Tagged: Robert Bork

Law 19: There are no manufacturers of corpora delicti

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Old Louisiana State Capitol in Baton Rouge: Interior with stained glass dome

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The Female Party

“Nearly two-thirds of all Democrats are women; here we see the much-discussed gender gap as less than half of the Republicans are female.” (Maisel, American Political Parties and Elections, 2016)

ii

From same source: “In a Gallup poll conducted in June 2015, 31 percent [of Americans] identified themselves as Democrats, 25 percent as Republicans, and 41 percent as independents.”

Assuming the ratios for party membership stand also for people who “identify as” (as a matter of fact I see no reason, no explanatory factor why both ratios should be significantly different), we’ve got the highest proportion of males among “independents.” Independent, therefore, sounds a lot like males who cannot identify with party politics.

According to my calculations, the figures are (source says “nearly two third,” and “less than half” [meaning “not significantly less,” I believe, otherwise the source is saying nothing of quantitative value], so these figures are approximations [also because 31+25+41 doesn’t add up to 100 percent]):

20.6 percent of American population are female Dem;

12.5 female Rep;

13.6 female independent;

10.3 male Dem;

12.5 male Rep;

27.3 male independent.

By order of magnitude: male independent (27.3) > female Dem (20.6) > female independent (13.6) > male & female Rep (12.5 twice) > male Dem (10.3).

iii

There are twice as many Democratic women as Democratic men in USA. This imbalance is in dire need of an explanation.

You can check my calculations are right in this quick way:

20.6=2(10.3) “there are twice as many Democratic women as Democratic men,” which is the same as “(Nearly) two-thirds of all Democrats are women,” since if you take 9, two thirds of 9 is 6, one third is 3, and 6=2(3).

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There are no manufacturers of corpora delicti

New York Will Allow People to Sue Gun Manufacturers for Violence.

Cuomo was elected at the wrong election, in fact he wanted to be a judge. Now he is governor and he thinks he can tell courts what their decisions should be?

There already were trials against arms manufacturers, notably after Sandy Hook.

But also there is the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act. Adoption of the act was obviously intended as a shield against the bad faith of Second Amendment opponents who want to hold arms manufacturers liable not for failing to deliver as stipulated but on the contrary for complying with business regulations and contract stipulations.

Example: “The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act shields the gun industry from nearly all civil liability for the dangers their products pose. With nearly every American industry and product, civil liability can be used as an important check on irresponsible manufacturers and sellers—but not the gun industry.” (Giffords Law Center: To prevent gun violence)

A gun manufacturer is liable if he sells a defective, hazardous gun, like any other manufacturer. What the opponents want is to make the manufacturers liable for weapons that function as stipulated in contracts and according to reasonable safety expectations, and under the rule of law there can be no such liability in this world.

Opponents talk of “dangerous products” as if the aim of a weapon were not, precisely, to be dangerous (in order to deter aggression and crime). The dangerous products of tort law are products which use is beneficial besides their dangerosity, so the category cannot as such apply to guns, which benefice lies in their very dangerosity, their purposeful dangerosity. Dangerous guns as to tort law are defective guns which use presents a danger to the user mainly; there is no liability regarding the gun’s normal danger to other people (to whom the gun is dangerous on purpose, in case they need to be deterred).

The trials that courts have examined and will continue to examine no matter what governor Cuomo says about it are cases of normal liability. But opponents want to create a new judicial category that cannot exist.

ii

A gun is a deterrent, as such it is dangerous.

You need explosives to drill tunnels. Explosives are “dangerous products” as to tort law because you need them to drill tunnels and at the same time their use is dangerous. Therefore liability might be involved when the danger turns out to cause injury. That is to say, when you use explosives, normally you don’t cause injury, you only open a tunnel.

On the other hand, when you use a gun, basically you harm or kill someone and–mind you–that’s the expected outcome of the lawful use of the gun (self-defense). Generally speaking you don’t need to use the guns you own because owning them is a sufficient deterrent most of the times.

Everyone (except a few “law centers”) thus sees that guns are not the usual dangerous products of tort law, as the danger guns pose is the very aim of their lawful ownership and use.

Since opponents to the right to bear arms wanted to remain blind to such crystal-clear distinctions, the legislator felt compelled to pass the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, in order to prevent complacent courts to call guns “dangerous” and hold manufacturers liable as if we were dealing with explosives needed to open tunnels, which would be a devious way to suppress the Second Amendment (emptying it out) without due constitutional amendment process.

iii

Just let me know if you have ever heard of a manufacturer held liable for damages caused by the unlawful use of his products. This is what opponents to the right to bear arms want for gun manufacturers.

