Tagged: free speech
Law 40 Wawkeism
Sep 2023-Mar 2024
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Wawkeism
“China Blasts German Foreign Minister Over ‘Dictator Xi’ Jibe” (Hindustan Times, Sep 2023)
Why are woke politicians such bellicose hawks? I am coining the word wawk for them. But no matter how wawk is a hen, it can only peck small chicken.
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Taliban’s Heinous Surveillance Cams
“Taliban Plan Mass Surveillance Network in Afghanistan Using U.S. “Security Map,” China’s Huawei” (Crux, Sep 2023)
Cameras are law enforcement tools. Taliban, like other governments, will enforce legislation with the help of cameras. When human rights organizations express concerns about a mere tool with which laws will be enforced but these organizations in fact consider that the laws themselves do not abide by human rights and are the problem, it is idle talk as far as their speech focuses on a universal tool rather than specific and allegedly problematic laws. These organizations show themselves as mere anti-Taliban pecking hens. Tomorrow, if they can find nothing else, they will express concern that the Taliban have a police force. When you express concern that the government of a country uses the same police measures as other countries, you are pecking like a hen.
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The right to advocate and incite unlawful conduct
“Influencer ‘Meatball’ appears to be arrested while livestreaming looting rampage in Philadelphia” (New York Post, Sep 2023)
Streaming is not looting. The influencer has First Amendment rights. The First Amendment allows advocacy of unlawful conduct and the influencer’s arrest was unjustified.
She has a First Amendment right to incite riot or looting or any other unlawful act one can think of, provided it is not inciting (1) an imminent act (2) likely to occur: Brandenburg v. Ohio. As she was livestreaming on her blog, she was not even addressing the crowds around her, which is the only way in which her speech could have resulted in imminent unlawful action likely to occur. There is no incitement relationship between the looting and her gloating over it.
But even if she had livestreamed herself addressing the looters, “Well done, guys!,” this is not incitement either because congratulations cannot be incitement, as the former follow the act while the latter precedes it. Furthermore, even if she had said “Well done! There is another store next door,” the looting started before her speech, and if this speech (“go to another store after this one”) could be incitement in this context, then congratulations would be incitement as well, as a warmup, but congratulations cannot be incitement by definition. As one has a right to advocate wrongful conduct, one obviously has a right to cheer over wrongful conduct, even if this could be said to warm up wrongdoers.
To be sure, congratulations may also occur during, rather than after, the act, but during the act is still not before the act, and one needs precedence to talk about incitement. If there were incitement in the present case, it would be incitement to keep looting and not to start looting, but if it could be said that such a thing exists as incitement to continue doing something that people had already started doing, then there is obviously no possibility that cheering could be protected by the First Amendment as it is in a free country where advocacy of unlawful acts is protected.
Even if addressing looters in one store with such words as “Loot the next store too” has some formal characteristics of incitement, it is not incitement, here, because for speech to be incitement it must incite, again, an imminent act likely to occur, and if the imminent act was likely to occur already before the speech, the speech is not inciting, it is only cheering, rejoicing, reveling, gloating… Looting has material interests attached to it, people loot for goods and merchandises; this motive is self-sufficient without the need to add cheering as a likely cause of continuation. As an individual caught in the middle of a rampage, and liking it, some of the influencer’s words had a few characteristics of incitement but her speech lacked other characteristics and they are all needed together to characterize unlawful speech.
The arrest follows a typical pattern of police frustration, where, most of the wrongdoers escaping arrest, police turn against a person for her speech. This is not acceptable under a Constitution with First Amendment. Besides, the arrest psychologically relies on an outdated notion that people on the street have a legally enforceable duty to make citizen’s arrests (called hue and cry): when, in the past, such a duty existed, a person running with the crowd after, say, a thief on the street while cheering for the theft at the same time was obviously unlikely.
To sum up, “keep going,” in whatever form, is not incitement. The looters were not triggered by the person’s speech. Gloating over wrongful acts is protected speech, as a form of advocacy.
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While Western governments and media were stressing that some Russians tried to emigrate to escape the draft, and this was described as a blow to the Russian regime, they asked European populations to welcome and accommodate millions of Ukrainian refugees who were fleeing not only the war zone in their country but also their country itself. In other words, while these governments and media asked European people to fund the Ukrainian army, they also asked them to welcome Ukrainian men escaping military service for the country we were supposed to root for. Ukrainian refugees had a duty to take refuge in their own country in order to enlist in the Ukrainian army; their coming to Europe has been opportunistic, to the best of a rational agent’s understanding.
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On the “hypocrisy of the international community” regarding the treatment of civil casualties in Ukraine and Palestine. The parallel between Ukraine and Palestine would be more adequate if Western nations held Ukraine accountable for Russian civilians’ deaths, which they are not doing, whether it be because there are no Russian civilian casualties (but there are: see below) or for the same reason they keep largely silent on Palestinian casualties, namely because they support Ukraine’s goals as they support Israel’s ones. They only see civilian casualties when the “bad guys” are responsible.
Nota Bene. 1) Since the beginning of the war, there have been Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory. 2) There is a significant Russian minority in Ukraine. If you refuse to call them ethnic Russians, you will count them as Ukrainian casualties rather than Ukraine’s victims; how convenient.
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Aerial invasion and mass bombardments have become the number one modus operandi of technological war, and this type of warfare is highly indiscriminate and lethal to civilians and civilian infrastructures, especially when faced with guerrilla warfare. This, among other things, is the reason why Western nations are reluctant (to say the least) to condemn the bombardments on Gaza, because they know they would do the same, namely indiscriminate mass bombardments, in the same situation, regardless of international law. The existence of Palestinian enclaves (the relics of Palestinian territories) surrounded by Israeli territories allows this to happen, and the so-called “human shields” in these enclaves are all the present and living Palestinian Arabs.
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“[British] Police ‘treading a very fine line’ | Pro-Palestine protesters provided with leaflets on antisemitism” (GBNews, Nov 2023)
These leaflets are police provocation. Police target law-abiding citizens, namely pro-Palestine demonstrators, telling them through leaflets: “We are confident that you may be criminals.” Of course, this serves to dissuade people from joining the movement, as individuals who decide to join know they would be under police surveillance as suspected criminals. These leaflets are blatant discrimination.
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“Algerian footballer Youcef Atal convicted by French court over Gaza post” (Islam Channel, Jan 2024)
The fact it took less than three months for a French court to pronounce a condemnation (for a post dated Oct 12) is unusually swift for a so-called speech crime. So much so that a political spin may be suspected in the procedure, in relation with the current atrocities taking place in Palestine. Besides, if Youcef Atal has no criminal record, his sentence is unusually harsh, even taking into account the suspended part of prison time. (He probably doesn’t have a record; I only say “if” to avoid making believe I know his file personally.) The sentence is unusually harsh and the trial unusually swift, which hints at political pressure to speed it up and at a political sentence. This was a political trial, not a fair trial.
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Of Salutes and Flags
“Hundreds Perform Nazi Salute in Italy. (…) Banning the Nazi salute opens the Pandora’s box.” (FirstPost, Jan 2024)
The Pandora’s box has been open for decades in France and I confirm politics is a joke here.
