According to Dr Satoshi Kanazawa (London School of Economics) in his book The Intelligence Paradox: why the intelligent choice isn’t always the smart one (2012), general intelligence is, in evolutionary terms, the faculty to deal with “novel and nonrecurrent adaptive problems.” He argues that in the African savanna where humanity’s ancestors evolved till the relatively recent (at evolution scale) advent of agriculture, the use of general intelligence was limited to such one-off, isolated problems, and consequently selection pressure upon the development of intelligence did not exist in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA). He further contends that in our modern man-made environments the capacity to deal with novel and nonrecurrent problems has become of utmost importance, yet this capacity, i.e. general intelligence, is not the best way to solve the general adaptive problems mankind still faces. The most important of these general adaptive problems is optimizing one’s fitness via mating, the coping with which relies on specific regions of the brain different from those in charge of intellect: namely, those in charge of emotions, or instincts.
There is something quite intuitive in the idea. Often enough people perceived as extremely intelligent tend to be derided by their peers as geeks or eggheads. Culture and mass culture frequently display funny characters who are very intellectual and at the same time awkward in many respects, such as Murray in the TV series Riptide; among my circle of school friends, to call someone “Murray,” based on the series, was one way to mock, though not with an altogether spiteful intent, an awkward guy, especially one who would fail to achieve anything outside the classroom.
Yet, no matter how intuitive, such a view runs counter to one tenet of evolutionary psychology (EP) – a field to which Kanazawa’s book belongs –, namely that high-status males are more reproductively successful than other males. In the view of EP, the Murrays of the world are the greatest womanizers, because it is general intelligence that has become the principal highway to status in our modern man-made environments. (For a broader discussion of EP findings on reproductive inequalities, see xxxii and xxxiii, or better all my posts from xxvii on.)
By presenting Kanazawa’s intelligence paradox in the terms above, I don’t do him justice, although that would render rather well his book’s subtitle “why the intelligent choice isn’t always the smart one,” but I have found myself in a quandary since I have wished to discuss his book, because of several inconsistencies.
The intelligence paradox is based on what Kanazawa calls “the Savanna-IQ Interaction Hypothesis,” that reads as follows: “Less intelligent individuals have greater difficulty comprehending and dealing with evolutionarily novel entities and situations that did not exist in the ancestral environment than more intelligent individuals. In contrast, general intelligence does not affect individuals’ ability to comprehend and deal with evolutionarily familiar entities and situations that existed in the ancestral environment.” (p. 56)
Given this hypothesis, the intelligent choice is out of reach of the smart brain whereas neither the smart nor, by definition, the intelligent choice is out of reach of the intelligent brain, although the intelligent brain may or may not make smart choices (smart is defined as the way to cope successfully with “evolutionary familiar situations”). So far, so good. But the negative relationship I have being talking about (that intelligent people are geeks wanting in smartness) is clearly alluded to in the title of chapter 12: “Why Intelligent People are the Ultimate Losers in Life.” Relying on the Savanna-IQ Interaction Hypothesis, intelligent people should not be the ultimate losers, since their intelligence “does not affect their ability to comprehend and deal with evolutionarily familiar entities.” Moreover, if the hypothesis is true there should be no “intelligence paradox” at all, because smartness and intelligence would then be two uncorrelated abilities, whereas both the notion of a paradox and the idea that intelligent people are the ultimate losers in life imply a negative relationship. Let us look at some of Kanazawa’s contentions in more detail.
According to Kanazawa, the intelligence paradox predicts that more intelligent people are more homosexual than the general population because homosexuality is not natural, it is not common among animals nor among contemporary tribes of hunter-gatherers: “Even though some form of homosexuality is observed in many species, the basic biological design of all mammalian species is heterosexual reproduction, and exclusive or predominant homosexuality is rare in nature.” (p. 127) Kanazawa then says the data shows homosexuals are more intelligent.
He does not say, unless I’m mistaken, that it is the exclusive homosexuals that are more intelligent, which is in fact what the paradox predicts, not that occasional homosexuals, or bisexuals, are more intelligent, because such behaviors being observed in many species, as Kanazawa acknowledges, one may argue they’re natural. This is what Robin Baker says: Homosexual behaviors are quite common among animals. Moreover, most homosexuals, Baker argues, are bisexual, only a minority of them are exclusive homosexuals (see xxviii). The reason why exclusive homosexuality even exists is the same as why schizophrenia (according to Baker) exists, both at about 1% of the population: Both occur, namely, inside a process of mutation-selection balance. A gene mutation occurs that makes people exclusive homosexuals or schizophrenics and, as most of these individuals do not reproduce, selection prevents the mutation being forwarded.
