

THE SCIENCE OF SEX: COMPETITION AND PSYCHOLOGY

By Florent Boucharel

The present writings date back from the years 2015-2016 when I did extensive readings on evolutionary biology and evolutionary psychology (EP).

As explained in the chapters, the phrase *science of sex* is the subtitle of one of Dr Robin Baker's books dealing, as their starting point, with human sperm competition and human reproductive competition. The first half of the present book is a discussion of the data and ideas found in Dr Baker's writings (Chapters 1 to 8).

Then we enlarge the scope by discussing other works of evolutionary psychology, beginning with a book on the reproductive value (or absence thereof) of human intelligence by Dr Satoshi Kanazawa (Chapter 9).

From there we discuss differences in current human societies through the lens of reproductive competition, based on a book by Dr Aziz S. Amin (Chapters 10 and 11).

The concluding chapters discuss the limitations of EP as expressed by opponents from the academic field and/or implied by alternative models (Chapters 12 to 14).

Florent Boucharel
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A Discussion of Dr Robin Baker's Child Tax System

In his book *Sex in the Future* (1999), evolutionary biologist Robin Baker (University of Manchester, United Kingdom) advocates a 'child tax system' in which each male genitor, as determined by now available and satisfactorily reliable paternity tests, would be required on a systematic basis to provide financial support for each of his genetic children. Associated with the paternity test technology, which, if generalized, will abolish paternity uncertainty for ever and allow every man to be certain that a child is his, such a tax system would also put an end to the injustice incurred by single mothers abandoned by their mates. The system, in fact, is presented by Dr Baker as an improvement on the child support legislations currently in vigor in the United States and United Kingdom, which have such fairness for single mothers as their aim.

Dr Baker presents his idea as follows: 'The production of a fair formula will need a great deal of discussion and analysis. One principle, though, should be paramount: each of a person's genetic children should be entitled to an *equal share* of that person's income and resources. A proportion of the person's income should be deducted for child support, then divided equally among his or her genetic children.'

As appears from this quote, Dr Baker is concerned about the finding of a fair formula. However, his system is fundamentally unfair.

At first sight, it seems reasonable and fair to ask a male genitor to contribute financially to the upbringing of his genetic children, whether they live under his roof or not, because it would release from an unfair burden abandoned mothers left to cope for themselves. But in fact it is not.

If, for instance, the child has been conceived during an orgy, in the course of which the female was inseminated by several men, is the biological father any more responsible for her pregnancy than any of the other male participants? I contend he is not, because his being the father, in this case, only results from his semen 'beating' the other participants' semen inside the ovary tract, a result for which he cannot be held responsible, inasmuch as that depends on physiological mechanisms over which (we shall assume presently, before presenting a few qualifications) he has no control.

The reasoning can be extended to any situation in which a woman has multiple sex partners (though not at the same time) during any period that leads to a pregnancy.

As a consequence, in order to be fair, a child tax system should require that each and every male mate of that woman contribute to the child's support, since each of them is, in the normal course of events, equally responsible for mating with the woman, and at the same time each of them is equally irresponsible as moral agents (leaving aside notions such as free agent and free will: we consider the man as an agent here when his behavior is concerned –although we agree that this behavior may be entirely determined by previous causes– as opposed to the behavior or performance of his semen inside the tract being concerned) with respect to the outcomes, because as far as their moral and legal character is concerned what occurs inside the

ovary tract between competing semen is out of their reach. None of them as agents can decide the result.

We will now qualify this statement. In fact, according to Dr Baker, a male actually has some control over what happens in the female's ovary tract. This control usually amounts to making sure to have *routine sex* with his partner, so that he keeps 'topping up' the tract with his semen, making it more difficult for a potential lover's sperm to fertilize an egg inside the tract. Some more technicalities, such as the position adopted during intercourse, would also make a difference, but none of them is seemingly efficacious enough to be likely to thwart natural endowment in that respect, i.e. testes' size and functioning. Biological species in which promiscuity, and thus sperm competition, are common, such as chimpanzees and humans, develop bigger testes than species in which male dominance and harems are the norm, like gorillas and orangutans. In the context of promiscuity, penis shape and size would also contribute to remove from the tract the semen already present, and thus weaken this semen's chances to fertilize an egg, increasing one's own chances (in case the semen present is that of another man).

