directeurs ont ainsi la plus large appréciation pour refuser les accompagnatrices voilées et que le ministre (leur autorité hiérarchique) a indiqué qu’il était pour ce refus, les directeurs connaissent les desiderata de leur hiérarchie, dont leur carrière dépend.

iii

Non c’est faux. L’étude de 2013 du Conseil d’État fait jurisprudence ! Depuis ce texte tous les tribunaux administratifs ont suivi l’avis du Conseil d’État. En 2015 le tribunal administratif de Nice avait annulé la décision d’une école primaire d’interdire à une mère voilée d’accompagner des élèves lors d’une sortie scolaire. Vous comparez le ministre de l’éducation nationale avec un élu RN [qui] a commis un délit pénal ! Le ministre de l’éducation nationale n’a jamais discriminé et humilié une femme devant des enfants de CM2 ! (ESBN)

J’ai cité ma source [elle indique en effet la décision du tribunal administratif de Nice mais ne dit pas que tous les tribunaux administratifs ont suivi l’avis du Conseil d’État ; l’affaire devant le TA de Nice est donc peut-être la seule à pouvoir être invoquée en l’espèce, et ce serait alors ce TA seul que le twittos qui me répond appellerait « tous les tribunaux administratifs »]. Je peux également citer le ministre. « … a fustigé mardi 24 septembre une affiche de campagne de la FCPE qui défend le droit de mères voilées de faire des sorties scolaires, qu’il a qualifiée d’erreur regrettable. » (Le Nouvel Observateur, article du 24 septembre 2019) Et au Sénat, en réponse à une question d’actualité le 20 avril 2018: « Le Conseil d’État précise qu’un chef d’établissement peut recommander aux mères de ne pas porter le voile dans les sorties scolaires. C’est ce que je recommande aux chefs d’établissement de recommander aux mamans accompagnatrices. »

Et je n’ai pas « comparé » l’élu RN avec le ministre. J’ai dit que Julien Odoul tirait en quelque sorte les conclusions de la philosophie portée publiquement par le ministre. Si ce qu’il a fait est un délit, c’est à la justice de le dire (en sachant que la Cour EDH reconnaît une immunité assez large aux élus dans les débats des assemblées locales, sur l’exemple des parlementaires, et ça se comprend, dans le cadre de la décentralisation).

Il est vrai que, dans la discussion de la loi sur l’éducation, le ministre n’a pas demandé à sa majorité de voter l’amendement LR qui semble correspondre à sa pensée maintes fois exprimée. Peut-être est-ce par tactique politicienne, c’est-à-dire pour ne pas laisser l’opposition se « glorifier » d’une mesure qu’il semble, par ses prises de position répétées, approuver ?

Le voile n’est pas souhaitable dans notre société. (Ministre de l’éducation nationale)

Si je suis commerçant et que j’affiche ces mots sur la devanture de mon magasin, d’un côté c’est dire « Femmes voilées passez votre chemin » (Christians Only), d’un autre côté ce sont des paroles de ministre… Gros dilemme.

« Le voile n’est pas souhaitable mais pas interdit parce que ce gouvernement (dont je ne suis que le porte-parole dans le domaine de mes attributions) n’arrive pas à se décider : il a trop peur des conséquences de ses actes. » 🤷‍♂️

Si, tout en n’étant pas souhaitable, le voile n’est pas interdit, quel est l’intérêt de dire et répéter que le voile n’est pas souhaitable ? Les opinions personnelles d’un ministre n’ont aucun intérêt pour la collectivité : c’est la politique qu’il défend activement qui nous intéresse, c’est-à-dire ses actes.

Puisque le voile n’est pas interdit par le gouvernement, un ministre n’a qu’une chose à dire : c’est pourquoi le voile n’est pas interdit par le gouvernement, et non pourquoi le voile n’est pas souhaitable selon ce ministre.

Même si c’est le gouvernement qui pense que le voile n’est pas souhaitable, aucun ministre, puisque le gouvernement n’interdit pas le voile, n’a à dire pourquoi le voile n’est pas souhaitable, car un ministre doit expliquer la politique du gouvernement et pas la non-politique du gouvernement.

