2 Preliminary Dismissal of Deceptive Appearances
In Europe they have hate crime laws, hate speech laws, and police states. (Cf. City of Houston v. Hill, U.S. 1987, holding that “[t]he freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state.” By this well-thought definition European countries are not free nations but police states indeed.)
In U.S. they only have hate crime laws.
What makes hate crime laws so unexceptional?
“Hate crimes are offenses that are committed because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, or sexual orientation of another individual or group of individuals. … Various state courts found that, since the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment protects speech and thought, even when that speech or thought is offensive, any law criminalizing thought should be rendered unconstitutional.” (Hate crimes by Kristin L. Stewart, J.D. [excerpt] in Encyclopedia of American Law, D. Schultz ed., 2002)
If a crime is found to be this or that “(name a crime) as a hate crime,” penalties are increased.
2 Preliminary Dismissal of Deceptive Appearances
Contrary to appearances, hate crime laws in the United States are probably not designed to protect the white population from black criminals. How, then, could such appearances have arisen?
First, we are told about an epidemics of hate crimes. “If you believe the news, today’s America is plagued by an epidemic of violent hate crimes” is from the presentation of the book Hate Crime Hoax: How the Left is Selling a Fake Race War (2019) by Wilfred Reilly, assistant professor of political science at Kentucky State University.
Second, we know the massive proportion of black inmates in the prison population of the States: cf. The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (2012) by Michelle Alexander, visiting professor at Union Theological Seminary, New York City.
Third, in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a hate crime state statute. A group of black men had assaulted a white boy after watching the film Mississippi Burning. It was found their attack was racially motivated and the increased penalty of the instigator, Todd Mitchell, justified.
From (1), (2) & (3), one would swear blacks are responsible for the epidemic of hate crime. Indeed, it is hard to see how a crime epidemic, namely a hate crime epidemic, would not be reflected in the prison inmates population, that is, how the disproportionate numbers of black inmates in prison would not reflect the hate crime epidemic, especially considering the emblematic precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court on hate crime laws applies to a black defendant who challenged the constitutionality of his increased penalty.
This is a deceptive appearance. In reality hate crime laws protect minorities.
Hate crime laws trivialize crime
“This book is as timely as today’s headlines. Professor Lawrence has written a powerful, persuasive, and eloquent call for more effective action by Congress and the states to deal with these despicable crimes. Civil Rights is still the unfinished business of America. Hate crimes are uniquely destructive and divisive, because their impact extends far beyond the victim. They poison entire communities and undermine the ideals for which America stands. They deserve to be punished with the full force of the law, and Professor Lawrence’s book brings us closer to that important goal.” Senator Edward M. Kennedy on Punishing Hate: Bias Crimes under American Law (2002) by Frederick M. Lawrence.
This praise by Sen. Kennedy contains all the appalling mistakes an informed person is supposed not to make when thinking and talking about crime and the law.
“This book is as timely as today’s headlines.”
It is known, it is even common-sense, since at least Roscoe Pound (Criminal Justice in America, 1930), that to resort to designing criminal law in hysterical reaction to headlines is the worst one can think of, it is Lynch mentality smuggled into the legislative bodies and through them into the courts.
Sen. Kennedy’s is the confession he was a headline-law maker, one who made headline laws. With lawmakers like him, it is headlines which make laws. Yet no one knows what the headlines reflect (a few people believe they reflect reality). If media were neutral reporting agencies, then, given what has been said in II about New Jim Crow, media treatment of crime would reflect the makeup of prison population (because prison population is a good token for the known figure of crime), that is to say the media would devote the same share of crime news to black crime as the share of black inmates population in prisons. Is this the case?
If this is not, even if it were because the media are not racist whereas lawmakers, the police and the judiciary are, it turns out they make their headlines according to their own notions rather than to an actual state of things. If the state of the society as far as crime is concerned is institutional (colorblind) racism, i.e. a New Jim Crow, and the media correct this because they go against the stream, then admittedly their headlines are no different from political pamphlets; therefore legislators are not bound to take their headlines as guidelines, anymore than they are to follow the views of any scholar, intellectual, or writer.
