Tagged: criminal law
Law 19: There are no manufacturers of corpora delicti
EN-FR
EN
The Female Party
“Nearly two-thirds of all Democrats are women; here we see the much-discussed gender gap as less than half of the Republicans are female.” (Maisel, American Political Parties and Elections, 2016)
From same source: “In a Gallup poll conducted in June 2015, 31 percent [of Americans] identified themselves as Democrats, 25 percent as Republicans, and 41 percent as independents.”
Assuming the ratios for party membership stand also for people who “identify as” (as a matter of fact I see no reason, no explanatory factor why both ratios should be significantly different), we’ve got the highest proportion of males among “independents.” Independent, therefore, sounds a lot like males who cannot identify with party politics.
According to my calculations, the figures are (source says, in the first quote above, “nearly two third,” and “less than half” [meaning “not significantly less,” I believe, otherwise the source is saying nothing of quantitative value], so these figures are approximations [also because 31+25+41 doesn’t add up to 100 percent]):
20.6 percent of the American population are female Dem;
12.5 female Rep;
13.6 female independents;
10.3 male Dem;
12.5 male Rep;
27.3 male independents.
By order of magnitude: male independent (27.3) > female Dem (20.6) > female independent (13.6) > male & female Rep (12.5 twice) > male Dem (10.3).
There are twice as many Democratic women as Democratic men in the USA. There is an equal number of Republican men and women. And there are twice as many independent men as independent women. These imbalances, except in the case of the Republican party, are in dire need of an explanation. (The “gender gap” explains nothing, especially considering the absence of imbalance in one category.)
You can check my calculations are right in this quick way: 20.6=2(10.3) “there are twice as many Democratic women as Democratic men,” which is the same as “(Nearly) two-thirds of all Democrats are women,” since if you take 9, two thirds of 9 is 6, one third is 3, and 6=2(3).
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There are no manufacturers of corpora delicti
Abstract: The claim that gun manufacturers are treated differently than other manufacturers is unsubstantiated, in contract, consumer protection, and tort law. Arguments for gun control often overlook a general principle of law that may be encapsulated in the words “There are no manufacturers of corpora delicti.”
i
“New York Will Allow People to Sue Gun Manufacturers for Violence.” Cuomo was elected at the wrong election, in fact he wanted to be a judge. Now he is governor and he thinks he can tell courts what their decisions should be?
There already were trials against arms manufacturers, notably after Sandy Hook. But also there is the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act. Adoption of the act was obviously intended as a shield against the bad faith of Second Amendment opponents who want to hold arms manufacturers liable not for failing to deliver as stipulated but on the contrary for complying with business regulations and contract stipulations.
Example: “The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act shields the gun industry from nearly all civil liability for the dangers their products pose. With nearly every American industry and product, civil liability can be used as an important check on irresponsible manufacturers and sellers—but not the gun industry.” (Giffords Law Center: To prevent gun violence)
A gun manufacturer is liable if he sells a defective, hazardous gun, like any other manufacturer. What the opponents want is to make the manufacturers liable for weapons that function as stipulated in contracts and according to reasonable safety expectations, and under the rule of law there can be no such liability in this world.
Opponents talk of “dangerous products” as if the aim of a weapon were not, precisely, to be dangerous (in order to deter aggression and crime). The dangerous products of contract law are products which use is beneficial besides their dangerousness, so the category cannot as such apply to guns, which benefice lies in their very dangerousness, their purposeful dangerousness. Dangerous guns as to contract law are defective guns which use presents a danger to the user mainly; there is no liability regarding the gun’s normal danger to other people (to whom the gun is dangerous on purpose, in case they need to be deterred).
The trials that courts have examined and will continue to examine no matter what governor Cuomo says about it are cases of normal liability. But opponents want to create a new judicial category that cannot exist.
ii
A gun is a deterrent and as such it is dangerous. It is dangerous as such.