Other than exclusive forms of homosexuality are in fact strategic, they are a way to deal with familiar adaptive situations, and one finds these behaviors among animal species quite frequently, so the intelligence paradox would not predict that people engaged in such behaviors are more intelligent. In fact, the intelligence paradox cannot even predict that exclusive homosexuals are more intelligent if it does not predict at the same time that schizophrenics are more intelligent, nor that any people affected by severe genetic mutations that would make them unfit for the ancestral savanna are more intelligent.
Certainly Kanazawa’s most astonishing contention is that the intelligence paradox predicts that intelligent people consume more drugs, alcohol and cigarettes because such consumption is not natural. On this score, he finds the results “somewhat equivocal” (p. 176), still he is inclined to consider the prediction realized. On this particular point, I would first like to quote one of Kanazawa’s mentors (named twice in the book’s acknowledgments), Dr Richard Lynn, in his book Dysgenics (2011): “Cigarette smoking (…) is, like alcohol consumption, an expression of weak self-control over immediate impulse gratification.” As I explain in xxx, the Stanford Marshmallow Experiment shows that children with self-control are more intelligent for they get higher status later in life and intelligence is the principal highway to high status today. So, if the intelligence paradox predicts that intelligent people drink, smoke and take drugs more than others, it can safely be dumped.
However, does the paradox really predict such a thing? According to Kanazawa, smoking did not exist before the culture of tobacco, nor drinking before the advent of brewery and distillation, nor taking drugs before the development of refining techniques, in a word they could not exist before agriculture and were nonexistent in the African savanna. Yet, many tribes of hunter-gatherers are familiar with psychotropic substances they encounter in the course of their foraging activities, such as hallucinogenic mushrooms, so the dependence on agriculture seems erroneous. I am not categorical that our ancestors in the savanna knew such substances and consumed them; I am merely doing what EP scholars do when they try to describe the life of our ancestors, taking contemporary tribes of hunter-gatherers as the closest approximation.
The vocabulary of psychotropic and stimulating substances used by hunter-gatherers is quite extensive. In the Spanish language alone, I know the following terms, most of them being taken from the vernacular languages of Amerindian tribes: achuma, ayahuasa or ayahuasca, bacuey or macuey (aphrodisiac), chamairo, chamico, cochizpacle, cocoyome, cojoba, colorín, curupa, frijolito (“little bean”), gasparito, jabí, jícore, masacoate (name of a Mexican boa which flesh was consumed by Indians as an aphrodisiac), ñorbito (aphrodisiac), paricá, peyote, pillunchuca, sumarique, señí, tacualispacle or clacualispacle (aphrodisiac), xtabentún, yagé. For more details on some of these words, see my glossary of Aztequismos (here) and Americanismos I (here) and II (here) (Spanish and French).
If taking such drugs predates agriculture and was familiar in the EEA, the intelligence paradox cannot predict what Kanazawa says it does.
Kanazawa predicts that “more intelligent men (but not more intelligent women) value sexual exclusivity” (p. 97) – “having one sexual partner in a committed relationship” (p. 101) –, and the data proves him right. More intelligent men value sexual exclusivity because it’s not natural, since polygyny was rampant in the savanna, whereas for a woman, sharing her man with other women or not, she was supposed sexually exclusive to that man. Intelligent men are decent Murrays. So far, so good.
Yet, Kanazawa also finds that more intelligent men have more extramarital affairs (figure 7.2, p. 108), and here is his explanation: “Note that the Intelligence Paradox is about individual preferences and values, what people desire and want in their heads; it’s not necessarily about what people actually do. If people have complete choice over their behavior, they are expected to pursue what they desire and want, but they do not always have such complete choice. And, when it comes to sex and mating, men have very little choice.” (p. 109) In other words, Dr. Kanazawa is telling us intelligent men desire to be monogynous but women force them to be polygynous.