Contrary to wearing uniforms and displaying paraphernalia, the salute per se is not an offense in the French books (as such it is forbidden in stadiums only) but the courts condemn it nevertheless as incitement to racial hatred. Thus, where the law actually forbids, say, the display of Nazi flags, the guilty may have to pay a 1,500€ fine, but where the law says nothing but courts nevertheless filled in the gap, then one may incur one year in prison and a 45,000€ fine. The legislator said nothing on the salute but the salute is punished as racial hatred, whose penalties are substantially heavier than for Nazi uniforms and objects that are statutorily punished by a much smaller fine, even though the obvious display of objects, if the salute is racial hatred, is racial hatred by the same token. So much so for consistency.
Finally, neither the law nor the courts limit the scope of the law to the Nazi and Italian Fascist parties; their phrasing targets organizations condemned by the Nuremberg and other trials in 1945 and other organizations condemned for crimes against humanity. Which means displaying the Israeli flag should be punished by French courts when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rules that Israel has committed or is committing a genocide.
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Defamation and the Fair Trial Principle
(For those reading French, see Droit 39 “Diffamation et Droits de la défence.”)
a) Speech during a trial
b) Speech after a trial
a) In Trump’s defamation case, what has been condemned is basically Trump’s defense in his sexual offence trial. When you defend yourself in a trial, what in other circumstances might be called defamation is protected speech, because otherwise no one could defend themselves in a trial and no one could have a fair trial. Trump’s defense was protected from defamation suits in the context of his trial. The federal prosecutor talks about Trump’s tweets, interviews, after this or that audience, at this or that time, but she fails to tell us how the points she stresses are outside the protection that Trump’s speech, like any other accused person’s speech, was afforded for his defense. Think about it, now when one is brought to court and wants to dismiss their accuser’s allegations, that is, when one defends themselves, if they lose the trial, they will also lose a defamation trial because they dare defend themselves?
In this particular trial, protected speech was not limited to the precinct of the court, because both parties were public figures and the trial was in the mass media as much as in the court. Therefore, it is obvious that Trump had a right to express himself on the trial in the media, that is, he had a right to carry elements of his defense to the public via the media, which were dealing with the trial. Consequently, his speech was protected as defense speech in a trial, and at the very least, if it could not be protected because in some similar cases this had been previously ruled out, Trump may have been in good faith about his rights, about the extremely important rights of speech protection in a fair trial. This condemnation conveys the suggestion that the court treats protection of speech quite lightly, even to the point of ignoring it. What citizens will remember of this trial is that by defending oneself in a trial one may incur another trial for defamation.
Defending oneself in a trial, if it is libel, is protected libel. Trump lost a libel case after he was sued for commenting his own trial on the internet and in interviews. His comments were merely to tell what his defense is in the case, namely that his accuser is a liar. These people mean he was the only person on earth compelled to keep silent about his own trial? There can be no fair trial at all if your defense is liable to be treated as libel because a judicial trial is basically, for starters and some dubious characters here involved, reciprocal aspersions.
b) Besides, you can’t defame someone whose reputation is not at risk. Since the court said a party to a trial did not lie, this party is reputed to not be a liar, and when the accused keeps calling her a liar this cannot taint her reputation. The whole libel suit is flawed on principle. An American citizen has the right to keep claiming he is innocent (and his accuser is a liar) after he was found guilty by a court of law. You can’t sue for libel a man who claims his innocence. He claims his innocence but the accuser has been vindicated by the court, the court’s judgment therefore precludes that the person the court found guilty, when he keeps claiming his innocence, commits libel, because there can be no damage to the vindicated accuser’s reputation in such a claim.
Conclusion
When I say “I am innocent,” I am saying (unless I believe my accuser is making a mistake, a precision I would then be well-advised to articulate) that my accuser is lying. Someone wanted to object to me that, had Trump said he is innocent, he would not be sued for libel (quote: “He’s not being sued for claiming he’s innocent”), but, as this person claims, as Trump said his accuser is a liar he is being sued. I call everyone’s attention to the fact that had Trump said he is innocent, these very words (“I am innocent”) would accuse his accuser of lying, which my detractor says is deservedly sued for libel. His viewpoint is therefore inconsistent and unfamiliar with libel law.
Annex
“The Adult Survivors Act (ASA) is New York State legislation enacted in May 2022 which amends state law to allow alleged victims of sexual offenses for which the statute of limitations has lapsed to file civil suits for a one-year period, from November 24, 2022, to November 24, 2023.” (Wikipedia)
There are statutes of limitations for a reason, the bill is tailor-made and unconstitutional. The laws of the state have statutes of limitations but the lawmaker of the day, although acknowledging the relevance and goodness of said statutes, suddenly finds it expedient to cancel them for a short, limited period. Expediency considerations do not belong to the legislative power, lawmakers must make good laws and repeal bad laws. If statutes of limitations are good, they must leave them alone, if they are bad, they must repeal them. This temporary cancellation of statutes was an unconstitutional infringement on the judicial power, to which the laws of the state say that statutes of limitations are good legislation they must abide by. This legislative self-contradiction is constitutional insanity, that is, unconstitutional remissness.
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Corporate Speech and the First Amendment
There is no such thing as corporate speech, as speech is protected as a political right, that is, speech protection is the result of a connection to the electoral process and ballot. The right to vote is the condition for protected speech. The Supreme Court of the United States must reverse Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission and allow the legislator to regulate and limit so-called corporate speech.
Commercial speech is not fully protected (in contrast to hate speech for instance). The U.S. constitution does not want advertising to flood the “marketplace of ideas,” so the notion that websites have a constitutionally protected freedom to censor content for the sake of advertisers is fanciful. The lawyer we heard in Moody v. Netchoice talks of “users and advertisers,” but he really thinks “advertisers” only because advertisers are the platforms’ source of income, not users. Besides, users and advertisers shouldn’t be thrown in the same bag as far as the First Amendment is concerned, because commercial speech is protected from state regulation only partially, while the user is an agent on the marketplace of ideas and has the right to vote, that is, the right to determine the states and nation’s policies.
When you’re watching a political debate to make a choice on who you’re going to vote for, you’re in a speech environment. When the broadcast is cut for commercials, you’re leaving this environment. Next thing you know, they’ll tell you a football game is “speech.” The Founding Fathers did not fight tyranny for this.
Furthermore, private censorship by platforms is infliction of emotional distress, a tort. When a platform user makes a speech that the U.S. constitution protects and he is censored by the platform because of his speech, the platform is a platform for speech but acts as a private club, or a church, or a private property. However, the platform attracts users to expose them to commercial speech, advertisers being their source of income. The platform has a minimal duty to the user in the circumstance, which is that, as long as they abide by the law, users must be free on the platform. Anything else is ruthless exploitation by platforms exposing gagged masses to advertising and mind manipulation.
Thus, the reasoning is along two lines. 1) Private censorship by platforms might be liable to tort actions. 1a) It could be for invasive moderation, invasion of others’ rights. It would be absurd to claim a platform owner can shield a manic staff who harasses targeted users, like an ex-girlfriend, through flagging their posts manically. Not admitting that a platform can be sued for moderation is like saying they can staff their moderation offices with maniacs and that would be just as good. Absurd. 1b) Then, a notice on posts could well be libel, depending on the notice, but even a removal could have the same effect on one’s reputation. Even though platforms cannot be liable for users’ content (Section 230), they are liable for moderation. Moderation is speech and not all speech is protected; moderation can be unprotected speech where libel laws obtain. Section 230(2) provides “Good Samaritan protection” for bona fide moderation, it isn’t a blanket protection.
