Kantism & Astronomy (4 Fragments)
The idea of space and time as a priori forms of intuition with no content in the external world is a foundation of Kant’s philosophy. However, this is what the relativistic theory claims, implicitly, to have disproved, with its space-time that is a fourth dimension and can be distorted by mass.
Dark energy is not predicted by the original Big Bang theory, deriving from relativity. According to the original scenario, we should be assisting to a slowdown in universal expansion, because matter and radiation are self-attractive. However, the contrary has been observed: Expansion would be accelerating. The only way for this to happen, under the assumption of the Big Bang, is that dark matter exists, which is self-repulsive gravitationally. The Big Bang theory does not hold either without the hypothesis of an inflation field, otherwise the universe would collapse. I conclude that the theory needs constant amendment to fit in the data, and such is no sign of a good frame-theory.
Relativistic black holes do not exist. Mainstream astronomers need them because of the Big Bang theory. They do not care that well-known astronomers like Hoyle and Prigogine have already come with alternative models. They stick to the Big Bang, notwithstanding the singularities of the model, like infinite temperature at some point in time (to believe this can occur in the physical world, one really has to be a strong believer). They need black holes so that current observation fits in with the total amount of matter predicted by the theory.
The world of our experience is an illusion, but an illusion that submits to rules. These rules are given by our cognitive apparatus. Infinite temperature, a so-called singularity of the relativistic Big Bang, or infinite density, at the center of a black hole, does not conform to the rule and possibility of experience, for empirical qualities have to be finite. Kantian antinomies of space, time, causality, regarding the question of their finitude, do not bear on objects of our experience but on a priori forms of knowledge. The uncertain finitude of these forms relates to their being a priori, before all experience.