They say: ‘’When products cause damages, manufacturers are liable. Guns kill people, so gun manufacturers must be held liable.’’ This is nonsense. It is when their products are used in a lawful expected way (and yet causing damage) that manufacturers may be held liable. If on the other hand someone kills another one with say a screwdriver, the manufacturer may not be held liable for the loss of one’s life.

With guns the lawful and the unlawful uses both have the same outcome: injury or death of people (leaving aside such uses as hunting and shooting sports). Therefore, similarly, when people kill others with guns unlawfully, the manufacturer is not liable. And when someone kills another lawfully, in self-defense, then his gun worked as expected. There can be no trial unless someone needed to fire a gun and it did not work as expected.

The opponents to the right to bear arms want you to believe blather.

iv

I’ve heard of pharmaceutical companies being prosecuted for not making it hard enough to open their packages to keep the content from candy-seeking children. (N.)

The suits my interlocutor talks about are normal liability cases, what one may expect, not necessarily “what one may reasonably expect,” it depends on the claims, but “what one may expect within the boundaries of the rule of law.” What the opponents to the right to bear arms are up to is quite different, it isn’t possible to give them reason without violating legal principles.

Manufacturers, like the pharmaceutical companies in the example, are expected to deliver reasonably safe products–gun manufacturers too and guns have safety locks.

This being said, in the same way that you cannot sue (win a suit against) a pharmaceutical company when someone uses their medicines to deliberately poison another person to death, you cannot sue gun manufacturers for the shooting of innocent people. There’s no exception to the principle that I know or can think of.

A product turned tool of crime, a part of corpus delicti, shifts to quite another sphere. There is no “manufacturer” of that “new” object. There are no manufacturers of corpora delicti because crime is in criminal intention (mens rea).

Reminder: “The five elements of a crime. (1) Actus reus–The guilty act (2) Mens rea–The guilty mind (3) Concurrence–The coexistence of (1) an act in violation of the law and (2) a culpable mental state (4) Causation–The concurrence of mind and act must produce (5) Harm.”

That leaves open tort litigation against gun manufacturers if the shooter is declared insane and criminally irresponsible. Perhaps.

v

One cannot sue (win a suit against) manufacturers for tort damages when a crime is committed with one of their products. This is what opponents to the right to bear arms push for.

They push for their reform not by saying they want all manufacturers to be suable for damages when crimes are committed with their products but by saying they want the general law of torts applied to gun manufacturers as it is to any other manufacturer, but the truth is that gun manufacturers are already within the general law and if we were to give reason to the opponents to the right to bear arms we would make gun manufacturers liable in situations where the other manufacturers are not.

As to someone’s claim that “you can sue anyone for tort damages,” the opponents themselves are not so sure, as shown in the recent news New York Will Allow People to Sue Gun Manufacturers for Violence. A bill–or whatever state or local act–is needed in their eyes.

Another bill is the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (2005) “that protects firearms manufacturers and dealers from being held liable when crimes have been committed with their products.” I am trying to argue that there was no need of such a bill because the protection described in the quote is a necessary consequence of foundational notions of law, is a general unwritten principle which I tentatively encapsulate in the words “There are no manufacturers of corpora delicti.”

Note that the exception I laid down, namely criminal irresponsibility, obtains under the Act as well (unless there is a particular clause to the contrary), as the criminal conduct of the criminally irresponsible is not a crime.

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Ladies and gentlemen, the Bishop of Stockholm. Complete with cassock, mitre and crosier.

Eva Brunne, Bishop of Stockholm (2009-2019)

“Eva Brunne is the first openly lesbian bishop of a mainstream church in the world and the first bishop of the Church of Sweden to be in a registered same-sex partnership.” (Wikipedia) (2009-2019)

ii

Archbishop Antje Jackelén, primate of the Church of Sweden. “The first female archbishop,” since 2014 strongly dedicated to apparel tradition.

Archbishop Antje Jackelén, Primate of the Church of Sweden

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Taney

They blame Chief Justice Taney (Scott v. Sandford, 1857) for “seeing slavery in the Constitution” but if slavery was not in the Constitution, why did slaveowners and the Southern States ratify it? You had to convince them that slavery was in the Constitution to obtain their ratification, and if you turned out to be convincing then it probably was because it is true that slavery was in the Constitution, even if you did not believe it yourself and thought you were lying to slaveowners.

