Lessons in Law 5
Dec 2020. EN-FR
“The argument against censorship is clear: no person should dictate our tastes, ideas, or beliefs. No official has the right to say what is trash or what has value.” – Justice William O. Douglas
It’s more than just an argument against censorship in the sense of prior restraint:
“It is impossible to concede that by the words ‘freedom of the press’ the framers of the amendment intended to adopt merely the narrow view then reflected by the law of England that such freedom consisted only in immunity from previous censorship.” – Justice George Sutherland
In about all Western countries previous censorship, i.e. prior restraint, is past, but the amount of public prosecutions for speech is appalling in about all Western countries but the USA. In those countries it’s still the “narrow view then reflected by the law of England.“
Invasive Moderation (Part II)
Read Part I here.
Seriously why do these people think nobody has successfully sued Twitter for First Amendment violations? ([A Twitter user named] The First Amendment)
Perhaps because people such as TFA, the Twitter user here quoted, spread the erroneous notion that Twitter can’t be sued for their moderation. But if such a suit can’t be a First Amendment issue as they claim, make no mistake it will be a free speech issue nonetheless and you’ll see it happen: The First Amendment vs Free Speech.
The First Amendment suit to come:
1/ The First Amendment’s aim is to maintain a free “marketplace of ideas” (the first occurrence of the phrase was in Justice Holmes’s dissent on Abrams v. United States 1919);
2/ Trusts must be combated on that marketplace too, and “preferred freedoms doctrine” gives “greater protection to civil liberties than to economic interests.”
What cause of action do you think exists against Twitter for moderating content, putting notices on tweets, or restricting the ability to like or retweet certain tweets? (The First Amendment)
The cause is invasion upon others’ rights.
Not admitting that a platform can be sued for moderation is like saying they can staff their moderation offices with maniacs and that would be just as good. I claim a staff of lunatics would do a less prejudiced and prejudicial job than many a platform. They are an impediment to the free marketplace of ideas.
What rights? (The First Amendment)
a/ A notice on tweets could well be libel for ought I know, depending on the notice, but even a removal could have the same effect as to the person’s reputation. You tell me what rights libel laws protect.
One lawyer TFA has RTed said: Platforms’ moderation is by the First Amendment. I agree platforms must not be liable for users’ content but I disagree they must not be liable for moderation. Moderation is speech and not all speech is protected; moderation can be unprotected speech. A State of the Union address isn’t supposed to be libelous either but as a POTUS (President of the United States) once tweeted to advertise a certain pizza parlor we may see a future POTUS disparaging a burger parlor in his State of the Union address and that could be judged libelous by a court of law.
The worst scenario is platforms protected from liability both for users’ content and for their moderation – basically the current state of affairs.
b/ What rights? The same rights as here: “The conscious decision by an airline to deny a passenger a ticket for no good reason might justify the award of punitive damages.” (Encyclopedia of American Law, 2002, D. Schultz ed.: Punitive Damages) Similarly, the decision by a social media to deny a user speech for no good reason might justify the award of punitive damages. How could it be a good reason for a business set up with the corporate purpose of offering people a platform for speech, that it disagrees with what someone said?
I prevent Senator Ted Cruz (and the rest of Congress) from punishing private companies based on the content of the speech they allow or disallow on their websites. Companies have the First Amendment right to determine what speech is conveyed on their websites. (The First Amendment)
Take that statute: “In California, you [a business] also can’t discriminate based on someone’s unconventional dress.” This California statute goes beyond the Civil Rights Act’s protected classes. It’s still in vigor as of Sep 3, 2020. Dress, like an armband in the famous precedent, is speech, so in fact Cal companies don’t “have the First Amendment right to determine what speech is conveyed” on their premises already.
Besides, “The conscious decision by an airline to deny a passenger a ticket for no good reason might justify the award of punitive damages.” (See above for source and brief discussion.)
No, YouTube is not “violating Section 230” by deleting videos that question election results. YouTube could say that it won’t allow any uploads by professors named Jeff, and that wouldn’t “violate Section 230.” (It would, of course, be terribly short-sighted). (Asst. Prof J. Kosseff)
Short-sighted indeed: “The conscious decision by an airline to deny a passenger a ticket for no good reason might justify the award of punitive damages.” Perhaps it wouldn’t violate Section 230 but I wouldn’t advise it all the same.
