Lessons in Law 9: Crack Hill

English language and a pinch of French.

Crack Hill

There’s been a crack pandemic in Paris, France, these last years, with an area now known as Crack Hill (la colline du crack) in the North-Eastern parts of the city. Neighbors talking of a “hell,” a “nightmare,” and other such words has become commonplace. Authorities are pouring millions of taxpayer money in a so-called crack plan doing nothing but distributing under police surveillance new crack pipes every Thursday to the 1,500 crackheads (they know the numbers!) who roam on Crack Hill and paying for 400 hotel rooms for crackheads.

Thus, the bureaucracy’s sole policy is to prevent the crackheads’ habit from turning them into blood felons, with the result that they will remain an endless source of unpunished misdemeanors and lower-key felonies, an everlasting nightmare for the neighborhood. – This in a country where the numbers of police officers per inhabitant are extremely high (340 for 10,000 inhabitants, that is, one officer for 294 people, according to Wikipedia).

*

« Le Gilet jaune Jérôme Rodrigues relaxé » (Le Parisien 7/3/21) : une bonne nouvelle, bien que je ne comprenne pas le jugement. Rodrigues avait traité de « bande de nazis » des membres d’un syndicat policier et le ministre de l’intérieur avait saisi la justice pour injures. Le juge dit que les propos « visaient non l’ensemble des policiers mais les méthodes de certains d’entre eux » et que le syndicat « ne se confond pas avec l’administration publique qu’est la police nationale ». Oui et alors ? Rodrigues était poursuivi pour injures et non pour diffamation envers un corps constitué (la police nationale), donc le fait que les propos ne visaient pas le corps mais certains membres de ce corps ne disculpe pas en soi de l’injure.

La question est de savoir si traiter les gens de « nazis » est une injure. Or comment cela ne serait-il pas une injure alors que la loi française condamne pénalement l’idéologie nazie et que donc un nazi est un hors-la-loi ; si traiter quelqu’un de voleur est une injure, traiter quelqu’un de nazi est forcément une injure, qui doit être condamnée en tant que telle. Il est donc évident que le ministère public ou le ministre auteur de la plainte va faire appel et a bien des chances de gagner, suite à un jugement sans queue ni tête (du moins tel que rapporté par le journal). Le calvaire de Jérôme Rodrigues est loin d’être fini. « Allez en dictature »…

*

The “shield” for “extremist” views is the First Amendment

The Wikipedia page ‘Gab’ (an internet platform) says: “Gab claims that it promotes free speech and individual liberty, though these statements have been criticized as being a shield for its alt-right and extremist ecosystem.” Under American law an “alt-right ecosystem” has no need of a shield, its shield is the law (First Amendment), so the critics alluded to are irrelevant unless the problem is the very shield American law offers alt-right ideas, that is, the problem is free speech.

The construction “Gab claims… though” is objectionable; there can be no “though” here, free speech is indeed what it is all about. When one creates a business for money laundering, as money laundering is illegal, then the business is a “shield.” Therefore, as alt-right views are shielded by the First Amendment, describing Gab as a “shield” is libelous.

It strikes one as odd, given First Amendment law, that some Americans, like the author(s) of this Wikipedia page, seem to have been raised in a European legal environment where freedom of speech exists only for what the powers that be allow and everything they label extremist is doomed to endless persecution.

ii

Finnish minister says sexist online comments about female politicians is a “threat to democracy.”

The utterance is even more ominous when one thinks that under Finnish democratic law derogatory comments on public figures such as elected officials might be prosecutable and severely punished. I am not saying this is the case, as I don’t know Finnish law, but that wouldn’t surprise me given the state of the law in my and several other continental European countries that I know.

iii

Pro-liberty Skidmore students blocked from creating a club after “cancel mob” organized against them.

Before cancel culture there’s the heckler’s veto, a cancel mob is a heckling mob. I don’t know how a “Student Government Association,” which blocked the club’s creation under pressure of a heckling mob, relates to government, if at all, in free speech law (any form of government support would suffice) but the doctrine about heckling is: “the core concern … is that allowing the suppression of speech because of the discontent of the opponents provides the perverse incentive for opponents to threaten violence rather than to meet ideas with more speech.” (mtsu.edu) Link

iv

Instagram deletes post of President Biden falling up the stairs under its “violence and incitement” policy.

MSNBC analyst says Biden falling meme could incite violence.