I disagree with late (conservative failed nominee to the Supreme Court) Robert Bork: A constitutional amendment was indeed necessary to end slavery in the United States, and Taney was a correct interpret of the Constitution.

Picture: Taney statue removed from Maryland state house (Aug 2017).

Source: Washington Post

(For a discussion of Bork’s views, see Law 8.)

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Charged For (Name a Crime)

Former highschool student charged for putting Hitler quote in yearbook. (New York Post, July 13, 2021)

New York Post‘s headline is sheer disinformation, of which their own article gives ample evidence. The kid is charged for “computer crimes for accessing a database used by students to alter two classmates’ entries.”

The so-called “Hitler quote” are the words “It is a quite special secret pleasure how the people around us fail to realize what is really happening to them,” which the kid “incorrectly attributed” to George Floyd. To detect that these were actually Hitler’s words requires a level of specialization far beyond the average and if, to boot, as the paper seems to say, the kid did not know they were Hitler’s words (obviously, if the kid “incorrectly” attributed the words to George Floyd, it means he did not change the author’s name on purpose, knowingly), you may not talk of a Hitler quote at all.

The second quote is thus described by NYP: “Tryon, 18, also reportedly inserted a quote in a second student’s yearbook entry referencing drugs and Boston bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who was convicted in the April 2013 attack that killed three people and wounded more than 260 others.” There’s not a jot of information in that, it could mean anything, the quote could either be apology of terrorism or indictment of terrorism or something entirely different for all we know. Obviously NYP doesn’t care what the content of this quote is, they had their headline with the “Hitler quote” and that was good enough for these muckrakers.

But, again, the case is not at all about a Hitler quote. The headline should not read “charged for putting Hitler quote in yearbook” because under the rule of law you charge people for crimes and a Hitler quote, even in a yearbook, is not a crime.

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Libel Law and Political Cartel 2

Trust in US mainstream media hits rock bottom. (Reclaim the Net)

This is why Justices Thomas and Gorsuch’s view that New York Times Co. v. Sullivan should be reversed must not be heeded to. Libel law must remain favorable to the messenger when the message deals with public officials and public figures. Smear campaigns by disreputable media do little harm. On the other hand giving public officials (read, mainly, politicians) a convenient weapon in libel law woud Canadize USA (see Law 18: Libel Law and Political Cartel). I go as far as saying that current U.S. libel law is what has made U.S. mainstream media fall into general disrepute, as media felt unbound and that has been their fall because they lack integrity.

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Taxes and Irresponsible Police

‘’Defund the police’’ is the logical sequel to Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales (SCOTUS 2005). No one needs (as no one should rely on) an irresponsible police. To pay taxes for this is madness plain and simple.

’Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled, 7–2, that a town and its police department could not be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failing to enforce a restraining order, which had led to the murder of a woman’s three children by her estranged husband.’’ (Wikipedia)

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FR

« On n’est pas en Turquie »

Rappelez-vous. Macron réfute toute dérive autoritaire : « On n’est pas en Turquie. » (Huffington Post, 4/12/20)

Or quel pays figure avec la Turquie parmi les États « sous surveillance » (under watch) en matière de censure internet ? La France, seul État occidental dans cette catégorie avec l’Australie (et la Norvège mais seulement pour les métadonnées transnationales : « only the metadata on traffic that crosses Norwegian borders »). (Wikipédia : Internet Censorship)

A noter que parmi les « ennemis d’internet », donc la catégorie encore en-dessous dans cette classification de Reporters sans frontières, à côté des dictatures auxquelles on s’attend (Chine…), on trouve les U.S. et le Royaume-Uni. Depuis Trump, les U.S. ne cherchent même pas à garantir un principe de « neutralité du Net », donc rien d’étonnant puisque les acteurs privés font alors ce qu’ils veulent.

En résumé, 4 États occidentaux censurent internet : U.S. (libre censure privée), Royaume-Uni, Australie et France. Parmi ces quatre, seul un, la France, est membre de l’Union européenne (UE).

Si la Turquie n’a pas le droit d’entrer dans l’UE, je ne vois pas ce que la France y fait.

ii

On n’est pas en Turquie, on est en Franquie.

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Des mots inacceptables

Rappelez-vous. Macron : « On ne peut pas parler de violences policières dans un Etat de droit. » (« Ne parlez pas de “répression” ou de “violences policières”, ces mots sont inacceptables dans un Etat de droit. »)

Non, c’est en dictature qu’on ne peut pas parler de violences policières.