He means that a man “has no realistic choice to say no” to a woman (p. 105). This is a rather audacious step from the finding of evolutionary biology regarding the differential biological costs of reproduction which imply males’ somewhat indiscriminate sexual outlook compared to females’ choosiness. I say it’s audacious because evolutionary biology also posits that males are urgent and females coy, which is not altogether the same proposition. In biological terms, if a male is not urgent – not proactive – no female will choose him. A man, thus, may be thought to always have the choice either to enter the arena (the lek) in the hope of being chosen or remain outside and attract no attention at all. Still, a man can desire to be monogynous, i.e. faithful, yet be induced into temptation and succumb to it in the course of his social interactions with many persons of the other sex, occasions allowing for the succumbing, without our being justified to call his behavior proactive in the proper sense. That would be, then, the lot of intelligent men, namely to be seduced by women, to be chosen by women without wanting to be chosen, and succumb because of males’ universal urgency.
So the question is: Are more intelligent men, although they desire to be monogynous and as a consequence are not urgent with women once they have got a partner, more likely to be chosen and induced into sex by women? According to Kanazawa, the answer is yes. As to this, I repeat here what I have said under the head of addictions, that more intelligent men also have more self-control, so if to begin with they desire to be monogynous although it’s not natural, they also are in a better position to resist succumbing, albeit that, too, is not natural.
But a more important question perhaps is about the attractiveness of intelligent men. According to Kanazawa, they are more attractive: “More intelligent individuals – both men and women – are on average physically more attractive than less intelligent individuals.” (p. 106). The source of this assertion is Kanazawa (2011) and Kanazawa & Kovar (2004), that is, papers from the same. As a complement, “more intelligent individuals – both men and women – are significantly taller than less intelligent individuals. And, once again, women prefer taller men as mates.” (p. 107) (Note that Kanazawa elsewhere says Asians are “slightly more intelligent than other races.” (p. 124). As Asians are also shorter than other races, his findings on the relationship between height and intelligence must apply inside one race and not across races.)
As to intelligent women’s attractiveness, here is another distinct statement by Kanazawa, which he does not relate to the previous assertions even though they likely bear on the discussion: “modern British people are not very endogamous on intelligence [the talk is about the British because one of the three studies used by the author is the British National Child Development Study (NCDS), the other two being from US; these studies sometimes contradict one another, like in the case of correlations between IQ and smoking already mentioned]. More intelligent men do not appear to marry more intelligent women in the contemporary United Kingdom.” Given the fact that more intelligent men are supposed to be more attractive and that at least their status is no obstacle to attracting a partner (when it’s not the very reason that attracted the partner in the first place) because it is more likely to be high than not, one is entitled to conclude from this study that intelligent women are not physically attractive on the whole, contrary to quote p. 106 from the previous paragraph.
As to men’s attractiveness, I invite the reader to read my essay xxxii. I add two remarks. 1/ Kanazawa et al.’s papers on attractiveness are based on judgments on photographs, “by two different judges.” I suggest that such minimal tests may not be very convincing, especially since it is known that women’s appreciation of men’s attractiveness varies during the course of their menstrual cycle. Thornhill and Palmer write in their Natural History of Rape (2000): “Perret et al. (1998) report that women in their study found men’s faces that were slightly feminized more attractive than men’s faces that were highly masculine. Highly masculine faces show greater effects of testosterone. This is interpreted by the researchers as a female preference for men who will invest in women. However, the same research group found that women who are not on the pill (i.e., are having ovulatory cycles) and are at the fertile point of their cycle prefer the most masculinized faces.” (pp. 203-4). The study alluded to posits a cyclic variation of individual women’s preferences through time.
2/ Kanazawa finds more evidence for his stance in the following: “The evolutionary psychologist Geoffrey F. Miller has consistently argued that women preferentially select men with higher levels of intelligence to mate with. … There appears to be some evidence for this suggestion. … more intelligent men are significantly more likely to have ever been married and to be currently married at age 47 than less intelligent men.” (pp. 184-5) This overlooks the irrelevance of marriage (or any other form of pair-bonding) to assess women’s sexual preferences, according to the springboard model (see xxxii) and the phenomenon of cuckoldry. Among Darwinian scholars, I have found so far that only Robin Baker does not overlook the predictable consequences of human sperm competition and female sexuality. Especially when intelligent men “are not very endogamous on intelligence” are they likely to be cuckolded by their partners because, as we shall see next, intelligent women are less eager to want children, consequently less eager to look for sexy sons’ genes outside their pair.