The SCOTUS (Supreme Court of the United States) has stressed time and again that the First Amendment ensures the free flow of information and ideas. If private actors turn out an impediment to that free flow, I rest assured the Court will uphold “antitrust” statutes that combat the problem.
No. The First Amendment applies to state actors. To hold otherwise would require SCOTUS to reverse longstanding First Amendment doctrine. (TFA)
TFA’s is a quite correct inference from the First Amendment and yet it is also misleading, because a balancing must be made with another inference which is the free flow of ideas, and the result must depend on how these conflicting yet both necessary inferences are weighed against each other. There’s no doubt in my mind that the free flow of information and ideas will prevail, as common law never has construed private property as a source of entirely discretionary power.
As to the doctrine TFA stresses, it is right insofar as the two inferences were not conflicting in the past and it is only since recently that they have been.
Des goûts et des couleurs
Le débat sur les « valeurs » communes a eu lieu il y a plus de 75 ans aux États-Unis, et ce pays libre a évidemment tranché dans un sens contraire à la majorité française actuelle avec sa loi contre le séparatisme : “While acknowledging that fostering national unity or shared values was important, the Court rejected the claim that it could force people to share or adopt values” Commentaire à l’arrêt West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnett (1943).
Aussi, quand on dit que le projet de loi contre le séparatisme est fait pour que nous restions un pays libre, c’est évidemment le contraire de la vérité : ce projet de loi est fait pour que la France reste un pays non libre.
Le contraire de rester un pays libre est en effet de rester un pays non libre, et non pas être un pays libre qui devient un pays non libre. Les Français ne savent pas ce qu’est la liberté et ne savent pas non plus qu’ils ne le savent pas.
Il y a devant nous plusieurs façons de rester un pays non libre : ou bien adopter la loi de sécurité globale puis la loi sur le séparatisme, ou bien ne pas les adopter, ou bien adopter l’une et pas l’autre et alors laquelle. C’est vrai qu’on a l’embarras du choix.
Quand l’État chinois a mis en place la reconnaissance faciale à tous les coins de rue, les commentateurs français n’ont pas fait des articles sur le thème : « Les Chinois perdent leurs libertés. » En effet, les commentateurs français ne sont tout de même pas demeurés au point de supposer des libertés aux Chinois de Chine maoïste avant la reconnaissance faciale et le système de crédit social. Ils voient bien de loin mais pas de près, je ne sais plus comment ça s’appelle.
A Country Where Pornography Isn’t Obscene?
Given that “obscenity is not protected under First Amendment rights to free speech,” it is puzzling that U.S. law doesn’t affirm at the same time a presumption against the whole pornographic industry.
That in American law obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment and yet most pornography is, is beyond my understanding. I honestly fail to see how the bulk of porn videos and pictures can pass the “redeeming value” test set up by the courts as I’m told they do. So maybe scholars are wrong and it simply isn’t true that “pornographic materials are protected by the First Amendment” as far as the bulk of them is concerned, and that so long as porn is cordoned off, “redlight-districted,” so to speak, authorities don’t prosecute. That would be law enforcement discretion, choosing not to prosecute obscenity when it is cordoned off. The reason we would fail to see it this way is that such an extensive use of discretion is at odds with our sense of what the rule of law ought to be.
Single defendants are more likely to be convicted and more harshly by a court of law. I think I read it in an American law encyclopedia but forgot to mark the passage. Anyway, the first thing a criminal judge asks defendants is their marital status and whether they have kids.
Given that “the first thing a criminal judge asks defendants is their marital status and whether they have kids” and what I have read about judicial discrimination against singles, all convicted singles can appeal convictions on the ground of singlism.
The First Amendment Protection
of Speech and Assembly Which Advocate Violence
“Otherwise, the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect even speech and assembly which advocate violence.” (Encyclopedia of American Law, D. Schultz ed: Brandenburg v. Ohio)
“Otherwise” = when speech is not intended to produce “imminent lawless action”(1) and not “likely to produce such action”(2).
The use of the negative form here (by me) is confusing. The decision poses (1) and (2) as compounded, not alternate conditions: there must be both the intent to produce imminent lawless action and, independent of the intent, an actual likelihood as to result. If one of the two conditions is missing, speech is protected.
Depuis la chute du Rideau de fer, l’Union européenne est le dernier régime stalinien au monde.