You need explosives to drill tunnels. Explosives are “dangerous products” as to tort law because you need them to drill tunnels and at the same time their use is dangerous. Therefore liability might be involved when the danger turns out to cause injury. That is to say, when you use explosives, normally you don’t cause injury, you only open a tunnel.
On the other hand, when you use a gun, basically you harm or kill someone and–mind you–that’s the expected outcome of the lawful use of the gun (self-defense). Generally speaking you don’t need to use the guns you own because owning them is a sufficient deterrent most of the times.
Everyone (except a few “law centers”) thus sees that guns are not the usual dangerous products of tort law, as the danger guns pose is the very aim of their lawful ownership and use.
Since opponents to the right to bear arms wanted to remain blind to such crystal-clear distinctions, the legislator felt compelled to pass the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, in order to prevent complacent courts to call guns “dangerous” and hold manufacturers liable as if we were dealing with explosives needed to open tunnels, which would be a devious way to suppress the Second Amendment, emptying it out, without due constitutional amendment process.
iii
Just let me know if you have ever heard of a manufacturer held liable for damages caused by the unlawful use of his products. This is what opponents to the right to bear arms want for gun manufacturers.
They say: ‘’When products cause damages, manufacturers are liable. Guns kill people, so gun manufacturers must be held liable.’’ This is nonsense. It is when their products are used in a lawful expected way and yet causing damage, due to a defect, that manufacturers may be held liable. If on the other hand someone kills another one with say a screwdriver, the manufacturer cannot be held liable for the loss of one’s life.
With guns the lawful and the unlawful uses both have the same outcome: injury or death of people (leaving aside such uses as hunting and shooting sports). When people kill others with guns unlawfully, the manufacturer is not liable. And when someone kills another lawfully, in self-defense, then his gun worked as expected. There can be no trial unless someone needed to fire a gun and it did not work as expected.
iv
“I’ve heard of pharmaceutical companies being prosecuted for not making it hard enough to open their packages to keep the content from candy-seeking children.“
The suits my interlocutor talks about are normal liability cases, what one may expect, not necessarily what one may reasonably expect, it depends on the claims, but what one may expect within the boundaries of the rule of law. What the opponents to the right to bear arms are up to is quite different, it isn’t possible to give them reason without violating the consistency of legal principles.
Manufacturers, like the pharmaceutical companies in the example, are expected to deliver reasonably safe products–gun manufacturers too and guns have safety locks.
In the same way that you cannot sue (win a suit against) a pharmaceutical company when someone uses their medicines to deliberately poison another person to death, you cannot sue gun manufacturers for the unlawful shooting of innocent people. There’s no exception to the principle that I know or can think of.
A product turned tool of crime, a part of corpus delicti, shifts to quite another sphere. There is no “manufacturer” of that “new” object. There are no manufacturers of corpora delicti because crime is in criminal intention (mens rea) and there is nothing a manufacturer could do to prevent people from having criminal intentions. A manufacturer can improve the technicalities of his products as well as consumer information about the products’ potential hazards so that their use is as safe as possible, but his action cannot reach further than his products, that is, he has no control over people’s lives. (The impact of marketing and advertising is an entirely different issue and here we do not examine the prospects of suing manufacturers for their advertisements, only the prospects of suing them for “violence” as in the New York statute.)
Reminder: “The five elements of a crime. (1) Actus reus–The guilty act (2) Mens rea–The guilty mind (3) Concurrence–The coexistence of (i) an act in violation of the law and (ii) a culpable mental state (4) Causation–The concurrence of mind and act must produce (5) Harm.”
