Tagged: defamation
Law 40 Wawkeism
Sep 2023-Mar 2024
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Wawkeism
“China Blasts German Foreign Minister Over ‘Dictator Xi’ Jibe” (Hindustan Times, Sep 2023)
Why are woke politicians such bellicose hawks? I am coining the word wawk for them. But no matter how wawk is a hen, it can only peck small chicken.
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Taliban’s Heinous Surveillance Cams
“Taliban Plan Mass Surveillance Network in Afghanistan Using U.S. “Security Map,” China’s Huawei” (Crux, Sep 2023)
Cameras are law enforcement tools. Taliban, like other governments, will enforce legislation with the help of cameras. When human rights organizations express concerns about a mere tool with which laws will be enforced but these organizations in fact consider that the laws themselves do not abide by human rights and are the problem, it is idle talk as far as their speech focuses on a universal tool rather than specific and allegedly problematic laws. These organizations show themselves as mere anti-Taliban pecking hens. Tomorrow, if they can find nothing else, they will express concern that the Taliban have a police force. When you express concern that the government of a country uses the same police measures as other countries, you are pecking like a hen.
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The right to advocate and incite unlawful conduct
“Influencer ‘Meatball’ appears to be arrested while livestreaming looting rampage in Philadelphia” (New York Post, Sep 2023)
Streaming is not looting. The influencer has First Amendment rights. The First Amendment allows advocacy of unlawful conduct and the influencer’s arrest was unjustified.
She has a First Amendment right to incite riot or looting or any other unlawful act one can think of, provided it is not inciting (1) an imminent act (2) likely to occur: Brandenburg v. Ohio. As she was livestreaming on her blog, she was not even addressing the crowds around her, which is the only way in which her speech could have resulted in imminent unlawful action likely to occur. There is no incitement relationship between the looting and her gloating over it.
But even if she had livestreamed herself addressing the looters, “Well done, guys!,” this is not incitement either because congratulations cannot be incitement, as the former follow the act while the latter precedes it. Furthermore, even if she had said “Well done! There is another store next door,” the looting started before her speech, and if this speech (“go to another store after this one”) could be incitement in this context, then congratulations would be incitement as well, as a warmup, but congratulations cannot be incitement by definition. As one has a right to advocate wrongful conduct, one obviously has a right to cheer over wrongful conduct, even if this could be said to warm up wrongdoers.
To be sure, congratulations may also occur during, rather than after, the act, but during the act is still not before the act, and one needs precedence to talk about incitement. If there were incitement in the present case, it would be incitement to keep looting and not to start looting, but if it could be said that such a thing exists as incitement to continue doing something that people had already started doing, then there is obviously no possibility that cheering could be protected by the First Amendment as it is in a free country where advocacy of unlawful acts is protected.
Even if addressing looters in one store with such words as “Loot the next store too” has some formal characteristics of incitement, it is not incitement, here, because for speech to be incitement it must incite, again, an imminent act likely to occur, and if the imminent act was likely to occur already before the speech, the speech is not inciting, it is only cheering, rejoicing, reveling, gloating… Looting has material interests attached to it, people loot for goods and merchandises; this motive is self-sufficient without the need to add cheering as a likely cause of continuation. As an individual caught in the middle of a rampage, and liking it, some of the influencer’s words had a few characteristics of incitement but her speech lacked other characteristics and they are all needed together to characterize unlawful speech.
The arrest follows a typical pattern of police frustration, where, most of the wrongdoers escaping arrest, police turn against a person for her speech. This is not acceptable under a Constitution with First Amendment. Besides, the arrest psychologically relies on an outdated notion that people on the street have a legally enforceable duty to make citizen’s arrests (called hue and cry): when, in the past, such a duty existed, a person running with the crowd after, say, a thief on the street while cheering for the theft at the same time was obviously unlikely.
To sum up, “keep going,” in whatever form, is not incitement. The looters were not triggered by the person’s speech. Gloating over wrongful acts is protected speech, as a form of advocacy.
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While Western governments and media were stressing that some Russians tried to emigrate to escape the draft, and this was described as a blow to the Russian regime, they asked European populations to welcome and accommodate millions of Ukrainian refugees who were fleeing not only the war zone in their country but also their country itself. In other words, while these governments and media asked European people to fund the Ukrainian army, they also asked them to welcome Ukrainian men escaping military service for the country we were supposed to root for. Ukrainian refugees had a duty to take refuge in their own country in order to enlist in the Ukrainian army; their coming to Europe has been opportunistic, to the best of a rational agent’s understanding.
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On the “hypocrisy of the international community” regarding the treatment of civil casualties in Ukraine and Palestine. The parallel between Ukraine and Palestine would be more adequate if Western nations held Ukraine accountable for Russian civilians’ deaths, which they are not doing, whether it be because there are no Russian civilian casualties (but there are: see below) or for the same reason they keep largely silent on Palestinian casualties, namely because they support Ukraine’s goals as they support Israel’s ones. They only see civilian casualties when the “bad guys” are responsible.
Nota Bene. 1) Since the beginning of the war, there have been Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory. 2) There is a significant Russian minority in Ukraine. If you refuse to call them ethnic Russians, you will count them as Ukrainian casualties rather than Ukraine’s victims; how convenient.
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Aerial invasion and mass bombardments have become the number one modus operandi of technological war, and this type of warfare is highly indiscriminate and lethal to civilians and civilian infrastructures, especially when faced with guerrilla warfare. This, among other things, is the reason why Western nations are reluctant (to say the least) to condemn the bombardments on Gaza, because they know they would do the same, namely indiscriminate mass bombardments, in the same situation, regardless of international law. The existence of Palestinian enclaves (the relics of Palestinian territories) surrounded by Israeli territories allows this to happen, and the so-called “human shields” in these enclaves are all the present and living Palestinian Arabs.
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“[British] Police ‘treading a very fine line’ | Pro-Palestine protesters provided with leaflets on antisemitism” (GBNews, Nov 2023)
These leaflets are police provocation. Police target law-abiding citizens, namely pro-Palestine demonstrators, telling them through leaflets: “We are confident that you may be criminals.” Of course, this serves to dissuade people from joining the movement, as individuals who decide to join know they would be under police surveillance as suspected criminals. These leaflets are blatant discrimination.
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“Algerian footballer Youcef Atal convicted by French court over Gaza post” (Islam Channel, Jan 2024)
The fact it took less than three months for a French court to pronounce a condemnation (for a post dated Oct 12) is unusually swift for a so-called speech crime. So much so that a political spin may be suspected in the procedure, in relation with the current atrocities taking place in Palestine. Besides, if Youcef Atal has no criminal record, his sentence is unusually harsh, even taking into account the suspended part of prison time. (He probably doesn’t have a record; I only say “if” to avoid making believe I know his file personally.) The sentence is unusually harsh and the trial unusually swift, which hints at political pressure to speed it up and at a political sentence. This was a political trial, not a fair trial.
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Of Salutes and Flags
“Hundreds Perform Nazi Salute in Italy. (…) Banning the Nazi salute opens the Pandora’s box.” (FirstPost, Jan 2024)
The Pandora’s box has been open for decades in France and I confirm politics is a joke here.