Lessons in Law 9: Crack Hill

English language and a pinch of French.

Crack Hill

There’s been a crack pandemic in Paris, France, these last years, with an area now known as Crack Hill (la colline du crack) in the North-Eastern parts of the city. Neighbors talking of “hell,” “nightmare” and other such words has become commonplace. Authorities are pouring millions of taxpayer money in a so-called crack plan doing nothing but distributing under police surveillance new crack pipes every Thursday to the 1.500 crackheads (they know the numbers!) roaming on Crack Hill, and paying for 400 hotel rooms for crackheads.

Thus the bureaucracy’s sole policy is to prevent the crackheads’ habit from turning them into blood felons, with the result that they will remain an endless source of unpunished misdemeanors, an everlasting nightmare for the neighborhood. – This in a country where the numbers of police officers per inhabitant are extremely high.

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« Le Gilet jaune Jérôme Rodrigues relaxé » (Le Parisien 7/3/21) : une bonne nouvelle, bien que je ne comprenne pas le jugement. Rodrigues avait traité de « bande de nazis » des membres d’un syndicat policier et le ministre de l’intérieur avait saisi la justice pour injures. Le juge dit que les propos « visaient non l’ensemble des policiers mais les méthodes de certains d’entre eux » et que le syndicat « ne se confond pas avec l’administration publique qu’est la police nationale ». Oui et alors ? Rodrigues était poursuivi pour injures et non pour diffamation envers un corps constitué (la police nationale), donc le fait que les propos ne visaient pas le corps mais certains membres de ce corps ne disculpe pas en soi de l’injure.

La question est de savoir si traiter les gens de « nazis » est une injure. Or comment cela ne serait-il pas une injure alors que la loi française condamne pénalement l’idéologie nazie et que donc un nazi est un hors-la-loi ; si traiter quelqu’un de voleur est une injure, traiter quelqu’un de nazi est forcément une injure, qui doit être condamnée en tant que telle. Il est donc évident que le ministère public ou le ministre auteur de la plainte va faire appel et a bien des chances de gagner, suite à un jugement sans queue ni tête (du moins tel que rapporté par le journal). Le calvaire de Jérôme Rodrigues est loin d’être fini. « Allez en dictature »…

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The ‘shield’ for ‘extremist’ views is the First Amendment

The Wikipedia page ‘Gab’ (the internet platform) says: “Gab claims that it promotes free speech and individual liberty, though these statements have been criticized as being a shield for its alt-right and extremist ecosystem.”

Under American law an “alt-right ecosystem” has no need of a shield, its shield is the law (First Amendment), so the critics alluded to are irrelevant unless the problem is the very shield American law offers alt-right ideas, that is, the problem is free speech.

The construction “Gab claims… though” is objectionable, there can be no “though” here, free speech is indeed what it is all about. When one creates a business for money laundering, as money laundering is illegal, then the business is a “shield.” Therefore, as alt-right views are shielded by the First Amendment, describing Gab as a “shield” is libelous.

It strikes one as odd, given the First Amendment law, that still some Americans, like the author(s) of this Wikipedia page, seem rather to have been raised in a European legal environment where freedom of speech exists only for what the powers that be allow, and everything they label extremist is doomed to endless persecution.

ii

Finnish minister says sexist online comments about female politicians is a “threat to democracy.”

The utterance is even more ominous when one thinks that under Finnish democratic law derogatory comments on public figures such as elected officials might be prosecutable and severely punished. I’m not saying this is the case, as I don’t know Finnish law, but that wouldn’t surprise me given the state of the law in my and other continental European countries.

iii

Pro-liberty Skidmore students blocked from creating a club after “cancel mob” organized against them.

Before cancel culture there’s the heckler’s veto, a cancel mob is a heckling mob. I don’t know how a “Student Government Association,” which blocked the club’s creation under pressure of a heckling mob, relates to government, if at all, in free speech law (any form of government support would suffice) but the doctrine about heckling is: “the core concern … is that allowing the suppression of speech because of the discontent of the opponents provides the perverse incentive for opponents to threaten violence rather than to meet ideas with more speech.” (mtsu.edu) Link

iv

Instagram deletes post of President Biden falling up the stairs under its “violence and incitement” policy.

MSNBC analyst says Biden falling meme could incite violence.

They expect him to fall a lot…

Joe Biden has been would-be candidate for POTUS for 35 YEARS.