The same holds with the media coverage of hate crime. Sen. Kennedy wants to legislate in a “timely” fashion, following the headlines. Given what has just been said, however, he is nothing but the willing audience of a hate crime law lobby, whereas the true situation might or might not support a need for new or further legislation. Obviously, if the coverage is a hoax (Wilfred Reilly), no legislation is called for by the timely headlines. (Needless to say the notion of timely headlines is absurd: Reread the sentence and you’ll see Sen. Kennedy actually talks of timely headlines; however there is but one timely time for news headlines.)
“These despicable crimes”
Which crimes are not despicable? Crimes that a senator is more likely to commit, like embezzlement?
“Hate crimes are uniquely destructive and divisive, because their impact extends far beyond the victim.”
That the impact of all crimes “extends far beyond the victim” is on the contrary the obvious truth, one at the foundation of the secular distinction between tort law and criminal law, and hardly, therefore, could a premise be more unsupportive of the conclusion, namely, that hate crimes are unique.
“They poison entire communities and undermine the ideals for which America stands.”
One would swear other crimes are mere trifles.
“They deserve to be punished with the full force of the law.”
Yes, like any other crime. Actually, a good axiom of jurisprudence is that crimes deserve to be punished with the full force of the law. Accordingly, since every crime is punishable by the full force of the law, one cannot make a difference between one crime and the same crime “as a hate crime.”
If such a difference were legitimate, it would actually imply a decrease in penalties for hate crimes.
Hate crimes are crimes of passion,
therefore the penalty must be decreased, not increased
Here come the love crimes.
I had intended the word as a joke. I thought: If one talks of hate crimes, there must be love crimes too, which is absurd. Then I remembered the crimes of passion (crimes passionnels): “The ‘crime of passion’ defense challenges the mens rea element by suggesting that there was no malice aforethought, and instead the crime was committed in the ‘heat of passion’.” (Wikipedia: Crime of passion)
Crimes of passion are what I would like to call the love crimes. Love is a passion. Hate is no less a passion than love –sometimes love turns to hate– and therefore, as the crime of passion defense applies to love crimes, the defense applies to hate crimes too.
Think about Todd Mitchell, the black defendant in Wisconsin v. Mitchell who “instigated an attack against a white young boy.” He had just been watching the film Mississippi Burning, which stirred the rage of oppression in his heart, to the point he could not stand it anymore. His brothers and sisters in race had been enslaved, trafficked, segregated, Jim-Crowed for centuries. Hatred was stirred in him, his spirits cried for vengeance. A young white boy walked by.
Even if Mitchell had been animated by an ideology, by the liberal ideology that cannot stress enough the evils of a system and the burden of debt currently weighing upon the white man till the end of times, even if he had been an avid reader of liberal books, still his deed would not be an ideological crime –because there is no such thing under the U.S. Constitution, which protects freedom of conscience– but a crime of passion.
(Even the minutest premeditation in coldest blood could be a crime of passion, I find, because hate is a passion, just like the cheated husband who premeditates his wife’s death could invoke the defense in my eyes, because from love to despair time may elapse but the heat of passion remains, the heat of passion is not the same thing as the heat of the moment.)
But the Supreme Court –Rehnquist Court (surely this rings a little bell)– did not see a liberal black boy under the dramatic and melodramatic influence of a Hollywood blockbuster stuffed with the most advanced techniques of emotions and mind manipulation, no, and “the Wisconsin statute…was not punishing the defendant for his or her bigoted beliefs or statements, but rather the predicted ramifications of his or her crime” (oyez.org). Mark these words: A hate crime law does not punish a defendant for his or her bigoted beliefs or statements. I have no idea what the Court, or its commentator, means by “the predicted ramifications of the crime” and as I have not read the whole decision yet I reserve my judgment, only saying it looks like a mighty innovation in the field of criminal law and I’m surprised it is not more discussed in academia and among advocates of hate crime laws, who keep saying, instead, that hate crime laws punish bigoted biases (one also talks of bias crimes).
So very true is it that hate crimes are crimes of passion that it is even positive law in the gay panic defense. A man subject to homosexual advances may react violently with assault, battery, murder attempt, sometimes the seducer’s death. The defendant can invoke gay panic defense at his trial and if the motion is accepted his act will be treated as a crime of passion. As the reader can well imagine, statutes to that effect have disappeared from about every legal system in the western world, and now the same acts are likely to be treated as hate crimes with increased rather than decreased penalties. (Likely because how could such a reaction not be the sign of strong biases?)
