Tagged: law

March 17, 2023

Law 36: The just war, or Free trade and therapeutic chewing gum

EN-FR March 2023

The just war

Both China and Russia agree that an act of “aggression” is not causeless, that an aggression may be provoked, that an attack may be defensive and may even be, in Napoleon’s words, the best defense, that, therefore, an attack is not by itself a breach of international law, and that American precedents buttress this view. Even if American aggressions had all been supported in the past by UN’s endorsement (which is clearly not the case: see Bay of Pigs, etc.), as in Libya, no one is obliged to see this as more binding than the US herself finds the numerous UN’s rebukes of international law violations by the United States’ protégé Israel binding.

The US administration shall be exposed as a duplicitous and irresponsible entity. When Russia strikes, it is an aggression, all of a sudden, after decades of claiming her protégé Israel’s strikes and territorial expansion have a just cause, namely, are defensive. An irresponsible fool cannot be world leader.

(ii)
Free trade and therapeutic chewing gum

Commercium liberum means that if China doesn’t buy British opium from British India, the English will attack China and with their military power open Chinese harbors to opium imports. This is called Opium War and it’s real. Free trade is a völkerrechtlich (international-law) justa causa of aggression. Recently, Singapore wanted to ban chewing gum from its territory; the US objected, therefore Singapore keeps importing “therapeutical” chewing gum, and this is how everything can be therapeutic if need be. As the states are on a cannabis legalizing spree, prepare for the Cannabis Wars of tomorrow.

Cannabis Wars will be American aggressions against countries that oppose flooding by medical and/or recreational cannabis, this opposition being an impediment to free trade. Hong Kong’s colonial status was a result of the Opium Wars, so it cannot be said that these “free trade” wars are not for territorial gains. They are 1/ aggression wars, 2/ possibly ending in territorial changes, and above all they are 3/ just wars, having justa causa.

It’s in the books. As Iran is currently sailing two ships toward the Panama Canal, the US, according to Hindustan Times, expressed worry that “Iran’s presence may damage trade and the global economy market,” that is, the US is telling us they have a just cause for sinking these ships, as per the Opium Wars and other precedents.

Note. Above, I don’t mention that the two Iranian ships are warships, and one may question this. Here is my answer. It is “Iran’s presence” that is said by the US to be likely to “damage trade.” As I assume the presence of warships from some, probably most other countries does not elicit the same kind of response, the US statement was not elicited by the ships’ being warships but by their being Iranian. Had I included their quality of warships, people may have construed the affair as being elicited by the ships’ being warships, whereas, had the vessels been commercial ships, the US would have made no comment, which is wishful thinking.

(iii)

Saudi’s “Won’t Sell Oil” warning to US if Biden imposes Russia-like price cap. (Hindustan Times)

Saudis should impose a price cap on American chewing gum.

China tells PLA [People’s Liberation Army] to get combat ready amid Russia’s war (Hindustan Times)

China might also benefit from inviting Taliban advisors. – Talibans’ strategy and tactics expertise is asked all over the world. Großmächte like Russia and China need Taliban advisers to improve the asymmetric warfare component of their military.

“US intelligence warned of NATO-Russia clash.” Allo? The US got intelligence about themselves from their own services? US intelligence warned the US administration that the US planned to support Ukraine “as long as it takes.” Good work!

The thin line between nothing and a promise

Finland backtracks after pledge [to send fighter jets] to Ukraine. (HT)

Apparently, Finland’s prime minister talked without the least clue about the situation, promising things Finland can’t give.

–If you actually read what she said, she did not promise anything. Doesn’t matter for smooth-brained Russian lovers.

Of course, these people never promise anything, especially to their constituents. I don’t know why people keep thinking these people’s words have any meaning at all.

But who can tell this interlocutor is not splitting hairs, “technically speaking, this was not a promise in the sense of an oath on the Holy Book,” when there was in the air an expectation of Finnish jets but the Finnish army eventually said “we need our jets, sorry”? What is the point of saying the latter if there was no expectation, and what brought about an expectation if not some statement about Finland’s will to send jets? I don’t care about hair-splitting, that’s what they’re always doing when they let people down.