Here’s what Robert H. Bork wrote for year 1987: “Senator Biden’s presidential aspirations came to a sudden end, probably for all time. The campaign staff of Governor Michael Dukakis gave the press videotapes demonstrating that Biden had plagiarized speeches by other politicians such as Britain’s Neal Kinnock. In addition, the press learned that Biden had misrepresented his law school record. As the damaging facts began to pile up, Biden at first tried to explain and finally had to hold a press conference at which he withdrew as a candidate for his party’s nomination.” (The Tempting of America, 1990)

For a discussion of Robert Bork’s ideas, see Lesson 8.

v

‘It started with words’ so free speech is not okay?

vi

Biden appointee Timothy Wu once questioned whether the First Amendment was “obsolete,” has questionable free speech views.

A fair statement is that all elected officials and their appointees have questionable free speech views, because a political class will always want to mutate into a political cartel, which requires speech control and suppression, so the condition for free speech is a truly independent judicial power and irremovable judges, something that apparently does not exist in this world except in the USA (God bless America). Do not make as if Republican majorities had no questionable free speech views: the many anti-BDS laws, which will be struck down one after the other, and the sooner the better, are a recent example of the tendency.

vii

Force is the one thing we’re not allowed to advocate.

The First Amendment allows one to advocate force. “Advocacy of illegal conduct” is protected speech, what is not protected is “incitement to imminent lawless action” (Brandenburg v. Ohio), the word to emphasize here being “imminent.” Case law explains that, for speech to be unprotected, the lawless action it advocates must be not only imminent but also likely to follow from speech. I would argue that there is an intrinsic impossibility for online speech to be incitement to imminent action, the law is aimed at speech “brigaded with action,” that is, speech to and from among a mob prone to act, or, in the classic example, shouting fire in a crowded theater.

It’s legal, but it will still get you banned.

Being legal it depends on the carriers’ policies whether speech is suppressed and so far they have had quite discretionary powers.

Given what I just said about online speech I am surprised that a former shareowner of a platform, namely Parler, is raising funds for his legal counsel in view of a Congress hearing about the platform’s responsibility for the Capitol storming. It looks like rogue intimidation. I question the legality of any step by the legislator that compels private citizens to legal counsel expenses. The judiciary, not the legislative, is the power that examines particular responsibilities.

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Is there rationality in the affirmation that as blacks make a disproportionate part of prison inmates in America the American society is racist? Looking at the figures of wealth beside the figures of prison inmates, one finds consistence across the two sets, that is, the less wealthy group is also the group with disproportionate numbers of prison inmates, which makes perfect sense on the merely economic and sociological level as poverty is ridden with deprivation and incentives to illegal conduct. As it is to be sociologically expected that crime be more rampant in poor neighborhoods than in wealthy ones, it is also to be expected that blacks have more prison inmates, as the figures show they are poorer in the main.

Therefore, although the affirmation according to which the society is racist can be inferred from prison inmates figures is hardly challenged because of the fear the challenge could be construed as a claim that blacks are intrinsically (like genetically) more criminal as a race, in fact there exists an entirely economic cause for penal figures.

This shifts attention to the cause of economic inequalities, as one might then ask if there is something intrinsic to racial groups that some thrive more and some thrive less in the economy? If inequalities in prison figures can be inferred from wealth group status, the latter cannot be inferred away, so to speak.

The anti-racist idea is that, given equal opportunities, all racial groups must and would equally thrive in the economy. So, as there are economic differences between racial groups, it must be that the society does not give equal opportunities to all and this because it is racist. Thus the American society is to be called racist as long as each racial group does not have the same proportions of wealth and poverty as the global average, that is, as long as they are not all the same in terms of wealth.

That this can and will result from the free market is, I am sure, what no one among Americans believes, so the fact that Americans keep talking of their economy as a free-market economy, having at the same time an anti-racist agenda, is questionable.

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As you know, ex-post-facto legislation is expressly prohibited by the US constitution.

(On the eve of the sesquicentennial of Ohio’s Statehood in 1953 it was discovered that while the Ohio constitution had been ratified, the territory of Ohio was never formally admitted to the union. President Eisenhower made a joke about Ohio state officials drawing salaries under false pretenses and then had congress RETROACTIVELY ratify Ohio’s statehood.)

In its purity the principle holds in criminal law only, but such a construction may be argued to be unconstitutional indeed:

“Thomas Jefferson described them [ex post facto laws] as ‘equally unjust in civil as in criminal cases.’ Over the years, however, when deciding ex post facto cases, the United States Supreme Court has referred repeatedly to its ruling in Calder v. Bull, in which Justice Samuel Chase held that the prohibition applied only to criminal matters, not civil matters, and established four categories of unconstitutional ex post facto laws.” (Wikipedia)

Like Jefferson I see no reason why the principle should be limited to criminal law, because even if ignoring the principle must be particularly dramatic in criminal law it doesn’t mean such neglect is benign in other legal domains.