Hate crimes are crimes of passion
and like other crimes of passion they have no place left amidst our laws
Today crimes of passion are hardly law any longer. A man finding his wife with another man will shoot them and then kill himself, and perhaps his kids in the bargain, because he knows society will not pardon him the heat of passion. He knows only cuckolders are excused nowadays.
As one, therefore, sees crime of passion laws dwindling, one must draw the consequences as to the notion itself, which includes hate crimes. Hate crimes can have no place amidst our laws.
Hate crime laws shift the tendency of regimes from majoritarian to countermajoritarian
In aristocratic regimes, the nobility is a minority too.
If one agrees the purpose of hate crime laws is not, contrary to appearances, or not only to hold the grudge of black people against whites for a past of slavery and unequal segregation in check, then one must consider the following reasoning.
Hate crime laws are designed to protect minorities from the violent manifestation of biases. That minorities would bear a natural grudge against the majority for the latter’s entrenched position and status does not seem to ever enter the mind of advocates of bias crime laws and I have never heard one such advocate express concern for the safety of individuals in the majority due to a grudge of this kind. Yet it occurs to me that, if I belonged to a minority and the majority had privileged status in the society, I would resent the fact. In case I expressed my resentment with violent acts, that would be hate crime then, would it not? But no, we are never told of such psychological problems; one has to know the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions to be aware that anti-white feelings can be a bias, and in some European countries you would look for the same kind of precedent as Wisconsin v. Mitchell in vain (but not because such crimes never happen).
All in all, one can safely bet that a risk of increased penalties exists above all for crimes where victims are from minorities. Therefore, if a criminal who is neither a hate criminal nor a love criminal, only an indifferent criminal who wants money, thinks –and I claim the media and politicians have inoculated this thinking in him– that he risks increased penalties if his victim belongs to a minority, then the obvious consequence is that he will avoid picking a victim among identifiable minorities and on the contrary target individuals from the majority. Hate crime laws point to the majority as self-evident victim for “passionless” criminals. Clearly, a government must have strong countermajoritarian mechanisms to be able to pass such laws – to the point that one wonders what role is left to its majoritarian mechanisms.
Hate crime laws are hate speech laws
This section is divided in two parts (a) and (b), the former being the mere quote of an earlier writing, Hate crime laws are unconstitutional (Law 20).
a/ Hate crime laws are unconstitutional view-based discrimination.
It’s time the courts declared hate crime laws unconstitutional. This is long overdue. How can hate speech be protected as the U.S. Supreme Court intends (Brandenburg v. Ohio , R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul , Snyder v. Phelps , Matal v. Tam ) when public figures known for taking positions some call hate speech must always fear being provoked to offenses, even minor, that would lead to aggravated punishment while the opponents who provoked the incidents have no such Damocles sword hanging over their heads?
Let’s take an example. If a public figure vilified by LGBT groups as a hater gets entangled in a brawl with LGBT hecklers, he may face hate crime charges while the others will face unruly behavior charges or such like (they are not known for being haters because they’re the ones who call people haters and the media follow that stance).
The “haters” (who have a constitutional right to hate speech) are at greater risk of frame-up because for them even the slightest charges can be greatly detrimental due to the increased penalties with which hate crimes are dealt with. Hate crime laws protect a minority heckler’s veto. Due to such legislation, whole classes of people are therefore deprived of their full rights to political participation for lack of equal protection under the law. This is government repression of political opponents.
b/ Hate crime laws are conceived as disguised hate speech laws.
Discretionary police and prosecution power serves to squelch speech in scores of contexts, by making pretextual use of laws against disorderly conduct, trespass, unlawful assembly, disobeying a lawful order (like orders to move or keep moving), breach of the peace, and other such low-level criminal statutes, and scholars point out the failure of courts to address the issue properly.
The issue must be of increased concern when to low-level incriminations may be added the hate crime label. Since there have been various cases of “petty larceny, as a hate crime,” one can well imagine charges such as “trespass, as a hate crime” or “disobeying a lawful order, as a hate crime.”
