Abortion Charters Ready
Mississippi Officially Asks Supreme Court To Overturn Roe v. Wade. (Breaking911): The brief continues, “The only workable approach to accommodating the competing interests here is to return the matter to ‘legislators, not judges.’… The national fever on abortion can break only when this Court returns abortion policy to the states – where agreement is more common, compromise is more possible, and disagreement can be resolved at the ballot box.”
Another scenario is to leave the matter to judges and they make abortion unconstitutional over the whole territory of the Union. – If you return abortion to the states, abortion will be a matter of two-day trips to the right state.
They think returning abortion to the states will guarantee the prohibition in red states. They do not even look for a federal bill, which would be repealed and then revoted and then repealed again and then voted again and then canceled and so on, they want such legislation for red states that have remained red from time immemorial (you know what I mean). But the trick is, the blue states will remain open for “abortion charters” from red states year in year out unless the Supreme Court declares abortion unconstitutional.
One may say the difference between criminalization in some states and criminalization at federal level is only one of scope since charters can cross borders as they can make interstate flights. However, the difference is more substantial than that as it is more difficult to plan an abortion abroad and this guarantees that the legislation will yield some results in terms of diminishing abortion figures (whereas the possibility of interstate flight would greatly hamper the legislation’s purpose).
Another possibility is to explore legal sanctions against people traveling to other states or countries in order to commit felonies according to state or federal legislation.
Back to the Future Legislation
You’ve got those state bills passed (Texas to name one state [perhaps the first and only so far]) that declare abortion will be banned in the state as soon as Roe v. Wade is overturned.
What is this? It is either mere incantation (not proper lawmaking) or something I can’t believe: Imagine Roe v. Wade is overturned at a time when the legislative houses of Texas support abortion, I can’t believe the incantatory bill can be set in motion. It’s as if it never existed.
Now that I have said this, I will think about it and tell you later why this is so.
Imagine the state legislature is for abortion and the governor is against it when Roe v. Wade is overturned.
As head of the executive the governor says it is his duty to implement the bill that was passed years ago, which says something like “As soon as Roe v. Wade is reversed, without further ado abortion is banned in Texas.” He says it is his duty to implement the law like any other standing law and the fact that the present legislature did not adopt it is completely immaterial; after all the present legislature did not adopt all currently standing laws either.
But the legislature says: “The governor is bound to implement standing laws but the bill in question cannot be standing because it is a mere incantation. The past legislature had no constitutional power to bind in back to the future fashion the present legislature against the latter’s will. The bill is void.”
It is important that the legislators do not concede the law is standing because then they would have to repeal it by a legislative act but the governor would veto their act (the lawmakers would have to override the veto, which might be out of their reach).
The principle to bear in mind is that a legislative act must be binding for the legislature that passes it in order to bind future legislatures too (by binding I mean that the act is normative at the time the legislature passes it). Otherwise it is an incantatory act and must remain so forever, that is, it never stands. If the law could stand, that would mean the legislature can decide what others’ will is, but actual lawmakers can only express what their will is. With the statutes in question the legislature says, in fact, “Were Roe v. Wade overturned today, we would ban abortion without further ado” but it must leave it to the actual legislature that lives a reversal to decide what it wants to do.
To avoid any confusion, the words present and actual can be synonyms but here I use them as opposites. These laws claim present lawmakers are actual lawmakers in the future too but this is not to assume in any circumstance (even if, as a historical fact, which is on an altogether different plane, Texas has been an uncontested red state). Lawmakers pass either acts that are normative, that is, binding at the time they pass it, or unbinding resolutions and declarations that cannot bind a future legislature either without an express act of the latter to that effect.
“Petit larceny, as a hate crime.” This is nuts and you know it. (See my indictment of hate crime legislation in Law 20.)
All countries except the USA must be inhabited by apes, otherwise why would they need Ape Speech Laws?
It’s true the European Court of Human Rights says free speech is not an absolute human right, but to be honest the ECHR is not an absolute court either.