2) A law curbing platforms’ speech regardless of the First Amendment could pass the strict scrutiny test because of the so-called preferred position doctrine that applies in case of conflicts of rights. As currently the First Amendment cannot ensure for free, voting citizens the free flow of information and ideas against encroachments by platforms, a statute is needed. That statute will be upheld against the private companies’ claim that it violates their, the companies’ First Amendment right. Indeed, corporate speech has not as strong a status as citizens’ speech, all this ultimately deriving from the common law, where property is not a source of absolute discretionary power. Corporate speech is twofold: commercial and political. Admitting that corporations’ political speech is equally protected under current precedents (since Citizens United), that’s not the case of their commercial speech. This enables one to say that, according to the existing positive legislation, corporations have fewer First Amendment rights than individuals.
The envisioned statute can specify the kind of companies concerned, same as there exist statutes regarding “common carriers.” Some time ago, Justice Clarence Thomas floated the idea that internet platforms are common carriers. If this is what they are, the platforms will realize that a statute can impose duties on companies, on private property. Malls are a good example in the discussion. See Logan Valley Plaza (1968): “Logan dealt with the right to use private property as equivalent of public space”; “A business in a privately owned shopping center cannot prevent labor picketing in its surroundings.”
– Wouldn’t narrowing the scope of 230 potentially incentivize U.S. companies to register abroad? Of course internet companies have to comply with each country’s local laws and ICCPR but that concerns, to my knowledge, widely what should and must be censored – not what cannot be censored, as long as the terms are enforced without prejudice. (G. Muller)
These American companies operate in foreign countries where they are under obligation to censor content (see for instance the European DSA–Digital Services Act). Why would they register abroad if tomorrow these companies come under an obligation not to censor content in the U.S.? Registering abroad, they would face the same compulsions as if registering in the U.S., namely: to censor abroad, not to censor in the U.S.
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Firepower and the Second Amendment
Whether a legislator wants to ban machine guns or bump stocks (see Garland v. Cargill about the constitutionality of a Trump-era ban on bump stocks, currently examined by the U.S. Supreme Court), this is a vicious wish because enactment is unconstitutional. The Second Amendment means that the state cannot tamper with the gun function of guns. If you can ban bump stocks, nothing can stop you from banning anything except toy guns shooting soft rubber bullets while claiming the U.S. constitution has a Second Amendment. “Militias” that are “necessary to the security of a free State” need more than toy guns, they need the deadliest weapons on the market.
A militia being necessary to the security of a free State, it needs the deadliest weapons. We all know you don’t need a machine gun to go hunting, but this amendment wasn’t written for hunting. It was written for the security of a free State. We also know that whether a “well regulated militia” is something of the irretrievable past or not, it is not what the Court is asked to consider, because this is only the premise of the amendment, and it is the amendment’s prescription that is the standing and binding rule, namely that the state don’t infringe on the people’s right to bear arms for the security of a free State.
In other words, whether well regulated militias have been existing or not these last decades, it still obtains that the people’s right to bear arms is necessary for the security of a free State according to the constitution. You can’t deny it without hollowing out the amendment. The constitution is not concerned about what rifle or what firepower a hunter needs to shoot a deer, so that lawmakers could put a limit on the firepower legally available to citizens. The firepower constitutionally available to U.S. citizens is the firepower necessary to the security and existence of a free State, that is to say, the deadliest weapons available. All restrictions on this account are unconstitutional.
The Second Amendment forbids the state to consider that its standing army has made “well regulated militias” unnecessary to the security of a free State. But the right to bear arms is a people’s individual right, not a militia’s collective right. The authors of the amendment made this obvious and they made it so lest, through devious statutes, militias became annexes to the standing army and/or the states’ administrations (which is actually the case with the existing militia statutes and militias). The people’s right to bear arms entails the unrestricted freedom to achieve maximum firepower, because the security of a free State entails the ongoing validity of the constitution itself, that is, there can be no higher duty for a U.S. citizen than the security of a free State, and therefore, as this highest duty requires arms, lawmakers cannot impose limits on the firepower available to citizens.
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Removing Names from the Ballot
Trump has not been convicted for insurrection. Statutorily removing his name from the ballot for insurrection (January 6 events) amounted, therefore, to removing his name because “somebody” is saying Trump is an insurrectionist. This “somebody” could be my grandma or your grandpa or the current President of the United States, it doesn’t matter, this somebody is nobody. Coloradan authorities lacked a legal basis for their action. The only possible legal basis would have to be an actual conviction for insurrection, and not only an indictment because from indictment to conviction the indictee is presumed innocent (Coffin v. U.S., 1895). You cannot remove a person from the ballot for sedition when this person is presumed innocent of sedition. That the Colorado supreme court thought otherwise is baffling. Coloradan authorities misused their authority.
“Colorado should be able to bar oath-breaking insurrections from our ballot,” a Coloradan official declared after Trump v. Anderson. Well, you can do that, Colorado state, only you don’t have the power to say who is an insurrectionist and who is not, it has to be a court of law, with an actual conviction, which is the small detail missing in your operation. You are a government, not a court, and although you would like to convict Trump for insurrection, you don’t have this power and you removed from the ballot a person as innocent of insurrection as your own officials until proven guilty by a court. Colorado state intended to gather in its hands the powers both of an executive and the judiciary, and these people don’t even seem to realize how spiteful this is to fundamental principles.
Detractors of SCOTUS’s Trump v. Anderson (2024) are now considering a federal bill, which is the obvious option given the angle in the court’s decision. In my humble opinion, however, this was not so much a state versus union issue as an executive power versus judicial power, a checks and balances issue. To remove an “insurrectionist” from the ballot is not allowed to a government absent a judicial sentence about said person. As a commentator already put it, the bill smelled a lot like a bill of attainder, and by floating the idea this commentator made it clear that in his opinion the issue was not whether states (as opposed to the federal state) could take such a step but whether the authorities of a state and/or federal authorities could pass a bill targeting people who have not been convicted by a court and at most are indicted and still presumed innocent. And the answer to the latter question is an obvious no.
If the ballot removal act is a bill, it is a bill of attainder, forbidden by the attainder clause of the U.S. constitution. If it is an executive act, it lacks legal ground, which could only be an actual conviction for insurrection or a bill. An executive act depriving a citizen of his rights (the right to participate in an election) without legal ground is misuse of power. It seems these people have been taking the partisan Jan 6 house committee for some kind of court of law because they’re always talking of insurrection as if guilt has been proven by a court. However, a claim of insurrection is at this stage a mere fancy and cannot serve as legal ground, the Jan 6 committee notwithstanding.
The issue is people’s right to be candidates for elections when there is no charge of insurrection against them and all other conditions are met for their being candidates (age, nationality, and so on). This right is constitutionally protected. Neither a state nor a federal act can deprive an American citizen of this right on a mere fancy of insurrection. And for a claim of insurrection to serve as legal ground, guilt must be proven by a court of law, by a final conviction in a court. Indictment is to no avail in this regard because indictment is an executive act, and a legal ground could only be a judicial act by an independent court after a fair trial.
What, then, would such a federal statute aiming at removing Trump from the ballot be? Absent a conviction by a court of law, it would be a bill of attainder, forbidden by the attainder clause of the constitution. The bill would be both a judicial, individual judgment (“Trump is an insurrectionist”) and a legislative act (“Therefore he must be booted from the ballot”). Bills of attainder are unconstitutional because of the fundamental principle of separation of powers. To rule that “Trump shall be booted from the ballot” you need a prior judicial, individual judgment stating that “Trump is an insurrectionist.” This judgment is missing. To remove Trump from the ballot, a law could be passed without being attainder if it were so worded: “Any person indicted (not convicted yet) for insurrectionary acts shall not be accepted as candidate.” However, how could this be congruent with the presumption of innocence? The government could indict any person and these people would be deprived of their right to be candidates for elections without judgments by independent courts. That would be unconstitutional too, a misuse of power.