So it seems that all this would have to be taken into account with a view to designing a child tax system. Such a system, then, would have to inquire whether such or such has utilized some technique or other in order to increase the success of his sperm inside the tract and has in this manner slanted the physiological process in his favor, thus arranging for greater chances than his competitors to sire a child during intercourse. Furthermore, natural endowment should be considered as well, in order to determine whether one male did initiate intercourse with chances of fertilization that were objectively greater than his competitors, in which case also the tax burden should lie on him more heavily.

It gets even more complicated when one adds that the woman as well can slant the physiological events occurring inside her tract. *Female orgasm* is described by Dr Baker as a strategy used by the woman to favor the semen of one man, because it would function as a pump sucking up the semen deeper inside the tract, closer to the fertilization zone. A child tax system, in order to be fair, would also have to take that into account and determine whose man, if any, was thus favored by the woman, although I am not quite clear about whether this particular finding should induce the tax burden on that man to be increased or lessened. On the one hand, the woman's orgasm or any other of her slanting operations increases the man's probabilities to sire the child, and so to be consistent the burden should be made heavier, but on the other hand the man is not to pay for another agent's behavior relating to him, and on the contrary as this behavior is to result in loading him with a burden he should be compensated and his burden lessened.

So, leaving the last point aside, it is of two scenarios one or the other. In the simple one, competing males are not responsible for what happens in the ovary tract, the genetic father no more than the other mates, and they are all due to pay the same amount of tax for the child. In the more complex one, each man's financial burden should be determined according to the initial probabilities that each of them would sire the child (if child there must be), given either the techniques they used (position, timing, frequency, etc) or their natural endowments (men with greater endowments would pay more, in that scenario), and also given the slant of the woman's intervention. It is important to note that the result itself, i.e. the identity of the biological father, is not as important as these initial probabilities, because the former is contingent on the

latter, and what provides for the rest –that is, what makes sometimes the greater probability and sometimes the lesser– here is beyond anyone’s knowledge and handling.

In none of both cases, the father alone, excluding other mates, should pay the tax. A man should be required to pay the whole tax if he has been the only mate, or the tax system is unjust to that man. How the tax administration is to know the woman’s number of mates is further to be investigated.

References: The three books by Dr Robin Baker, *Sperm Wars*, *Baby Wars*, and *Sex in the Future*. As a rather original way of scientific vulgarization, these books are interspersed with fictional stories aimed at illustrate the points in case.

ANNEX TO CHAPTER ONE

After I sent Dr Baker the above reflexions through his website (www.robin-baker.com), he kindly wrote me the following lines.

Dear Florent Boucharel

Thank you for sending me this link.

I thoroughly enjoyed reading your thoughts on the matter and seeing you wrestling with all the same ifs-and-buts that I did over 15 years ago now. Your thoughts are intriguing and interesting – but I still think my system is fairer and certainly more workable than yours. After all, paternity (and maternity) can be proved – the number of sexual partners men and women have cannot. (...)

Life would be very boring if everybody agreed.

Once again, thank you for contacting me.

Best wishes

Robin Baker

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Dr Robin Baker's Science of Sex: A Discussion

The Science of Sex is the subtitle of one edition of Robin Baker's work *Sperm Wars* (1996), a book that was followed by the equally important *Baby Wars* (1998) and *Sex in the Future* (1999). This Sex Wars trilogy provides the broad public with tremendous insights on human sexuality and human nature, based on biology research. As works of scientific vulgarization, these best-selling books present the results of decade-long research and publications in scientific journals. With the present chapter, my aim is to discuss a few of these major findings, under thematic heads.