Contrary to wearing uniforms and displaying paraphernalia, the salute per se is not an offense in the French books (as such it is forbidden in stadiums only) but the courts condemn it nevertheless as incitement to racial hatred. Thus, where the law actually forbids, say, the display of Nazi flags, the guilty may have to pay a 1,500€ fine, but where the law says nothing but courts nevertheless filled in the gap, then one may incur one year in prison and a 45,000€ fine. The legislator said nothing on the salute but the salute is punished as racial hatred, whose penalties are substantially heavier than for Nazi uniforms and objects that are statutorily punished by a much smaller fine, even though the obvious display of objects, if the salute is racial hatred, is racial hatred by the same token. So much so for consistency.
Finally, neither the law nor the courts limit the scope of the law to the Nazi and Italian Fascist parties; their phrasing targets organizations condemned by the Nuremberg and other trials in 1945 and other organizations condemned for crimes against humanity. Which means displaying the Israeli flag should be punished by French courts when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rules that Israel has committed or is committing a genocide.
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Defamation and the Fair Trial Principle
(For those reading French, see Droit 39 “Diffamation et Droits de la défence.”)
a) Speech during a trial
b) Speech after a trial
a) In Trump’s defamation case, what has been condemned is basically Trump’s defense in his sexual offence trial. When you defend yourself in a trial, what in other circumstances might be called defamation is protected speech, because otherwise no one could defend themselves in a trial and no one could have a fair trial. Trump’s defense was protected from defamation suits in the context of his trial. The federal prosecutor talks about Trump’s tweets, interviews, after this or that audience, at this or that time, but she fails to tell us how the points she stresses are outside the protection that Trump’s speech, like any other accused person’s speech, was afforded for his defense. Think about it, now when one is brought to court and wants to dismiss their accuser’s allegations, that is, when one defends themselves, if they lose the trial, they will also lose a defamation trial because they dare defend themselves?
In this particular trial, protected speech was not limited to the precinct of the court, because both parties were public figures and the trial was in the mass media as much as in the court. Therefore, it is obvious that Trump had a right to express himself on the trial in the media, that is, he had a right to carry elements of his defense to the public via the media, which were dealing with the trial. Consequently, his speech was protected as defense speech in a trial, and at the very least, if it could not be protected because in some similar cases this had been previously ruled out, Trump may have been in good faith about his rights, about the extremely important rights of speech protection in a fair trial. This condemnation conveys the suggestion that the court treats protection of speech quite lightly, even to the point of ignoring it. What citizens will remember of this trial is that by defending oneself in a trial one may incur another trial for defamation.
Defending oneself in a trial, if it is libel, is protected libel. Trump lost a libel case after he was sued for commenting his own trial on the internet and in interviews. His comments were merely to tell what his defense is in the case, namely that his accuser is a liar. These people mean he was the only person on earth compelled to keep silent about his own trial? There can be no fair trial at all if your defense is liable to be treated as libel because a judicial trial is basically, for starters and some dubious characters here involved, reciprocal aspersions.
b) Besides, you can’t defame someone whose reputation is not at risk. Since the court said a party to a trial did not lie, this party is reputed to not be a liar, and when the accused keeps calling her a liar this cannot taint her reputation. The whole libel suit is flawed on principle. An American citizen has the right to keep claiming he is innocent (and his accuser is a liar) after he was found guilty by a court of law. You can’t sue for libel a man who claims his innocence. He claims his innocence but the accuser has been vindicated by the court, the court’s judgment therefore precludes that the person the court found guilty, when he keeps claiming his innocence, commits libel, because there can be no damage to the vindicated accuser’s reputation in such a claim.
Conclusion
When I say “I am innocent,” I am saying (unless I believe my accuser is making a mistake, a precision I would then be well-advised to articulate) that my accuser is lying. Someone wanted to object to me that, had Trump said he is innocent, he would not be sued for libel (quote: “He’s not being sued for claiming he’s innocent”), but, as this person claims, as Trump said his accuser is a liar he is being sued. I call everyone’s attention to the fact that had Trump said he is innocent, these very words (“I am innocent”) would accuse his accuser of lying, which my detractor says is deservedly sued for libel. His viewpoint is therefore inconsistent and unfamiliar with libel law.
Annex
“The Adult Survivors Act (ASA) is New York State legislation enacted in May 2022 which amends state law to allow alleged victims of sexual offenses for which the statute of limitations has lapsed to file civil suits for a one-year period, from November 24, 2022, to November 24, 2023.” (Wikipedia)
There are statutes of limitations for a reason, the bill is tailor-made and unconstitutional. The laws of the state have statutes of limitations but the lawmaker of the day, although acknowledging the relevance and goodness of said statutes, suddenly finds it expedient to cancel them for a short, limited period. Expediency considerations do not belong to the legislative power, lawmakers must make good laws and repeal bad laws. If statutes of limitations are good, they must leave them alone, if they are bad, they must repeal them. This temporary cancellation of statutes was an unconstitutional infringement on the judicial power, to which the laws of the state say that statutes of limitations are good legislation they must abide by. This legislative self-contradiction is constitutional insanity, that is, unconstitutional remissness.
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Corporate Speech and the First Amendment
There is no such thing as corporate speech, as speech is protected as a political right, that is, speech protection is the result of a connection to the electoral process and ballot. The right to vote is the condition for protected speech. The Supreme Court of the United States must reverse Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission and allow the legislator to regulate and limit so-called corporate speech.
Commercial speech is not fully protected (in contrast to hate speech for instance). The U.S. constitution does not want advertising to flood the “marketplace of ideas,” so the notion that websites have a constitutionally protected freedom to censor content for the sake of advertisers is fanciful. The lawyer we heard in Moody v. Netchoice talks of “users and advertisers,” but he really thinks “advertisers” only because advertisers are the platforms’ source of income, not users. Besides, users and advertisers shouldn’t be thrown in the same bag as far as the First Amendment is concerned, because commercial speech is protected from state regulation only partially, while the user is an agent on the marketplace of ideas and has the right to vote, that is, the right to determine the states and nation’s policies.
When you’re watching a political debate to make a choice on who you’re going to vote for, you’re in a speech environment. When the broadcast is cut for commercials, you’re leaving this environment. Next thing you know, they’ll tell you a football game is “speech.” The Founding Fathers did not fight tyranny for this.
Furthermore, private censorship by platforms is infliction of emotional distress, a tort. When a platform user makes a speech that the U.S. constitution protects and he is censored by the platform because of his speech, the platform is a platform for speech but acts as a private club, or a church, or a private property. However, the platform attracts users to expose them to commercial speech, advertisers being their source of income. The platform has a minimal duty to the user in the circumstance, which is that, as long as they abide by the law, users must be free on the platform. Anything else is ruthless exploitation by platforms exposing gagged masses to advertising and mind manipulation.
Thus, the reasoning is along two lines. 1) Private censorship by platforms might be liable to tort actions. 1a) It could be for invasive moderation, invasion of others’ rights. It would be absurd to claim a platform owner can shield a manic staff who harasses targeted users, like an ex-girlfriend, through flagging their posts manically. Not admitting that a platform can be sued for moderation is like saying they can staff their moderation offices with maniacs and that would be just as good. Absurd. 1b) Then, a notice on posts could well be libel, depending on the notice, but even a removal could have the same effect on one’s reputation. Even though platforms cannot be liable for users’ content (Section 230), they are liable for moderation. Moderation is speech and not all speech is protected; moderation can be unprotected speech where libel laws obtain. Section 230(2) provides “Good Samaritan protection” for bona fide moderation, it isn’t a blanket protection.