Often, in the usual cases, charges are dropped and the victim of malicious policing is no more heard of. In the case of hate crimes there could be no dropping of the charges, for obvious reasons. Therefore, since police power can be used to squelch one’s speech and the courts have no sure means to second-guess the discretionary use of police power (filming police on public space is a hazy legal issue: don’t you fancy it be a well-established right), I believe advocates of hate crime laws intend to take advantage of the situation to have hate crime laws serve as hate speech laws. I believe it for the simple reason that if hate speech laws were not unconstitutional these are the laws they would demand. We have seen it in Europe: the same rhetoric used in the U.S. in support of hate crime laws is used in Europe to advocate hate speech laws.
So long as hate crime laws exist, the U.S. is at risk of becoming –if not being already, through the judicially undetected, pretextual use of executive discretion– a police state like current European Old World regimes.
Abortion Charters Ready
Mississippi Officially Asks Supreme Court To Overturn Roe v. Wade. (Breaking911): The brief continues, “The only workable approach to accommodating the competing interests here is to return the matter to ‘legislators, not judges.’… The national fever on abortion can break only when this Court returns abortion policy to the states – where agreement is more common, compromise is more possible, and disagreement can be resolved at the ballot box.”
Another scenario is to leave the matter to judges and they make abortion unconstitutional over the whole territory of the Union. – If you return abortion to the states, abortion will be a matter of two-day trips to the right state.
They think returning abortion to the states will guarantee the prohibition in red states. They do not even look for a federal bill, which would be repealed and then revoted and then repealed again and then voted again and then canceled and so on, they want such legislation for red states that have remained red from time immemorial (you know what I mean). But the problem is the blue states will remain open for “abortion charters” from red states year in year out unless the Supreme Court declares abortion unconstitutional.
One may say the difference between criminalization in some states and criminalization at federal level is only one of scope since charters can cross national borders same as they can make interstate flights. However, the difference is more substantial than that as it is more difficult to plan an abortion abroad and this guarantees that the legislation will yield some results in terms of diminishing abortion figures (whereas the possibility of interstate flight would greatly hamper the legislation’s purpose).
Another possibility is to explore legal sanctions against people traveling to other states or countries in order to commit felonies according to state or federal legislation.
Back to the Future Legislation
You’ve got those state bills passed (Texas to name one state [perhaps the first and only so far]) that declare abortion will be banned in the state no sooner than Roe v. Wade is overturned.
What is this? It is either mere incantation (not proper lawmaking) or something I can’t believe. Imagine Roe v. Wade is overturned at a time when the legislative houses of Texas support abortion, I can’t believe the incantatory bill can be set in motion, it’s as if it never existed.
Now that I have said this, I will think about it and tell you later why this is so.
Imagine the state legislature is for abortion and the governor is against it when Roe v. Wade is overturned.
As head of the executive the governor says it is his duty to implement the bill that was passed years ago, which says something like “As soon as Roe v. Wade is reversed, without further ado abortion is banned in Texas.” He says it is his duty to implement the law like any other standing law and the fact that the present legislature did not adopt it is completely immaterial; after all the present legislature did not adopt all currently standing laws.
But the legislature says: “The governor is bound to implement standing laws but the bill in question cannot be standing because it is a mere incantation. The past legislature had no constitutional power to bind in back to the future fashion the present legislature against our will. The bill is void.”
It is important that the legislators do not concede the law is standing because then they would have to repeal it by a legislative act but the governor would veto their act (the lawmakers would have to override the veto, which might be out of their reach).
The principle to bear in mind is that a legislative act must be binding for the legislature that passes it in order to bind future legislatures too (by binding I mean that the act is normative at the time the legislature passes it). Otherwise it is an incantatory act and must remain so forever, that is, it never stands. If such a law could stand, that would mean the legislature can decide what others’ will is, but actual lawmakers can only express what their will is. With the statutes in question the legislature says, in fact, “Were Roe v. Wade overturned today, we would ban abortion without further ado” but it must leave it to the actual legislature that lives a reversal to decide what it wants to do.
To avoid any confusion, the words present and actual can be synonyms but here I use them as opposites. These laws claim present lawmakers are actual lawmakers in the future too but this is not to be assumed in any circumstance (even if, as a historical fact, which is on an altogether different plane, Texas has been an uncontested red state). Lawmakers pass either acts that are normative, that is, binding at the time they pass it, or unbinding resolutions and declarations that cannot bind a future legislature either without an express act of the latter to that effect.