Besides, before calling people “Russian lovers” (with savage expletives), one should consider who is distraught by the news: Russians or Ukrainians? Who is angry? Who is cursing the Finns in their heart? (In general, the disappointed curse.) Who will say this is an about-face if asked? – Am I a Russian lover for scolding the Finnish authorities to let Ukrainians down? Whose brain needs more training?

This lady, Finland’s prime minister, went to Kiyv in quality of head of government and said, in that official position, she’s “open to providing jets.” Was this saying something or saying nothing? Or does it mean, “I’m open to providing jets but it doesn’t depend upon me.” Was the news that some nobody in the remotest parts of the country said he’s open to providing jets to Ukraine but who cares, he’s a nobody? Now a Finnish general says the jets can’t be sent in Ukraine because they are needed at home. If he is correct, then this lady couldn’t materially be “open to providing jets,” because there was no material basis for such a declaration, which would have required available jets in surplus of needed jets, essential at home, and she should have been briefed about this before going to Kyiv, knowing Ukrainians would ask for support and formulate requests. The general is telling her, in her face, something very unpleasant, and he makes it known to the world. He might be a rebel, refusing to obey the government, as he’s not the person to tell the latter how the existing jets are to be used, whether kept at home or sent to Ukrainians. Given the solemnity of a declaration made within an official delegation in a foreign country, I assume the general will be sacked and the jets sent. Otherwise, the government must fall. I retract the term “promise,” however, having learnt from my interlocutor that governments around the world shouldn’t take the words of Finland’s authorities seriously; when this government says they’re “open,” one must add in petto “but that doesn’t depend upon them,” this is no commitment, only meaningless blah blah.

If it isn’t a promise when the government says to be open to something, then the government actually says to be “open but…” So what is the “but” here? Is it a vote from Parliament? Not at all. Is it a national referendum? Not at all. Is it a veto from allies? Not at all. A Finnish general is correcting the Finnish prime minister. The “but” was “I’m open to providing jets but it depends on a general who turns out to be, as a civil servant, under the hierarchical power of the government, that is, he does what I’m telling him.” The government can’t claim it renounces sending jets because its generals are opposed to the government’s idea, because it would be treason for the army to oppose the government. Therefore, no excuse. You send the jets or you never were open to sending them; you were just, for reasons I honestly fail to understand, deceptive with people you call friends.

–She was asked by a journalist in a press conference about the jets and she said it could be discussed if other countries think about sending them. She didn’t promise anything.

I left the last word to this other interlocutor. First, I had already taken back the word “promise.” Then, the answer to my question about this lady’s words, namely, “was this saying something or saying nothing?” has its answer: it was saying nothing. Poland is willing to send fighter jets to Ukraine and hasn’t waited for a common position of NATO countries. But again, the material basis for such a declaration by Finland’s head of government was lacking, because, as the general said in the meantime, Finland can’t afford to send jets abroad, no matter what a common position of NATO countries would turn out to be; the army’s position is not dependent on whether other countries can send their own jets.

Arms supply as principal-agent problem

US and UK officials are reportedly worried that Ukraine is firing thousands of artillery shells daily to hold on to Bakhmut. According to New York Times, there are concerns in the West that the pace at which Ukraine is burning through ammunition, is unsustainable (HT)

The arms suppliers worry about how the supplied army is using the material. However, the suppliers didn’t “supply” tactical command. It goes without saying that when you supply weapons you may do something very useless unless you can be sure the weapons will be used efficiently. Imagine the military operations were directed from or by the supplier countries instead to make sure the material is used efficiently: would these countries still be nonbelligerent? In other words, either NATO has no control over the efficiency of its doing as a non-belligerent party or it becomes belligerent.

There is a principal-agent problem (google these words) in the supply of weapons which remains undiscussed. In this kind of problems, suppliers could keep supplying for decades with guns a child who shoots at trees, thinking this is a soldier shooting at enemies. NATO can’t make sure its weapons are used efficiently, that is, make sure its doing is worth it, without taking control, and that means to become a belligerent party.

Video from the US-Mexico border shows chaotic scenes as hundreds of people attempted to force their way into the US, after problems with a new app aimed at processing their asylum claims. (Al Jazeera English)

To condition state decisions upon smartphone usage is unlawful subsidizing of a private sector. I think this administration is corrupt. – What is a public administration that conditions a public benefit upon the purchase of smartphones made by private manufacturers, if not a corrupt agency in the hands of private interests?