That leaves open tort litigation against gun manufacturers if the shooter is declared insane and criminally irresponsible. Perhaps, because then the shooting is not a crime. But then again, a manufacturer has no influence over people’s state of mind; here insanity cannot be distinguished from criminal intent. What could be argued is that gun manufacturers have an influence over the whole nation’s state of mind, making it violent, but this kind of reasoning cannot be used in judicial proceedings, which bear on individual cases, and may be food for the legislator’s thought qua legislator subject to the Constitution. (If such reasoning could be used in a court of law, that would excuse all violent criminals.)
v
One cannot sue (win a suit against) manufacturers for tort damages when a crime is committed with one of their products. This is what opponents to the right to bear arms push for. They push for their reform not by saying they want all manufacturers to be suable for damages when crimes are committed with their products but by saying they want the general law of torts applied to gun manufacturers as it is to any other manufacturer, but the truth is that gun manufacturers are already within the general law and if we were to give reason to the opponents to the right to bear arms we would make gun manufacturers liable in situations where the other manufacturers are not.
As to someone’s claim that “you can sue anyone for tort damages,” the opponents themselves are not so sure, as shown in the recent news “New York Will Allow People to Sue Gun Manufacturers for Violence.” A bill–or whatever state or local act–is needed in their eyes.
Another bill is the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (2005) “that protects firearms manufacturers and dealers from being held liable when crimes have been committed with their products.” There was no need of such a bill because the described protection is a necessary consequence of foundational notions of law, is a general unwritten principle which we encapsulate in the words “There are no manufacturers of corpora delicti.”
As gun manufacturers cannot be held responsible in situations where other manufacturers are not without violating the general principle that there are no manufacturers of corpora delicti, no legislative body or court is granted the constitutional power to make such a move. If guns are to be treated in the overriding fashion that opponents want, it has to be through constitutional amendment, probably not only by removal of the Second Amendment but also by allowing expressly tort suits against manufacturers for the unlawful use of their products, or by forbidding individuals to carry guns.
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Ladies and gentlemen, the sartorially correct Bishop of Stockholm. Complete with cassock, mitre and crosier.
“Eva Brunne is the first openly lesbian bishop of a mainstream church in the world and the first bishop of the Church of Sweden to be in a registered same-sex partnership.” (Wikipedia) (2009-2019)
ii
Archbishop Antje Jackelén, primate of the Church of Sweden. “The first female archbishop,” since 2014 strongly dedicated to apparel tradition.
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Taney
They blame Chief Justice Taney (Scott v. Sandford, 1857) for “seeing slavery in the Constitution” but if slavery was not in the Constitution, why did slaveowners and the Southern States ratify it? You had to convince them that slavery was in the Constitution to obtain their ratification, and if you turned out to be convincing then it probably is because it is true that slavery was in the Constitution, even if you did not believe it yourself and thought you were lying to slaveowners.
I disagree with late (conservative failed nominee to the Supreme Court) Robert Bork: A constitutional amendment was indeed necessary to end slavery in the United States, and Taney was a correct interpret of the Constitution.
Picture: Taney statue removed from Maryland state house (Aug 2017).
(For a discussion of Bork’s views, see Law 8.)
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Charged For
(Name a Crime, not a Freedom)
Former highschool student charged for putting Hitler quote in yearbook. (New York Post, July 13, 2021)
New York Post‘s headline is sheer disinformation, of which their own article gives ample evidence. The kid is charged for “computer crimes for accessing a database used by students to alter two classmates’ entries.”
The so-called “Hitler quote” are the words “It is a quite special secret pleasure how the people around us fail to realize what is really happening to them,” which the kid “incorrectly attributed” to George Floyd. To detect that these were actually Hitler’s words requires a level of specialization far beyond the average, and if, to boot, as the paper seems to say, the kid did not know they were Hitler’s words (obviously, if the kid “incorrectly” attributed the words to George Floyd, it means he did not change the author’s name on purpose, knowingly), you may not talk of a Hitler quote at all.
The second quote is thus described by NYP: “Tryon, 18, also reportedly inserted a quote in a second student’s yearbook entry referencing drugs and Boston bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who was convicted in the April 2013 attack that killed three people and wounded more than 260 others.” There’s not a jot of information in this, it could mean anything, the quote could either be apology of terrorism, or indictment of terrorism, or something entirely different for all we know. Obviously, NYP doesn’t care what the content of this quote is, they had their headline with the “Hitler quote” and that was good enough for these muckrakers.