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Porn being legal in the U.S., a platform needs to moderate its content to bar porn. No one can object to such moderation, but then, using the argument, the platforms become willing witch hunters for the administration. The solution is to make porn illegal. Filmed pornography being based on meretricious contracts, its very making is illegal to begin with (see Law 22 “Pacta turpia cannot be speech”).
Platforms need to moderate content because porn is legal in the U.S., with the valid argument: “We need to moderate content because we’ve got to bar porn from flooding our platforms since it is not police job but ours.” Therefore, ban porn again. Porn is no more speech than a football game (and much more damaging). Stop the nonsense, the only reason they – mafia lawyers – say porn is speech is because in the U.S. speech is protected. How can filmed pornography be legal in states where prostitution is illegal (all states except Nevada), when the making of filmed pornography requires the same meretricious contracts as prostitution? Filmed pornography is filmed prostitution, and if there is such a thing as crime prevention the making of filmed pornography should be prevented in said states. You’ve got to be consistent.
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Some ethical remarks on police interrogation techniques
1) The right for a police officer to be deceptive during an interrogation
Ask yourself why it is not okay for a juvenile service officer to be deceptive, but it is for a police officer (these are interrogation regulations in the states, where the presence of a juvenile service officer is mandatory when juveniles are interrogated by police). There can be no good reason, for in the former case a moral commandment prevails while in the latter expediency does, but if it is a question where a moral commandment applies, expediency is not a legitimate concern. Criminals use deception to conceal their crimes. As the outcome of Alyssa Bustamante’s trial shows, the police officer’s occasional deception during the interrogation was not even decisive, since the whole interview was dismissed as evidence and yet Bustamante was convicted.
2) Sitting close to the suspect
In normal social interactions, especially in the U.S., one would not sit so close to a stranger as the detective to the suspect here (no need to specify the case) without an intention to intimidate or even assault the stranger. Why should a detective be allowed to intimidate a suspect? Truth requires dialectical skills and the state should not tolerate other, bullying, humiliating techniques. According to proxemics, imposing a spatial distance shorter than the socially accepted distance between two interacting strangers is indeed a form of humiliation and degradation.
3) Telling the suspect to look at you in the eyes
Telling someone to look at you in the eyes, as the detective does with the suspect (no need to specify), is outrageous in normal social interactions. It is a request that, between strangers, could easily start a so-called “trivial altercation” resulting in homicide (such trivial altercations between strangers are a cause of 37% of all homicides). In other words, for a detective to talk like this is a misuse of power.
Between two strangers, the reaction of a normally constituted man to an injunction to “look at me in the eyes when I’m talking to you” is some kind of “f*** you.” As this is not an option for a suspect interrogated by a police officer, the suspect is degraded. To be sure, between strangers, there is no such thing as asking their ID to someone and other such things either; however, police are entitled by law to make such requests, whereas to our knowledge there is no legal ground formally allowing a detective to carry out an interrogation by asking the suspect to look at him in the eyes. An interrogation can be carried out without the suspect being forced to look at people in the eyes if it is not his habit.
Law 38 The harmony of hate speech laws with state discrimination and prior censorship
EN-FR / July-August 2023
French President Macron suggests fines for parents of rioting youths. (Al Jazeera English, July)
As the journalist from Al Jazeera correctly says in this video, such fines would require a new law. But such a law would be unconstitutional because the general principle in French legislation is that you and no one else are criminally responsible for your acts. A fine is a criminal penalty, therefore a fine cannot ignore the principle; but a fine to parents of a criminal kid would ignore the principle. The possibility to engage parents’ responsibility in the trial of a minor already exists, actually, but it is a civil liability for torts, not a criminal responsibility for crimes, which it can never be according to the principle. The civil liability of parents can be claimed by victims, so the state itself could only claim it as a victim, if such a thing is conceivable at all, but not as a prosecuting and fine-imposing authority.
(Pour plus d’éléments en français à ce sujet, voyez Law 37, à « Émeutes et responsabilité du fait d’autrui ».)
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Lawmakers as Ballot-Grubbers
U.S. Lawmakers Warn Pro-Khalistan Forces; Lash Out At ‘Racist’ Attack On Indian Embassy. (Hindustan Times, July)
These U.S. congressmen are ridiculous; they are not judges, justice after wrongdoing is not their responsibility. Prosecution is not either. What are they talking about, then? There is nothing they can do, yet they are reported talking. Do they think Indians or Americans of Indian origin can be paid lip service and that is good enough? If their talking could have any kind of institutional leverage, that would be a breach of the separation of powers. And they cannot even pass a law against Hinduphobia specifically, for that would be legislative discrimination.
“I won’t tolerate, so vote for me.” You should vote for these people as judges, not as congressmen. As congressmen, they cannot pass laws that give extra protection to Indian consulates and other Indian interests in the U.S. They cannot target Khalistani militants either, as speech is constitutionally protected in the United States, including advocacy of violence and of other illegal conduct. All these congressmen are doing is slyly entertaining the unrealistic fancies of a communitarian lobby.
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The Industry of Defilement
Sex Scene Involving Bhagavad Gita Sparks ‘Hinduism Under Attack’ Debate In India. A scene in the movie shows Oppenheimer reading the Bhagavad Gita while having sex. Uday Mahurkar, Information Commissioner with the Government of India, questioned how the epic got certification with this scene. (Hindustan Times)
Against the approval by the Board of Film Certification of a profanatory scene, insulting religious feelings, made by degenerate and callous Westerners, the Information Commissioner has the right sense of duty. Besides, the scene in question is, according to Sec. 295 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), defilement of a sacred object in flagrante delicto. The film director and producers are subject to citizen’s arrest if they set foot on Indian soil: Any Indian citizen may arrest them and defer them to the police immediately.
Not only did the Board fail to bring this scene to the authorities’ attention for insult to religious feelings (a crime under Sec. 295 IPC), but it approved it. This scene is a crime in flagrante delicto, defilement of a sacred Hindu object by callous and dastardly felons. The penalty for these criminals is up to 4 years in prison. Change Indian law if you are not happy with it, but at this juncture the Indian administration is remiss for approving such heinous pestilence. The least we can ask of the authorities is that they apply the laws they have been elected to apply, since, in India as in Europe, the cancellation of such laws regarding speech is never on political platforms. I will see to it that they enforce the laws they are so fond of. You cannot blame a statesman for enforcing the law; you must blame those who do not, or you are against the rule of law.
“Sex isn’t a taboo or sin in Hinduism.” This is so naive. How can sex be taboo in monotheistic religions where it is said: “Procreate and populate the earth,” by this token? Is adultery allowed by Hinduism? Is flashing one’s genitals in the street with lecherous intent allowed by Hinduism? Is rape allowed? If these and others are interdicts, there is a notion of taboo. Obscenity and decency are far less cultural than one thinks.