One may ask: Is it subsidizing the paper industry, to condition a public benefit on a written letter to the administration? Arguably, yes. However, the difference between the expense for one sheet of paper and a pen or pencil on the one hand and for a smartphone on the other hand, is not insubstantial, so if the administration so far requested a written letter, it doesn’t mean it is not more corrupt by asking to download an app on a phone now.

Les bras d’honneur d’un ministre au Parlement

Il n’y a pas si longtemps, un journaliste eut droit à un procès pour un doigt d’honneur. L’immunité parlementaire pour les propos tenus dans l’hémicycle protège, que je sache, les parlementaires et non les autres personnes présentes, par exemple un ministre. Et je ne crois pas non plus qu’un ministre ait une immunité générale vis-à-vis du code pénal, par exemple vis-à-vis de l’article relatif à l’injure, laquelle serait en l’occurrence facile à caractériser pour ces bras d’honneur dans l’hémicycle puisque le ministre a lui-même reconnu les faits (deux bras d’honneur), une admission sur le ton plaisant et cynique qui a choqué la présidente de séance. Des rappels au règlement, moi je veux bien, mais pourquoi un journaliste passe au tribunal, lui ?

Dans le cas du journaliste, comme son doigt d’honneur était adressé à des CRS, c’était un outrage. Or un député est également une personne dépositaire de l’autorité publique, selon le code : un bras d’honneur à un député est donc tout autant un outrage, c’est-à-dire une injure aggravée. Mais un journaliste passe en jugement et écope d’une amende pénale, tandis qu’un ministre peut se vanter de son délit. Surtout ne changez rien.

Note. S’agissant de l’affirmation selon laquelle « l’immunité parlementaire pour les propos tenus dans l’hémicycle protège, que je sache, les parlementaires et non les autres personnes présentes, par exemple un ministre », on pourrait sans doute répliquer que, si un ministre ne bénéficie pas de la même immunité que les parlementaires au sein de l’hémicycle de l’une ou l’autre chambre, il est désavantagé dans la discussion politique, étant contraint dans ses prises de parole quand les parlementaires ne le sont pas. Or l’immunité parlementaire n’empêche pas le bureau de l’Assemblée de prononcer des sanctions, telles que des suspensions, à l’encontre d’un parlementaire en raison de ses propos, tandis que le bureau d’une chambre n’a évidemment aucun pouvoir de sanction à l’encontre d’un membre du gouvernement. De sorte que si l’immunité s’étendait aux ministres, ce sont ces derniers qui seraient avantagés dans la discussion politique au sein du Parlement puisqu’il n’existerait aucune instance de sanction, judiciaire ou législative, à leur encontre tandis que les parlementaires seraient toujours passibles de sanctions prises par leur chambre. Dans ces conditions, l’immunité parlementaire servirait aux membres du gouvernement et non aux parlementaires, et même aux membres du gouvernement contre les parlementaires, ce qu’il est impossible de supposer pour un dispositif protecteur de la fonction parlementaire.

January 28, 2023

Law 32: Hate-speech-law countries v. free-speech countries

EN-FR

Hate speech laws in so-called “free-speech” countries

How free speech is contrived to allow governments
to discriminate at will in hate-speech-law countries

Two examples: Sweden and India, with discussion of recent incidents

1/ Quran burning and incitement against religion in Sweden
2/ Saffron bikini and defilement of religion in India

1/ Quran burning and incitement against religion in Sweden

“Turkish protesters have expressed outrage in Istanbul after a far-right politician burned a Quran in front of the Turkish embassy in Stockholm.” (Al Jazeera English, YouTube, Jan 22)

As there is no freedom of speech in Europe, the request to ban and punish this kind of act/speech, Quran burning, is a legitimate demand of nondiscrimination. Swedish law criminalizes hate speech out of consideration for communitarian feelings. Therefore, the failure of Swedish authorities to prosecute such acts is contemptuous: not attending to this particular community’s feelings while they claim to attend to communitarian feelings sends the message that this community is not worth attending to, according to Swedish authorities. They simply do not want this community to be protected by Sweden’s hate speech laws, and this is blatant discrimination.