“Petit larceny, as a hate crime.” This is nuts and you know it. (See my indictment of hate crime legislation in Law 20.)
All countries except the USA must be inhabited by apes, otherwise why would they need Ape Speech Laws?
It’s true the European Court of Human Rights says free speech is not an absolute human right, but to be honest the ECHR is not an absolute court either.
Chicanos and the Inconsistencies of U.S. Law
In Hernandez v. State of Texas (1954) the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution applied not only to the concept of races, namely blacks as opposed to whites, but also to nationalities, i.e. classes, and that Mexican Americans (whom I hereafter call Chicanos as they themselves call today if I am not mistaken) are such a nationality or class.
The Texas courts had ruled that Chicanos are whites and that the Fourteenth Amendment is aimed at protecting not whites but the former slaves, blacks. (The special issue of the case was jury trial but here I will leave that aside.)
Chicanos are whites under U.S. law although most of them are mestizos in their countries of origin. Obviously they are not blacks (most of them – but there are a few blacks in Mexico) and the Texan courts, narrowly looking at the 14th Amendment, claimed to know two races only, blacks and whites.
I believe this could also be the result of the Immigration Act of 1924 or Johnson-Reed Act. Notwithstanding the fact, scorned time and again by scholars of the liberal and neoconservative veins alike, that Congress made extensive use of eugenics expertise to create national quotas adverse to the coming of Southern and Eastern Europeans, migrants from Mexico and other Latin-American countries were untouched by the law. This is evidence that private interests prevailed on said expertise. South-Western states wanted to continue using cheap agricultural labor (including children) and in the nineteen-twenties had started to set up maquiladoras north of the border (for instance Farah Clothing in El Paso, Texas). From a eugenicist’s point of view, the very expert standpoint called by Congress, mestizos in no way could have been viewed as less detrimental to the genetic make-up of the nation than, say, Italians, which coming was restricted by the Act.
Thus, while Congress limited immigration from large parts of Europe for the good of the United States on racial grounds, it set no limitation on mestizos from south of the border. How could courts see mestizos otherwise than as whites then? (The 1924 Act remained in vigor until 1965.)
In Hernandez v. State of Texas the Supreme Court found ample evidence that there existed a form of segregation of Chicanos on the ground: “They discovered a county-wide distinction between ‘white’ and ‘Mexican’ persons. At least one restaurant prominently displayed a sign that declared, ‘No Mexicans Served.’ Additionally, until a few years earlier, some Mexican American children attended segregated schools and were forced to drop out by fifth or sixth grade.” (Oboler S., 2005, via Wkpd) Although I find the words “at least one restaurant” unsupportive of the conclusion, because if the Court had found more than one restaurant would it not have said what number it was rather than the vague “at least one”? and on the other hand one restaurant county-wide refusing to serve Mexicans is evidence of the owner’s idiosyncrasy rather than of institutionalized discrimination, I believe the Court’s findings are true, because as Texas had its own Jim Crow laws I assume Texans would not make much difference between Negroes and Chicanos even though the 1924 Act said (at least en creux [in hollow]) the latter were whites† – said so under obvious lobbying of plantation and maquiladora owners in need of cheap labor, and in disregard of congressional expertise (eugenics).
Hernandez v. State of Texas “was a major triumph for the ‘other White’ concept, the legal strategy of Mexican-American civil-rights activists from 1930 to 1970. … It was replaced in 1971 by Cisneros v. Corpus Christi ISD, which recognized Hispanics as an identifiable minority group.” (Texas State Historical Association [TSHA])
Note that Chicanos being whites was for Texan courts an argument against, in the current interpretation since Hernandez, full acknowledgment of their rights. As the solution of the Supreme Court in Hernandez and Cisneros is that Hispanics’ rights must be specially protected because they are an identifiable minority (‘the other whites’), the two combined does not bode well for non-Hispanic whites in the foreseeable future as their majority becomes thinner, for it is this majority status that is thought to call for special legal protection of minorities and a time may come when the majority status exists no more de facto while all its de jure consequences are maintained because that is found convenient by a new majority of protected minorities…
†The assertion will seem overstretched to many but in the final analysis the question boils down to this: When were Hispanics first considered whites in the U.S. while a large majority of migrants from Latin America are mestizos, and most mulattoes, on the other hand, were considered blacks (one-drop rule: “any person with even one ancestor of black ancestry –one drop of black blood– is considered black”)? More precisely: Is it since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment or since the exemption of Latin Americans from the quotas in the Johnson-Reed Act or since another date?