In this discussion, Kanazawa surmises that more intelligent men value sexual exclusivity because it’s not natural, but I think it depends more on how a male fares in sperm competition. If a male is uncompetitive, he would waste his time and energy in affairs, so he’d better invest in mate-guarding and parenting, like the good Murray he is. The fact that more intelligent men value sexual exclusivity proves my point right, that more intelligent men are meagerly endowed, virilely speaking.
Incidentally, when EP scholars talk of high-status men in the past, they show us an emperor with his harem, in the present for aught I know they may be talking of a restaurant manager, who is perhaps more likely to cuckold his employees than the reverse. Perhaps, then, one should not equate high status with elites; these would be two radically distinct concepts. In the classic of sociology The Children of Sanchez by Oscar Lewis, we have the example of a “high-status man,” Sanchez, whose job is to buy food for a restaurant in Mexico City. Hardly a high-status job, yet this man provides resources to three women living in different places of the same squalid barrio.
The overlooking of elite men’s poor virile endowments by most EP scholars so far may be due to some kind of sycophancy, the will (probably unconscious) to avoid presenting elite people in an evolutionarily unpleasant light. The sycophancy derives from certain notions about virility and manliness. If a high-status man fails to take advantage of his high status by inseminating many women, why care about status to begin with? Why be rich rather than poor, since it’s so much more trouble earning money than feeding on charity or welfare? The “unpleasant” is that high-status men are not emperors with harems like in the past; a good deal of them are (but sometimes I’ve got my doubts, especially after reading EP books) quite decent fellows, and that’s the shame, you see. By the same token, they may be suspected to be weak. Are weak elites true?
As to the question of why be rich rather than poor, I think the intelligence paradox predicts that, all men on the savanna having to hunt and forage, intelligent men are slackers.
As we have already seen, more intelligent individuals have more homosexual partners than less intelligent individuals (although I have contended this is not predicted by the intelligence paradox). They also have, on a declarative basis, more heterosexual partners (p. 137). The figures are: very bright Americans (IQ > 125) (5% of the US population) have had 9.98 heterosexual partners; bright (110 < IQ < 125) (20% of the US population) 9.79; normal (90 < IQ < 110) (50% of the US population) 8.9; dull (75 < IQ < 90) (20% of the US population) 7.92; very dull (75 < IQ) (5% of the US population) 7.10. Murray Bozinsky is a myth. You may call him a geek, or any person who looks like him a “Murray,” but he cuckolds you in your back. There are the haves and the have-horns!
Yet, as the figures here are based on individual statements, some of the statements may be deceptive. I should think the dull and very dull especially may have a tendency to under-declare their numbers of mates, because, as Kanazawa explains in chapter 5, they tend to be more conservative in politics, so under-declaring would be a way for some of them to display greater consistency between conservative ideas and their behavior. Same thing, perhaps, for intelligent people, who would think they would appear as lacking consistency if they did not over-declare their numbers of mates.
Male urgency patterns also depend on one’s time allocation. Men who work more have less time to court women (outside work, that is; please let me know if the workplace is the greatest sex club available, I need to know for productivity choices). Who works more: organization men or the leisure underclass?
A Parenthesis on the Clark-Hatfield Experiment
The Clark-Hatfield experiment is dealt with by Kanazawa (pp. 102-4) to explain female choice and men’s taking it as it is. It shows that 75% of male college students approached by an unknown attractive woman (a confederate in the experiment) who ask them if they would like to have sex with her the same night respond “yes,” comparing to 0% of female students approached by an unknown attractive man making the same proposal. I find the experiment silly. Men with a little knowledge of life, a little knowledge of women and courtship would have much reason to suspect the woman’s motivations. Some of the guys surely thought it was a hidden camera TV show. Some others may have been thinking the woman was a prostitute (I know a couple of streets in my city where unknown women ask you to get laid with them), some others that she was a schizophrenic intent on killing them, some others that it was a third-type encounter with an extraterrestrial, and all these were the least nincompoops of the batch. Apparently, none of the guys tried to embrace or kiss the woman on the spot, whereas she, if deemed sincere, would have been eager to respond.