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Multipartyism is a corrupt form of people’s government

Multipartyism is a corrupt form of people’s government. The point is to bring not more than two platforms to the electorate’s choice because that’s the only way to ensure that the elected majority will apply the electoral platform rather than coalition pacts bargained behind closed doors between various elected parties. The platform itself is the result of primaries so what Perot and others do as third parties could well be done in the frame of one or the other party.

In multipartyism parties run for platforms they know they will amend behind closed doors the very day after election day!

That is, if no party gets absolute majority (50 percent or more of the votes, that is, of the seats). With two parties competing one will get absolute majority, but with more than two parties competing absolute majorities are exceptional and coalition pacts must be reached between parties to form majority governments. Where absolute majorities are not exceptional one may talk of a de facto bipartisan system.

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La différence entre un Français et un Américain, c’est que l’un chante « Aux armes » et que l’autre a le droit de porter des armes. « Vous chantiez, j’en suis fort aise… »

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On Legalizing Polygamy

Polygamy is as good as nonexistent in the Arab Gulf states:

“Today, because of higher standards of education and additional leisure time to spend, compatible spouses are more desired. This issue also contributed to the almost complete eradication of polygamy in Gulf. Although permitted under Islam, the custom even in the past was rarely practiced. Often women include specific paragraphs in their marriage contract prohibiting the husband from taking a second wife.” (Article Marriage, in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab States Today: An Encyclopedia of Life in the Arab States, Maisel & Shoup ed., 2009)

The phrasing is ambiguous. “Eradication” would not make one expect the following sentence: “the custom even in the past was rarely practiced.” Because if it was rarely practiced in the past, then it was already “eradicated,” in the sense that it was rare already, and the conclusion is that the custom is as uncommon today as it was in the past, so there has been no change, and certainly no eradication. The situation was and is that only the wealthiest men, typically of the ruling families, had and have multiple wives. Besides, this “monopoly” must by necessity be consolidated by the rent economy, as one fails to see how individual males depending on the state for their income would be allowed several wives without the state correspondingly increasing their income, which would be perceived as unwarranted by the rest of males, whereas coming from the free market this kind of perception does not obtain.

So one point for allowing polygamy would be that it’d remain uncommon anyway, as it was and is in the Gulf states.

ii

In an online summary of Edward Dutton’s book Why Islam Makes You Stupid… But Also Means You’ll Conquer the World (2020), I find Dutton includes among the reasons why Islam makes one stupid… and likely to conquer the world… polygamy. But on this he’s wanting on the side of sociological data, as polygamy is hardly more practiced by Muslims than by others.

I have already written on the issue on this blog (here), warning against assuming that the legality of polygamy translates into high degrees of polygyny, as the figures in fact show that polygyny is high in sub-Saharan countries (not all Muslim) and the Caribbeans (where polygamy is illegal).

Back to Dutton: How can Muslim polygamy, i.e., the legal acceptance/tolerance of it can be a factor of stupidity if it does not translate into major differences with countries where it is prohibited? That’s the same as saying that I would become dumber by tolerating my neighbor’s using intoxicants, without using them myself, as the dumbing effect (if there’s any) of intoxicants is limited to the user and does not extend to the one who tolerates it.

Therefore, when in the recent French bill against ‘separatism,’ commentators and, in the travaux préparatoires and debates, the legislators themselves conflate Islam with issues that are in fact connected with the culture of sub-Saharan migrants, be them from Muslim communities or not, namely polygamy and female genital cutting (same as with polygamy female circumcision predates Islam and has been maintained in whole communities, Islamic or not).

iii

Of course it does not make sense to speak of an Islamic “tolerance” for polygamy, as the Prophet of Islam had several wives. Another word must be used to convey the idea that it is a good thing that some men at least have multiple wives even though almost all of them will have only one, as it probably turned out to be the case throughout the history of Islam in its main centers.

iv

Polygyny can take many forms. No one really has to relinquish it in a state where polygamy is not allowed and only the legal institution of it does not exist; a polygynous man can adapt to any legal system, find arrangements within the law, for instance as to heirloom etc, and I fail to see what obstacles there are to de facto polygyny in the West. The French legislator thinks he has adopted measures just now (the bill I have been briefly discussing in ii) to prevent de facto polygyny in France but this will only serve to make the bureaucracy still more intolerably intrusive in all people’s lives. They can never think out of that box, it’s always more bureaucratic control, like readers of Tocqueville know.