2) A law curbing platforms’ speech regardless of the First Amendment could pass the strict scrutiny test because of the so-called preferred position doctrine that applies in case of conflicts of rights. As currently the First Amendment cannot ensure for free, voting citizens the free flow of information and ideas against encroachments by platforms, a statute is needed. That statute will be upheld against the private companies’ claim that it violates their, the companies’ First Amendment right. Indeed, corporate speech has not as strong a status as citizens’ speech, all this ultimately deriving from the common law, where property is not a source of absolute discretionary power. Corporate speech is twofold: commercial and political. Admitting that corporations’ political speech is equally protected under current precedents (since Citizens United), that’s not the case of their commercial speech. This enables one to say that, according to the existing positive legislation, corporations have fewer First Amendment rights than individuals.
The envisioned statute can specify the kind of companies concerned, same as there exist statutes regarding “common carriers.” Some time ago, Justice Clarence Thomas floated the idea that internet platforms are common carriers. If this is what they are, the platforms will realize that a statute can impose duties on companies, on private property. Malls are a good example in the discussion. See Logan Valley Plaza (1968): “Logan dealt with the right to use private property as equivalent of public space”; “A business in a privately owned shopping center cannot prevent labor picketing in its surroundings.”
– Wouldn’t narrowing the scope of 230 potentially incentivize U.S. companies to register abroad? Of course internet companies have to comply with each country’s local laws and ICCPR but that concerns, to my knowledge, widely what should and must be censored – not what cannot be censored, as long as the terms are enforced without prejudice. (G. Muller)
These American companies operate in foreign countries where they are under obligation to censor content (see for instance the European DSA–Digital Services Act). Why would they register abroad if tomorrow these companies come under an obligation not to censor content in the U.S.? Registering abroad, they would face the same compulsions as if registering in the U.S., namely: to censor abroad, not to censor in the U.S.
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Firepower and the Second Amendment
Whether a legislator wants to ban machine guns or bump stocks (see Garland v. Cargill about the constitutionality of a Trump-era ban on bump stocks, currently examined by the U.S. Supreme Court), this is a vicious wish because enactment is unconstitutional. The Second Amendment means that the state cannot tamper with the gun function of guns. If you can ban bump stocks, nothing can stop you from banning anything except toy guns shooting soft rubber bullets while claiming the U.S. constitution has a Second Amendment. “Militias” that are “necessary to the security of a free State” need more than toy guns, they need the deadliest weapons on the market.
A militia being necessary to the security of a free State, it needs the deadliest weapons. We all know you don’t need a machine gun to go hunting, but this amendment wasn’t written for hunting. It was written for the security of a free State. We also know that whether a “well regulated militia” is something of the irretrievable past or not, it is not what the Court is asked to consider, because this is only the premise of the amendment, and it is the amendment’s prescription that is the standing and binding rule, namely that the state don’t infringe on the people’s right to bear arms for the security of a free State.
In other words, whether well regulated militias have been existing or not these last decades, it still obtains that the people’s right to bear arms is necessary for the security of a free State according to the constitution. You can’t deny it without hollowing out the amendment. The constitution is not concerned about what rifle or what firepower a hunter needs to shoot a deer, so that lawmakers could put a limit on the firepower legally available to citizens. The firepower constitutionally available to U.S. citizens is the firepower necessary to the security and existence of a free State, that is to say, the deadliest weapons available. All restrictions on this account are unconstitutional.
The Second Amendment forbids the state to consider that its standing army has made “well regulated militias” unnecessary to the security of a free State. But the right to bear arms is a people’s individual right, not a militia’s collective right. The authors of the amendment made this obvious and they made it so lest, through devious statutes, militias became annexes to the standing army and/or the states’ administrations (which is actually the case with the existing militia statutes and militias). The people’s right to bear arms entails the unrestricted freedom to achieve maximum firepower, because the security of a free State entails the ongoing validity of the constitution itself, that is, there can be no higher duty for a U.S. citizen than the security of a free State, and therefore, as this highest duty requires arms, lawmakers cannot impose limits on the firepower available to citizens.
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Removing Names from the Ballot
Trump has not been convicted for insurrection. Statutorily removing his name from the ballot for insurrection (January 6 events) amounted, therefore, to removing his name because “somebody” is saying Trump is an insurrectionist. This “somebody” could be my grandma or your grandpa or the current President of the United States, it doesn’t matter, this somebody is nobody. Coloradan authorities lacked a legal basis for their action. The only possible legal basis would have to be an actual conviction for insurrection, and not only an indictment because from indictment to conviction the indictee is presumed innocent (Coffin v. U.S., 1895). You cannot remove a person from the ballot for sedition when this person is presumed innocent of sedition. That the Colorado supreme court thought otherwise is baffling. Coloradan authorities misused their authority.
“Colorado should be able to bar oath-breaking insurrections from our ballot,” a Coloradan official declared after Trump v. Anderson. Well, you can do that, Colorado state, only you don’t have the power to say who is an insurrectionist and who is not, it has to be a court of law, with an actual conviction, which is the small detail missing in your operation. You are a government, not a court, and although you would like to convict Trump for insurrection, you don’t have this power and you removed from the ballot a person as innocent of insurrection as your own officials until proven guilty by a court. Colorado state intended to gather in its hands the powers both of an executive and the judiciary, and these people don’t even seem to realize how spiteful this is to fundamental principles.
Detractors of SCOTUS’s Trump v. Anderson (2024) are now considering a federal bill, which is the obvious option given the angle in the court’s decision. In my humble opinion, however, this was not so much a state versus union issue as an executive power versus judicial power, a checks and balances issue. To remove an “insurrectionist” from the ballot is not allowed to a government absent a judicial sentence about said person. As a commentator already put it, the bill smelled a lot like a bill of attainder, and by floating the idea this commentator made it clear that in his opinion the issue was not whether states (as opposed to the federal state) could take such a step but whether the authorities of a state and/or federal authorities could pass a bill targeting people who have not been convicted by a court and at most are indicted and still presumed innocent. And the answer to the latter question is an obvious no.
If the ballot removal act is a bill, it is a bill of attainder, forbidden by the attainder clause of the U.S. constitution. If it is an executive act, it lacks legal ground, which could only be an actual conviction for insurrection or a bill. An executive act depriving a citizen of his rights (the right to participate in an election) without legal ground is misuse of power. It seems these people have been taking the partisan Jan 6 house committee for some kind of court of law because they’re always talking of insurrection as if guilt has been proven by a court. However, a claim of insurrection is at this stage a mere fancy and cannot serve as legal ground, the Jan 6 committee notwithstanding.
The issue is people’s right to be candidates for elections when there is no charge of insurrection against them and all other conditions are met for their being candidates (age, nationality, and so on). This right is constitutionally protected. Neither a state nor a federal act can deprive an American citizen of this right on a mere fancy of insurrection. And for a claim of insurrection to serve as legal ground, guilt must be proven by a court of law, by a final conviction in a court. Indictment is to no avail in this regard because indictment is an executive act, and a legal ground could only be a judicial act by an independent court after a fair trial.
What, then, would such a federal statute aiming at removing Trump from the ballot be? Absent a conviction by a court of law, it would be a bill of attainder, forbidden by the attainder clause of the constitution. The bill would be both a judicial, individual judgment (“Trump is an insurrectionist”) and a legislative act (“Therefore he must be booted from the ballot”). Bills of attainder are unconstitutional because of the fundamental principle of separation of powers. To rule that “Trump shall be booted from the ballot” you need a prior judicial, individual judgment stating that “Trump is an insurrectionist.” This judgment is missing. To remove Trump from the ballot, a law could be passed without being attainder if it were so worded: “Any person indicted (not convicted yet) for insurrectionary acts shall not be accepted as candidate.” However, how could this be congruent with the presumption of innocence? The government could indict any person and these people would be deprived of their right to be candidates for elections without judgments by independent courts. That would be unconstitutional too, a misuse of power.