Intelligent people are the “ultimate losers in life” because they fail more often to have “as many children as one can potentially raise to sexual maturity so that the children themselves can reproduce,” (p. 178), which is the definition of optimizing one’s fitness, “an evolutionary familiar goal.” In the discussion, Kanazawa only deals with data of children raised by the respondents, so all children begot by men outside their bonds are ignored, which is by itself problematic since it has been argued that more intelligent men have more affairs and presumably beget more children outside wedlock.
The picture below shows figures 12.3 and 12.4 (pp. 182-3). (Click to enlarge)
Before dealing with the intelligence component in these tables, some general considerations on fertility. According to Baker (Baby Wars), in industrial countries about 10% of people are infertile, roughly the same number of men and women. I’m not sure if this includes people who could have children but decide not to; the present figures show a greater number of childless people, so the sample must be warped or Baker’s figures must be wrong — or alternatively the number of people who remain deliberately childless, if not included in the 10%, must be high.
As a matter of fact, on these tables 444 women out of a sample of (444 + 2210) = 2,654 have not had children at age 47 (which means, for all practical purposes, that they will never have: “99.7% of women and 96.5% of men complete their lifetime reproduction by the time they are 45” p. 181). Cross-calculation gives the proportion of 16.7% of women being childless. For men, the figures are 475 men out of 2,319, which gives us 20.4% (same remark as for women). One woman out of six, one man out of five remain childless.
If we follow evolutionary psychologist David Buss, the difference in figures between childless women and childless men should be greater, with much more childless men than childless women: “The primary reason men are so much more given to violence, and specifically to the violence of murder, is that the stakes of the mating game are so much higher for men than for women, because there is much more variability among men than among women in reproductive success.” (The Murderer Next Door, 2005). The present figures do not seem to support this statement, because if the variability does not depend on the number of childless people, men and women as pairs, taken broadly, have the same numbers of children respectively: If a woman has two kids, the man has two kids. If variability does not depend on childless individuals, it depends on putative fathers who are not the biological fathers of the children they raise (10-15%), on the number of single mothers (X), and on the number of men who remarry and make more children (X). I don’t know if these latter phenomena can account for a much greater variability among men than among women in our societies. In any case, there (still) is more variability among men.
Two other tables (pp. 179-80) show answers to the question “Do you ever want children?” (asked at age 23). According to these tables, 10.6% of women and 10.95% of men say they do not want to have children. Seemingly, physiological causes of infertility (infections etc.) and failure to attract mates account, thus, for only half cases of childless men.
Among the individuals who say at age 23 they do not want to have children, more intelligent individuals, both men and women, are in relatively greater numbers. Kanazawa shows that intelligent men change their minds before they reach 45 and make as many children as other men (so they’re not “ultimate losers” after all), but intelligent women don’t change their minds (or they do but men don’t want them!).
The reason more intelligent men do not, at age 23, desire to have children may be due to the high costs of parenting I exposed in my essay xxxiii (How To Make Successful Children Without Parenting) and the reason they change their minds, whereas intelligent women do not, perhaps is because men don’t want status to get a mate (and children) but rather they want a mate (and children) to get status – they fear ostracism (see the Cyberball experiment: no matter how trivial the context, how low the stakes, ostracism generates great stress).
In the case of intelligent women, if it’s not only that men, no matter how intelligent, are not particularly interested in them (and we have seen that men may not be endogamous on intelligence), it might be due to some particularity of female sexuality. No matter how you take it, the burden of parenting is greater on women (although it has become absurdly heavy on men these days – but then, again, men will accept the burden if they think it can help them avoid ostracism). Now, something evolutionarily advantageous (or required) is pleasurable. Sex is. People derive enjoyment from sex in order for their genes to replicate (routine sex is hardly pleasurable because it is a by-product of sperm competition), but reproduction (gene replication) can be thwarted by contraception. If having children and having to have routine sex is viewed by a hedonistic intelligent woman as likely to prevent her from enjoying sex, she will not have children. Intelligent women are not reproductively successful because they’re more polyandrous. Studies show they’re indeed more testosteronized (cf. Nyborg). There is truth in the conservative view that a life of pleasure alienates the individual from family life. This being said, many other considerations beside sexual “emancipation” may conduce one to deliberately avoiding parenting, and, considering the above figures, it seems that such a deliberate choice is not so rare.