Un magistrat soumis au devoir de réserve, tu te demandes ce qu’il fait en dehors de la salle, s’il vient d’un meeting politique, d’une réunion d’association, d’écrire pour un journal, de publier un livre… Non, tu te dis qu’il sort d’un cercueil dans sa robe noire et qu’il y retourne.
Un bon avocat ne gagne pas forcément plus d’affaires qu’un mauvais, car il faut aussi que le juge soit bon.
Le meilleur des mondes meilleurs
Ce pays n’a pas d’autre nom pour le droit relatif à la liberté d’expression que « droit de la presse ». La presse que l’administration arrose de subventions. Comme c’est commode. Le meilleur des mondes.
C’était le meilleur des mondes… avant internet. L’État français fait aujourd’hui ce qu’il faut pour maintenir sa doctrine compte tenu d’internet : loi Avia, loi de sécurité globale, loi contre le séparatisme… Dire que l’État français devient autoritaire, c’est ne pas comprendre l’évolution. En effet, ce n’est pas parce qu’il adopte ces lois que l’État français devient autoritaire mais c’est parce qu’il est autoritaire qu’il adopte ces lois. Parce qu’il est autoritaire et qu’il entend le rester malgré internet.
S’agissant du droit de manifester, tant que les Français manifestaient encadrés par des syndicats subventionnés (les cotisations représentent moins de 30 % du financement des syndicats), ils croyaient à la liberté de manifester. Depuis qu’ils veulent se passer des syndicats, ils trouvent que l’État leur met des bâtons dans les roues.
La justice pour mineurs suit un principe d’atténuation de la peine. C’est pourquoi un garde des sceaux parlera d’autant plus fortement des droits des victimes dans la justice des mineurs que le principe qui sous-tend cette dernière s’y oppose. Dans la justice des mineurs, la peine est atténuée par principe mais, pour la victime, l’acte est ce qu’il est, les dommages sont ce qu’ils sont, peut-être même plus violents que si le coupable avait été adulte car « On n’est pas sérieux quand on a dix-sept ans »… Et c’est pourquoi le grand sujet, dans la justice des mineurs, le grand sujet défendu avec ardeur par les ministres successifs, ce sont les droits des victimes – qui ne peuvent avoir en justice des mineurs et tant qu’elle existera qu’une place au rabais.
Criminal penalties are illegal as they are grounded on the hubristic notion that the society is owned by its representatives, namely, at the date of the notion’s emergence, the king. Criminal law and criminal penalties are the artefact by which kings dispossessed traditional justices.
The consequence is that the judicial system is clueless about how to integrate “victim’s rights” => “victim justice, or what is often referred to as parallel justice“! It’s no integration at all but parallelization.
When you’ve got parallel justices but no double jeopardy doctrine, then you do the defendants an injustice. (To have parallel lines you need at least two lines, even in case they overlap.)
A Chronology of Desegregation in the USA
Cut-ups from the Encyclopedia of American Law
(Read sections Brown v. Board of Education & Desegregation and One Bused Nation from Lesson 4 here.)
As late as 1992 the state of Mississippi was before the Court because it was continuing to maintain a dual university system (United States v. Fordice) (about 40 years after Brown v. Board of Education).
In 1991 the Supreme Court ruled that once a school district eliminated “the vestiges of prior discrimination,” it no longer had to maintain racial balances. Oklahoma City Board of Education v. Dowell (1991)
In September 1999 a judge of the district court involved in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklemburg Board of Education (1971) found that the Charlotte-Mecklemburg School District had eliminated all traces of intentional racial discrimination and so ordered it to stop its massive busing program.
Finally, a counterpart to de jure segregation is de facto segregation, which refers to division of races based on residential patterns. De facto is not mandated by the state or required under law. Instead it is a voluntary form of segregation. De facto has been recognized by the Supreme Court, which ruled that because it was based on private action it did not allow for a judicial remedy. In the case of Milliken v. Bradley (1974) the Court ruled that de facto segregation in residential patterns could not be remedied by forced busing of students from suburban schools to urban schools.
In the USA coroners are elected officials in a majority of states (“More than 80 percent of U.S. coroners are elected“). In 2016 the Progressives of ThinkProgress published a paper “Why do we still elect coroners?” which conclusion –no surprise from Stalinians– is to stop electing them.