References are:

Sperm Wars (Basic Books, 2006) (further on abbreviated as SW);

Baby Wars (Ecco Harper Collins, 2000) (BW);

Sex in the Future (Arcade Publishing, 2000) (SF);

Sperm Competition in Humans. Classic and Contemporary Readings, by Todd K. Shackelford and Nicholas Pound (ed.) (Springer, 2006) (SCH). This book gathers several papers by Baker and his colleague Mark Bellis, as well as papers from other scholars, some disagreeing with Baker and Bellis, and parts of a 1984 book by the pioneer researcher in the field of human sperm competition, Robert L. Smith (University of Arizona).

Penis Shape and Size

According to Robin Baker, the shape of the human penis has been evolved in the context of sexual promiscuity and sperm competition among our primate ancestors. Not only does it allow insemination, but it also serves as a tool to remove, via intercourse thrusting, semen present in the female's genital tract. This hypothesis has been tested with dildos and artificial matrices, and has been found to be correct. By removing the sperm already present in the tract, the male prevents it from achieving fertilization, while placing his own semen in the tract to the same fertilization purpose, in a process of reproductive competition. In species characterized by *male dominance* (alpha males), sexual competition takes the form of male aggressivity and aggressivity displays, on which outcome depends access to females. In species characterized by *promiscuity*, such as chimpanzees, access to females is open to every male, and sexual competition takes the form of sperm competition. Testes and penis endowments are similar across chimpanzees, and other promiscuous primate species, and humans (the data at my disposal concerns testes and penis size, but I suppose the same must hold true for penis shape as well, otherwise the difference would require some explanation). Sperm competition means that semen from different males compete in the female's tract to fertilize an egg. To that effect, semen does not only contain 'egg-getter' sperm, whose task is to fertilize the egg, but also 'killer sperm', designed to destroy the competing sperm. In order to increase the performance

of one's own sperm, a male would also remove sperm from the tract during thrusting, chances being that sperm is present and that it is another male's. The coronal ridge of the glans is here called to task, and the bigger the penis the more effective the removal.

This is the usual scenario in a context of rampant promiscuity. If we assume, now, that promiscuity is not as rampant among contemporary humans as it was among their primeval ancestors, what the man is doing while having intercourse with his regular partner is removing his own sperm from her tract, most of the time. Even if promiscuity is still widespread, in a monogamous context it is rarer that a woman cheats her regular partner with a regular lover than that she cheats him with one-off lovers, so most of the time it is his own sperm, again, that her regular partner, during their routine sex, removes from her tract. In such a context, if realistic, I suggest that the function of the penis shape as sperm remover might become an hindrance to the male's reproductive success, rather than an advantage, because, intuitively, it seems that such a constant inseminating and removing of one's own semen cannot be as efficient as letting the semen once inseminated doing its job. In any case, if penis shape was evolved in a context of rampant promiscuity, it is reasonable to assume that it cannot be as efficient if the context has changed.

It would be another case of some evolved trait turned dysfunctional in modern societies, such as the preference for fatty food. Such preference was evolved in times when fatty food was scarce (Konrad Lorenz); now that it is abundantly available in Western societies, eagerness for it has provoked an obesity epidemic of tremendous proportion in these countries. If obesity causes one's reproductive stamina to decrease, then obese people, due to their very obesity, will reproduce less than other people, and in this way strong eagerness for fatty food, and/or less capacity to repress it, can be expected to diminish in the population with time.

This is not the case with testes and penis endowment. As explained above, in a context of reduced promiscuity, and of monogamy, human penis shape and size may lower a man's reproductive stamina. Baker has described something along these lines with the notion of 'sperm wars specialist': 'Put the specialist in a monogamous situation and he was sub-fertile. After each insemination, huge numbers of his killers and egg-getters clustered around his partner's egg. Multiple sperm entered the egg simultaneously and dense concentration of deadly chemicals were released by the surrounding sperm hordes. The egg always died. But send his sperm in to battle, and he was virtually invincible.' (SW 160). The 'sperm wars specialist' here described is the man with big testes, able to ejaculate abundant sperm, but the notion applies to men with big and well-shaped penises as well, able to dispose of greater quantities of competitors' semen: in a monogamous situation the latter too are sub-fertile. Whatever the nature of his sperm wars speciality (testes or penis, but I believe the two are correlated), for the individual in question monogamy is fatal.