They expect him to fall a lot. Joe Biden has been would-be candidate for POTUS for 35 YEARS. Here’s what Robert H. Bork wrote for year 1987: “Senator Biden’s presidential aspirations came to a sudden end, probably for all time. The campaign staff of Governor Michael Dukakis gave the press videotapes demonstrating that Biden had plagiarized speeches by other politicians such as Britain’s Neal Kinnock. In addition, the press learned that Biden had misrepresented his law school record. As the damaging facts began to pile up, Biden at first tried to explain and finally had to hold a press conference at which he withdrew as a candidate for his party’s nomination.” (The Tempting of America, 1990)

For a discussion of Robert Bork’s ideas, see Lesson 8.

v

‘It started with words,’ so free speech is not okay?

vi

Biden appointee Timothy Wu once questioned whether the First Amendment was “obsolete,” has questionable free speech views.

A fair statement would be that all elected officials and their appointees have questionable free speech views, because a political class will always want to mutate into a political cartel, which requires speech control and suppression, so the condition for free speech is a truly independent judicial power and irremovable judges, something that apparently does not exist in this world except the USA. Do not make as if Republican majorities had unquestionable free speech views: the many anti-BDS laws, which will be struck down one after the other, and the sooner the better, are a recent example of the tendency.

vii

Force is the one thing we’re not allowed to advocate.

The First Amendment does allow one to advocate force. “Advocacy of illegal conduct” is protected speech, what is not protected is “incitement to imminent lawless action” (Brandenburg v. Ohio), the word to emphasize here being “imminent.” Case law explains that, for speech to be unprotected, the lawless action it advocates must not only be imminent but also likely to follow from speech. I argue that there is an intrinsic impossibility for online speech to be incitement to imminent action; the law is aimed at speech “brigaded with action,” that is, speech to and from among a mob prone to act, or, in the classic example, shouting fire in a crowded theater.

I am surprised that a former shareowner of a platform, namely Parler, is raising funds for his legal counsel in view of a Congress hearing about the platform’s responsibility for the Capitol storming. It looks like rogue intimidation. I question the legality of any step by the legislator that compels private citizens to legal counsel expenses. The judiciary, not the legislative, is the power that examines particular responsibilities.

*

Is there rationality in the affirmation that as blacks make a disproportionate part of prison inmates in America the American society is racist? Looking at the figures of wealth beside the figures of prison inmates, one finds consistence across the two sets, that is, the less wealthy group is also the group with disproportionate numbers of prison inmates, which makes perfect sense on the merely economic and sociological level as poverty is ridden with deprivation and incentives to illegal conduct. As it is to be sociologically expected that crime be more rampant in poor neighborhoods than in wealthy ones, it is also to be expected that blacks have more prison inmates, as the figures show they are poorer in the main. Therefore, although the affirmation according to which the society is racist can be inferred from prison inmates figures is hardly challenged because of the fear the challenge could be construed as a claim that blacks are intrinsically (genetically) more criminal as a race, in fact there exists an entirely economic cause for criminal figures.

This shifts attention to the cause of economic inequalities, as one might then ask if there is something intrinsic to racial groups that some thrive more and some thrive less in the economy. If inequalities in prison figures can be inferred from wealth group status, the latter cannot be inferred away, so to speak.

The antiracist idea is that, given equal opportunities, all racial groups must and would equally thrive in the economy. So, as there are economic differences between racial groups, it must be that the society does not give equal opportunities to all and this because it is racist. Thus, the American society is to be called racist as long as each racial group does not have the same proportions of wealth and poverty as the global average, that is, as long as they are not all the same in terms of wealth. That this can and will result from the free market is, I am sure, what no one among Americans truly believes, so the fact that Americans keep talking of their economy as a free-market economy, having at the same time an antiracist agenda, is questionable.

*

As you know, ex-post-facto legislation is expressly prohibited by the US constitution.

(On the eve of the sesquicentennial of Ohio’s Statehood in 1953 it was discovered that while the Ohio constitution had been ratified, the territory of Ohio was never formally admitted to the union. President Eisenhower made a joke about Ohio state officials drawing salaries under false pretenses and then had congress RETROACTIVELY ratify Ohio’s statehood.)