But, again, the case is not at all about a Hitler quote. The headline should not read “charged for putting Hitler quote in yearbook” because under the rule of law people are charged for crimes and a Hitler quote, even in a yearbook, is not a crime.
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Libel Law and the Political Cartel 2
Trust in US mainstream media hits rock bottom. (Reclaim the Net)
This is why Justices Thomas and Gorsuch’s view that New York Times Co. v. Sullivan should be reversed must not be heeded to. Libel law must remain favorable to the messenger when the message deals with public officials and public figures. Smear campaigns by disreputable media do little harm. On the other hand, giving public officials (read, mainly, politicians) a convenient weapon in libel law woud Canadize U.S.A. (see Law 18: Libel Law and Political Cartel). I go as far as saying that current U.S. libel law is what has made U.S. mainstream media fall into general disrepute, as the media felt unbound and that has been their fall because they lack integrity.
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Taxes and Irresponsible Police
‘’Defund the police’’ is the logical sequel to Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales (SCOTUS 2005). No one needs (as no one should rely on) irresponsible police. To pay taxes for this is madness plain and simple.
‘’Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled, 7–2, that a town and its police department could not be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failing to enforce a restraining order, which had led to the murder of a woman’s three children by her estranged husband.’’ (Wikipedia)
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FR
« On n’est pas en Turquie »
Rappelez-vous. Macron réfute toute dérive autoritaire : « On n’est pas en Turquie. » (Huffington Post, 4/12/20)
Or quel pays figure avec la Turquie parmi les États « sous surveillance » (under watch) en matière de censure internet ? La France, seul État occidental dans cette catégorie avec l’Australie (et la Norvège mais seulement pour les métadonnées transnationales : « only the metadata on traffic that crosses Norwegian borders »). (Wikipédia : Internet Censorship)
A noter que parmi les « ennemis d’internet », donc la catégorie encore en-dessous dans cette classification de Reporters sans frontières, à côté des dictatures auxquelles on s’attend (Chine…), on trouve les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni. Depuis Trump, les États-Unis ne cherchent même pas à garantir un principe de « neutralité du Net », donc rien d’étonnant puisque les acteurs privés font alors ce qu’ils veulent.
En résumé, 4 États occidentaux censurent internet : États-Unis (libre censure privée), Royaume-Uni, Australie et France. Parmi ces quatre, seul un, la France, est membre de l’Union européenne (UE).
Si la Turquie n’a pas le droit d’entrer dans l’UE, je ne vois pas ce que la France y fait.
ii
On n’est pas en Turquie, on est en Franquie.
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Des mots inacceptables
Rappelez-vous. Macron : « On ne peut pas parler de violences policières dans un Etat de droit. » (« Ne parlez pas de “répression” ou de “violences policières”, ces mots sont inacceptables dans un Etat de droit. »)
Non, c’est en dictature qu’on ne peut pas parler de violences policières.
Law 16: Where knowing the law is of no use
English (I) and French (II).
I
Critical race theory is correct: civil rights legislation is rubbish and the liberals’ record a piece of trash.
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Where knowing the law is of no use
British man cleared after being arrested for “offensive” online video. A win for free expression.
A win for free expression? “The court cleared L. after learning he did not make the video, shared it as a joke, and the clip had been quote-tweeted 369 times, and retweeted 47 times, and had 107 likes.” The police picked up the man randomly among 400 “criminals” and there was a trial and that wasn’t the trial of the police but of the man and you call that a win for free expression? No, it would have been a win if the police had been tried and convicted for harassing a law-abiding citizen.