One solution to his problem is to partner with a promiscuous woman, in whose genital tract he will find plenty of alien semen to destroy, rather than destroying the egg. In such a case, a man would have to be grateful to his wife for cheating him... However, it is more likely that promiscuous women mate with promiscuous men, so his chances, competing with other sperm wars specialists, are even. As a consequence, the best reproductive strategy for such a man remains to cuckold average men. In this way, the genes for big penis size and specific shape do not diminish in the population, although they have become dysfunctional in a monogamous context.

Female Orgasm

Dr Baker describes female orgasm as a strategy utilized by women in order to favor one man's sperm in her tract over other men's. It would function as a pump sucking up the semen deeper inside the tract, closer to the fertilization area. The question is whether the mechanism really is refined enough to be able to discriminate among different sperm. I lack the anatomical and physiological knowledge to answer but such a system strikes me as most efficient and fine-tuning (perhaps too much to be credible), given that it is supposed to have evolved, like penis shape, in a context of rampant promiscuity where females carry the semen of different males inside their wombs most of the estrus time. Is the climaxing woman's tract able to pump up semen from the ejaculating man without pumping at the same time the semen already present there after being inseminated by other men, i.e. without bringing the whole semen present in her tract closer to the fertilization area?

Beside this anatomical question, female orgasm, it must be noted, seems to be one of the most mysterious phenomena in human sexuality. The figures relative to the proportion of women experiencing it during intercourse very much differ across studies: from 30% (Hite, 1970s) to 70% (Saad, 2011), through 50% (Reik, 1940s). Somewhere between 0 and 100%, one could say, trying to make something out of it. As all these different figures have been compounded from questionnaires, this should warn us to be cautious with questionnaire results.

Then, there is the question of vaginal vs clitoral orgasm, of vaginal vs clitoral women, of the G-spot, and so on, all very mysterious, and probably myths. Also associated to female orgasm is the question of female ejaculation, which, for some scholars, does not exist, although some pornographic material is advertised as depicting female ejaculation (so-called 'fountain women').

Oral Sex

In the paradigm of evolutionary biology reproduction is central, so one wonders what can be, in a reproductive strategy, the purpose of such practices as oral sex which cannot bring about fertilization. According to Dr Baker, fellatio serves two aims for the woman: via sensory clues (smell, etc), it provides her with information 1/ regarding the man's health; 2/ regarding his faithfulness: she can detect if the penis has penetrated another vagina. Cunnilingus serves the same both aims for the man.

In this context, it is surprising that men have not evolved a dislike for fellatio, nor women a dislike for cunnilingus, since both practices expose them to negative consequences in terms of reproductive success. Knowing that a woman, via fellatio, may find him unsuitable for sex due to the state of his health, or unsuitable as a long-term partner because of his cheating, a man should search to avoid fellatio, if only to keep the possibility to cheat on the woman if it ever occurs to him that it would be to his advantage. Similarly, the woman should wish to avoid cunnilingus being performed on her.

When absence of dislike already comes as a surprise, then the fact that fellatio is mostly men's demand, and cunnilingus women's demand, clearly runs contrary to Dr Baker's view. These findings are found in Eysenck, *Sex and Personality* (1976): based on questionnaires, 'Women have done almost four times as many [sexual] things they disliked as men. ... Only just over 50 per cent of females who had indulged in fellatio actually enjoyed doing so.' See also Eysenck & Nias, *Sex, Violence, and the Media* (1979), referring to the same study: 'Men nearly always enjoyed what it was that they had done; women in nearly half the cases said that they had not enjoyed various activities, including *fellatio* and '69', although they had participated in them. Thus if showing oral sex in films has the effect of making this type of activity more popular among males (who after all constitute the majority of viewers of pornographic material) it would also have the effect of forcing many women to take part in *fellatio*, say, in order to please their men, while in reality disliking it.' It does not make sense that males evolved a taste for a practice, fellatio, that is contrary to their reproductive goals, and women a dislike for so useful a tool. Either Eysenck et al.'s finding is wrong (because of unreliable questionnaires), or it must be Baker's view.