All in all, I do not think Kanazawa is justified, because a few intelligent women remain deliberately childless, to end his book by the question: “Why is the tendency [intelligence] to commit the greatest crime against nature [voluntary childlessness] the ultimate gauge of human worth?” He has not shown with sufficient clarity that such a breach against nature is really the crime of the intelligent; he has even brought forth data to the contrary. As to his questioning the value people place on intelligence, it is all the more irrelevant given that intelligence has become the main highway to social status.
Intelligence has become the main highway to social status – to a point. Very intelligent people may easily be barred from every opportunity by coalitions of less bright people as it is more difficult for them, due to sparse numbers, to form coalitions with as intelligent people as them.
Pure science does not pay as much as applied science, so the applied scientist must be more intelligent than the pure scientist because the former’s status is higher.
Another stimulating book that I recommend is Waistland: The (R)Evolutionary Science behind our Weight and Fitness Crisis (2007) by my friend Dr Deirdre Barrett from Harvard Medical School. (I call her my friend because I wish her well.) I am not going to discuss the book’s content, though; I just want to show its jacket (picture).
On this jacket you can see a prehistoric man standing on a big, bright-colored double cheeseburger. The book deals with the fact that we are not prepared to cope with an environment of abundantly available fatty foods and that this has provoked a major fitness crisis. The picture of the prehistoric man on the burger appears both on the front cover and the spine, so you can’t put the book in your library without seeing the flashy burger, even if only peripherally, when you look at your library unless you drop the jacket before.
This troubles me a lot because Deirdre writes: “Even more analogous to Tinbergen’s dummies, the exaggeration of visual elements in addictive foods often plays a role in hooking us” (p. 33) and “Food ads increase both immediate and long-term consumption of junk food.” (p. 90).
As I have repeatedly said in my series on advertising, advertisers today rely heavily on the effects associated with peripheral vision, in which peripheral stimuli are not treated by regions of the brain involved in conscious processes, so even if you think you never look at the burger in your library it will not escape your peripheral attention when you look in the direction of your library, and you’ll be the more easily hooked that you will not be mobilizing rational defenses.
At the same time that Deirdre warns against exaggerate visual elements and visual food ads that make us addict to junk food, she flashes gaudy burgers at her readers in this fashion! How is this possible? How can publishers treat their authors with such disregard and contempt? How can authors accept it and let their message be drawn in the dirt by publishing houses’ marketers? I am dissatisfied with my friend because she now looks like a fool.
We prefer our pets to other people and that’s fair. You know what it costs you to take care of a pet, but you don’t know what it may cost you to let another man live.
Beware the genius: He will dump our work and writings and our very names into insignificance and oblivion. We know why we want him dead – the sooner the better.
A writer is a person who writes books and then sends them to a grocer for his or her opinion.
The present section is dedicated to my friend X (an appropriate pseudonym), famous in the whole seventh arrondissement of Paris for having said: “I’m not interested in sex, only in porn.”
Dr Robin Baker wrote: “Sex is everywhere, from Web to television.” It will be our privilege to see that, when he wrote this, in 2006, sex was almost nowhere. It is us who will know what it means to say that sex is everywhere. (One major reason can be found in “Sperm-Improving Pornography,” xxxii) In the same way that exposure to commercial messages rose from 1,000 per day in 1989 to 10,000 per day in 2007 (a 900 percent increase in about twenty years)*, we shall witness an exponential increase in exposure to pornographic material in the next decades. (Those complaining that they just can’t turn their eyes somewhere without being flashed porn, will be instructed to respect the others’ choice and freedom.)
Porn is free (just type “porn” in your browser and enjoy). As advertisements on porn websites are still porn, in a way porn is even ad-free: You could watch the ads merely and still be enjoying porn. Porn is free and ad-free. What economics is that?
Product placement in porn: You could have the male performer wear nothing during the performance but a conspicuous pair of Nike sneakers for instance (the red ones). Masturbation conditioning is very efficient (cf. Rachman, Eysenck). Let a man masturbate to ejaculation repeatedly on porn scenes with product placement and he will afterwards “salivate” at the mere sight of the products on store displays. But brands don’t do that, I am told. Although they often enough rely on sexploitation in their advertising – with sycophants warning us to refrain from ejaculating outcries because there is no such thing as bad publicity –, they are very shy, then, when it comes to making use of the possibilities open to them with porn. What are they waiting for? Are they not after the money?
Mass media civilization means psychoticism, because mass media are conditioning maladaptive sexuality (crystal screen sexploitation conditioning), and psychotics, according to Eysenck, are the least conditionable.