They give the example of one coroner in whose reports “suspicious deaths in police custody were simply accidents or natural causes.” What those Stalinians don’t tell you is that in countries where coroners aren’t elected, they ALL declare such suspicious deaths as natural.
The First Amendment Protection of Book Burning
“Books won’t stay banned. They won’t burn. Ideas won’t go to jail. In the long run of history, the censor and the inquisitor have always lost. The only sure weapon against bad ideas is better ideas. ” – Alfred Whitney Griswold
“They won’t burn”? Book burning is protected speech.
Picture: Comic books burning in Spencer W.Va. [West Virginia], 1948 (AP Photo via mtsu.edu Middle Tennessee State University’s First Amendment Encyclopedia)
Of course Griswold meant “books won’t burn as a result of state action.” However, I’m sure some people would cry foul state-sponsorship if a GOP local section carried out book burnings while the governor or POTUS is a Republican, for instance. Book burning is free speech.
“Books won’t burn as a result of state action without judicial redress” isn’t the same as “books won’t burn,” to begin with. People have the constitutional right to burn books. The ambiguity of Griswold (or is it GRIMswold?)’s words is unescapable. “Books won’t burn” has a smell of “You won’t burn books,” a threat at people who would exercize their First Amendment right to burn books in public in protest against those books spreading like morbid germs.
Lessons in Law / Cours de droit 4
Nov-Dec 2020 EN-FR
Il faut beaucoup de bureaux pour faire un monde meilleur.
Aux USA, les syndicats sont historiquement opposés à l’immigration : « labor unions, historically wary of immigrants as a cheap-labor threat » (Encyclopedia of American Law, 2002, Ed. D. Schultz: Immigration & Naturalization Service) En France, les syndicats sont tous pro-immigration. Dans un de ces pays, les syndicats de travailleurs servent les intérêts de leurs adhérents. Dans l’autre, les syndicats sont les alliés du patronat. Je vous laisse dire qui est qui.
Stalin’s genocide of Crimean and Caucasian Muslims after WWII is being denied in Russia and the West by and large.
« Le 12 novembre 2015, le Parlement d’Ukraine et, le 9 mai 2019, le Parlement de Lettonie reconnaissent la déportation des Tatars de Crimée comme un génocide. » (Page Wkpd Déportation [sic] des Tatars de Crimée) La page Wkpd française n’est pas à jour : après l’Ukraine et la la Lettonie, la Lituanie (6/6/2019) et le Canada (10/6/2019) ont également reconnu le génocide stalinien des Tatars de Crimée : cf Wkpd page en anglais.
+ même page : « Ukrainian singer Jamala dedicated her 2016 Eurovision winning song 1944 to the deported [genocided!] Crimean Tatars. »
In contrast, Soviet mass deportation of Chechens and Ingush the same year (1944) « was acknowledged by the European Parliament as an act of genocide in 2004 » (Wkpd). There was no difference with Soviet treatment of Crimean Tatars. So…
Les lois de vérité historique portent atteinte :
-aux libertés académiques : principe à valeur constitutionnelle ;
-à la liberté d’enseignement : principe à valeur constitutionnelle ;
-à la liberté de conscience : principe à valeur constitutionnelle ;
mais ça existe en France.
Une telle loi ne peut exister qu’au prix d’une interprétation des libertés précitées qui les vide de toute substance. Si bien qu’il faut nécessairement dire qu’en France il n’y a ni liberté académique, ni liberté d’enseignement, ni liberté de conscience.
First Amendement Law vs Free Speech
Sarah Palin is awesome and there is going to be a large lawsuit against Twitter on first amendment rights. (S.T., Nov 26)
To allow internet platforms, which have become the Agora of the day, to suppress free speech because they’re private businesses and no government, will soon prove antiquated.
As “Privately-Run Libraries Expand Throughout U.S.” (Center for Digital Education, 2015), if privately-run libraries are private organizations re First Amendment law and the Amendment “does not impact the ability of private organizations to limit speech,” one sees the consequences. It’s about “privately-run public libraries,” like in the news: “A Maryland company that runs public libraries faces opposition as it seeks to add the 24 libraries in California’s Kern County to its portfolio of 82 in six states.” – my question being: Is a privately-run public library a private or public organization re First Amendment law? If private, then Board of Education v. Pico (US Supreme Court, 1982) doesn’t apply and these libraries are free to withhold any of their books from readers.