Why do I say the man was subjected to police harassment? Normally, when police bring a man before a criminal court for trial, if the court, differing from the police, pronounces acquittal, it is based on a difference as to facts. The police thought, according to the evidence at their disposal, that the man was guilty, but the court found out the story was another one. They differ on the facts of the case. But when the court acquits the accused based on the same facts upon which the police and the prosecutor acted to prosecute the accused, how do you call this?
Here the court learnt that L. “did not make the video, shared it as a joke, and the clip had been quote-tweeted 369 times, and retweeted 47 times, and had 107 likes,” but the police investigation, which obviously had reached the selfsame conclusion that L. “did not make the video, shared it as a joke, and the clip had been quote-tweeted 369 times, and retweeted 47 times, and had 107 likes” had sent L. before a court for these –and no other– facts! Clearly L. had NOT told the police he had made the video himself, in dead earnest, and was the only person to share it, because we will assume he is not suicidal–if he were he would have told the court the same story. Therefore, the police, having all the facts it needed to leave L. alone, ignored the law and subjected L. to a dire ordeal–out of sadism? one might ask.
With these perverted laws repressing speech, it is always the same and everybody knows it and no one dares speak their mind because a trial’s always possible, it all depends on the subjective appreciation –or even whims– of this or that officer or magistrate. This, I believe, is a strong motive why the U.S. Supreme Court wants none of such insanities, whereas in Britain they are still children living in the days of Blackstone who thought free speech is protected when there is no prior restraint.
In other words, they all agree on the facts of the case; yet, based on facts on which they all agree, one demands a conviction and the other acquits. This means no one can know what is permissible and what is not, as knowing the law is of no use. What is required of citizens is not so much knowing the law as being able to read people’s minds.
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Feudalism and Liberty
Since when can anyone not to mention employers, punish anyone for stating their thoughts and opinions? My employer is not my “daddy” and I am not their property so whatever I say or do as long as it is not at work is none of their concern, ever. (Dr Z.)
The situation Dr Z. describes resembles feudalism. However, if we take the problem as one of freedom maximizing, we probably should leave employers some room to dismiss at will, which remains the default rule in most of the United States (De Geest, American Law: A Comparative Primer, 2020).
To begin with, the U.K. Equality Act, which excludes opinion as a just cause for dismissal (except “discrimination” –read: content that is not politically correct, and you can count on British courts to make the exception as broad –or rather as discriminatory– as they can, and “harassment”), is of 2010, that is, it is a recent creation. Before that, British employers could fire workers based on their opinions and that would be construed most of the time as fitting the employer’s discretion.
In the U.S. there is no federal Equality Act statute and, as I said, the at-will doctrine remains the default rule. How they blend this with fair employment clauses of the civil rights statutes is beyond my knowledge. Be that as it may, one’s opinion is not one of the protected classes covered by the civil rights acts, so if an employee displeases his boss because of his opinions and the boss fires him, probably there is not much the employee can do about it. An employer might argue his collaborator is undermining his business (which has a public relations dimension) by making his opinions known, and sometimes that could well be the case, so I cannot agree 100% with Dr Z. because it is a business owner’s freedom against that of his employee, and both must retain some degree of freedom. Yet we all perceive that employers will bend to outside pressures to dismiss any employee who expresses views unpleasant to this or that community or lobby so long as they cannot reply to such cancel mobs (heckler’s veto) that the law bars them from dismissing the employee based on his or her opinions. So, yes, probably some statute is needed to shield employees, because that would even shield the employer. The latter would then face boycott campaigns (boycott is protected speech) but –who knows?– he might survive it. However, I don’t expect business organizations to support such a policy.
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Claim Settlement, or The New Aristocracy
How can you settle claims as prosecution for a crime does not depend on actual claims at all? Even though nobody would file a claim when there is a dead man, prosecuting authorities, if they’ve got a suspect, will send him or her before a court of law. So what does it mean that claims are settled? In theory an injured party has no power to prevent criminal prosecution. Is it settled with the prosecutor then? On what grounds?