Clear Eyes

[This section is based on a misunderstanding, as I understood 'fair eyes' when reading 'clear eyes.' The annex to this chapter resolves the misunderstanding. I am nonetheless leaving the section here, both for the data it contains, which will later serve again, and for the sake of the discussion on fair eyes in a later chapter (ch. 12), as it turns out that fair eyes are a favorite trait, just like clear eyes, and chapter 12 brings the explanation that I am asking here in this section.]

People's taste for other persons as sexual mates is based on fairly objective traits, and, unfortunately for some, beauty is not so much in the eyes of the beholder than part and parcel of the genetic endowment. What constitutes beauty is now better known by biologists; it is an aggregate of various traits that supplies the prospective mate with proof both of health and sound genetic endowment.

Dr Baker describes male beauty as follows: 'The features she [a woman] finds most attractive are clear eyes, healthy skin and hair, firm buttocks, a waist that is about the same in circumference as his hips, shapely legs, broad shoulders, quick wit and intelligence. She is also attracted by symmetry in his physical features.' (SW 145). He describes female beauty in that way: 'In addition to shape, men all over the world also respond strongly to clear eyes, healthy hair and skin, and the shape of the face, particularly its symmetry.' (SW 148). In another passage he writes: 'In addition to shape, men all over the world also respond strongly to clear eyes, healthy hair and skin, and the symmetry of the face and body – again, features that are strong indicators of health and hence fertility.' (BW 131).

Why clear eyes are indicators of health is beyond my understanding, and Baker offers no explanation. Clear eyes are depigmented eyes [no, it is fair eyes that are depigmented, see the above said in brackets heading the present section], the clearer the more depigmented, with blue as the most depigmented, then grey, then all shades of green and brown to the most

pigmented black eyes. Why the lack of iris pigment should be a sign of health I have no idea, and the assertion is puzzling, since in the world population at large pigmented iris is the rule rather than the exception. In fact, clear eyes are rare, they are virtually inexistent outside the white, so-called Caucasian race, which includes Arabs and Indians of India, among whom clear eyes are rare too. [Clear eyes are opposed to dull eyes and it is in that quality that they are an indicator of health. The reason why fair eyes are preferred –see ch. 12– is because they do not conceal emotions as measured by the iris' dilatation, as much as darker eyes.]

The fact is even more puzzling when another trait ascribed to women's preferences is dark skin: 'at high cycle fertility...women...prefer relatively high degrees of male skin coloration (melanin- and hemoglobin-based) that may correspond to elevated testosterone' (Randy Thornhill, SCH viii). Mention of high cycle fertility refers to the two dimensions of women's sexual choice, one being the search for a long-term partner, based on social status evaluation, and the other, the search for genetic endowment. Women's physical preferences are relevant for the second dimension, which is here in consideration. On the one hand, Baker contends that women in search of genetic endowment prefer clear eyes, and on the other hand SCH affirms they prefer dark skin. A clear eyes-dark skin combination is even rarer than clear eyes alone, because in general clear eyes are correlated with fair skin. Moreover, if dark skin is an indicator of testosterone level, is it also the case with clear eyes, or rather are dark eyes not a sign of elevated testosterone?

Male Masturbation

In the context of sperm competition, male masturbation would be useful as it disposes of decaying sperm, allowing the man to inseminate more efficient semen during intercourse. Obviously, inseminating old or decaying sperm into the woman's tract is taking the risk to have one's semen underperform against competing sperm. Thus, while the common discourse on male masturbation is that the practice ends with the advent of 'normal' sexual activity, i.e. with sexual intercourse becoming regular, for Dr Baker it remains a normal activity during the whole life, when circumstances require it, that is whenever the time span between two copulations exceeds a few days. Surveys would show practice to be consistent with this, with very few men masturbating when copulations are close enough, and masturbatory activity increasing together with time span between copulations.