As private businesses are already constrained to not discriminate based on race, ethnicity etc according to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, this is no big step further to constrain them to not discriminate based on speech either.
If the First Amendment has value, it is because one’s opinions are one’s life (even if one is free to change one’s mind) and it is the fear of consequences that must be stopped, whether the feared consequences are prosecutions or the loss of one’s livelihood. – If we admit this, then not only private businesses should not be allowed to discriminate against employees but also against customers such as internet platform users based on speech.
With or without section 230 website owners have the right to determine what speech is conveyed on their property. (Emgorse, Dec 5)
Are they allowed to determine who conveys speech on their property based on the color of one’s skin? – As one’s speech reflects one’s opinions and one’s opinions are one’s inner life, I see the view here expressed as no different than that of people who advocate discrimination based on ethnicity etc. Besides, given that democracy lives on the free flow of ideas (“the marketplace of ideas“), and considering the nature of internet platforms, comparing them with family households is unsustainable re First Amendment.
The Good Samaritan clause in section 230 indeed provides immunity from civil liabilities for providers that restrict content but only if they act “in good faith” in this action. => Free flow of information and ideas. “Section 230(c)(2) provides Good Samaritan protection from civil liability for operators of interactive computer services in the removal or moderation of material they deem obscene or offensive, even of constitutionally protected speech, AS LONG AS it is done in good faith.” Wkpd
Assuming that [“I see the view here expressed as no different than that of those who advocate discrimination based on ethnicity”] was the case, so what if it was? Would you treat him differently because of his views, also becoming like those who discriminate based on ethnicity? (digital slime, Dec 6)
If I were an internet platform, you mean? Because that’s the topic.
Who has the power to discriminate? The provider, not the user. Restaurant owners are individuals but as they’re on the hiring side of the handle, it is them are asked to not discriminate against protected categories, not the waiters.
We’re all equal before the law but also its allows for differences when situations are different. When managerial decisions are concerned, individuals are concerned qua managers. So d.s.’s question is irrelevant as it draws the same consequences whether there’s “qua” or not, or this or that “qua.”
D.s. agrees there are individuals qua “public officials” but seems to forget there also are individuals qua “public figures” (not working in the public sector) and as far as section 230 is concerned individuals qua websites who are liable for their moderation when not done “in good faith.”
In any case there can be no claim of total shielding from disputes about moderation, not least because users may find they’re moderated contrary to the platform’s very own guidelines. Deceptive terms of service are illegal: “Deceptive terms and conditions void a contract in entirety.” (Duick v. Toyota Motor Sales USA Inc, Cal. App. 2 Dist.) Moderation contrary to TOS would be evidence, at the very least when consistently contrary.
Deceptive terms voiding a contract is a separate issue. One that shouldn’t actually come up since most social media sites reserve the right to remove you for any reason any way. (digital slime)
Come up with evidence of deceptive terms, deceptive moderation and other deceptive practices by social media and the judge will make them pay.
According to d.s.’s reasoning, a moderator could moderate his ex-girlfriend in an invading fashion like an electronic stalker and get off scot-free.
Justice for all. The responsibility for invasive moderation, like some say is found on platforms, is the moderator’s, owner or staff; the owner cannot shield a manic staff moderator but the staff’s defence can be that he abided by the contract.
Une manifestante lyonnaise, légèrement blessée par un tir de LBD en 2019, a obtenu une décision favorable du tribunal administratif mercredi. Ces dernières années, quatre hommes ont déjà été indemnisés par ce biais, sans condamnation pénale du tireur. (Mediapart, 26 nov.)
Il ne manquerait plus qu’une action devant la justice administrative empêche de saisir le juge pénal, alors même qu’une décision favorable du TA est, face aux manoeuvres de l’IGPN complice, bien souvent la seule preuve que la victime peut faire valoir devant un juge judiciaire.
La doctrine est qu’une faute de l’agent permet de saisir le juge judiciaire. Or si le régime de « responsabilité sans faute » devant le tribunal administratif sert à empêcher le JJ d’être saisi, ce régime est moins protecteur qu’il n’y paraît car rien ne responsabilise alors les agents. En effet, le régime de responsabilité sans faute de l’État sert alors à couvrir toutes les possibles fautes des agents, et même si l’État a ensuite, dans ce cadre, des moyens de rétorsion contre l’agent, c’est de la cuisine interne à l’administration, loin des regards.