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Porn being legal in the U.S., a platform needs to moderate its content to bar porn. No one can object to such moderation, but then, using the argument, the platforms become willing witch hunters for the administration. The solution is to make porn illegal. Filmed pornography being based on meretricious contracts, its very making is illegal to begin with (see Law 22 “Pacta turpia cannot be speech”).
Platforms need to moderate content because porn is legal in the U.S., with the valid argument: “We need to moderate content because we’ve got to bar porn from flooding our platforms since it is not police job but ours.” Therefore, ban porn again. Porn is no more speech than a football game (and much more damaging). Stop the nonsense, the only reason they – mafia lawyers – say porn is speech is because in the U.S. speech is protected. How can filmed pornography be legal in states where prostitution is illegal (all states except Nevada), when the making of filmed pornography requires the same meretricious contracts as prostitution? Filmed pornography is filmed prostitution, and if there is such a thing as crime prevention the making of filmed pornography should be prevented in said states. You’ve got to be consistent.
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Some ethical remarks on police interrogation techniques
1) The right for a police officer to be deceptive during an interrogation
Ask yourself why it is not okay for a juvenile service officer to be deceptive, but it is for a police officer (these are interrogation regulations in the states, where the presence of a juvenile service officer is mandatory when juveniles are interrogated by police). There can be no good reason, for in the former case a moral commandment prevails while in the latter expediency does, but if it is a question where a moral commandment applies, expediency is not a legitimate concern. Criminals use deception to conceal their crimes. As the outcome of Alyssa Bustamante’s trial shows, the police officer’s occasional deception during the interrogation was not even decisive, since the whole interview was dismissed as evidence and yet Bustamante was convicted.
2) Sitting close to the suspect
In normal social interactions, especially in the U.S., one would not sit so close to a stranger as the detective to the suspect here (no need to specify the case) without an intention to intimidate or even assault the stranger. Why should a detective be allowed to intimidate a suspect? Truth requires dialectical skills and the state should not tolerate other, bullying, humiliating techniques. According to proxemics, imposing a spatial distance shorter than the socially accepted distance between two interacting strangers is indeed a form of humiliation and degradation.
3) Telling the suspect to look at you in the eyes
Telling someone to look at you in the eyes, as the detective does with the suspect (no need to specify), is outrageous in normal social interactions. It is a request that, between strangers, could easily start a so-called “trivial altercation” resulting in homicide (such trivial altercations between strangers are a cause of 37% of all homicides). In other words, for a detective to talk like this is a misuse of power.
Between two strangers, the reaction of a normally constituted man to an injunction to “look at me in the eyes when I’m talking to you” is some kind of “f*** you.” As this is not an option for a suspect interrogated by a police officer, the suspect is degraded. To be sure, between strangers, there is no such thing as asking their ID to someone and other such things either; however, police are entitled by law to make such requests, whereas to our knowledge there is no legal ground formally allowing a detective to carry out an interrogation by asking the suspect to look at him in the eyes. An interrogation can be carried out without the suspect being forced to look at people in the eyes if it is not his habit.
Law 37 On Swedish Discrimination
Languages: EN-FR
EN
The International Criminal Court is not a “court,” it is something no constitutional regime could have in place, namely both a prosecutor and a court in one and the same organ, a mixture of powers abhorrent to constitutional principles. Therefore, no fair trial can ever be had from such a body, and international justice as embodied by the ICC is no justice at all. The treaty instituting the ICC is not binding for countries abiding by constitutional principles. Take France; the preamble of its constitution says: “A society without separation of powers has no constitution” (“Toute société dans laquelle la garantie des droits n’est pas assurée, ni la séparation des pouvoirs déterminée, n’a point de Constitution“). How could such a country be bound by decisions from a body whose constitution (the treaty) so blatantly overlooks the principle of separation of powers? The ICC’s answer amounts to saying, and I am telling you no joke, that the prosecutor and the judges do not share the same office within the court’s precincts…
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TikTok CEO Shou Zi Chew faces off with US legislators in hearing. Shou Zi Chew was grilled about teenage safety and data security. (Al Jazeera English, March 2023)
“Deadly challenges” among teenagers on social platforms are not specific to one company: How do these legislators care about deadly challenges when it’s done on a US platform? And how would forcing the sale of TikTok to a US company, as suggested, solve the problem? They are mixing things up –(a) national security issues re a Chinese company and (b) the usual problems of such platforms, most of them American– to create an emotional climate against the activity of a Chinese-owned company and pinpoint in this Chinese company the problems these legislators fail to address in US companies. This is discrimination and China would be justified to see a casus belli in this, as per the Opium Wars, Open Door Policy, and other precedents of international law. The American public will be made to endorse, by way of deception, a legislative response to bogus claims on national security by approving measures against problems occurring with all such platforms, which the American legislator fails to address in the case of other, mostly American companies. The remiss legislator is claiming to address a general problem by pinpointing a foreign, Chinese company, and this is discriminatory.
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Ukrainians and their supporters online are protesting the International Olympic Committee’s recommendation to let Russian and Belarusian athletes compete at international competitions under a ‘neutral’ white flag. (Al Jazeera English, March 2023)
They should reread Pierre de Coubertin. The games are for all countries, and those countries which object to this may boycott and remain out of it. The games’ organizers are not a political tribunal hearing complaints from this or that country.
Make no mistake, Russian athletes already competed under a neutral flag in the previous games, this has nothing to do with the conflict in Ukraine but with sports ethics, related to allegations of doping, as the organizers considered the Russians did not evidence a serious will to cope with the problem.
The International Olympic Committee (IOC) has no power, under its statutes, to exclude a country on political grounds. What the people who make this demand fail to see is that such an exclusion would be outrageous because it would send the message that there is no conflict in the world expect the conflict in Ukraine, a mind-bogglingly insensitive message. The IOC is simply not that kind of tribunal.
– Oh yeah? Care to tell us why Germany and Japan were not allowed to participate in 1948 Olympics then? There is always a line.
Coubertin was dead and the IOC made a mistake it did not dare to make twice. Not inviting Russia while inviting other countries engaged in offensive wars would be a reckless disregard for the sufferings of victims; the IOC would be a puppet of state interests for which some wars and sufferings matter while others don’t.
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On Rahul Gandhi’s trial for defamation after saying “Modi is a surname of thieves” – and international implications. “Modi is a surname of thieves” is not defamatory, as it is not an allegation of facts. It is a jibe. If someone dislikes my name, it may anger me but that doesn’t build up to a factual claim, that is, a defamation. Although the message intended is that the person, by implication, is a thief, this is not an allegation of facts. Insult and defamation are different concepts. Insult is a damage to feelings; defamation is a damage to reputation. When A says B has the surname of a thief, A may hurt B’s feelings (if B is thin-skinned, which is not an overly good quality for a statesman) but B’s reputation remains intact. Had A said B had stolen goods on this or that occasion, then, yes, there may be some damage to B’s reputation (through alleged facts). Not here. Rahul is innocent of defamation.
Everybody has a say on Indian jurisprudence because Indian judges may be posted at international courts and therefore make international law; if it turns out Indian judges are not professional at home, we should oppose their tenure at international courts. The way Indian justice is carried out is not an “internal matter”; if Indian judges are not competent and ethical at home, international courts should discard their applications. If they try to claim that law means subservience to Indian politics, their applications should be discarded without further review.