In its purity the principle holds in criminal law only, but such a construction may be argued to be unconstitutional indeed: “Thomas Jefferson described them [ex post facto laws] as ‘equally unjust in civil as in criminal cases.’ Over the years, however, when deciding ex post facto cases, the United States Supreme Court has referred repeatedly to its ruling in Calder v. Bull, in which Justice Samuel Chase held that the prohibition applied only to criminal matters, not civil matters, and established four categories of unconstitutional ex post facto laws.” (Wikipedia) Like Jefferson I see no reason why the principle should be limited to criminal law, because even if ignoring the principle must be particularly dramatic in criminal law it doesn’t mean such neglect is benign in other legal domains.

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Multipartyism is a corrupt form of people’s government

Multipartyism is a corrupt form of people’s government. The point is to bring no more than two platforms to the electorate’s choice because that’s the only way to ensure that the elected majority will apply the electoral platform rather than coalition pacts bargained behind closed doors between various elected parties. The platform itself is the result of primaries so what Perot and others do as third parties could well be done in the frame of one or the other party. In multipartyism parties run for platforms they know they will amend behind closed doors the very day after election day! That is, if no party gets absolute majority (50 percent or more of the votes, that is, of the seats). With two parties competing one will get absolute majority, but with more than two parties competing absolute majorities are exceptional and coalition pacts must be reached between parties to form majority governments. Where absolute majorities are not exceptional one may talk of a de facto bipartisan system.

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La différence entre un Français et un Américain, c’est que l’un chante « Aux armes » et que l’autre a le droit de porter des armes. « Vous chantiez, j’en suis fort aise… »

*

On Legalizing Polygamy

Polygamy is as good as nonexistent in the Arab Gulf states: “Today, because of higher standards of education and additional leisure time to spend, compatible spouses are more desired. This issue also contributed to the almost complete eradication of polygamy in Gulf. Although permitted under Islam, the custom even in the past was rarely practiced. Often women include specific paragraphs in their marriage contract prohibiting the husband from taking a second wife.” (Article Marriage, in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab States Today: An Encyclopedia of Life in the Arab States, Maisel & Shoup ed., 2009)

The phrasing is ambiguous. “Eradication” would not make one expect the following sentence: “the custom even in the past was rarely practiced.” Because if it was rarely practiced in the past, then it was already “eradicated,” in the sense that it was rare already, and the conclusion is that the custom is as uncommon today as it was in the past, so there has been no change, and certainly no eradication. The situation was and is that only the wealthiest men, typically of ruling families, had and have multiple wives. Besides, this “monopoly” must by necessity be consolidated by the rent economy, as one fails to see how individual males depending on the state for their income would be allowed several wives without the state correspondingly increasing their income, which would be perceived as unwarranted by the rest of males, whereas coming from the free market this kind of perception does not obtain.

So, one point for allowing polygamy is that it would remain uncommon anyway, as it was and is in the Gulf states.

ii

In an online summary of Edward Dutton’s book Why Islam Makes You Stupid… But Also Means You’ll Conquer the World (2020), I find Dutton includes among the reasons why Islam makes one stupid… and likely to conquer the world… polygamy. But on this he’s wanting on the side of sociological data, as polygamy is hardly more practiced by Muslims than by others. I have already written on the issue on this blog (here), warning against assuming that the legality of polygamy translates into high degrees of polygyny, as the figures in fact show that polygyny is high in sub-Saharan countries (not all Muslim) and the Caribbeans (where polygamy is illegal).

How can Muslim polygamy, i.e., the legal acceptance or toleration of it can be a factor of stupidity if it does not translate into major differences with countries where it is prohibited? That’s the same as saying that I would become dumber by tolerating my neighbor’s using intoxicants, without using them myself, as the dumbing effect (if there’s any) of intoxicants is limited to the user and does not extend to the one who tolerates it.

Therefore, when in the recent French bill against ‘separatism,’ commentators and, in the travaux préparatoires and debates, the legislators themselves conflate Islam with issues that are in fact connected with the culture of sub-Saharan migrants, be them from Muslim communities or not, namely polygamy and female genital cutting (same as with polygamy female circumcision predates Islam and has been maintained in whole communities, Islamic or not), they are mistaken or prejudiced, because in Africa said practices are no more Islamic than, say, animistic.

iii

Of course, it does not make sense to speak of an Islamic tolerance for polygamy, as the Prophet of Islam had several wives. Another word must be used to convey the idea that it is a good thing that at least some men have multiple wives even though almost all of them will have only one, as it probably turned out to be the case throughout the history of Islam in its main centers.

iv

Polygyny can take many forms. No one really has to relinquish it in a state where polygamy is not allowed and only the legal institution of it does not exist; a polygynous man can adapt to any legal system, find arrangements within the law, for instance as to heirloom etc., and I fail to see what obstacles there are to de facto polygyny in the West. The French legislator thinks he has adopted measures just now (the bill I have been briefly discussing in ii) to prevent de facto polygyny in France but this will only serve to make the bureaucracy still more intolerably intrusive in people’s lives. They can never think out of that box, it’s always more bureaucratic control, as readers of Tocqueville know.