Hate speech laws are something democracies and dictatorships have in common. Or is USA the only democracy in the world? #GodBlessAmerica
No speech is protected if it incites violence. (D.B., Nov 28)
WRONG. No speech is protected if it incites “imminent lawless action“: Brandenburg v. Ohio, US Supreme Court, 1969.
“Imminent” means that speech is protected when it “amounts to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action [like violence] at some indefinite future time“: Hess v. Indiana, 1973.
The American Constitution protects speech that incites violence in some cases and I should say most cases. D.B.’s view is the same misunderstanding that led Misters Brandenburg and Hess to be prosecuted in violation of the Constitution.
D.B.’s phrasing is misleading. “Inciting violence”, when it is “advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time” is protected speech, so the Court does not examine whether speech incites violence, only whether it incites “imminent lawless action.”
The “imminent lawless action” test is more stringent than the earlier “clear and present danger” test, so even speech that wouldn’t pass a “clear and present danger” test is now protected. Thus, to tell people they can’t “incite violence” is to mislead people, as they are constitutionally entitled to advocate riots, bombings, killings, you name it, as long as it is in “some indefinite future time.” And if it is true that the imminent lawless action test is more protective of speech than the earlier clear and present danger test, then advocacy of violence is protected not only when adressing some indefinite future time – because of the word “present.” As the less protective test contains the notion of “present danger,” one is bound to think that the more protective test has discarded it, and that “imminent action” being not the same as “present danger” there can be present (not future) danger and yet no imminence of lawless action.
Depuis janvier 2019, dans le cadre de la politique de francisation du français, on ne dit plus « one man show » mais « Grand Débat National ». Exemple : « Pierre Emmanuel Barré a reçu une standing ovation à la fin de son Grand Débat National aux Folies Bergères. »
Brown v. Board of Education and Desegregation
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka et al. (1954) was based on massive empirical evidence that segregation in the Southern states did not live up to the standard of separate but equal. Yet Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) had been based on the a priori possibility of the standard, which cannot be disproved by empirical evidence. An a priori possibility is to be rejected by statement of a priori impossibility, statement that is lacking in Brown v. Board as it relies on empirical facts. From empirical facts only, the conclusion could well have been that segregation be redesigned, started anew.
As the conclusion from the empirical evidence could be either ending segregation or redesigning it, the decision to end segregation would require an additional a priori impossibility justification that cannot be found in Brown v. Board. So the Court’s conclusion exceeded the premise, as the only ways open to the Court, absent a statement of a priori impossibility, was redesigning or leaving it to the states to decide.
Desegregation was postulated rather than inferred by the Court, whose reasoning in the case is a mere petitio principii (the fallacy known as begging the question).
Petitio principii i.e. begging the question: Based on empirical evidence, on empirical evidence only, you can’t have the imperative of desegregation in the conclusion if you don’t put it in the premises yourself (if you don’t postulate it no matter what the evidence is).
In Brown v. Board, unanimous justices say: Segregated schools are not equal and we believe they can’t be. We see the main part for them is “Segregated schools are not equal,” whereas “they can’t be” is a minor point in their eyes, as a belief suffices. Yet from one about to conclude with mandatory desegregation, one was expecting not a mere belief that “they can’t be” but a formal demonstration: an a priori demonstration of an impossibility per se.
Moreover, the very fact that unanimous justices wouldn’t express more than a belief is testimony that the documents sent by the NAACP and attorney Thurgood Marshall were wanting on that side of the issue. And it wasn’t bad faith on the justices’ part, as they granted desegregation.
According to commentators, the NAACP articulated some demonstration of the kind, well aware, then, that such a demonstration was unavoidable, but in the end justices expressed a mere belief, the polite way to say the demonstration was worthless. Without offering one of their own.
One Bused Nation
As of precedent of Sep 1999, when a school district has “eliminated all traces of intentional racial discrimination,” busing programs must be stopped. How may one think this is not starting over with segregation, as said elimination was the result of busing only?
Busing made mixed schools. End busing and you get segregated schools again, because busing did not mix neighborhoods.
What can lead from busing to mixed neighborhoods is that families find busing so impractical, burdensome and punitive they prefer moving in the neighborhoods where their kids are bused, in order to avoid this busing hell. As if the inspiration for desegregation designers were Machiavelli rather than the Founding Fathers.