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“Donald Trump’s Hush Money Indictment“
What are the charges? “Hush money,” what crime is that? Is a man punishable for being a victim of blackmail?
It looks like a conspiracy using a hooker to make a man fall through blackmail. “Blackmail is the crime of threatening to release certain private information, unless the victim meets specific demands. In many states, blackmail falls under the laws of extortion or theft by coercion. This offense is generally a felony that can carry over a year in prison for a conviction.”
I mean “conspiracy” in the legal, not the thought-police sense: “A conspiracy exists when 2 or more persons join together and form an agreement to violate the law, and then act on that agreement. The crime of conspiracy was created to address the inherent dangers posed to society when people come together and join forces to commit criminal acts.”
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Italy’s most powerful mafia busted as more than 1,000 police officers carry out raids across Europe. (Crux, April 2023)
According to this news, the ‘Ndrangheta is responsible for drug dealing and money laundering (it goes without saying that crime money must be laundered, so it is a mere detail). In the past, Crux says, they used to kidnap people for ransoms; let us assume this is the past and their only crime today is drug dealing. I, then, claim these people today are morally less repugnant than the governments that arrest them and at the same time, through taxation, make money from pornography and prostitution, which are legal in these countries. These governments are complicit in human trafficking. Ironically, this and other mafia groups probably launder their illegal money precisely through these legal activities. In fact, we know that nothing can be done against organized crime in the current institutional framework of these countries, as organized crime is the main corrupting agency in a system where many admit, since Tocqueville, that some degree of corruption is inescapable. Corruption is now exerted by organized crime, which did not exist in American democracy in Tocqueville’s time. (On this point, see my essay Pacta turpia are not speech here, with the Comments section.)
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The developing country that is the first economy in the world
US aims to hinder China’s development by depriving it of developing status: Spokesman. (CCTV Video News Agency, June 2023)
We are reading that BRICS’s share in global GDP has just or is about to surpass G7’s share. Does China agree with these figures and, if yes, does China agree that GDP is a benchmark of development?
–GDP “per capita.”
OK. Two questions. 1) Is there a consensus on what the GDP per capita threshold should be between developed and developing countries? 2) If there is no consensus, what GDP per capita should China reach to become a developed country, according to the Chinese themselves? A developing country is due to become a developed country sometime: When do the Chinese see that time coming? If a developing country has no target, the reach of which would prompt her to say “mission accomplished, we are now developed,” she is not “developing,” and the developed-developing categories lack meaning. Such a country would not be developing; she would, due to preferential treatment clauses in vigor, be a permanently privileged country. This is not to say that the US is legitimate to ascribe this or that statute to China unilaterally.
This page shows the distinction is wanting. To sum up one of the points, a developed economy is service-based while a developing economy is industry-based. How can such a benchmark be of any worth? International division of labor is not going to stop at any GDP and/or GDP per capita figure, because it is ingrained in the mechanisms of international trade. Therefore, by this benchmark, some developing countries will remain “developing” forever, if they specialize in industry in the international division of labor, no matter how high their GDPs per capita. By this rule, developing countries are not developing.
The abstract distinction between developed and developing countries goes against the conditions upon which life itself is premised. There is no such thing as a developed vs. developing organism or economy (the set of material conditions for living organisms): they are all developing. China is developing as much as G7 countries. The current theoretical construct for a regulation of international trade aiming at fairness among parties is, therefore, nonsense. It is premised on an ideal of equally developed, that is, non-developing, stationary economies, which is only conceivable, empirically, as death. No threshold can define a terminally developed economy because there is no such thing as an economy of this kind. Therefore, the labels are entirely arbitrary, so much so that denouncing this or that label is itself arbitrary. In the final analysis, this denouncing is, when all parties claim to abide by the same arbitrary framework, a sovereign decision.
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On Swedish Discrimination
NATO Chief Jens Stoltenberg spoke out on the burning of the Quran in Sweden. Stoltenberg said that the burning of the Quran was offensive and objectionable, but not illegal. (Hindustan Times, July 2023)
If it is offensive, then it is, by the letter of the Swedish law, illegal, because incitement is by definition offensive speech and incitement against groups based on their religious faith (“trosbekännelse”) is illegal hate speech according to the Swedish legislation (see Law 32). This is, again, the letter of the law, and the claim that Swedish hate speech laws do not protect Muslims from incitement in the form of offensive book burning is a despicable attempt at discriminating against Muslims.
This blatantly discriminatory interpretation of the law makes me want to burn heaps of Swedish constitutions and flags. What do I care if some find it offensive? The NATO bureaucrat says offense is not a problem. What are the Swedish hate speech laws for, if they are not supposed to prevent and punish offenses?
This bureaucrat and others only defend freedom of speech when the target of speech are Muslims. Not only does Sweden have hate speech laws protecting whole groups, including religions or faiths, from incitement (“hets”), which this bureaucrat does not oppose, but it also has many other repressive laws, such as lese-majesty laws, which, again, go unnoticed by said bureaucrat. When such discriminating people say “freedom of expression,” it means: Deprive Muslims of their speech through legal speech repression and then make them the target of hate speech through alleged freedom of speech. This is arbitrariness and consequently tyranny. “Offence toward the monarch and the royal family (lèse-majesté) remains a criminal offence in Sweden under the Swedish Criminal Code. Defamation or insult committed against the King or other member of the Royal Family is a criminal offence under Ch. 18, Sec. 2 of the Criminal Code. The punishment is imprisonment for up to four years, or up to six years in the case of gross defamation” (International Press Institute: Sweden).
The US has no say in the matter, considering that Quran burning is free speech in US legislation, where the First Amendment has barred legislatures from passing hate speech laws. The Biden administration is expressing concern over some speech abroad that its own Constitution protects at home… However, this administration is correct to say that Quran burning is hate speech according to a no-nonsensical hate speech legislation (where omission to prosecute make the authorities, therefore, remiss and show they are full of hate against Muslims).
In this country, Sweden, a man can spend six years behind bars for “defaming” the king or any member of the royal family. This is a free speech country, you hear me! To be sure, international analysts say that convictions for defaming the king or the royal family are rare. I believe they are, because six years imprisonment is dissuasive enough to keep people silent about the monarchy. But the analysts seem to believe, when they say convictions are rare, that in fact the law is not really applied, because Sweden is a free speech country; it is more a joke than a law, therefore. Certainly, the notion of legislation as a joke is not foreign to European countries; yet here is something different: here, a law that suppresses speech efficiently by dissuading people from opening their mouths is described as innocuous considering the scarcity of trials! The dialectic should be clear, and when the same people allow Quran burning in the name of free speech, this is nothing but institutionalized anti-Muslim hate.
On the first day of Eid al-Adha, a person set fire to the Muslim holy book outside a mosque in Stockholm. Swedish government later charged him with agitation against an ethnic or national group. Bur Iran’s Foreign Minister, Hossein Amirabdollahian, has held the Swedish government responsible for allowing such protests and announced that Tehran would not be sending an ambassador, despite having appointed one. The Swedish courts had granted permission for these demonstrations, citing freedom of expression. (Hindustan Times)
You must be wrong, Hindustan Times, because if the courts “had allowed such demonstrations,” by which you mean, presumably, that courts had allowed Quran burning, the government would not have filed charges against a man burning a Quran, as you say the Swedish government did. As the authorities, facing an act of Quran burning, filed charges for agitation against a group (“hets mot folkgrupp”), that is, for hate speech, there is obviously no judicial precedent (stare decisis) stating that Quran burning is not a hate speech crime under the statutory law regarding agitation against a group. Prosecution authorities are not supposed to disregard a judicial precedent when it exists. Therefore, you must be wrong, and the courts had said nothing of the sort. And how could the courts have said something of the sort when the act in question is undeniably the kind of act repressed by the letter of the Swedish hate speech law, which protects from offensive speech such groups as those based on religious faith?