The classic work of sociological literature, The Children of Sanchez, may be described as a case depiction of polygyny in Mexico. Sanchez, a restaurant waiter (I wouldn’t call that high status– and Lewis’s book is about the “culture of poverty” –, although evolutionary psychology, EP, tends to associate polygyny with high status), had several wives and children in various barrios of Mexico City, sharing his earnings between all of them, and all of them living in misery. – Polygyny is not legal in Mexico. Would Mexican authorities make it legal, they would adjust the legal system to the reality of their country. A migrant to Mexico from a country where polygyny is legal, would still think polygyny is permissible there, albeit not legal. By practicing it, he would conform to a Mexican reality and couldn’t be accused to be a cause of disruption. (In the U.S., what would be disruptive is the same migrant’s will to live in a nucleus family of single wife and children, as the de facto model is communal child-rearing under Amazons’ control. Wait and see.)

v

An alternative to the form of consociationalism here advocated for the Western world may be the American constitutional theory as exposed by Supreme Court judges: “We are not an assimilative, homogeneous society, but a facilitative, pluralistic one, in which we must be willing to abide someone else’s unfamiliar or even repellant practice because the same tolerant impulse protects our own idiosyncrasies. … In a community such as ours, ‘liberty’ must include the freedom not to conform. ” Justice Brennan, on Michael H. v. Gerald D. 1989. That may make America sound pretty much liberal, but I still perceive it is more conservative than continental Europe (it is no accident, by the way, that of all European countries the UK left the EU), where they have got authoritarian liberalism whereas in the States it remains PC (political correctness) liberalism.

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Kierkegaard Against ‘Christendom’

Isn’t it astonishing that one would need a “school of intelligence,” Epicureanism, to “contend” that we ought to look for pleasure? Is it something people need be told or rather they needn’t be told that they like and want pleasure more than displeasure? Kierkegaard is talking through me right now: He strongly objected to Christianity turning into a form of Epicureanism, with the indicting question: What is the point of making eternal bliss dependent upon what people want in this life? If the good life that leads to eternal bliss is what everybody wants without being told, namely a comfy pleasurable existence, then there was no need to warn them of eternal damnation. ‘Christendom,’ that is, Christianity as Epicureanism, is nonsense.

A call to a pleasurable life has no meaning except as opposition to the thought of an afterlife or a supernatural order of things, as ‘superstitious beliefs’ (in Epicurus’s words) can hinder one’s correct conduct on the way to a pleasurable life, leaving aside the question that the obstacles are also in the very craving for pleasure as it is more often than not self-contradictory and requires a method, a guidance which Epicurus proposed to delineate (with what success?). – Precisely because of Epicureanism’s rejection of superstition, the grounds are lacking for Christianity to be an Epicureanism, that is, to be of this world. This life is ultimately about winning the afterlife, not about making life comfy. For the latter one needs Epicureanism but for one who heeds the warning from beyond Epicureanism is miserable blindness. One cannot reconcile both views, and this is the reason Christendom is anti-Christian. The idea that the routine observance of sacraments, received from priests, moreover, who are in nothing different from their herd except that they have a MORE pleasurable life than most of them (in terms of wealth –being high functionaries of the state in the Scandinavian Lutheran churches– and good name and family life and leisure and so on), is what a Christian life is about, is appalling when one thinks, like Kierkegaard, about it.

When asked how to live the good life, the clergyman in Christendom might answer: “Be in my shoes.” Hinting not as much as to what is to be done as a Christian, as to a collective situation where the good life is partly inherited (the bishop is the bishop’s son) and partly the result of worldly shrewdness that has nothing to do with Christian teachings and everything with an Epicurean quest for pleasure, including the pleasure to slit others’ throats (metaphorically speaking, at least, that is, as there are in the state church x or y bishop tenures then you’ll get x or y incumbents and the other candidates will be failures). Ultimately, the guidance for Epicureanism is how to make this school of intelligence compatible with a state of things where people are not at each other’s throats all the time. We all know we want our pleasure and we all have some notions of how to get it (although our pleasures conflict with each other too), and yet it happens more often than not that our pleasure must depend on an object that we don’t own.