Defilement of a sacred object is to use or represent it used for a purpose other than its legitimate religious use. This is why people who say that in Hinduism sex is not taboo are far off the mark anyway. If the Gita were represented as serving as a stool for a character to step on and reach an object in the higher parts of a cupboard, that would be another form of defilement although the character’s action is per se not sinful. Even if this use of the religious book as such would be permitted, the representation of such an action is defilement. They say the Gita is pressed by an actress against her naked bosom during a sex scene. In the stool example, using the book in this way in case of need may remain a private act, but a film made with such a scene would be prima facie defilement – even if using stools is not a sin – because it is intended by the film maker to have the book seen in such derision by all viewers. The malicious intent is obvious, this is derision. It has nothing to do with the sexual values contained in the book; this silly argument amounts to saying it is fine to urinate on people because urinating is not a sin.
At least the Indian authorities should summon the maker and producers to ask them what their intent was with this scene. The stool example: If a film showed a man stepping on his holy book to reach some object that saves his life, while praying for forgiveness, the message conveyed would be in conformity with faith. Here there is not a word from the source of speech as to their intent with using the Gita in this way. If they mean the Gita is erotic poetry designed by its makers to be read for arousal in sexual mystics, the authorities are still allowed to declare that the Gita is not such a prop according to the general understanding of the people, and that this answer is nothing but a bad excuse by callous and/or malicious unbelievers.
In the film’s trailer, the eponym character is called by another man a “womanizer.” One of this womanizer’s girlfriends or affairs, therefore, uses the Gita as a sex prop. What can be the message conveyed by this context? A womanizer’s extramarital affair is a woman of disrepute or scorn according to all moral standards we can think of. Therefore, the Gita is shown utilized by a morally dubious woman, perhaps some prostitute; this is a disreputable usage in conformity with the female’s disreputableness. Consequently, the Gita is shown defiled by some manic harlot, and this showing is itself defilement absent a consistent explanation, which the Indian authorities are due to ask according to Indian law.
– Watch the movie before jumping to conclusions.
Absolutely no need to watch this piece of trash to reach the proper conclusions from reliable reports. If I were to watch all contemptible movies before I make comments, I would be as much a supporter of these films, by patronizing theaters or platforms, as a detractor; therefore, the suggestion is extremely silly.
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Of Threats and Cowards
FBI Shoots Utah Man After Threat to Kill Biden, Craig Robertson Death Ammo For Trump Far-right Base? (Hindustan Times, Aug) – One user commented: “People think you can say anything on social media…a threat is a threat. I obviously don’t know the full circumstances but, if he pointed a weapon at an agent, then there was only going to be one outcome.”
A threat must be a “true threat,” or it is protected speech (First Amendment). Were the man’s threats true threats? A man giving a phone call to the white house saying “I am coming to assassinate the president” (John Andrew Bazor Jr’s words, according to the FBI) may be treated as a true threat, as per the law. A man venting his anger on the internet is exercising his freedom of speech. An FBI that cannot see the difference is an instrument of tyranny.
– The man had a plan to get camo and a sniper and try to take out the president. Seems like a valid threat.
What was the man’s age again? Do you know shooters of that age in active service? However, I feel there might be some “true threats,” in the technical sense, in the man’s writings, because of a crescendo of specifics, after the first FBI raid on his home. Clearly, he was incensed after the trampling of his constitutional freedom of speech by a petty bureaucracy, which led him to grief and insurrectional rhetoric. He had been provoked, his freedom of speech had been challenged by control freaks with badges, so he felt the need to assert his freedom in new, unprecedented ways (for decades of his life this man had never called attention on him with internet posts). Seeing the crescendo of specifics in the man’s posts, the FBI took it personally, they could not endure the verbal attacks. Now the man’s dead. This kind of dynamics would not happen under a good government. All in all, a fair trial would have cleared Craig Robertson, because he was provoked, his freedoms were challenged by a wicked administration.
It is a fact that the Biden administration is always talking of opponents as outlaws, and this challenge to constitutional liberties is a mistake that grants insurrectional speech a judicial blanket. To say nothing of the fact that a threat that no one can reasonably think can be carried out (fancying a 70 something, disabled sharpshooter, for instance) is never a true threat; in fact, people who call this a true threat show themselves as chicken.
To sum it up, “a threat is a threat” is dead wrong because the First Amendment protects “threats” that are not “true threats” but a fancy of the administration. Among the words quoted as threats by the media (HT video) is “You have no idea how close your agents came to bang,” and as a media quotes it, certainly they got it in a file of threats alleged by the FBI. The meaning of these words, in more formal English, is: “Unbeknownst to them, I nearly killed your agents.” Although these words may infuriate said agents, and, due to their esprit de corps, the whole FBI, it is not a threat at all, because threats are about the future, not the past. Therefore, among the alleged threats, this one is an obvious mistake, a very obvious one, which casts doubt on the whole file and on an administration that tends to call threats, in order to criminalize it, all speech that unnerves its agents. This is a bad administration, a killer administration.
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Experts in Election Rigging
Political Parties in Taiwan Protest Against Lai Ching-Te’s “Transit” Trip to U.S. (CCTV Video News Agency, Aug)
As the United States is denouncing the One China principle, there is no hope of a political solution. The U.S. will interfere in elections to ensure that the separatist party always gets the upper hand, as she has done time and again in numerous elections abroad (recently in Pakistan, with the no-confidence vote against Imran Khan, as exposed by leaked documents). Soon such protests as shown in CCTV’s video will be banned in Taiwan, in the name of the rule of law, of course…
Lai is in the U.S. to discuss a joint operation to rig the coming elections in Taiwan. That the U.S. rigs elections abroad is documented. (In parentheses, with so much expertise in election rigging, it was inevitable that one day some would find it expedient to use these skills at home.)
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The harmony of hate speech laws
with state discrimination and prior censorship
Complement to Law 32: Hate-speech-law countries v. free-speech countries & Law 37: On Swedish Discrimination.
‘After Ukraine, Next We Will…’: Chechen Leader [Ramzan Kadyrov] Threatens To Punish West For Quran Burnings. (Hindustan Times, Aug)
Said nations are failed systems, which claim to be inclusive but cannot accept religions as they are. In fact, they are atheistic absolutism. – When inclusiveness is your ideal but you can’t live up to it, you must leave the scene, disappear. Get lost.
Often, I read, from Indian and other Islamophobiacs, the same reasoning, which uses a comparison with Gulf monarchies, for instance Saudi Arabia, which do not accommodate religions beside Islam. As if the Indian and other national constitutions were contracts with Saudi Arabia! Saudi Arabia is a sovereign state and India another sovereign state, each of them having a state constitution of its own. If the Indian constitution says that the country is inclusive and accommodates different religions, it does not make this dependent on what Saudi Arabia does according to the latter’s constitution, which would be the case if said principles depended on the conduct of parties to a contract. The Indian constitution is inclusive and, if you disagree with this, then you have a problem with the Indian constitution, and Saudi Arabia is actually your model (but with another religion or lack thereof). You need a change in your own constitution.
I
Preliminary remark: Part I, (ii) and (iii), is a reasoning based on a likely partial description of the situation, serving as general considerations on devious ways of state discrimination; Part II, (iv) and (v), completes the description with important elements, which, if not mere appearances, might clear the Swedish government of the suspicions raised in Part I, although at this juncture it is not possible to be definite about this. Namely, Part I focuses on a situation where the man who burns copies of the Quran is not prosecuted (the decision of prosecuting authorities is still pending); Part II presents the legal rationale behind the man’s not being arrested or prevented from burning Qurans despite formal charges for hate speech filed against him.