“Research suggests that sexual content in still pictures elicits automatic attention in viewers.” (Annie Lang et al., in Sex in Advertising, 2003, ed. Tom Reichert & Jacqueline Lambiase) Evolution theory predicts that this will be true for men more than for women: “Symons proposed that the primary adaptations responsible for the occurrence of rape were the mechanisms involved in the human male’s greater visual sexual arousal [my emphasis], greater autonomous sex drive, reduced ability to abstain from sexual activity, much greater desire for sexual diversity per se, greater willingness to engage in impersonal sex, and less discriminating criteria for sexual partners.” (Thornhill & Palmer, A Natural History of Rape, 2000) Given these adaptations, porn is a male-impacting conditioning technology from which women are largely immune. The more porn addiction is consuming men’s time, the more men are removed from the social process, a tendency consistent with the idea that, as social progress means furthering the eradication of war and violence in human relationships, it implies the subjection of the most violent sex of the two.
“Rankings by Internet audience-tracking services ignore the popularity of such sites [porn sites].” (J. Lambiase, in Sex in Advertising). However, “Alexa Research found sex to be the most popular search term between March 1999 and January 2001, based on more than 42 million search pages viewed in aggregate by users at 10 portal or search engine Web sites.” (ibid.)
Sex is everywhere? We have seen nothing yet.
When my friend X (an appropriate pseudonym) said “I’m not interested in sex, only in porn,” I told him he couldn’t make babies by simply watching porn. He answered: “I’ve always fancied making children was something people had to be induced to by state help. As a rule the state taxes success. Progressive income tax is a tax on natural endowments, you know. We are a meritocracy that likes to load merit down. Here, however, by giving family policy money to all but the childless, the state remunerates reproductive success and taxes failure. This is madness.” Something along those lines. I think he’s barmy.
Caciquismo and Reproductive Inequalities
“A study that matched men and children based on seven blood types documented precisely how much more risk men lacking resources run of being genetically cuckolded. Of men in the highest socioeconomic bracket, only 2 percent of the children had fathers other than the putative father. Among the middle class, the genetic-cuckoldry rate rose to 12 percent. And among the lower class, the genetic-cuckoldry rate rose to 20 percent. Since genetic cuckoldry can only occur when women have affairs, it’s clear that men lacking resources experience more paternity uncertainty.” (David Buss, The Murderer Next Door, 2005).
The source is a study on a Mexican population (Cerda-Flores, Barton, Marty-Gonzalez, Rivas & Chakraborty, “Estimation of Nonpaternity in the Mexican Population of Nuevo Leon: A Validation Study with Blood Group Markers,” American Journal of Physical Anthropology, vol. 109, 1999). Apparently, Buss has no hesitation in generalizing these findings to Western societies. Mexico is an interesting country (I lived there as a child) but personally I would be more cautious about generalizing the results, if “developmental causes” (causal input from genes and environment) make any sense. Truly, Nuevo Leon is a rather advanced state in the country, with the same standard of living (according to Wikipedia) as Croatia or Poland, but the wealth and activity are concentrated in the state capital, Monterrey, the remaining parts being rural, poor, and probably very traditionally minded; so, much depends on the sample.
By traditionally minded, I mean traditional Mexican caciquismo, where high-status men must not be expected to be more literate nor articulate nor knowledgeable than the other men. In traditional societies IQ is more widespread across social classes, in advanced societies more concentrated in the upper classes (this is “meritocracy,” cf. Herrnstein & Murray 1994); and high IQ associates with traits such as restraint, conscientiousness, etc. Convincing data would be the correlation between symmetry (low fluctuating asymmetry) and status: if negative, or insignificant, I must be right because the springboard effect (see xxxii) must then be strong, the duality of women’s strategy must be great, they would cuckold the rich with the poor. In any case, developmental causes should make us cautious about generalizing results from one population to another.
My expectation as to the correlation between symmetry and status is that it is negative, but it seems that evolutionary psychologists’ expectation is the reverse. For instance, when Thornhill and Palmer equate symmetry with “greater social dominance,” one is led to think that symmetry means high status, but here is what they write: “That symmetric men appear to engage in more fights with other men than asymmetric men do may be due to their greater social dominance and their larger body size.” (A Natural History of Rape). Seemingly, Thornhill and Palmer equate social dominance with fistfight. As fistfight, however, is a clear sign that the endowments enabling one to cope with our societies’ high-status requirements are lacking, I cannot equate social dominance, in that case, with high status. We would be dealing only with the fringe, with gangsters and the like, people whose peculiar talents may enable them to secure resources and (what kind of) women, but not in the daylight nor in the broad arena.