Another example: the OJ Simpson trials. There were two trials: criminal and civil (tort suit). As you remember OJ was aquitted by the criminal court and found guilty in the tort trial (due to different evidence rules) but that’s not what interests me now. What interests me is how parties can settle a claim in a criminal trial when they’re not even supposed to be there and it takes a civil trial for them to be represented (in some countries the criminal and tort aspects would have been judged in one single trial)?
ii
My conjecture is that claims are settled when the prosecutor doubts that the evidence is beyond a reasonable doubt (the legal standard of proof in criminal trials) and therefore doubts that a criminal trial can thrive against the suspect, so the prosecutor treats the whole matter as a tort case that can be settled between parties. However, on what principle can the pondering of evidence value at the disposal of the prosecution allow the prosecution to make a tort of a crime (or to erase, so to speak, the criminal dimension of an offense that is both a tort and a crime)–while evidence value is the fortuitous result of police work?
The consequence is that rich people, no matter how criminally they behave, will hardly ever have criminal records–rules of subsequent offenses, among other things, will not apply to them. What a privilege.
Tocqueville, a keen observer of the United States, warned about two dangers: tyranny of the masses, which libertarians are fond to recall, but also the tyranny of a money aristocracy.
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State Action of Private Platforms
Lawsuit against Twitter reveals how it works with Democrats to censor. (Reclaim the Net, June 18, 2021)
Evidence of state action: “One of these documents is an email from M., Press Secretary for then-California Secretary of State P., to Twitter employee K. that appears to refer to this dedicated channel as ‘the partner portal.’ In the email, M. flagged a tweet from another Twitter user that was previously reported through this partner portal and stated: ‘We would like this tweet taken down ASAP to avoid the spread of election misinformation.’”
1/ Not only did the state refer the tweets through the “dedicated channel,” which would be the usual procedure, but also and in any case the state, via a public officer, made the alleged usual procedure an unusual one by sending an unsolicited email (“Flagging the following tweet that I reported…”), which can be construed as a threat and command to process the report according to the state’s wish.
2/ If the appellation “partner portal” is a true description, then obviously the nexus is established between the private party and the state and therefore the private party’s action is state action.
Given state action, censorship by the private party is a civil liberties First Amendment case.
II
À l’occasion de l’enfarinage de J.-L. Mélenchon le 12 juin, j’apprends, dans le journal, qu’un homme a été interpellé pour « violence sur personne chargée d’une mission de service public ». Je suppose que ce sont les députés et autres élus que notre code pénal décrit comme des personnes chargées d’une mission de service public.
La situation est donc la suivante aux élections : un candidat déjà élu est une personne chargée d’une mission de service public, ce qui lui vaut une protection judiciaire spéciale, tandis que ses concurrents qui ne sont pas déjà élus ne sont rien. C’est octroyer à certains candidats un avantage contraire à tous les principes d’un régime électif. (Je ne crois pas que Mélenchon l’ait jamais dénoncé, ni le Conseil constitutionnel mais ça ce n’est même pas un peu étonnant.)
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Une justice de bons petits soldats du gouvernement
Je pense que les juges ne devraient plus être inamovibles comme actuellement mais élu par la population locale et notés sur leurs résultats.
Je suis moi-même pour l’élection des juges (ou de la plupart des juges) mais cette personne fait erreur sur le statut actuel du juge français.
1/ Obligation statutaire de mobilité :
“Le juge français est soumis à une obligation statutaire de mobilité géographique ou fonctionnelle qui est exercée généralement tous les cinq à sept ans.”
2/ Un seul pool de magistrats du parquet (hiérarchiquement dépendants du ministère de la justice !) et du siège, avec passage de l’un à l’autre et dans les deux sens, exemple ce jeune magistrat : “Issu du premier concours de l’ENM (celui des étudiants), trois ans de parquet, deux ans et des poussières de siège civil.”