Ce gouvernement a une politique vis-à-vis du voile, et c’est que le voile n’est pas interdit (accompagnatrices…). Que le voile ne soit pas souhaitable n’est donc pas une politique du gouvernement. Un ministre qui ne parle pas de la politique du gouvernement, n’est pas dans ses attributions.

Si le gouvernement pense collectivement comme le ministre que le voile n’est pas souhaitable, mais ne l’interdit pas, alors ce qu’il faut qu’il explique ce n’est pas pourquoi le voile n’est pas souhaitable mais pourquoi son interdiction est encore moins souhaitable.

Les belles-lettres forment un bel esprit – ce que Kant appelle un singe.

(Kant actually speaks of literati who study modern literature and not of those who study humanities from the Greeks. He calls the latter humanists and the former ‘apes of the humanists.’)

The independence of Catalonia would have consequences for France as there are historical parts of Catalonia and native speakers of Catalan on French territory. It would have consequences for EU as well, as nobody knows if independence would not lead to #Cataxit. Indeed, if Catalonia is no longer part of Spain but remains part of EU, Catalans may find out the rules are the same and nothing has changed, for Spain is part of EU which is a supranational set of binding rules. So I see no prospect of major change in independence without a Cataxit. As this certainly is the reasoning that is made also by EU authorities, Catalan independentists must be in their cross-hairs, and the harsh judicial sentences that were pronounced against their leaders are as much the result of European policy as that of Spanish law.

Catalans are part of EU as a part of Spain. If an independant Catalonia is also part of EU, Catalan independence is only formal as the new country will abide by the same set of binding rules of EU origin. (There’s no veto for small countries in the EU legislative process.) If, on the other hand, the EU accepts the membership of independent Catalonia, that could imply an #Spaxit: Would Spain want to remain in the EU beside Catalonia, the independence of which it had opposed? If you slap a man in the face, his wallet will be telling him he’d better not react but the likelihood is he will. The economy is largely irrelevant in the issue (and more irrelevant in general than people assume). If the reason why Catalonia wants to leave Spain is really the current economic transfers from Catalonia to other parts of Spain, transfers will still occur inside the EU, independence will not change that.

Doigt d’honneur à des policiers : amende de 300 euros requise contre le journaliste Gaspard Glanz. (Le Monde)

La vraie amende, ce n’est pas 300 euros mais les frais d’avocat. Car pour ce doigt d’honneur il y a peut-être écrit 10.000 euros dans le code (je ne l’ai pas sous les yeux), donc forcément tu payes un avocat (mettons un forfait à 2.000 euros) : 2.300 euros pour un doigt d’honneur, c’est bien la France.

Qu’on laisse tranquilles les femmes qui souhaitent porter un foulard ! La loi de 1905 assure la liberté de croire ou de ne pas croire et la neutralité de l’État. (Manon Aubry, députée européenne France Insoumise)

Il y a aussi la polémique sur les prénoms qui, comme ils ont un sens dans la religion musulmane, sont donnés à leurs enfants par les parents musulmans. Certains disent que cela montre leur volonté de ne pas s’intégrer à la société française : un raisonnement au mépris de la laïcité. Si un Musulman veut donner à ses enfants des prénoms qui ont un sens en islam, plutôt que des prénoms du calendrier, c’est son droit dans une république laïque.

Les mêmes qui dénoncent le voile dénoncent les prénoms qui ne sont pas dans le calendrier de la Poste. Après l’interdiction du voile viendra l’obligation de s’appeler Alphonse (1^er août), Fulbert (10 avril), Pélagie (8 octobre), Urbain (19 décembre), Melaine (6 janvier)…

Cette attaque sur les prénoms musulmans, venant de quelqu’un qui par exemple s’appelle Jean, du nom d’un apôtre de son propre culte, devient dans ce cas parfaitement intolérable.

Fiat Lux

Ce n’est pas parce que Dieu a créé la lumière qu’il ne voit pas dans le noir.