The classic work of sociological literature, The Children of Sanchez, may be described as a case depiction of polygyny in Mexico. Sanchez, a restaurant waiter (I wouldn’t call that high status, although evolutionary psychology, EP, tends to associate polygyny with status), had several wives and children in various barrios of Mexico City, sharing his earnings between all of them, and all of them living in misery. – Polygyny is not legal in Mexico. Would Mexican authorities make it legal, they would adjust the legal system to the reality of their country. A migrant to Mexico from a country where polygyny is legal, would still think polygyny is permissible there, albeit not legal. By practising it, he would conform to a Mexican reality and couldn’t be accused to be a cause of disruption.

(In the U.S., what would be disruptive is the same migrant’s will to live in a nucleus family of single wife and children, as the de facto model is communal child-rearing under Amazons’ control. Wait and see.)

v

An alternative to consociationalism may be the American constitutional theory as exposed by Supreme Court judges:

“We are not an assimilative, homogeneous society, but a facilitative, pluralistic one, in which we must be willing to abide someone else’s unfamiliar or even repellant practice because the same tolerant impulse protects our own idiosyncracies. … In a community such as ours, ‘liberty’ must include the freedom not to conform. ” Justice Brennan, on Michael H. v. Gerald D. 1989

That may make America sound pretty much liberal but I still perceive it is more conservative than continental Europe (it is no accident, by the way, that of all European countries the UK left the EU), where they have got authoritarian liberalism whereas in the States it remains PC liberalism.

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Kierkegaard Against ‘Christendom’

Isn’t it astonishing that one would need a “school of intelligence,” Epicureanism, to “contend” that we ought to look for pleasure? Is it something people need be told or rather they needn’t be told that they like and want pleasure more than displeasure? Kierkegaard is talking through me right now: He strongly objected to Christianity turning into a form of Epicureanism, with the indicting question: What is the point of making eternal bliss dependent upon what people want in this life? If the good life that leads to eternal bliss is what everybody wants without being told, namely a comfy pleasurable existence, then there was no need to warn them of eternal damnation. ‘Christendom,’ that is, Christianity as Epicureanism, is nonsense.

A call to a pleasurable life has no meaning except as opposition to the thought of an afterlife or a supernatural order of things, as ‘superstitious beliefs’ (in Epicurus’s words) can hinder one’s correct conduct on the way to a pleasurable life, leaving aside the question that the obstacles are also in the very craving for pleasure as it is more often than not self-contradictory and requires a method, a guidance which Epicurus proposed to delineate (with what success?) – Precisely because of Epicureanism’s rejection of superstition, the grounds are lacking for Christianity to be an Epicureanism, that is, to be of this world. This life is ultimately about winning the afterlife, not about making life comfy. For the latter one needs Epicureanism but for one who heeds the warning from beyond Epicureanism is miserable blindedness. One cannot reconcile both views, and this is the reason Christendom is anti-Christian. The idea that the routine observance of sacraments, received from priests, moreover, who are in nothing different from their herd except that they have a MORE pleasurable life than most of them (in terms of wealth –being high functionaries of the state in the Scandinavian Lutheran churches– and good name and family life and leisure and so on), is what a Christian life is about, is appalling when one thinks, like Kierkegaard, of it.

The clergyman in Christendom, when asked how to live the good life, might answer: “Be in my shoes.” Hinting not as much as to what is be done as a Christian, as to a collective situation where the good life is partly inherited (the bishop is the bishop’s son) and partly the result of worldly shrewdness that has nothing to do with Christian teachings and everything with an Epicurean quest for pleasure, including the pleasure to slit others’ throats (metaphorically speaking, at least, that is, as there are in the state church x or y bishop tenures then you’ll get x or y incumbents and the other candidates will be failures). Ultimately the guidance for Epicureanism is how to make this school of intelligence compatible with a state of things where people are not at each other’s throats all the time. We all know we want our pleasure and we all have some notions of how to get it (although our pleasures conflict with each other too), and yet it happens more often than not that our pleasure must depend on an object that we don’t own.