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FR
Contre la subvention sociale de l’avortement
États-Unis : un juge de la Cour suprême bloque un arrêt qui limite l’accès à la pilule abortive. (CGTN Français, avril 2024)
Une personne qui ne désire pas d’enfants doit faire en sorte de ne pas en avoir par la façon dont elle se comporte. La loi n’oblige pas les gens à avoir des enfants mais la loi n’est pas non plus obligée de réparer les erreurs des individus. Pourquoi le contribuable doit-il payer, via la sécurité sociale, pour que l’État corrige les erreurs de personnes qui ne veulent pas d’enfants et sont pourtant sur le point d’en avoir, c’est-à-dire ont agi (à moins de viol) contrairement à leurs propres objectifs, donc de manière irréfléchie ? Que l’on montre d’abord que ces dépenses d’avortement, pilules abortives et autres, sont à la seule charge des personnes concernées et non du contribuable avant de parler de liberté, parce que si, comme en France, ces dépenses sont socialisées, la responsabilité subventionne l’irresponsabilité et ce n’est pas acceptable. Vous êtes libres d’avoir des enfants ou pas, du moment que le contribuable ne paye pas pour vos avortements, car il n’a aucune responsabilité dans vos erreurs personnelles.
Dans les pays comme la France où l’avortement est une dépense socialisée, une femme ne devrait avoir droit, au mieux, qu’à un nombre limité d’avortements dans sa vie, défini par la loi, par exemple un ou deux. À la grossesse non voulue suivante, elle devrait subir une stérilisation forcée. « Mon corps, ma liberté », soit, mais ce n’est pas à moi de te payer ta liberté. L’avortement doit être une dépense entièrement privée ou bien être assortie de règles du genre énoncé.
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Du concept de philosophies plurielles des droits de l’homme et de sa naïveté
Il faut « respecter les philosophies des droits de l’homme des autres pays » (Ambassadeur chinois). (CGTN Français, juin 2023)
On ne peut parler de différentes philosophies des droits de l’homme. S’il y avait différentes philosophies, l’une protégerait moins les droits que l’autre et serait donc déficiente par rapport à l’autre, serait moins parfaite et moins « respectable ». Ce qu’il faut chercher à savoir, c’est si la pratique des États est conforme à leur discours. Quand un État européen est condamné de manière répétée par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme pour les mêmes violations, c’est qu’il ne respecte pas les droits de l’homme et ne s’amende pas, ne cherche même pas à s’améliorer ; c’est juste un présomptueux donneur de leçons.
Quand il est question de « valeurs asiatiques » pour définir une philosophie asiatique des droits de l’homme, il s’agit de faire une place au collectif dans le traitement des droits individuels. Or les États occidentaux ont exactement le même raisonnement chez eux : dans la pratique gouvernementale des États européens vis-à-vis de leurs citoyens, le discours est toujours que les libertés individuelles ne sont pas absolues et que leur exercice est limité par la considération de l’intérêt général. C’est seulement à l’égard d’autres États souverains, par exemple asiatiques, que les pays occidentaux passent sous silence cette dimension de leur propre pratique gouvernementale et tiennent un discours absolutiste fallacieux. Cette instrumentalisation des droits de l’homme est régulièrement dénoncée par la Chine et d’autres pays, et c’est là une approche plus pertinente que d’invoquer des philosophies différentes, car en réalité la philosophie occidentale des droits de l’homme est la même que celle des valeurs asiatiques, dans la pratique interne des États occidentaux.
Quand il s’agit de libertés, c’est toujours, dans la philosophie occidentale comme dans les valeurs asiatiques, un compromis entre l’individuel et le collectif. Il n’y a donc pas de différence de philosophie. Quand, à présent, on prétend que la philosophie des droits de l’homme exclut par principe telle ou telle législation, par exemple l’application de la peine capitale, il est certain, si l’on admet que les droits de l’homme exigent nécessairement l’abolition de cette peine, qu’il ne s’agit plus d’une question de compromis ; et si un État veut maintenir la peine de mort tout en se disant respectueux des droits de l’homme, il lui faut invoquer une « autre » philosophie des droits de l’homme, avec laquelle cette peine est compatible. Or que les États européens (au contraire des États-Unis) et les ONG occidentales aient fait de l’abolition de la peine de mort un critère du respect des droits de l’homme ne signifie pas que ce soit autre chose qu’une manœuvre, que ce soit une philosophie légitime des droits de l’homme plutôt qu’une interprétation dévoyée. Les philosophes européens des Lumières (Montesquieu, Voltaire, Kant…) qui ont contribué à poser les bases d’une philosophie des droits humains considéraient la peine capitale comme légitime. (La source d’inspiration des promoteurs de l’abolition est un assez obscur juriste, Beccaria, surtout connu pour cet argument abolitionniste ; les philosophes du même courant, comme Voltaire, ont retenu de ce juriste ses appels à mettre fin à la « barbarie » judiciaire, mais Voltaire, par exemple, a défendu la légitimité de la peine capitale, qui n’est donc pas, pour ces auteurs, une peine barbare en soi.) L’absolutisme abolitionniste est injustifié du point de vue des droits de l’homme et sert en réalité à créer une ligne simpliste de démarcation entre États en ignorant les questions plus sensibles des pratiques gouvernementales qui, indépendamment des proclamations, traduisent un parti pris répressif entre l’individuel et le collectif dans les sociétés occidentales.
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Émeutes et responsabilité du fait d’autrui
Le garde des sceaux veut « rappeler aux parents un certain nombre de choses ». Il peut rappeler autant de choses qu’il le souhaite : aucune loi n’interdit aux gens de sortir, si ce n’est un couvre-feu. Ce n’est donc pas la peine de proférer des menaces, car appliquer des sanctions pour des conduites permises par la loi (sortir ou laisser sortir ses enfants) serait illégal.
Le garde des sceaux, comme le président de la République avant lui, qui sont censés parler dans le cadre de leurs fonctions au nom de la loi, ont parlé au nom d’un certain sens de la responsabilité morale, mais avec ce genre de propos ils sont en dehors de leurs attributions, et ils ne font que discriminer les parents de certaines zones urbaines, car si les parents d’un émeutier venu de Neuilly-sur-Seine se faisaient visiter par la police, ils diraient qu’ils ne pouvaient pas savoir que leur fils sortait pour participer à une émeute alors qu’ils pensaient qu’il allait seulement faire sa rooftop party hebdomadaire à plein volume avec ses petits camarades de la Haute Ecole de marketing commercial, et l’on dirait alors « c’est vrai, ils ne pouvaient pas savoir », tandis que Fatma de Sarcelles devait savoir, quant à elle, et avait donc le devoir au nom de la loi d’enfermer son enfant à double tour : présomption de culpabilité.