Chicanos and the Inconsistencies of U.S. Law
In Hernandez v. State of Texas (1954) the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution applied not only to the concept of races, namely blacks as opposed to whites, but also to nationalities, i.e. classes, and that Mexican Americans (whom I hereafter call Chicanos as they themselves call today if I am not mistaken) are such a nationality or class.
The Texas courts had ruled that Chicanos were whites and that the Fourteenth Amendment was aimed at protecting not whites but the former slaves, blacks. (The special issue of the case was jury trial but here I will leave that aside.)
Chicanos are whites under U.S. law although most of them are mestizos in their countries of origin. Obviously they are not blacks (most of them – but there are a few blacks in Mexico) and the Texan courts, narrowly looking at the 14th Amendment, claimed to know two races only, blacks and whites.
I believe this could also be the result of the Immigration Act of 1924 or Johnson-Reed Act. Notwithstanding the fact, scorned time and again by scholars of the liberal and neoconservative veins alike, that Congress made extensive use of eugenics expertise to create national quotas adverse to the coming of Southern and Eastern Europeans, migrants from Mexico and other Latin-American countries were untouched by the law. This is evidence enough that private interests prevailed on said expertise. South-Western states wanted to continue using cheap agricultural labor (including children) and had started in the nineteen-twenties to set up maquiladoras north of the border (for instance Farah Clothing in El Paso, Texas). From a eugenicist’s point of view, the very expert standpoint called by Congress, mestizos in no way could have been viewed as less detrimental to the genetic make-up of the nation than, say, Italians, which coming was restricted by the Act.
Thus, while Congress limited immigration from large parts of Europe for the good of the United States on racial grounds, it set no limitation on mestizos from south of the border. How could courts see mestizos otherwise than as whites then? (The 1924 Act remained in vigor until 1965.)
The Court found ample evidence that there existed a form of segregation as to Chicanos on the ground: “They discovered a county-wide distinction between ‘white’ and ‘Mexican’ persons. At least one restaurant prominently displayed a sign that declared, ‘No Mexicans Served.’ Additionally, until a few years earlier, some Mexican American children attended segregated schools and were forced to drop out by fifth or sixth grade.” (Oboler S., 2005, via Wkpd) Although I find the words “at least one restaurant” unsupportive of the conclusion, because if the Court had found more than one restaurant would it not have said what number it was rather than the vague “at least one”? and on the other hand one restaurant county-wide refusing to serve Mexicans is evidence of the owner’s idiosyncrasy rather than of institutionalized discrimination, I believe the Court’s findings are true, because as Texas had its own Jim Crow laws I assume Texans would not make much difference between Negroes and Chicanos even though the 1924 Act said (at least en creux [in hollow]) the latter were whites† – said so under obvious lobbying of plantation and maquiladora owners in need of cheap labor, and in disregard of congressional expertise (eugenics).
Hernandez v. State of Texas “was a major triumph for the ‘other White’ concept, the legal strategy of Mexican-American civil-rights activists from 1930 to 1970. … It was replaced in 1971 by Cisneros v. Corpus Christi ISD, which recognized Hispanics as an identifiable minority group.” (Texas State Historical Association [TSHA])
Note that Chicanos being whites was for Texan courts an argument against, in the current interpretation since Hernandez, full acknowledgment of their rights. As the solution of the Supreme Court in Hernandez and Cisneros is that Hispanics’ rights must be specially protected because they are an identifiable minority (‘the other whites’), the two combined does not bode well for non-Hispanic whites in the foreseeable future as their majority becomes thinner, for it is this majority status that is thought to call for special legal protection of minorities and a time may come when the majority status exists no more de facto while all its de jure consequences are maintained because that is found convenient by a new majority of protected minorities…
†The assertion will seem overstretched to many but in the final analysis the question boils down to this: When were Hispanics first considered whites in the U.S. while a large majority of migrants from Latin America are mestizos and most mulattoes, on the other hand, were considered blacks (one-drop rule: “any person with even one ancestor of black ancestry –one drop of black blood– is considered black”)? And more precisely: Is it since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment or since the exemption of Latin Americans from the quotas in the Johnson-Reed Act or since another date?