My message to Swedish authorities: You are contemptible. What are your hate speech laws for? Stop discriminating against Muslims and prosecute Quran burning as hate speech.

Where is the Swedish law that bans freedom of speech out of consideration of a religion’s belief?

It is where everybody can find it. “Hets mot folkgrupp blev olagligt 1949. På den tiden var det enbart härstamning och trosbekännelse som var grunder för hets mot folkgrupp. Detta ändrades 1970 till ras, hudfärg, nationellt eller etniskt ursprung eller trosbekännelse. År 2002 tillkom sexuell läggning och år 2019 könsöverskridande identitet eller uttryck.” (Wikipedia: Hets mot folkgrupp) The important word for the asked question is “trosbekännelse,” which means religious belief. Translation: “Incitement against groups became illegal [in Sweden] in 1949. At that time, descent and creed [trosbekännelse = religious belief] were the only grounds for incitement against groups. This was changed in 1970 to race, skin color, national or ethnic origin, or creed [again]. In 2002 sexual orientation was added and in 2019 gender identity or expression.”

Who are you to dictate how I dispose of my property?

You’ll have to ask this question to the Swedish legislator. – The technical answer, however, is that you can’t criminally dispose of your property. If you dispose of your property by making a hate speech of it, you’ll be prosecuted for hate speech by Swedish authorities.

So what forms of disposal are not hate speech? Presumably, burning is ruled out.

All disposal is not in the form of calling people’s attention. – If you ask me how they dispose of their old Quran copies in Muslim countries, I don’t know. All I know is that, if a person disposes of a Quran copy in Sweden and one finds it in his trash can, or if he burns it in his backyard, this is not hate speech. But what happened in front of the embassy is blatant hate speech (against a group based on its members’ creed or religious belief) and the negligence of authorities to act accordingly proves they discriminate against Muslims. It’s not too late.

(ii)

The answer from the Swedish authorities so far has been, to sum it up: “The act was very insensitive, but we are a free-speech country.” This is not true. Sweden is a hate-speech-law country: “Incitement against groups became illegal in 1949. At that time, descent and creed were the only grounds for incitement against groups. This was changed in 1970 to race, skin color, national or ethnic origin, or creed. In 2002 sexual orientation was added and in 2019 gender identity or expression.” The Swedish authorities are bound by their legislation to prosecute the wrongdoer; by their obdurate negligence to do it, they show that, as a principle, they refuse to comply with their hate speech legislation when the targeted group is Muslims. They thus discriminate against Muslims. On the one hand, they tell their national communities, their “groups” (folkgrupp), that Sweden protects them from hate speech by criminalizing hate speech; on the other hand, they claim they guarantee freedom of speech when one of these groups in particular is wronged by hate speech. You don’t need to be a Muslim to feel contempt for such malfeasance.

2/ Saffron bikini and defilement of religion in India

For a better understanding of the following, read “Saffron bikini v. national flag bikini” in Law 29.

Film Pathaan, with a saffron bikini dancing scene, was released this month amid protests. I support the protests. As the authorities disregard the outrage over saffron bikini, they should apologize to and compensate all people who have been convicted for tricolor (national flag) bikinis and other tricolor trappings, and I’m told they are not few. You’ll perhaps say in reply that India is a secular country and authorities have a mandate to ensure respect for the tricolor symbol, not for the saffron symbol, which is religious. There exist stringent laws about incitement and respect for community feelings in India: Why the negligence? Does secularism mean that a secular, atheistic elite will be granted the privilege to offend religious feelings, while the people is gagged?

No matter how Hindutva the government is, outrage over saffron bikinis is disregarded, the problem does not exist for them. They will keep focusing on hunting tricolor bikinis and other tricolor trappings. The numerous tricolor precedents, the stringent provisions of incitement laws, constitutional protection of communities’ feelings, are of no avail to a Hindutva government against the privileged few who bought a never-ending license to outrage religious feelings.

What about sadhus who wear a single saffron loincloth?