Last but not least, Epicurus wrote for a leisure class that doesn’t exist any longer. His thinking must be thus qualified that it answers the question of how to be happy with so much time on our hands, surrounded by slaves working for us, whereas in many cases we are not even able to secure the least bit of free time in our existence nowadays. So, talking of Epicureanism to today’s public is like telling them “there were better days, you know.” Carpe diem, pluck the day, usually summarizes Epicureanism in a nutshell. Carpe diem makes sense if I can say the day is mine, if I am no flotsam, floating with the stream or winds of the workday from morning till night, with no direction but that of the steady flow. Floating is not what the vessel but its wreck does.

ii

A few quotes from Kierkegaard’s Articles to The Fatherland and The Instant (from Attack Upon ‘Christendom’, translator Walter Lowrie, Princeton University Press, Tenth Printing 1991)

Articles in The Fatherland

28 the impudent fudge about Christianity being perfectible

35 in Protestantism, especially in Denmark, Christianity marches to a different melody, to the tune of «Merrily we roll along, roll along, roll along» – Christianity is enjoyment of life, tranquillized, as neither the Jew nor the pagan was, by the assurance that the thing about eternity is settled, settled precisely in order that we might find pleasure in enjoying this life, as well as any pagan or Jew.

37 I am not a Christian severity as opposed to a Christian leniency. By no means. I am neither leniency nor severity: I am… a human honesty.

38 as soon as the Christian requirement of poverty is brought to bear, family is a luxury

The Instant

110 Imagine that a man with a loaded pistol stepped up to a person and said to him, «I’ll shoot you dead,» or imagine something still more terrible, that he were to say, «I’ll seize upon your person and torture you to death in the most dreadful manner, if you do not (now be on the watch, for here it comes)…make your own life here on earth as profitable and enjoyable as you possibly can.» This surely is the most comical speech; for to bring that about one really does not need to threaten with a loaded pistol and the most amazing kind of death; perhaps neither the loaded pistol nor the most agonizing kind of death would avail to prevent it. And so it is here: by the dread of eternal punishment (frightful menace!), by the hope of an eternal blessedness, to want to bring about…yes, to bring about what we are (…) that we may live as we most like to live–for to refrain from civil crimes is nothing but plain shrewdness.

165 If in the natural man there is any instinct so strong as the instinct of self-preservation, it is the instinct for the propagation of the race, which therefore Christianity tried to cool off, teaching that it is better not to marry, yet, if worse comes to worst, it is better to marry than to burn. But in «Christendom» the propagation of the race has become the serious business of life, together with Christianity; and the priest (this epitome of nonsense enveloped in long robes), the priest, the teacher of Christianity, of the Christianity of the New Testament, has even got his income fixed in proportion to his activity in promoting the propagation of the race, getting a definite amount for each child.

183 So there is a difference as wide as the earth, as wide as heaven, between the Mynsterish [Bishop Mynster’s] life-view (which properly is Epicureanism, enjoyment of life and the lust for life, belonging to this world) and the Christian view, which is that of suffering, of enthusiasm for death, belonging to the other world; yea, there is such a difference between these two life-views that the latter (if it were taken seriously, and not at the very most expressed rarely in a quiet hour) must appear to Bishop Mynster as a kind of madness.

185 By indifferentism one commonly understands having no religion at all. But resolutely and definitely to have no religion at all is something passionate, and so is not the most dangerous sort of indifferentism. Hence too it occurs rather rarely.

189 I am unable to endure this thought [«The situation is this: the more thou hast to do with God, and the more He loves thee, the more thou wilt become, humanly speaking, unhappy for this life, the more thou wilt have to suffer in this life»], and therefore merely investigate this true definition of what it is to become a Christian, whereas for my part I help myself to endure sufferings by a much easier thought, one which is Jewish, not in the highest sense Christian, the recognition that I suffer for my sins.

190 And only by the help of this canst thou see that the Christianity of the New Testament does not exist, that the little religiousness there is in the land is at the very most…Judaism.

205 [Christianity] that religion precisely which extols the single state.

215 man is reduced to insignificance by marriage

223 Christianly it is egoism in the highest degree that because a man and a woman cannot control their lust another being must therefore sigh, perhaps for seventy years, in this prisonhouse and vale of tears, and perhaps be lost eternally.