Dans les pays civilisés, l’administration du parquet est staffée par des fonctionnaires administratifs de même statut que les autres fonctionnaires de l’administration centrale, c’est-à-dire de la branche exécutive ; en France, elle l’est par… des juges. (Il n’est pas “juge” quand il est au parquet, car on l’appelle alors un “procureur” ou son “substitut”, mais c’est bien la même personne qui passe de l’un à l’autre.)
Alors parler d’inamovibilité…
ii
Mes cours de droit sont un peu lointains mais je confirme que le juge est inamovible. Les magistrats ne peuvent pas recevoir une nouvelle affectation sans avoir donné leur consentement. Leur indépendance est garantie par le fait que le gouvernement ne peut pas suspendre, déplacer ou destituer un magistrat.
Mon interlocuteur a bonne mémoire mais réciter des cours de droit n’aide malheureusement pas, le plus souvent, à bien juger de la situation.
C’est comme quand, en 2013, le gouvernement pond une loi sur « l’indépendance du parquet », parce que la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme est un peu critique (un peu seulement mais quand même, ça fait tâche) et qu’en 2018, donc après cette loi sur « l’indépendance du parquet », la Cour EDH confirma sa jurisprudence (et ses critiques) dans un nouvel arrêt (Thiam c/ France). Vous voyez le problème ? Je suis certain qu’il y a beaucoup de commentaires élogieux de cette loi et de l’indépendance du parquet.
Mais nous parlons du siège et, citation pour citation, je connais celle-là : « Il est plus étonnant que le Conseil constitutionnel ait estimé que la condition de mobilité imposée aux magistrats du siège par la loi organique du 25 février 1992 ne méconnaissait pas le principe fondamental d’inamovibilité. » (Turpin, Mémento de la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel) Étonnant, voire risible.
Ce que mon interlocuteur dit n’est pas faux, simplement il faut prendre en compte la porosité entre les deux administrations, qui ne peut en aucun cas décrire une séparation des pouvoirs, que l’inamovibilité des juges est censée garantir.
iii
Dans ce contexte, l’élection des juges serait un renforcement du pouvoir des juges et de leur indépendance effective vis-à-vis du gouvernement.
Il y a plusieurs raisons à cela. Je me borne à en citer deux. La première, pas forcément la plus fondamentale selon moi, est qu’il y aurait des juges élus sur d’autres plateformes électorales que celle du gouvernement en place, de la même manière qu’il y a des régions ou des départements et autres de couleurs politiques différentes de celle du gouvernement. Ces juges auraient des comptes à rendre à un électorat, c’est-à-dire qu’ils appliqueraient une politique judiciaire dans leur ressort juridictionnel. De fait, aujourd’hui, c’est le parquet (le gouvernement) qui applique dans les cours une politique judiciaire, tandis que les juges ne sont que des machines à « appliquer la loi ».
Cette première raison n’est pas sans lien avec celle qui me semble plus fondamentale encore et qui est qu’un juge élu ne peut pas être un fonctionnaire anonyme soumis au devoir de réserve, et soumis dans tout son être, comme le juge actuel. Un élu soumis au devoir de réserve ? Absurde. Or le juge français est, dans notre droit, la personne la plus soumise aux restrictions draconiennes du devoir de réserve, de par le statut écrit de la magistrature (le plus draconien à cet égard avec le statut militaire). Cela doit être également pris en considération quand on parle de sa prétendue inamovibilité : en réalité, il est enserré dans un inextricable réseau de chicane statutaire et la moindre prise de parole de sa part équivaut, en fait, à sa mort professionnelle. C’est la forme la plus insidieuse de castration jamais conçue, mais comme elle n’empêche pas de se reproduire je suppose que les intéressés estiment avoir préservé l’essentiel.
iv
On ne peut pas être un bon juge indépendant avec les qualités qui font un bon petit soldat du gouvernement comme le magistrat du parquet, et quand un système prétend, comme le système français, que les deux sont interchangeables, en réalité il organise une justice de bons petits soldats du gouvernement, par contamination.