The comparison is misguided. Although there exist laws against nudity in India, they do not apply to sadhus, because a sadhu’s nudity is not the same as a paid actress’s nudity, the aim of which is to attract or arouse prurient interest. By the same token, a sadhu wearing saffron is not the same as an actress whose body is used as an object for making money through prurient interest, adding an insult to religion through saffron symbolism.

(ii)

The good news is that Bollywood needs to be saved, that is, it is heading toward irreversible collapse. “Can Pathaan save the Bollywood?” (Mirror Now) You’re asking too much of a saffron bikini.

“Pathaan 1 – Saffron Brigade 0.” Why the sarcasm? Is it proper of a news media? In a country where tricolor brigades are terrorizing tricolor bikinis and other tricolor trappings, such disregard for religious feelings by the authorities is as offensive as the offense itself. And don’t tell me this is a victory for free speech: the tricolor brigade is watching you.

(iii)

Their apathy will remain a stain on Indian authorities. If you think a tricolor bikini is an insult, and Indian law seems to think it is (see Gehna Vashisht and other cases), then a saffron bikini is blatant hate speech (Sections 153 and 295 of the Indian penal code). Negligence to act accordingly on the part of authorities is discriminatory remiss.

Section 295: “Whoever destroys, damages or defiles any place of worship, or any object held sacred by any class of persons with the intention of thereby insulting the religion of any class of persons or with the knowledge that any class of persons is likely to consider such destruction, damage or defilement as an insult to their religion, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.” (Emphases ours.)

Let us examine what a saffron bikini is, according to the wording of the law. We are talking about defilement, as sacredness is purposefully associated with pruriency in the form of scant clothing and lascivious dancing. The object is not a bikini in itself but a bikini purposefully made saffron. We do not have to prove that the wrongdoing is purposeful, as Hindus’ reverential feelings for saffron are well-known. Rather it is the accused who must prove they did not do the wrongdoing on purpose; they must provide convincing evidence that none of them had realized that the saffron bikini could upset Hindus’ feelings. In the words of the law, they must prove that they had no “knowledge that any class of persons [was] likely to consider such defilement as an insult to their religion,” and good luck with that: were these people brought before a court, I don’t think they could provide the least convincing evidence of ingenuity, unless, perhaps, they wriggled on the ground like worms and cried, because where in the world is saffron known for its religious symbolism if not in India? Think about it: these people, instead of being removed behind bars for two years, are going scot free, protected by a Hindutva BJP-led coalition government.

“A battle for freedom of speech”? I didn’t see journalists battle for free speech when a FIR (first information report by police) was filed against half a dozen people dancing with Aurangzeb’s poster in Maharashtra, a few days ago (see Law 31: Aurangzeb’s Ghost). Sections 95, 153, 295 etc. of the ICP are the law. Journalists do not oppose it, they only oppose its application to defilements of religion by Bollywood.

(iv)

At the same time that the Indian union government refuses to listen to its grassroots militants on Pathaan, and asks them to stop the stir, it bans a BBC documentary about the 2002 Gujarat riots in which hundreds of Muslims were murdered by mobs.

The ban is either legal or illegal. If it is illegal, there is no question of opportunity. If it is legal, there is no question of opportunity either, because the executive power is not allowed to pick up laws it will carry out from laws it will not carry out. The government must execute the whole legislation (hence its name: executive). Those who discuss the ban from the opportunity angle are wrong. If they disagree with the ban, they should, assuming the ban is lawful or constitutional, voice criticism against the law that allows such a ban, that is, they should ask to remove legislation that allows the authorities to ban this kind of speech. Let me know if they do. I assume they all discuss the opportunity and not the legality issue, because they are the opposition that wants to be the majority, and as the new majority they will want: 1) discretionary, not just executive power, 2) to ban criticism. They are all of a kind and form the political cartel.

I disagree with the idea that the executive should be granted even a minimal discretionary power: all decisions based on opportunity are discriminatory, by preventing expected benefits or sanctions of the law. Even though the idea is as commonplace as the practice, neither the idea nor the practice are constitutional, and they cannot be, as this would mean actual suspension of the separation of powers, and of checks and balances.