263 And inflexibly as the human race stands up for its will to punish, to punish even by death, those who are not willing to be like the others, just so firmly does eternity stick to its purpose of punishing with eternal perdition those who are tranquillized by being like the others.

281 Worldly shrewdness is eternally excluded, despised and abhorred, as things are in heaven, more than all vices and crimes, because in its nature it of all things most belongs to this wretched world, and most of all is remote from having anything to do with heaven and the eternal. [Shrewdness=Klugheit (Kant)]

7 comments

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  4. florentboucharel's avatar
    florentboucharel

    On Legalizing Polygamy

    After I published on my Academia a paper called “Consociationalism and Polygamy: The case for legalization of polygamy in the West,” made of this and other parts of this blog, my attention was called on a paper “The Logics of Polygamy” by its author, to whom I replied the following (interspersed with quotes from the author’s paper for a better understanding).

    Dear Kai Borrmann, thank you for sharing your paper “The Logics of Polygamy” with me. I think I disagree with you, however.

    If Islamic polygamy is criticized – as it is, often by muslims themselves – then for all kinds of legal, ethical or practical reasons; it is regarded to run counter to modern ideas about equality between the sexes. (K. Borrmann)

    First, Muslims cannot disagree with polygamy, since the Prophet of Islam was polygamous. This is not to say they ought to think it their duty to promote polygamy actively. As I wrote in my paper on polygamy, the phenomenon has certainly always been limited in the Islamic world itself (and polygyny most probably less rampant in this culture than in some non-Muslim societies).

    Surprisingly enough however, the main reference for justifying polygamy, Qur’anic verse 4:3, is spared from textual criticism. (K.B.)

    “If you fear that you will not do justice to the orphans, then you may marry the women you like, either two, three or four of them. But if you fear that you will not maintain equity between them, then you shall marry just one (free) woman or slave of yours. It will be closer to abstaining from injustice.” (Quran 4:3)

    The Quranic verse 4:3 you deal with in your paper supports this view, as it stresses conditions that cannot be fulfilled all the time for every man, obviously; there are some special responsibilities called for from having or planning to have more than one wife. As a matter of fact, polygamy is not a phenomenon that can be generalized to the whole of males, hence its by nature limited scope, because of the constant ratio of sexes around 1:1 (the mechanical process for this acknowledged result remaining unknown). Besides the Quran, the Sunnah is also authoritative and expatiates on polygamy, which remains undiscussed in your paper. In parentheses, that polygamy would “run counter to modern ideas about equality between the sexes” is immaterial: modern ideas have no authority per se and should even be discarded, from the Islamic point of view, when they run counter to the legitimate religious authoritative sources. Also, it can indeed be argued that polygamy is recognized as such by Western law, through the legal recognition of extramarital, so-called “natural” children. Polygamy is a legal regime; it is not this regime that allows a man’s sexual relationships with several women at the same time (polygyny), however only this regime allows a man to have legitimate children from several women at the same time, which is exactly the result of the legal recognition of extramarital children by Western law (the 1972 law in France, to take just one example).

    A way to catch up on this is to apply Deontic Logic, the logic of norms, to interpret the verse. (K.B.)

    Finally, I am not familiar with the logical formalism you apply and can only say that I do not welcome the revival, after the long-past demise of scholastic philosophy, of Aristotelian formalism by Anglo-Saxon so-called analytic philosophy, a typical breed of “Universitätsphilosophie.” Thank you for your attention. FB

    • florentboucharel's avatar
      florentboucharel

      “the mechanical process for this acknowledged result remaining unknown”: I need to say a little more about it, otherwise I would be thought naive. Statistically, the ratio must be 1:1 on the long term, as each baby has a 50-50 chance to be of one or the other sex. However, the mechanism that remains unknown is that significant departures from the ratio, for instance after a war, correct themselves, that is, when one sex is in excess, the statistical results are tilted toward the 1:1 ratio by an increase of chances that a baby will be of the other sex (male in case of deviations due to war losses). The nature of the correction mechanism remains unknown.