Dr Baker explains the popular prejudice existing against masturbation in spite of the current medical discourse (as opposed to the medical discourse of the past) that masturbation is sound and healthy, as a form of mischievous hypocrisy, by which some men would try to dissuade others to masturbate while masturbating themselves whenever required, in order to get an edge on reproductive competition.

Since I have noted elsewhere (in my French writings) the existence of such a popular prejudice, and attempted to explain it as sound, I feel bound to further explain my point of view here. My advocacy of temporarily restraining masturbation is aimed at young people having no sexual activity yet on a regular basis. I contend that masturbation places them on a physiological plane of permanent satiation, and inappetency, no matter how frustrated these young men may feel psychologically, whereas the tension created by unreleased libido provides surrounding

females with the necessary clues that the male is 'on' for sex; thus, a little repression would lead to quick regular intercourse, whereas by masturbation intercourse may be delayed indefinitely, as happens, I am told, with many students. I must admit, though, that in the final analysis such repression, if maintained, might lead to greater sexual indifference (and, in extreme cases of abstinence, to impotence), and thus impair reproductive success; it's a double-edged weapon.

This being said, Baker himself provides me with a situation where masturbation restraint may be advisable: the 'sperm wars specialist' (see 'Penis Shape and Size' above). As the specialist's sperm is, in a monogamous situation, usually too powerful an engine of destruction so that deprived of sperm competition it attacks the egg itself, advising that man to inseminate not the best of his sperm, but some old sperm matured in his ducts, perhaps is a way to offer him better reproductive prospects with his partner.

Ejaculates

One of the most intriguing findings of Dr Baker's research relates to the quantity of sperm ejaculated; it offers not a mechanistic view but a teleological one (based on final causes). Let the reader be reminded that final causes were excluded from scientific discourse by Enlightenment philosophers as being theological in nature, but they have come again in full force with Darwinian theory. In Baker's view, the volume of sperm ejaculated into the genital tract depends on what volume is necessary to 'top up' the woman, that is on the optimal volume needed in the context of sperm competition.

This has been a major surprise for me because I had relied on a mechanistic view of ejaculation to describe routine sex as a female strategy to detect man's unfaithfulness (the theory is sketched in one of my poems in French). According to that view, which I will have no difficulty to discard if necessary, when a man and woman are engaged in routine sex the woman's interoceptive sense allows her to evaluate the volume ejaculated, which only depends (correcting for health states) on the time elapsed since last ejaculation. So, if these mates have had fairly regular intercourse twice a week, for instance, for weeks or months, there can be no way for the man to ejaculate outside his mate's tract without her noticing it at the next intercourse, due to the unusually low volume then ejaculated. As a consequence, routine sex would be the woman's demand, as a mate guarding strategy.

Dr Baker proves me wrong on that point. If he is correct, the volume ejaculated inside a partner's tract depends on two factors: 1/ time elapsed since last intercourse; and 2/ time spent together since last intercourse. If the partners spent most of the time together, the semen will be scarce because the man has little doubt of the woman's faithfulness – his estimate of the chances that she cuckolded him is low, and accordingly he can be economical with his sperm. On the contrary, if they have been separated for a long time, his doubts about possible sperm competition will be raised, and the quantity ejaculated increased accordingly. So man ejaculates not the quantity that is available but the quantity that is optimal (with a view to facing sperm competition).

There is apparently a problem with the intuitive, mechanistic discharge model: Spermatic ducts are always full, sort of (SW 32). ‘Even the greatest rate of insemination (9.3 million sperm/h since last in-pair copulation when couples spend less than 25% of their time together) is lower than the estimated rate of sperm production by humans of 12.5 million/h (Johnson et al. 1980). It thus seems likely that observed insemination rates are in some ways strategic and not simply due to physiological constraint.’ (Baker & Bellis, SCH 166). This fact seems to imply some inconsistency in Dr Baker’s picture. As we saw in the previous paragraph, the man is willing to be economical with his sperm, because there would be an energetic trade-off implied. But does it make sense at all to talk of energetic costs of ejaculation, and of a trade-off, in such conditions of superabundant sperm production? In the normal use of the notion, a trade-off implies some scarcity, whereas we are faced here, seemingly, with such abundance that one cannot even talk, in the proper sense, of discharge nor of replenishing.