Concluding remarks

Despite their commonalities, both cases illustrate two different situations. In the Swedish case, one religious minority is discriminated against by the authorities. In the Indian case, the Hindu majority’s right to be protected by the law is disregarded by the authorities, which shield one sector of the society, namely Bollywood, from the legislation; in other words, against the religious majority, the Indian authorities discriminate in favor of this sector by elevating it above hate speech laws. Both actions are extralegal, namely, given the constitutional characterization of the executive power, illegal and unconstitutional. Through the practice, the will of the legislator is overlooked and the role of the judiciary undermined. The practice is defended on the ground that this overlook is needed and will occur only in situations where the generality of the law presents flaws that put the state at risk. The only possible arbitrator for this is the people and that supposes, therefore, that the people has an effective right to insurrection, which, absent a constitutional right to bear arms, is nonexistent. Otherwise, the practice should be set guidelines in the form of constitutional measures about the state of emergency. In the two cases we have discussed, the authorities are abusing their discretionary power without redeeming circumstances.

“[Female ex-BJP leader] Gets Gun License Citing ‘Life Threats’ Over Prophet Remarks.” (India Today, YouTube)

How long does it take to get a license? The authorities must verify the claim and that surely takes time. She seems to have had her license in no time, but is it the case for all Indian citizens? One day, you’ll hear that a man applied for a license because he was threatened, the claim was investigated by authorities, with a lot of red tape, and meantime the man was killed. Mark my words, you’ll hear about something like that, or I don’t know bureaucracy. An unconditional right to carry guns is the only correct alternative to a ban.

About current massive layoffs in big tech companies (Google, Meta, Twitter…). The revenue of a good deal of these so-called big tech companies is from advertising. Massive layoffs in big tech tell you manufacturing companies cut down their advertising spending because they are in poor condition. Badly impacted manufacturing and other companies first respond by cutting down on advertising. Big tech companies then have no other choice than cutting down on their workforce, because advertising is their main revenue. What massive layoffs in big tech tell you is the incoming massive layoffs in all other sectors, as advertising revenue dependent big tech companies are the first to cut down on the workforce.

“10 Palestinians Killed In ‘Deadliest’ Israel Raids in Years.” (NDTV, YouTube, Jan 27)

This headline is foolish. The raid is “deadliest in years” because of 10 casualties and one month ago 8, two months ago 9, three months ago 9 again, four months ago 6, and so on; something like that. About 200 Palestinians were killed in Israeli raids in 2022 alone. (212 according to the Palestinian Health Ministry.)

“Iranian drones program’s success and what are the lessons for India.” (The Print, YouTube, Jan 27)

Given the scathing indictment regarding Indian national production (“promising the moon and failing to deliver,” etc.), one should not disregard the possibility of corruption of national authorities by foreign suppliers. If decision-makers are biased toward foreign supply through corruption money, India will never develop serious programs of her own. At this stage, you may well ask the question.

Ironically, an excuse from the Indian side is that, in Iran, things are under control of the Guardians of the Revolution: “It is easier there because everything comes under the control of the Islamic revolutionary guard corps,” says a “source in Indian defense establishment.” Well, yes, the Guardians probably better enforce the country’s own anti-corruption laws, so the excuse almost sounds like an admission, or veiled whistleblowing.

La guerre par procuration expliquée par la France

Le texte suivant complète notre essai « Casus belli : Réflexions sur la guerre en Ukraine » de mai 2022 (ici).

Un article en ligne du 5 mars 2022 du Club des juristes, « La fourniture d’armes à l’Ukraine : quel cadre en droit international ? » (ici, auteur : E. Castellarin), présente le dispositif juridique utilisé par les nations de l’OTAN pour légitimer leur action de fourniture d’armes à l’Ukraine contre la Russie. Cet article appelle plusieurs remarques.