Le premier soir d’émeute était imprévisible car spontané. Le deuxième soir était imprévisible car on pensait que les forces de l’ordre avaient rétabli l’ordre dont elles portent le nom. Le troisième soir, idem, etc. Il est vrai qu’à un moment le gouvernement a appelé les parents au secours. Au secours des forces de l’ordre. Mais, et c’est mon argument, il n’avait pas ce pouvoir. Il ne peut pas donner d’ordre aux parents, seulement aux policiers, gendarmes, RAID, brigades anti-terroristes, véhicules blindés…
Un président de la République a certes le droit de parler pour ne rien dire. Il a même le droit de parler, pour la première fois que je sache, des jeux vidéo, comme si c’était le moment. S’il sait qu’il existe un problème avec les jeux vidéo, que n’en a-t-il fait un sujet de campagne électorale, que n’a-t-il demandé le vote d’une loi au Parlement, que n’a-t-il cherché à prévenir ou endiguer leurs méfaits ? C’est bien le moment de parler des jeux vidéo, quand il lui est demandé, non pas de prévenir leurs méfaits, mais de rétablir l’ordre. S’il avait fait voter une loi pour interdire, confisquer, réglementer – que sais-je ? – les jeux vidéo, il aurait aujourd’hui un pouvoir contre ce danger, mais il nous dit : « Je n’ai rien fait contre les jeux vidéo, je ne vous en ai même jamais parlé, c’est comme si je ne m’étais jamais rendu compte de rien, et voilà le résultat. » C’est surréaliste. Il peut dire ce qu’il veut aux parents, il n’a pas été élu pour donner des leçons de pédagogie. Qu’est-ce qui lui fait croire que les parents ont encore de l’autorité sur leurs enfants, d’abord ? Le problème de l’autorité touche les familles au premier chef, et ce n’est pas comme si l’État français ne s’était pas acharné contre l’autorité dans les familles ces dernières décennies. Quant à la prévisibilité de la durée des émeutes, les médias parlent d’un précédent de 2005 et je trouve très fort que tout le monde, apparemment, ait tout de suite compris que c’est 2005 qui était en train de se refaire. La perspicacité des commentateurs de ce pays est quelque chose de merveilleux.
Les médias faisant les titres sur 2005, s’ils parlent d’une longue série, plutôt qu’un précédent unique, cela n’apparaît pas dans les titres. Ils n’ont qu’à écrire dans les titres que c’est le dernier numéro d’une longue série pour que le discours de la durée prévisible des émeutes devienne crédible, car, je le reconnais, je n’ai pas souvenir d’autres dates. Je me souviens, en revanche, des Gilets jaunes, il n’y a pas si longtemps, et des manifestations contre la réforme des retraites, encore plus près de nous. Et de certaines images qui se ressemblent. Cependant, les gens capables de faire des pronostics à partir d’un précédent vieux de dix-huit ans ne sont pas des pronostiqueurs mais des agitateurs. Je voudrais que le garde des sceaux leur rappelle un certain nombre de choses à eux aussi. 99 % des Français ne lisent que les titres des journaux (plutôt que le journal tout entier) et seraient donc forcément convaincus que le précédent date de 2005 si des agitateurs professionnels et qui devraient se faire rappeler un certain nombre de choses ne soufflaient sur les braises.
Les propos sur la responsabilité des familles sont, comme pour les jeux vidéo, de la diversion : c’est évoquer des voies d’évolution législative dans un futur hypothétique alors qu’il est question de savoir quels pouvoirs exécutifs (ce qui n’inclut pas l’action contentieuse civile : voir supra) on emploie et comment pour rétablir l’ordre. Ils sont déjà dans « l’après », pour éloigner l’attention du présent. Et cet après ne répond évidemment même pas à la question des violences policières, puisque les agitateurs professionnels et le gouvernement sont d’accord pour dire que cela n’existe pas.
Contre les agitateurs professionnels, il faut des poursuites pénales pour incitation à la haine, à la suite de propos sur de grands médias, tels que « Ces gens se permettent des choses que les Français ne se permettraient jamais » (comme si les émeutiers n’étaient pas français) et « Pour eux, c’est une guerre de conquête ». À défaut de poursuites pénales, il s’agit de comprendre que ce gouvernement applique la législation de répression des propos haineux de manière discriminatoire en vue d’assurer l’impunité de certains. Que pourrait dire un procureur de la République prononçant le réquisitoire attendu ? Voici. (1) La République française applique le principe de la nationalité par droit du sol, il est par conséquent certain que la grande majorité des émeutiers, dont de nombreux mineurs, sont français. L’auteur des propos se fonde quant à lui, de manière illégitime, sur le droit du sang pour dénier la qualité de Français aux personnes en question. À partir d’une définition fictive, il oppose les comportements de deux catégories de personnes, les étrangers et les Français : ces derniers n’auraient pas de tendances émeutières en vertu de la qualité de leur sang ou d’un attachement millénaire au sol (car ils sont « de souche »). Ceci est de l’incitation à la haine envers les personnes d’origine étrangère, c’est-à-dire « à raison de » leur race, ethnie ou religion, personnes dont la présence serait, à raison de leur race etc., la raison des émeutes, et même la seule raison (la police est hors de cause). La conclusion en est nécessairement que ces personnes doivent être écartées d’une manière ou d’une autre, à raison de leur race etc., dans un souci d’ordre public, car sans ces « étrangers » pas d’émeutes. (2) La « guerre de conquête » est, pour l’auteur de ces propos, une nouvelle conquête de la France par les Sarrasins. Ces émeutes n’ont, pour lui, rien à voir avec des violences policières inexistantes : il s’agit d’un affrontement civilisationnel qui nécessite de la part de la France des mesures défensives contre ces personnes à raison de leur ethnie ou religion, c’est-à-dire des mesures discriminatoires assumées en tant que telles. Sans de telles mesures, la France sera conquise et perdue. Ceci est de l’incitation à la discrimination et à la haine.
(ii)
Sur la responsabilité des parents, il existe un principe de responsabilité civile du fait d’autrui, à l’article 1242 (ancien article 1384) du Code civil : « On est responsable non seulement du dommage que l’on cause par son propre fait, mais encore de celui qui est causé par le fait des personnes dont on doit répondre … Le père et la mère, en tant qu’ils exercent l’autorité parentale, sont solidairement responsables du dommage causé par leurs enfants mineurs habitant avec eux. … La responsabilité ci-dessus a lieu, à moins que les père et mère ne prouvent qu’ils n’ont pu empêcher le fait qui donne lieu à cette responsabilité. » Cependant, la doctrine souligne, pour dire qu’elle n’apprécie pas ce principe, que notre droit ne reconnaît pas un principe de responsabilité générale du fait d’autrui (il n’existe pas du tout en matière pénale : art. 121-1 CP). Après avoir tellement entendu parler de justice des mineurs sans avoir entendu parler en même temps de ces dispositions de responsabilité civile des parents du fait de leurs enfants, je suis porté à croire que les autorités les ont purement et simplement oubliées, et il n’est donc nullement légitime de leur part de les évoquer aujourd’hui, dans le contexte d’une pratique de la justice des mineurs qui l’ignore, ainsi que de l’acharnement de l’État français contre l’autorité dans les familles (qui fait obstacle à une imputation de responsabilité des parents). Mais surtout, puisqu’il s’agit de responsabilité civile, il faut, pour qu’elle soit engagée, des constitutions de partie civile. La justice des mineurs dissuaderait-elle les victimes de se constituer partie civile aux procès ? Ou bien les avocats des victimes oublient-ils de leur dire qu’elles peuvent demander d’engager la responsabilité des parents ? Ou bien la preuve que les parents n’ont pu empêcher les infractions commises par leurs enfants est-elle plus ou moins automatiquement acquise ?