(ii)
The excuse of Swedish authorities, namely “freedom of expression,” is lame, and even offensive, precisely because freedom of expression has not prevented the Swedish legislator from voting hate speech laws in which groups based on religious faith (trosbekännelse) are said to be protected from hate speech. Therefore, when the Swedish authorities tolerate hate speech against Islam in the form of Quran burning, the message is that hate speech is a crime except when it targets Muslims. That is, the Swedish government is blatantly discriminatory against Muslims. In a society where not a single form of speech would be criminalized as hate speech, the excuse would be relevant; here it is an insult to Muslims compounded to the existing state discrimination against Muslims through the use (and lack of it) of the national hate speech legislation.
– All religions are treated the same in Sweden.
Either all religions are treated the same, then the law article regarding religions is not implemented, and the question is both: why and how is this consistent with the rule of law? Or Islam is discriminated against. Assuming my contender is right, the Swedish authorities then discriminate against all religions as opposed to other protected minorities such as those based on race/ethnicity or sexual orientation. They ignore the hate speech legislation when hate speech targets religious groups, and this is a violation of the national law that expressly protects religious groups (groups based on trosbekännelse). It does not make Muslims’ anger less justified. They deserve a redress, and the government is remiss in ignoring their demand. Sweden passed such hate speech laws and is bound by its legislation.
Overlooking hate speech against religious groups while claiming to abide by a law saying that religious groups, among others, are protected by law against hate speech, they are hatemongers and enemies of the laws. The people we are talking about claim, in fact, to be entitled to act arbitrarily when they are bound to execute the law (executive power). It is Swedish law that grants protection to, among other religious and various other sorts of groups, Muslims against anyone’s talking about them as uncivilized and what not. That the executive power dares to claim that freedom of speech makes it legally impossible to act when freedom of speech has not prevented a law that compels them to act, marks them as outcasts. Those who have the duty to execute the law, its guardians, are the ones who trample it by ignoring it.
Furthermore, whatever one’s opinion is on, for instance, judicial stoning, the Swedish law does not include this or the opposite opinion in its purview. If one’s condemnation of stoning leads one to hateful speech, one is prosecutable and must be prosecuted, even if stoning were morally repugnant to all Swedes, for the simple reason that this feeling is not compelled by law, whereas incitement based upon it is prohibited. – Capital punishment, as a legal penalty, is not murder by any definition available. Some consider that a legislation including capital punishment does not respect human rights, but even this is not the conflation my contender then tried to make. Advocating for a legislative change introducing capital punishment is not prohibited by Swedish legislation, and if someone claimed that such advocacy should be prosecuted as incitement to murder, he might find some listeners, certainly, among the crackpots.
(iii)
“Criticizing a religion by burning a book,” a phrase uttered by someone who considers that the man who burns copies of the Quran is not guilty of hate speech, is most ridiculous. If such acts are legitimate criticism, nothing can be called hate or incitement. This is devious, asking not, squarely, for a repeal of the law but, in fact, for a discriminatory implementation depriving some of its protection. Burning, same as kicking, slashing, tearing apart, trampling, is not mere criticism; it is beyond criticism, it affords no counter speech, it is a mere nonverbal act of hate; and this, if need be, is evidenced by the fact that these acts fall under the label of desecration when done on national symbols such as flags. Even though flag desecration has been decriminalized in Sweden (1971), this decriminalization does not question the fact that said acts are offensive, outrageous; it only means that outrage to the national flag must not be opposed to freedom of speech. Therefore, when we talk, instead of the national flag, of a group expressly protected by a hate speech law, of course these outrageous acts fall within the purview of the law and are prohibited, and they deserve the greatest penalty available due to the particularly heinous form of hateful speech they represent.
That would be the dastardliest act of government if, because the national hate speech law protects religions from hate speech, and this government wants to persecute Muslims, it denied that Islam is a religion and now called it an ideology.
“The [Swedish] law criminalizes expression considered to be hate speech and prohibits threats or statements of contempt for a group or member of a group based on race, color, national or ethnic origin, religious belief [emphasis ours], or sexual orientation. Penalties for hate speech range from fines to a maximum of four years in prison. In addition the country’s courts have held that it is illegal to wear xenophobic symbols or racist paraphernalia or to display signs and banners with inflammatory symbols at rallies.” (U.S. Department of State: Report on Sweden) Talk about freedom of speech if you wish, Sweden is one of the most repressive countries in Europe regarding speech: “four years in prison”! In comparison, penalty for hate speech in France is a maximum of one year. And we will leave aside Sweden’s lèse-majesté laws criminalizing speech against the royal family. That such people dare to excuse their apathy with the mantra “freedom of speech” shows an abyss of depravity and shamelessness.
That Sweden is a liberal country is a myth. The only thing liberal about Sweden is that it was one of the first countries to decriminalize pornography (after Denmark), as they thought people watched porn just because it was forbidden, which was a stupidity. That such a bureaucratic country, with one of the highest numbers of civil servants depending on the state for their livelihood, can parade as a beacon of liberty, shows a high level of self-delusion. Of course, such a country as this has no tolerance for offensive speech, and its hate speech legislation is unsurprisingly one of the worst in the European Union. Swedish courts seem to be more liberal in that respect, however, as shown by the Pastor Åke Green case. On this case, two remarks. 1) “Homosexuality is a disease, a cancerous growth in the society” is not hate speech against homosexuals according to the Swedish supreme court. However, in its sibylline reasoning, the court seems to be excusing the speech on the fact that Åke Green is a pastor of a Christian denomination. Therefore, the chilling effect of the law on speech is not abated for ordinary people. 2) This seemingly liberal court decision (liberal in the sense of tolerating offensive speech) is a mere appearance. While the law remains in full force, this decision may create in observers the feeling that so-called liberal Swedes have a liberal approach to their hate speech law, but not at all: That such speech would not be condemned with (a maximum of) 4 years imprisonment when made by an ordinary citizen, or a Muslim, rather than a Christian pastor, is unpredictable.
In this most liberal country, you’re an adult at 18 but you can’t buy alcohol if you’re under 20. Alcohol is bought at state-owned dealers only. In this most liberal country, paying for a prostitute is a crime (even though offensive material such as filmed pornography, which requires pacta turpia to be made, is legal). This most liberal country has one of the most repressive legislations on drugs. And so on. How can words be distorted to such extent? Where does the legend of a liberal Sweden come from? I may approve of some of these laws, but I would blush at calling them liberal. All in all, if Swedes can call themselves liberal, I guess they can say that labelling someone a cancerous growth is not contemptuous and that Islam is not a religious belief as well…
II
(iv)
The current situation in Sweden is as follows. The Iraqi man on a Quran burning spree in Sweden will actually face trials for hate speech. What the Swedish government excuses by alleging freedom of speech is not, therefore, its not prosecuting the man but its not exerting prior restraint on the man’s acts, and this because free speech is construed as allowing criminal prosecution of speech once it is made, but not allowing prior censorship. The government claims it cannot stop a felon on a crime spree because his crime is a speech crime. The man will be duly summoned before a court in a couple of months, but in the meantime the authorities cannot, the government says, stop the felon, because of freedom of speech. In sum, 1) the man whom some claim is not guilty of hate speech will be tried for hate speech; 2) the government’s excuse (“freedom of speech”) has nothing to do with the fact that the government would think that Quran burning is definitely not hate speech but with the fact that the government could not, according to its spokespersons, stop a felon on a crime spree insofar as his crime is speech. The Swedish government repeats the “freedom of speech” mantra, not because it thinks the man is clear of criminal, illegal hate speech, but because it claims that, the crime being speech, freedom of speech prevents the authorities from arresting him preventively.