If, now, by “fight” is meant economic or political competition, then as both nowadays take place in the context of cooperative organizations whose recruitment is based on academic degrees and where the characteristics of symmetric men are at a disadvantage – are simply not welcome –, the contention makes no sense at all. The myth that aggressiveness and “maleness” are requirements of top-management activities is a relic of a vanished past, sustained by media spin. Top managers of our private-public technostructure have solid records of geek compliance from Ivy League, Oxbridge, grandes écoles, and the like. Seeing them, based on spin and old adaptations, as caciques will not help you understand the world we live in.
Rape and Recantations
In xxxiii, I dealt with the debate regarding false accusations of rape by women in nineteenth-century Britain. With awe and shivers, I even stated that the whole affair might not merely be the display of rancid male chauvinism expected from such ages of darkness. Even evolutionary psychologists have not dared go that far and, tormented by guilt, I was about to recant.
The main point in my doubt was that those male chauvinists did not seem to be at all aware of the fact that it is costly for a woman to advertise herself as having being raped. For instance, “Many men whose partners have been raped express the feeling that they are now left with ‘damaged goods.’ They report that they cannot bear the thought of remaining with a woman who has been sexually violated by another man. According to one study, more than 80 percent of couples in which the woman was raped during the relationship end up breaking up.” (D. Buss, The Murderer Next Door). That, among other things, would make a false accusation of rape very costly to the woman, whatever her goals may be for lying.
However, new data came to my attention which shows that such false accusations are still frequent. “A careful study of 109 rape cases in the United States found 41 percent of rape accusations to be false as evidenced by the women’s own recantations (Kanin 1994).” (Thornhill and Palmer, A Natural History of Rape). The lie could be the recantation itself rather than the accusation, when the woman becomes aware afterwards of the cost to her fitness from being known or perceived as a rape victim. Still, these numerous recantations cannot all be lies (can they) and we remain with a significant number of false accusations, so much more puzzling because of their cost to the women themselves. Thornhill and Palmer go on saying: “The women studied gave three reasons for their false reports: providing an alibi for a consensual encounter that might have led to pregnancy, seeking revenge against a rejecting consensual male partner and obtaining sympathy and attention from kin and/or friends. Kanin emphasizes that false rape allegations ‘reflect desperate efforts to cope with personal and social stress situations’.” (ibid.) In the face of this new evidence, there is no recanting possible.
According to Thornhill and Palmer, 13 percent of American women over 18 report having being raped at least once in their life (from Kilpatrick et al. 1992, for the National Victim Center, Arlington, Virginia). They add: “Kilpatrick et al. estimate the percentage of rapes of women not reported at between 66 and 84.” This leads to vertiginous figures for, if 13 percent is correct, then, with a 84 percent figure of rapes unreported, the percentage of women actually raped would be 81.25; with 66 percent unreported, it would be 38.2**. Thus, the number of women raped in America would lie somewhere between about four and more than eight out of ten. In comparison, the International Statistics on Crime and Justice (2010) by the United Nations give a reported rape rate for US of 28.6 per 100,000 people (source Wikipedia), that is, 0.0286 percent. Who’s pulling our leg and why? Such fantastic discrepancies in official sources are very disturbing.
March 21, 2016
*“According to the industry house organ Advertising Age, the average North American perceives some 1,000 ads daily.” (W. B. Key 1989). & “People are inundated daily by an average of 10,000 sales messages” (Renvoisé and Morin 2007).
**If 84% of rapes are unreported, the 13 women out of a hundred who report having being raped are only 16% of all actual cases of rape, and in reality 1,300/16 = 81.25% of American women would have been raped (with some degree of correction for women being raped several times over their lifetime). If 66% are unreported, the actual number of raped women is 1,300/34 = 38.2%. (Maybe this little calculation is in fact irrelevant. If a young woman is raped, under threat not to talk, once every other day by her stepfather for years, that makes thousands of rapes but one victim. But, in that case, the supposed figures for unreported rapes are not much relevant either.)