L’État pourrait, j’imagine, se constituer partie civile pour les dégâts sur les équipements publics relevant de lui, mais c’est la portion congrue, la plupart des équipements touchés relevant des collectivités, qui ne sont pas à la botte du garde des sceaux. L’État peut engager des poursuites pénales (l’action publique) sans plaignant mais, pour le paiement de dommages-intérêts aux victimes, il faut un volet civil au procès, c’est-à-dire une constitution de partie civile. Les menaces du garde des sceaux ne pourraient donc, dans le cadre de la responsabilité du fait d’autrui de l’article 1242 CC, se réaliser que si l’État lui-même peut se porter partie civile, ce qui semble impossible pour des dégâts non seulement sur des biens privés mais encore sur des équipements qui relèvent des collectivités locales.
Le dépôt de plainte avec constitution de partie civile implique le versement d’une consignation, plus les frais du procès ensuite (frais d’avocat). C’est pourquoi il existe des dispositifs pour procéder à une réparation en dehors de tout procès, en raison de quoi les victimes s’abstiennent plus facilement de se constituer partie civile : Fonds de garantie des infractions (pour les actes de terrorisme, les infractions ayant entraîné la mort ou une invalidité grave, les viols et agressions sexuelles), mesures indemnisant les commerces vandalisés lors de manifestations publiques, et autres.
Or, « en l’absence de texte spécial (ce qui devient rare), la Cour de cassation, chambre criminelle, déclare souvent l’action de l’association irrecevable devant la juridiction répressive (surtout lorsqu’il s’agit d’association à but désintéressé), au motif que le préjudice causé par l’infraction n’est pas personnel à l’association (le même argument conduit à repousser, sauf texte contraire, l’action civile exercée par l’État, le département ou la commune, dont l’intérêt se confond avec l’intérêt social protégé par l’action publique). Permettre aux associations d’exercer largement l’action civile devant la juridiction répressive (c’est-à-dire de déclencher l’action publique) serait empiéter sur les prérogatives du ministère public, défenseur attitré de l’intérêt général. L’action civile, dans l’aventure, perdrait son caractère fondamental d’action en réparation pour devenir un simple moyen de déclencher l’action publique » (J. Larguier, La procédure pénale, 1994). Sauf texte spécial, pas plus que les collectivités, l’Etat ne pourrait donc nullement se constituer partie civile dans ces émeutes et demander aux parents de payer via l’article 1242 CC. Du reste, l’argument cité par l’auteur, qui écrivait avant l’existence en France d’un contrôle de constitutionnalité, montre assez ce qu’il faut penser de ces textes spéciaux : ils dérogent à des principes fondamentaux, notamment (1) le monopole de l’accusation publique détenu par le ministère public (le parquet) et (2) le principe selon lequel l’intérêt de l’État se confond avec l’intérêt social protégé par l’action publique. Ces textes spéciaux semblent donc parfaitement inconstitutionnels.
Dans Le Parisien du 13 juillet 2023 (pages Grand Parisien), on trouve une interview du procureur général, qui affirme : « À Créteil, le parquet a aussi notifié leurs obligations par écrit aux parents des mineurs déférés devant le juge, pour leur signifier très clairement que leur responsabilité pouvait être engagée. » Très clairement, le parquet parle pour les autres. En tant que responsable de l’action publique, le parquet applique le principe pénal contenu à l’art. 121-1 CP, « Nul n’est responsable pénalement que de son propre fait », c’est-à-dire que les parents sont hors de cause selon ce principe. Le principe civil, qui est que « la responsabilité civile est plus étendue que la responsabilité pénale » et dont une application est l’art. 1242 CC concernant entre autres les parents d’enfants mineurs habitant chez eux, échappe donc à tout pouvoir du parquet : pour être mis en œuvre, ce principe nécessite une action civile (à la différence de l’action publique). C’est un peu comme quand, dans le même numéro du Parisien, le ministre de l’intérieur, au sujet d’un fait divers mortel, annonce, et c’est la conclusion de l’article : « Ce drame ne restera pas impuni. » C’est Mme Irma avec sa boule de cristal qui le lui a dit ? Car, pour ce qui concerne les attributions du ministre, elles ne s’étendent pas jusqu’à punir les crimes et délits, ce qui relève de la justice, alors qu’il est, lui, au gouvernement. Si la personne déférée à la justice est déclarée irresponsable, par exemple, le ministre sera démenti. L’action publique dépend certes du gouvernement, le parquet étant soumis à son pouvoir hiérarchique, mais quand le ministre dit « ce sera puni », il ne peut parler que de ce qui relève de son pouvoir ; or la punition au sens courant, la peine judiciaire, relève de la justice, mais peut-être que l’on peut aussi considérer des poursuites comme une punition en soi, si les autorités savent s’y prendre (« nous l’avons bien puni, nous pouvons à présent le déférer à la justice ») ; il faudrait demander à la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme ce qu’elle en pense. – Et toujours dans le même numéro, un article sur L’IGPN saisie après l’interpellation de Youssouf Traoré, lequel manifestait comme les années précédentes contre la mort de son frère Adama à la suite d’une interpellation policière en 2016.
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La chanteuse Izïa [Higelin] évoque le lynchage de Macron en plein concert, le parquet de Nice ouvre une enquête. (Le Parisien, juillet 2023)
Ce gouvernement ne connaît pas le droit à l’hyperbole et est donc ignorant en matière de liberté d’expression. Le grief, provocation à commettre un crime ou délit, n’est nullement crédible, c’est du flicage gouvernemental de la parole. Des Gilets jaunes ont été relaxés après une décapitation symbolique (voyez mon essai L’art de la décapitation symbolique ici) mais ça n’a pas empêché le parquet du même exécutif bis de traquer une nouvelle violence à pantin plus récente, comme si la justice n’avait rien dit sur le sujet. C’est lamentable.
La provocation à commettre un crime ou délit, c’est l’article 24 de la loi de 1881 sur la liberté de la presse. Cet article 24 précise qu’il faut avoir « directement provoqué » et concerne les propos qui n’ont pas été suivis d’effet. Ici, les propos n’ont certes pas été suivis d’effet (à part le déplacement des gendarmes, mais c’est un autre problème), et pour cause ils ne pouvaient être suivis d’aucun effet, Macron n’étant pas présent au concert, et hors de ce contexte les propos ne peuvent s’entendre comme une provocation, au vu de la forme. Comment cela pourrait-il donc passer pour une provocation « directe » ? Le mot n’est pas là pour faire joli. Une provocation directe est une provocation plus une autre condition, qui fait ici défaut. Une provocation est directe quand elle est susceptible d’avoir un effet immédiat ou imminent. Par exemple, si Izïa Higelin avait dit : « Allez, on casse tout ici », même si ce n’avait pas été suivi d’effet, c’aurait été une provocation directe à du vandalisme car la foule des spectateurs aurait pu en effet tout casser. Mais l’audience n’aurait pas pu agir aux termes de ladite provocation en cause, donc celle-ci, même si c’était une provocation, ne serait pas directe.
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La polygamie existe en droit français
La polygamie est un régime juridique ; ce n’est pas ce régime qui fait qu’un homme a ou peut avoir plusieurs femmes en même temps (polygynie), mais seul ce régime juridique permet à un homme d’avoir des enfants légitimes de plusieurs femmes en même temps. Or la reconnaissance des enfants naturels dans notre droit a exactement cette conséquence, ce qui fait que notre droit reconnaît la polygamie.