La première est que ce cadre est purement multilatéral et que le raisonnement bilatéral que j’emploie dans mon essai semble désormais exclu du champ de la pensée ; à savoir, les accords préventifs bilatéraux de défense, dont l’idée brille par son absence dans cet article, n’entrent apparemment plus dans le raisonnement des États européens, de sorte que mon argument selon lequel les États d’Europe de l’Ouest auraient pu offrir à l’Ukraine la garantie d’une intervention armée en cas d’agression russe, doit passer pour une bizarrerie désuète aux yeux des juristes avertis. Cela les regarde. Mais quid des États-Unis ? Ces derniers n’offrent-ils pas leur bouclier militaire à plusieurs pays, dont l’Arabie Saoudite ? Qu’est-ce qui les empêchait alors d’offrir le même bouclier à l’Ukraine, par exemple après l’annexion de la Crimée par la Russie ? Il semblerait que ce puisse être en partie les dispositions du droit international elles-mêmes, dans la mesure où celles-ci peuvent désormais permettre à des États de conduire une « guerre par procuration » (proxy war) sans se voir pour autant qualifiés ipso facto de parties au conflit. Examinons les différents dispositifs juridiques présentés par l’article.

« Dans l’affaire relative aux activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua, la Cour internationale de justice a été confrontée à la fourniture d’armes par les États-Unis aux contras, un groupe rebelle actif au Nicaragua. Elle a exclu que la fourniture d’armes puisse être qualifiée d’agression armée, mais elle a affirmé qu’on peut y voir une menace ou un emploi de la force (§ 195). » Ça ne commence pas très bien pour l’OTAN, du côté de la CIJ. Le § 195 de la décision de la Cour, de 1986, pourrait en effet servir à la Russie de fondement juridique à l’invocation d’un casus belli : « menace ou emploi de la force ». (Le terme même de casus belli est sans doute devenu tout aussi désuet que les contrats bilatéraux de défense territoriale évoqués dans notre précédent paragraphe, vu que cette notion simple est à présent décomposée en agression armée, d’une part, et menace ou emploi de la force, d’autre part.)

Notre juriste considère cependant que la décision de la CIJ est inapplicable au cas de l’Ukraine : « En réalité, l’analyse de la CIJ n’est pas applicable au conflit armé international en cours en Ukraine. L’armée ukrainienne a le plein contrôle, ponctuel et global, de ses actions, si bien qu’on ne peut pas analyser la fourniture d’armes un emploi indirect de la force par les États occidentaux contre la Russie. » Voire ! Il faudrait tout d’abord s’assurer que la CIJ a bel et bien prétendu que « le plein contrôle, ponctuel et global, de ses actions » par une armée excluait a priori un emploi indirect de la force par ceux qui lui fournissent des armes. Certes, l’armée ukrainienne est différente d’une organisation comme celle des contras au Nicaragua, et le conflit lui-même est différent. Mais nous ne voyons pas ce que veut dire cette réserve émise par l’auteur : en quoi les contras n’avaient-ils pas eux aussi « le plein contrôle, ponctuel et global, de [leurs] actions » ? Que signifie cette formule alambiquée ? Un tel embrouillamini peut-il se trouver dans une décision de justice internationale ? Nous en doutons. Nous mènerons cette recherche et y reviendrons. Pour le moment, nous considérons que c’est là une simple pirouette, une argutie sans queue ni tête. L’armée ukrainienne ne se distingue pas des contras sous l’angle obscur ici présenté, et, à défaut de plus ample explication, nous considérons donc que la décision de la CIJ s’applique au présent conflit. Poursuivons.

« Du point de vue du droit coutumier des conflits armés, la fourniture d’armes est incompatible avec le statut de neutralité » Cela ne continue guère mieux pour l’OTAN, du point de vue du droit international coutumier. Les États fournissant des armes à l’Ukraine ne sont pas neutres. Mais sont-ils pour autant, comme un raisonnement fondé sur le principe logique du tiers exclu pourrait le laisser penser, des parties au conflit ? La réponse du droit international est, selon notre juriste, négative : « Cependant, cela signifie simplement que les États qui fournissent des armes ne peuvent pas se prévaloir des droits des États neutres, par exemple celui d’obtenir la réparation d’éventuels dommages collatéraux subis en raison d’un bombardement sur le territoire d’un État partie au conflit. En revanche, la perte du statut d’États neutres au conflit en Ukraine ne signifie pas que ces États sont devenus parties au conflit. »