“Swedish police have allowed his demonstrations, citing freedom of speech, while filing preliminary hate speech charges against him.” (Crux, Aug) Swedish police allow, “citing freedom of speech,” demonstrations that they consider to be hate speech, that is, illegal speech. If you cite freedom of speech but your laws, although your constitution claims to guarantee freedom of speech, do not allow hate speech, then, obviously, you cannot cite freedom of speech in presence of hate speech. As, in Sweden, not all speech is free, how can Swedish police cite freedom of speech to allow speech that is not allowed? What an excuse is this? As hate speech is a crime, police must treat hate speech as a crime, rather than allowing a crime to be committed by citing freedom of speech. – Is this, what we are suggesting, prior administrative censorship? Yes, it is. Look at France, where criminalized speech is treated administratively with website termination, organization statute cancellation, and scores of other police tools. France is a member of the European Council (European Convention on Human Rights) same as Sweden.
– Wrong. He is granted the right to demonstrate because of the *right to demonstrate*. It is what was done at the demonstration which is tried in a court, to sort it out juridically, the police has no expertise in this area, and the police don’t make judgement calls – they follow Swedish law.
There are no hate speech laws in Sweden, it has been tried for “hets mot folkgrupp,” best translated as “incitement against ethnic group.” It is not illegal to feel or express hatred. It is illegal to incite violence against a specific group. It’s impossible to make a general claim, since every case has its unique circumstances. But since this is an attack on Islam as a religion, and not incitement against Muslims as a group, it doesn’t fall under this law.
1) The Swedish law is a typical “hate speech law,” a label that includes all laws criminalizing “group libel,” if one wants to use a more technical term, the term “hate” being used primarily by the promoters of such laws. What my contender here translates as incitement against a group is of course the same as group libel. If we did not call the Swedish law a hate speech law, there would be no reason to talk of hate speech laws elsewhere either, since all these laws are the same. Please note, also, that the above quoted U.S. Department of State correctly stresses that the Swedish law criminalizes “statements of contempt.”
2) A folkgrupp is not an “ethnic group,” since the Swedish law criminalizes group libel for all sorts of groups, based not only on race and ethnicity, but also, for instance, on sexual orientation and religious belief. A folkgrupp is a group of people or category of people.
3) The distinction between a religion and its members is nonsensical. This is as if one said that libeling “homosexuality” is permitted while libeling “homosexuals” is a crime; if such an escape way were allowed, group libel could not be indicted at all, the law could not be implemented. This interpretation, therefore, tries to empty out the law, which is not allowed: laws must be interpreted in such a way that their interpretation maintains the laws rather than cancel them (one cannot interpret laws away).
4) “Every case has its unique circumstances” is true for all kinds of laws, or, more precisely, for the whole legislation. Yet general claims must be possible, otherwise people would not know what is allowed and what is not. This claim smacks of ignorance about basic legal principles. If it is true, however, that general claims cannot be made about group libel (hate speech), then these laws are particularly obnoxious: speech is chilled for lack of certainty about the frontiers of legality. My contender may be right, but then he should draw the right conclusion too, which is that these laws must be repealed immediately.
5) The right to demonstrate is a right of speech; the Swedish government talked of the case as a speech issue rather than the narrower issue of right of demonstration. Law enforcement forces defer crimes to courts but also, as a rule, prevent crime. In the case of speech crimes, and to the best of my knowledge only in this case, and in Sweden, the police will not intend to prevent a crime, will let it happen, and then defer the “innocent until proven guilty by a court” (as always) criminal to a court for judgment. “This area,” in which, according to my contender, the police has no expertise, is nothing but the area of what crimes are according to the legislation, therefore the police has an obvious expertise. When a demonstration is planned, the administration is informed beforehand of its character and intent: if the object of a demonstration is illegal, in all countries that I know the demonstration is not allowed. In Sweden, it is allowed (“Swedish police have allowed his demonstrations”), although the police file charges after the event, knowing beforehand they would, given the prior declaration of intent by the organizer of the demonstration.
The remark smacked of ignorance (because unique circumstances are the general rule of legal cases, so they cannot serve any purpose in a discussion about the particular case of group libel) or was correctly pointing at a fatal flaw in these laws, namely, that no one knows for sure what they allow and what they forbid, which runs into a basic requirement of all laws.
As religious groups are mentioned among other sorts of groups, quite different in nature, they must be treated just the same as race and so on. All named groups are protected by the law, that is, they all deserve the same protection. If someone hates the ideas of Islam, and that transpires in his speech when he is talking of Islam, he is guilty of group libel.
“The law should not be there in the first place.” Yet it is there, so, in the name of the rule of law, one must enforce it squarely and fairly, not take the opportunity to discriminate through biased enforcement, until it is repealed. A repeal belongs to the political and legislative debate, not to police and judicial practice (beyond constitutional review). My warning is for those who try to neutralize the law regarding Muslims, while they would, with this legislative weapon, continue to smash all speech against other groups. If you don’t believe that this is a real temptation today, you are not a good observer of European societies.
(v)
The man is about to be tried for hate speech and his defense, that his speech is about Islam, not Muslims, is unlikely to be found of any worth [see (iii) 3)]. If this defense were acceptable, the article protecting religious groups from hate speech would be of no avail because then people would only need to say Islam rather than Muslims to avoid the due criminal penalties for hate speech (which can be 4 years in prison), and that would be absurd. The law, by itself, is harsh. What the authorities claim, however, is that, although the man will be tried in a couple of months, they cannot stop him, preventively, from committing other such crimes (Quran burning as hate speech) because these crimes are speech crimes that cannot be prevented administratively, that is, by police measures, as this would be censorship (whereas an ex post trial and indictment for speech by an independent court is considered to be compatible with freedom of speech).
In (some, probably most) other European countries with hate speech laws, this is not the same, police can take preventive and enforcement measures as with all other types of crime. In France, for instance, the administration can shut down a mosque (it already happened) when an imam is said by the authorities to make hateful preaches, that is, the police punish the whole local community by depriving it of its place of worship as a measure of enforcement of the hate speech legislation… In that respect, Swedes take the principles of freedom of speech a little more seriously; namely, allowing the executive power to enforce a speech-repressive law like any other law is government censorship, which is not supposed to occur in countries that vindicate free speech. However, if it is a crime in the first place according to the law, police are not supposed to let crimes be committed without intervening, as a rule. There is an ambiguity, most probably this police non-intervention rule for speech crimes is not absolute and the police could find a legal basis for preventing the man from burning Qurans. I am inclined to think there is a bias in law enforcement here. In fact, I believe the authorities in Sweden have not made up their mind whether Quran burning is or should be illegal, even though it reasonably cannot be denied that it is. I am afraid their intention is to make an exception with Islam, namely, to allow Swedish people to insult and offend Muslims while other religious (and all other protected) groups would remain protected. A form of discrimination.
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Décolonisation avancée
I
France Evacuates Citizens From Niger After Pro-Putin Protests At Embassy. (HT, Aug)
Two days ago, the French authorities “vowed immediate and uncompromising action if French citizens or interests were attacked” in Niger. (This, in parentheses, was said when French interests had already been attacked in Niger, with the storming of the French embassy by a mob.) Today they withdraw French citizens from Niger. Seen in this light, the earlier warning to the junta (do not let French citizens be attacked or…) was mere bluff. As France uttered a warning, she should have kept her citizens in Niger, since the warning was supposed to be a shield for her citizens, or what was it? French citizens in Niger had the shield of French power guaranteed by the French authorities, namely the presidency. But now, as France decides to evacuate her citizens from Niger, the authorities are implicitly admitting that the presidential warning was bluff, hot air. This is pathetic.
On ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States)’s threat of military intervention. That an “Economic Community” morphs overnight into a military organization suggests that all this is dictated by powers abroad. An economic community is based on economic treaties, these are not political or military treaties. The organization should change her name first, because in case its treaties stipulate such military interventions, they are not merely economic treaties and the organization’s name is deceptive, the organization is not merely an economic community. An organization with a deceptive name has no legitimacy, and on the other hand individual states aiming at a military alliance cannot use the frame of an economic community for military purposes.
(ii) FR
Il y a trois jours, la présidence française menaçait d’une réponse « immédiate et intraitable » toute attaque contre les citoyens et les intérêts français au Niger. (Ces propos intervenaient d’ailleurs après que les intérêts français avaient été attaqués au Niger, avec l’assaut de l’ambassade française par une foule déchaînée.) Aujourd’hui, la France rapatrie ses citoyens. C’est la réponse immédiate et intraitable ? Les propos de la présidence française suivis de cette évacuation couvrent la France de ridicule. Les citoyens français auraient dû se sentir en sécurité au Niger puisque la présidence menaçait ceux qui chercheraient à les attaquer. C’est une nouvelle démonstration que la parole de la France ne pèse rien, démonstration apportée cette fois par la France elle-même : personne ne croit que les menaces présidentielles puissent avoir le moindre effet dissuasif.
II
La Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEDEAO) a déjà sanctionné et suspendu le Mali en 2020, la Guinée en 2021 et le Burkina Faso en 2022. Pourquoi n’a-t-elle pas menacé ces pays d’une intervention militaire et le fait-elle seulement avec le Niger aujourd’hui ? Quel est le sens de cette escalade ?
Les menaces de la CEDEAO laissent penser que les États membres de l’organisation ont soutenu la campagne électorale de Bazoum et qu’ils cherchent à présent à rétablir « leur » candidat. Auraient-ils profité de lacunes dans la législation nigérienne sur le financement des partis politiques et des campagnes électorales ? Quand ils réclament le retour à l’ordre constitutionnel, il convient de souligner que des financements occultes sont déjà une violation de l’ordre constitutionnel. Des soutiens du nouveau Conseil national ont expliqué que Bazoum avait payé des électeurs, une pratique contraire aux principes d’un ordre constitutionnel digne de ce nom. Aucune réponse n’a été apportée à ces accusations graves, comme s’il fallait considérer que la pratique va de soi dans ces pays, alors que c’est une cause de nullité, tout comme les financements occultes étrangers. Les États occidentaux parlent d’ordre constitutionnel au Niger en acceptant des pratiques qui, dans ces propres États, conduiraient à l’annulation des élections. Ce n’est pas sérieux.
Par ailleurs, un président démocratiquement élu dans un pays où le taux d’illettrisme est de 73 %, c’est cela que défend la France.
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Pourquoi Dupond-Moretti est désormais un maillon faible du gouvernement. (Europe 1, juillet)
Il y a des présumés innocents en détention provisoire et d’autres au gouvernement. Où est le problème ? – Plaisanterie à part, n’est-il pas ahurissant qu’un ministre se prévale de la présomption d’innocence pour rester au gouvernement, quand la présomption d’innocence n’empêche pas que des gens soient privés de liberté et placés en détention ? C’est à couper le souffle.
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Violences sur Hedi : maintien en détention requis pour le policier. (Europe 1, juillet 2023)
Hier, une ancienne présidente du Syndicat de la magistrature affirmait, sur une chaîne d’information, qu’un policier est comme tout autre citoyen devant la justice. Dans un système où le principe constitutionnel de séparation des pouvoirs se traduit par une « séparation des autorités administratives et judiciaires » et par l’existence d’une juridiction administrative distincte des juridictions judiciaires, cette affirmation est principiellement fausse. Un policier est un représentant de l’État dans l’exercice de la puissance publique, et nous pourrions donc voir le préfet adresser un déclinatoire de compétence au tribunal judiciaire pour le dessaisir de l’affaire et la porter devant un juge administratif, où elle serait jugée comme une faute de service, si ce n’est qu’en la matière le juge administratif a lui-même entendu dégager les contours d’une faute personnelle des agents qui permet la mise en cause de ceux-ci devant les tribunaux judiciaires mais qui n’avait rien d’évident a priori, dans un tel système, puisqu’elle n’est apparue qu’a posteriori.
(Entre parenthèses, la seule fois où j’ai vu un crâne décalotté comme celui de Hedi, c’était l’image d’un cousin d’Ahed Tamimi, Mohammed Tamimi, après un passage de l’armée israélienne. Il serait regrettable que la police française traitât les Français comme des Palestiniens sous occupation, c’est-à-dire comme si c’était une armée d’occupation.)
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Cinq Américains bientôt autorisés à quitter l’Iran après le déblocage des fonds iraniens. (CGTN Français)
En résumé, les États-Unis achètent à l’Iran la liberté de citoyens américains avec l’argent de l’Iran.
– Non, c’est un échange de prisonniers plus des fonds iraniens débloqués !
C’est mieux que si c’était pire. Ce que j’ai voulu dire, c’est que les actifs financiers de l’Iran sont sa propriété et que la saisie de la propriété d’autrui s’appelle du vol. En supposant même que cette saisie ne serve pas son auteur à s’enrichir directement (si l’auteur ne comptabilise pas ces fonds et n’en fait rien), elle appauvrit le propriétaire légitime des fonds (dont le droit de propriété est de fait suspendu), et par conséquent, dans la relation entre les deux, l’un est après la saisie plus riche par rapport à l’autre du fait de l’appauvrissement (perte de propriété) de ce dernier. La saisie est donc une cause d’enrichissement dans la relation bilatérale de l’auteur de la saisie, une cause d’appauvrissement de la victime vis-à-vis de tous. Appauvrir quelqu’un est une cause d’enrichissement sans augmentation de capital propre compte tenu de la relativité des notions de richesse et pauvreté. Ces réflexions ne préjugent en rien du statut légal, aux États-Unis, des fonds iraniens saisis, lequel statut, pour l’ignorant que je suis, pourrait être que cet argent est placé et produit un rendement dont les États-Unis bénéficient, qu’en sais-je ? Auquel cas il n’y aurait même pas besoin de recourir à cette notion d’enrichissement indirect que je viens de développer, car la saisie serait alors la cause d’un enrichissement direct par augmentation du capital mobilisable.
Du point de vue de la loi, et en nous plaçant dans le contexte américain, la saisie de propriété n’est pas un vol, quand l’État la pratique, dans trois hypothèses dont une au moins est problématique. 1) La première est la saisie de propriété immobilière dans un but d’intérêt général et moyennant compensation financière : c’est la théorie de l’« eminent domain » (en France, expropriation pour cause d’utilité publique). 2) La deuxième est la saisie des biens de personnes condamnées par la justice : c’est la théorie de la « forfeiture » (en France, confiscation). 3) La troisième est celle qui nous occupe, et qui s’appuie sur des lois de sauvegarde de l’intérêt national. Or, quand la loi affecte un État souverain comme l’Iran, la saisie d’actifs s’inscrit dans une relation de souverain à souverain, transposition de celle de sujet de droit à sujet de droit, et la saisie unilatérale est donc un vol, même quand une loi nationale américaine le prévoit.