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Enquête ouverte sur un ex-général, accusé de propos antisémites. (Le Figaro, 18/6/21)
Non, une enquête n’est pas ouverte sur le général Delawarde pour « propos antisémites ».
Une enquête est ouverte pour « diffamation publique et provocation à la haine et à la violence à raison de l’origine ou de l’appartenance à une ethnie, une nation, une race ou une religion ».
Des propos antisémites ou homophobes ou ce que vous voulez qui ne sont ni de la diffamation (diffamation envers un groupe, catégorie totalement sui generis qui ne s’encombre pas de la moindre « exception de vérité » disculpatoire en matière de diffamation) ni de la provocation à la haine ni de l’incitation à la violence ni de l’injure ni de l’incitation à la consommation de stupéfiants ni de l’outrage à personne responsable d’une mission de service public ni de l’outrage à personne dépositaire de l’autorité publique ni de l’outrage aux symboles républicains ni des fausses informations, c’est-à-dire des fake news, ni de la violation du secret de l’instruction ni de la violation du secret médical ni de l’atteinte à la vie privée ni du blasphème (contrairement à ce que prétend la classe politique, il y a de la jurisprudence en 5e République) ni de la divulgation d’informations privées à des fins malveillantes sur une personne chargée d’une mission de service public ni de l’offense au chef de l’État (ah non, pardon, ç’a été abrogé en 2013, au temps pour moi) ni de l’atteinte au droit à l’image ni de la contestation de crime contre l’humanité ni de l’apologie d’actes de terrorisme ni de l’apologie de crimes de guerre ni de l’apologie d’eugénisme ni qu’est-ce que j’ai bien pu oublier ? NE SONT PAS UN DÉLIT.
ii
« Une enquête a été ouverte… »
Bonjour Monsieur. Êtes-vous le général Dominique Delawarde ? – Oui. Avez-vous tenu tel jour sur la chaîne Cnews les propos, je cite, « … » ? – Oui.
Vachement dure, l’enquête… (Oh là là, qu’est-ce qu’on a progressé depuis Sherlock Holmes !)
Dans ces affaires, il y a le plus souvent, peut-être presque toujours, un accord de tous, police, procureur, accusé, juge (tout le monde sauf le jury parce qu’il n’y a pas de jury), sur les FAITS (« machin a dit truc ») et pourtant il arrive que, pour des faits sur lesquels ils sont tous D’ACCORD, l’un exige une condamnation et l’autre acquitte.
« Va comprendre, Charles ! Avec le PMU on joue comme on aime. » Ils ont trop regardé la télé, ma parole… Quand les faits sont établis sans contestation, c’est la loi qui est le PROBLEME si elle permet ces divergences.
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Rimbaud inconnu : L’Ascétique
Citations tirées d’Une saison en enfer (c’est nous qui soulignons) :
À chaque être, plusieurs autres vies me semblaient dues. Ce monsieur ne sait ce qu’il fait : il est un ange. Cette famille est une nichée de chiens. Devant plusieurs hommes, je causai tout haut avec un moment d’une de leurs autres vies. – Ainsi, j’ai aimé un porc.
J’ai eu raison de mépriser ces bonshommes qui ne perdraient pas l’occasion d’une caresse, parasites de la propreté et de la santé de nos femmes, aujourd’hui qu’elles sont si peu d’accord avec nous.
N’est-ce pas parce que nous cultivons la brume ? Nous mangeons la fièvre avec nos légumes aqueux. Et l’ivrognerie ! et le tabac ! et l’ignorance ! et les dévouements ! – Tout cela est-il assez loin de la sagesse de l’Orient, la patrie primitive ? Pourquoi un monde moderne, si de pareils poisons s’inventent !
Moi ! moi qui me suis dit mage ou ange, dispensé de toute morale, je suis rendu au sol, avec un devoir à chercher, et la réalité rugueuse à étreindre ! Paysan !