Last but not least, Epicurus wrote for a leisure class that doesn’t exist any longer. His thinking must be thus qualified that it answers the question of how to be happy with so much time on our hands, surrounded by slaves working for us, whereas in many cases we are not even able to secure the least bit of free time in our existence nowadays. So talking of Epicureanism to today’s public is like telling them “there were better days, you know.” Carpe diem, pluck the day, usually summarizes Epicureanism in a nutshell. Carpe diem makes sense if I can say the day is mine, if I am no floatsam, floating with the stream or winds of the workday from morning till night, with no direction but that of the steady flow. Floating is not what the vessel does but its wreck.

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A few quotes from Kierkegaard’s Articles to The Fatherland and The Instant (from Attack Upon ‘Christendom’, translator Walter Lowrie, Princeton University Press, Tenth Printing 1991)

Articles in The Fatherland

28 the impudent fudge about Christianity being perfectible

35 in Protestantism, especially in Denmark, Christianity marches to a different melody, to the tune of «Merrily we roll along, roll along, roll along» – Christianity is enjoyment of life, tranquillized, as neither the Jew nor the pagan was, by the assurance that the thing about eternity is settled, settled precisely in order that we might find pleasure in enjoying this life, as well as any pagan or Jew.

37 I am not a Christian severity as opposed to a Christian leniency. By no means. I am neither leniency nor severity: I am… a human honesty.

38 as soon as the Christian requirement of poverty is brought to bear, family is a luxury

The Instant

110 Imagine that a man with a loaded pistol stepped up to a person and said to him, «I’ll shoot you dead,» or imagine something still more terrible, that he were to say, «I’ll seize upon your person and torture you to death in the most dreadful manner, if you do not (now be on the watch, for here it comes)…make your own life here on earth as profitable and enjoyable as you possibly can.» This surely is the most comical speech; for to bring that about one really does not need to threaten with a loaded pistol and the most amazing kind of death; perhaps neither the loaded pistol nor the most agonizing kind of death would avail to prevent it. And so it is here: by the dread of eternal punishment (frightful menace!), by the hope of an eternal blessedness, to want to bring about…yes, to bring about what we are (…) that we may live as we most like to live–for to refrain from civil crimes is nothing but plain shrewdness.

165 If in the natural man there is any instinct so strong as the instinct of self-preservation, it is the instinct for the propagation of the race, which therefore Christianity tried to cool off, teaching that it is better not to marry, yet, if worse comes to worst, it is better to marry than to burn. But in «Christendom» the propagation of the race has become the serious business of life, together with Christianity; and the priest (this epitome of nonsense enveloped in long robes), the priest, the teacher of Christianity, of the Christianity of the New Testament, has even got his income fixed in proportion to his activity in promoting the propagation of the race, getting a definite amount for each child.

183 So there is a difference as wide as the earth, as wide as heaven, between the Mynsterish [Bishop Mynster’s] life-view (which properly is Epicureanism, enjoyment of life and the lust for life, belonging to this world) and the Christian view, which is that of suffering, of enthusiasm for death, belonging to the other world; yea, there is such a difference between these two life-views that the latter (if it were taken seriously, and not at the very most expressed rarely in a quiet hour) must appear to Bishop Mynster as a kind of madness.

185 By indifferentism one commonly understands having no religion at all. But resolutely and definitely to have no religion at all is something passionate, and so is not the most dangerous sort of indifferentism. Hence too it occurs rather rarely.

189 I am unable to endure this thought [«The situation is this: the more thou hast to do with God, and the more He loves thee, the more thou wilt become, humanly speaking, unhappy for this life, the more thou wilt have to suffer in this life»], and therefore merely investigate this true definition of what it is to become a Christian, whereas for my part I help myself to endure sufferings by a much easier thought, one which is Jewish, not in the highest sense Christian, the recognition that I suffer for my sins.

190 And only by the help of this canst thou see that the Christianity of the New Testament does not exist, that the little religiousness there is in the land is at the very most…Judaism.

205 [Christianity] that religion precisely which extols the single state.

215 man is reduced to insignificance by marriage

223 Christianly it is egoism in the highest degree that because a man and a woman cannot control their lust another being must therefore sigh, perhaps for seventy years, in this prisonhouse and vale of tears, and perhaps be lost eternally.

263 And inflexibly as the human race stands up for its will to punish, to punish even by death, those who are not willing to be like the others, just so firmly does eternity stick to its purpose of punishing with eternal perdition those who are tranquillized by being like the others.

281 Worldly shrewdness is eternally excluded, despised and abhorred, as things are in heaven, more than all vices and crimes, because in its nature it of all things most belongs to this wretched world, and most of all is remote from having anything to do with heaven and the eternal. [Shrewdness=Klugheit (Kant)]