      • florentboucharel's avatar
        florentboucharel

        (Continuation)

        I referred to Aristotelianism and Scholasticism as historical examples of hyper-formalization of logics, of which formalization the symbolism of deontic logics is a late avatar. I suggest we leave this to electronic computers and use dialectical skills instead. The discussion remains confusing at a first reading for want of context. Who are the orphans? They must be the man’s stepchildren, that is, the children of the considered woman from a previous, dead man. By marrying this woman who already has children but lost her former husband, the man becomes a stepfather to her orphans. The verse 4:3 is, therefore, a rule of conduct for this case of polygamous possibilities: the case where a woman brings “orphans” with her in the marriage. As a result, the rules apply not to polygamy in general, but to the particular case. On the contrary, in case a woman is a virgin, for instance, verse 4:3 is pointless. If it were the main verse about polygamy in the Quran (“the main reference” in your words), that would mean the main verse does not present the main case but a special case. The main case remains undiscussed in your paper. However, you then talked of another verse, namely 4:129; would not this one be the main reference instead? What do you think?

        From the particular case, one cannot draw conclusions as to the logics of the general situation. A man marrying a woman who brings “orphans” with her is a special case, and the rules for the special case are special rules. That there are special rules shows, if this were not only the main but also the sole, the unique reference about polygamy in the Quran, that polygamy is allowed for Muslims.

        As to the text of the verse itself (“If you fear that you will not do justice to the orphans, then you may marry the women you like, either two, three or four of them. But if you fear that you will not maintain equity between them, then you shall marry just one free woman or slave of yours.”), it is two sets of one premise plus one conclusion. Marry several women “if you fear that you will not do justice to the orphans.” But marry only one woman “if you fear that you will not maintain equity between them,” and you say “them” here are the wives, not the orphans. If “them” here were the orphans, both premises would be of identical content, would they not? Fear of not doing justice and fear of not maintaining equity are the same. But as “them” are the wives, the problem is not the same, it is not an either/or problem like: Either you fear that you will not do justice to them (orphans), then marry one woman, or you fear not that you will not do justice to them (orphans), then (you can) marry several women. Same if “them” are “women.” The advice is an either/or problem only if the considered object is the same, orphans or wives, in both parts of the set.

        But the objects are not the same. You interpret as: “If one cares for the orphans, then one is allowed to marry more than one woman,” that is, if one fears that the orphans, for being without a father, will suffer injustice, then marry the woman and be a stepfather, a new father to her orphans. It is injustice by omission: by omitting to marry the woman, one fears injustice for her orphans. But the second part of the set deals with injustice by commission: if one marries several women, one may fail to maintain equity between them (women).

        Therefore, in this special case of polygamous possibility, a man must consider both omission and commission, as he may be unjust through both, but not in the same way. The rules, in this light, are not at all incompatible, which is the conclusion your formalism leads you to. By omission (omission to marry the mother of an orphan), one may do some amount of injustice to her orphans, who will remain fatherless; by commission (by marrying the woman), one may do some amount of injustice to his wives, if he fails to maintain equity between them. This is a commonplace situation, even outside polygamous relationships: a commonplace situation of conflict of duties where one must balance interests for the sake of justice.

        As to verse 4:129 (“You will never be able to maintain equity between your wives — no matter how keen you are. So do not totally incline towards one leaving the other in suspense.”), I understand your formalism leads you to a declaration of incompatibility with part 2 of verse 4:3 (“But if you fear that you will not maintain equity between them, then you shall marry just one woman”). On the one hand verse 4:129 excludes the possibility of maintaining equity between several wives, while on the other hand verse 4:3 makes of maintaining equity between one’s wives a condition for marrying several wives. Such apparent inconsistencies are found in all legislations around the world. The inconsistency is merely formal, not substantial (hence the impossibility to get the substantial meaning from a formalistic approach).

        The substantial meaning can be exposed as follows. When one has saved orphans from the injustice of being fatherless by marrying a second wife –a just and meritorious action–, one gets in the trouble of having to maintain equity between two wives, which is difficult, and consistent failure to achieve this result is an injustice by itself. Verse 4:129 rejects the notion that maintaining such equity can be an easy task, can be taken for granted. Don’t take for granted that your good actions toward the orphans will balance your wrong actions in dealing with your several wives if you’re careless. It all sums up to a balancing of duties. The same is commonplace in Western legislations, such as the balancing between freedom and anarchy, and such like. According to your formalism, freedom of speech is incompatible with libel suits, yet which country proclaiming freedom of speech does not have libel suits?

  5. Pingback: Document. Histoire de la Constitution “corporatiste” du Paraguay (1940-1967) | florent boucharel rAd-Free

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