US population 328M
July 22, 162k vaccinated people in US.
July 7, 5,208 dead after taking vaccine (VAERS [Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System]: fact checkers claim no causality is proven but we’ll take the figure as a reliable estimate of the so-called, acknowledged “vaccinal risk”)
Covid death toll: 610K. That’s 1 American out of 538.
Vaccine death toll: 162k/5,208 = 1/31,000.
When people focus on the 5,000+ deaths and make an argument against vaccination out of it, the figures don’t really support it. Or do they? Can governments sacrifice individuals for the public good? Even if a compulsory vaccination campaign’s death toll were known beforehand to be 1/31,000 or fewer, can it be adopted? I thought the government could not sacrifice even one individual save in time of war.
Does the French government, by instituting a sanitary pass (a vaccination certificate compulsory for all kinds of social activities), try to eschew its responsibility for the vaccine death toll? As several vaccines are already compulsory for newborns, why is the state’s responsibility not acknowledged in those vaccine’s death toll? (All vaccines must have a death toll as “vaccinal risk” is something real for all vaccines and who but the state that makes vaccination compulsory for the sake of public welfare is responsible for the death of individuals from vaccination?)
Were the US government to pass a compulsory vaccination bill, it would allow for the death of 1 person out of 31,000 in order to stop a 1 out of 538 virus death toll. Mathematically that would make the eventual death toll 57 times fewer.
The vaccine death toll, however, is random (as far as I know we cannot predict who will die), whereas the covid death toll is more predictable (the old and unhealthy will die in large proportions). With vaccination you are replacing Darwinian selection (the old and unhealthy will die from covid) by randomness (less people will die from vaccination but at random).
Je suis opposé à la vaccination forcée car c’est antidarwinien.
Selon mes calculs, à partir de statistiques officielles (5.208 morts déclarés au VAERS [Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System] sur 162.000 vaccinés), le taux de léthalité du vaccin aux États-Unis est d’environ 1/31.000 (un mort à la suite du vaccin sur 31.000 vaccinés).
Le taux de mortalité dû au vaccin aux US est un lourd 1/538 (plus de 610.000 morts selon les autorités).
En comparant les deux taux de léthalité, covid et vaccin, la mortalité par le covid (1/538) est certes bien plus importante que celle par le vaccin (1/31.000) : 57 fois plus élevée. Cependant, la léthalité de la vaccination est, à ma connaissance, imprévisible, tandis que la léthalité du covid l’est bien plus : on sait qu’elle touche surtout les personnes âgées et « à risque » (en raison d’un mauvais état de santé).
On peut voir le covid comme une réaction naturelle à la surpopulation. En rendant la vaccination obligatoire, on remplace une morbidité naturelle et darwinienne (élimination des vieux et des faibles) par une morbidité, certes théoriquement moins élevée, mais complètement aléatoire. (Je dis théoriquement car d’autres moyens de prophylaxie existent à côté de la vaccination.)
La vaccination doit donc rester un choix. Ceux qui se vaccinent sont immunisés par le vaccin, ceux qui refusent de l’être tomberont peut-être malades et, s’ils survivent (avec de bonnes chances de leur côté s’ils sont en bonne santé), ils seront immunisés contre la maladie par la maladie elle-même.
N.B. Ce raisonnement ne tient pas compte d’éventuelles séquelles de la maladie qui pourraient en soi, même en l’absence de léthalité, justifier la prophylaxie vaccinale. Perdre le sens du goût, par exemple, dans certains cas de covid, est sans doute assez préoccupant pour entrer dans ce cadre, même si c’est peu comparable aux séquelles de la poliomyélite. D’un autre côté, ce raisonnement ne tient pas non plus compte des autres effets indésirables possibles du vaccin, des autres « adverse events » du VAERS, dont certains peuvent être graves sans, je suppose, être davantage prévisibles que les cas de mort subite.
« Ce sont des criminels », dit à la télé M. le professeur en parlant des « personnes qui propagent la désinformation sur les réseaux sociaux ». – Soit. Quel est le mobile du crime ?