Notre juriste croit donc qu’il existe, relativement « au conflit en Ukraine », des États ni neutres ni parties au conflit. « Cette situation, » de partie au conflit, « qui impliquerait notamment le droit de la Russie de cibler les forces armées de ces États, ne se produirait que si celles-ci prenaient directement part aux hostilités ». Les États de l’OTAN sont donc sortis de leur neutralité mais, comme ils ne prennent pas directement part aux hostilités, ils ne sont pas non plus des parties au conflit. Cela confirme l’analyse russe de la « guerre par procuration » menée par ces États. En effet, si ces États ne faisaient pas la guerre, ils seraient neutres, or ils ne sont pas neutres, et s’ils prenaient directement part aux opérations, ils seraient parties au conflit, or ils ne le sont pas non plus : ils font donc la guerre par procuration (proxy war). L’analyse russe est entièrement conforme à ces éléments juridiques.

La suite de l’article tend à montrer que ce comportement est « internationalement licite ». Tout d’abord, le Traité sur le commerce des armes n’est prétendument pas violé, car les États n’ont pas connaissance, au moment de fournir ses armes, qu’elles « pourraient servir à commettre » un génocide, des crimes contre l’humanité ou des crimes de guerre. Cette clause du traité est cependant suffisamment générale pour que des livraisons d’armes lors d’un conflit en cours soient susceptibles de servir à commettre de tels actes. L’article ne dit pas en effet que les fournisseurs n’ont pas connaissance que leurs armes « serviront à commettre » des crimes, une formule qui serait moins contraignante pour les fournitures d’armes. On rétorquera peut-être que, de la façon dont je l’entends, peu de fournitures d’armes resteraient licites, mais n’est-ce pas précisément l’intention des concepteurs et signataires du traité que de lutter contre la prolifération ? En l’occurrence, exclure que des crimes de guerre puissent être commis par l’une des parties lors d’un conflit en cours est ou bien de l’angélisme ou bien un parti pris belliqueux qui ne peut être conforme à l’esprit du traité.

Cependant, l’UE a souhaité se garantir à ce sujet, en introduisant une clause suspensive en cas de violation du droit international par l’Ukraine, ce qui est interprété par notre juriste comme une preuve de respect formel du traité par l’UE. Voire ! Cette clause montre au contraire, selon nous, que l’UE se doute que ces armes « pourraient » servir à commettre des crimes de guerre etc., et qu’elle n’a donc formellement pas le droit de fournir ces armes. En prétendant prévenir les crimes de guerre etc., elle avoue être consciente que de tels crimes pourraient être commis, et c’est précisément cette prise de conscience qui devrait l’empêcher de livrer des armes.

Enfin, la résolution ES-11/1 de l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies ayant qualifié l’opération russe d’agression, l’Ukraine est « indéniablement » en légitime défense. L’auteur précise certes que la résolution onusienne est « dépourvue d’effet obligatoire et silencieuse sur la fourniture d’armes » (ce qui est un peu regrettable en termes de droit positif) mais affirme que c’est une « interprétation authentique de la Charte, objectivement valable pour tous les membres ». Ce qui est objectivement valable et en même temps dépourvu d’effet obligatoire, est surtout dépourvu d’effet obligatoire, en droit. Autrement dit, la question de l’agression et de la légitime défense reste ouverte. Le traitement des minorités nationales en Ukraine invoqué par la Russie est en débat. Or c’est la légitime défense qui est le principal élément de justification des nations de l’OTAN. En légitime défense, « [l]’emploi de la force de sa part [l’Ukraine] est licite (art. 51 de la Charte des Nations Unies) et ne peut pas engager sa responsabilité (art. 21 des articles de la Commission du droit international sur la responsabilité de l’État pour fait internationalement illicite), ni celle des États qui l’aident et l’assistent. » La légitime défense est plus qu’une légitimation, selon cette présentation, c’est un véritable blanc-seing (et la présentation est donc douteuse : certaines violations du droit naturel ne peuvent recevoir aucune justification et engagent toujours la responsabilité). Mais c’est aussi un point contestable, l’Ukraine ayant peut-être conduit sur son territoire une politique contraire au droit humanitaire envers la minorité russophone, et contraire également aux intérêts fondamentaux de son voisin, comme le prétend la Russie s’agissant des régions frontalières du Donbass et autre, dont la situation extrêmement troublée avant l’intervention russe n’a échappé à personne.