US population 328M
July 22, 162k vaccinated people in US.
July 7, 5,208 dead after taking vaccine (VAERS [Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System]: fact checkers claim no causality is proven but we’ll take the figure as a reliable estimate of the so-called, acknowledged “vaccinal risk”)
Covid death toll: 610K. That’s 1 American out of 538.
Vaccine death toll: 162k/5,208 = 1/31,000.
When people focus on the 5,000+ deaths and make an argument against vaccination out of it, the figures don’t really support it. Or do they? Can governments sacrifice individuals for the public good? Even if a compulsory vaccination campaign’s death toll were known beforehand to be 1/31,000 or fewer, can it be adopted? I thought the government could not sacrifice even one individual save in time of war.
Does the French government, by instituting a sanitary pass (a vaccination certificate compulsory for all kinds of social activities), try to eschew its responsibility for the vaccine death toll? As several vaccines are already compulsory for newborns, why is the state’s responsibility not acknowledged in those vaccine’s death toll? (All vaccines must have a death toll as “vaccinal risk” is something real for all vaccines and who but the state that makes vaccination compulsory for the sake of public welfare is responsible for the death of individuals from vaccination?)
Were the US government to pass a compulsory vaccination bill, it would allow for the death of 1 person out of 31,000 in order to stop a 1 out of 538 virus death toll. Mathematically that would make the eventual death toll 57 times fewer.
The vaccine death toll, however, is random (as far as I know we cannot predict who will die), whereas the covid death toll is more predictable (the old and unhealthy will die in large proportions). With vaccination you are replacing Darwinian selection (the old and unhealthy will die from covid) by randomness (less people will die from vaccination but at random).
Je suis opposé à la vaccination forcée car c’est antidarwinien.
Selon mes calculs, à partir de statistiques officielles (5.208 morts déclarés au VAERS [Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System] sur 162.000 vaccinés), le taux de léthalité du vaccin aux États-Unis est d’environ 1/31.000 (un mort à la suite du vaccin sur 31.000 vaccinés).
Le taux de mortalité dû au vaccin aux US est un lourd 1/538 (plus de 610.000 morts selon les autorités).
En comparant les deux taux de léthalité, covid et vaccin, la mortalité par le covid (1/538) est certes bien plus importante que celle par le vaccin (1/31.000) : 57 fois plus élevée. Cependant, la léthalité de la vaccination est, à ma connaissance, imprévisible, tandis que la léthalité du covid l’est bien plus : on sait qu’elle touche surtout les personnes âgées et « à risque » (en raison d’un mauvais état de santé).
On peut voir le covid comme une réaction naturelle à la surpopulation. En rendant la vaccination obligatoire, on remplace une morbidité naturelle et darwinienne (élimination des vieux et des faibles) par une morbidité, certes théoriquement moins élevée, mais complètement aléatoire. (Je dis théoriquement car d’autres moyens de prophylaxie existent à côté de la vaccination.)
La vaccination doit donc rester un choix. Ceux qui se vaccinent sont immunisés par le vaccin, ceux qui refusent de l’être tomberont peut-être malades et, s’ils survivent (avec de bonnes chances de leur côté s’ils sont en bonne santé), ils seront immunisés contre la maladie par la maladie elle-même.
N.B. Ce raisonnement ne tient pas compte d’éventuelles séquelles de la maladie qui pourraient en soi, même en l’absence de léthalité, justifier la prophylaxie vaccinale. Perdre le sens du goût, par exemple, dans certains cas de covid, est sans doute assez préoccupant pour entrer dans ce cadre, même si c’est peu comparable aux séquelles de la poliomyélite. D’un autre côté, ce raisonnement ne tient pas non plus compte des autres effets indésirables possibles du vaccin, des autres « adverse events » du VAERS, dont certains peuvent être graves sans, je suppose, être davantage prévisibles que les cas de mort subite.
« Ce sont des criminels », dit à la télé M. le professeur en parlant des « personnes qui propagent la désinformation sur les réseaux sociaux ». – Soit. Quel est le mobile du crime ?