Moreover, given the trade-off, masturbatory ejaculates would be less abundant than copulatory ejaculates (Pound, Shackelford & Goetz, SCH 19), a fact that has been validated experimentally. The makeup of these different ejaculates would also be different: ‘The percentage of motile and morphologically normal sperm also is higher for copulatory ejaculates (Sofitakis & Miyagawa, 1993)’ (SCH 19). Given that, in Dr Baker’s view, morphologically normal sperm is made of ‘egg-getter sperm’ whereas ‘killer sperm’ displays other shapes, how is one to explain that there is more ‘egg-getters’ in a masturbatory ejaculate, when they can meet no egg?

Conception Via Sperm Warfare: The Figures

Under the present head I have a slight problem with the figures advanced by Dr Baker. ‘A recent study in Britain concluded that 4 per cent of people are conceived via sperm warfare. In other words, one in every twenty-five owe their existence to the fact that their genetic father’s sperm out-competed the sperm from one or more other men within the reproductive tract of their mother.’ (SW 47). Elsewhere, Dr Baker considers this figure to be valid world wide: ‘Humans, with 4 per cent or more of children conceived via sperm warfare’ (SW 349).

Then, he also writes the following: ‘World wide, it has been calculated from studies of blood groups that about 10 per cent of children are in fact not sired by the man who thinks he is their father. This is also the level found in industrial Western societies.’ (SW 63-4), and: ‘Internationally, child support agencies are reporting a non-paternity rate of about 15 per cent.’ (SW 64), a figure he repeats elsewhere: ‘Of the men who resist supporting a child on the grounds of paternal uncertainty, 15 percent have their doubts verified by DNA fingerprinting.’ (SF 26). SF also confirms the 10 percent figure based on blood group studies. Baker does not mention the 4 percent figure again in that book.

Let us stress that the number of people ‘conceived via sperm warfare’ must be higher than the number of people ‘not sired by the man who thinks he is their father’, because, among the former, there must be some who were sired by the man who thinks he is their father, that is to say, sometimes the woman’s long-term partner, or husband, must have won the warfare and, even though he was cheated that had no consequences on paternity issues. At least in some cases – even if Dr Baker shows that a woman is more likely to cheat on her partner while in

estrus. So, a 4 percent figure of people ‘conceived via sperm warfare’ in a population hints at a lower number of people not sired by the putative father in that population, say 3 percent. Given the 10 percent figure from blood group studies, there cannot be a world wide 4 percent figure of people conceived via sperm warfare, because 10 percent of people not sired by the putative father hints, in turn, at a higher figure for sperm warfare, not a lower one.

Lastly, it must be stressed that the 10 percent figure is not an indicator of women’s unfaithfulness, which must be higher than that, because cheating does not always lead to pregnancy, presumably.

A way to reconcile these figures would be to state that British women are much less promiscuous than women in the world at large – 3-4 percent vs 10 percent. In this way John Stuart Mill would be proven wrong when he attributes our judgments on women to prejudice: ‘An Oriental thinks that women are by nature peculiarly voluptuous...An Englishman usually thinks that they are by nature cold. The sayings about women’s fickleness are mostly of French origin.’ (*The Subjection of Women*). As far as French women are concerned, a Frenchman is not so blinded by prejudice when he considers them to be fickle (*souvent femme varie...*), because more than 10 percent of them cheat on their legitimate partners, whereas an Englishman may have some reasons to say English women are cold, as sperm warfare is seemingly much less frequent among them.

Cuckoldry

Mainstream biology has been proven wrong by the sperm competition model in one important respect. Biologists relied on a model of ‘differential parental investment’ which they believed entitled them to conclude that men are promiscuous and women monogamous. Robert L. Smith has pointed out that such view lacked consistency: ‘The biological irony of the double standard is that males could not have been selected for promiscuity if historically females denied them opportunity for expression of the trait. If strict monogamy were the singular human female mating strategy, then only rape would place ejaculates in position to compete and the potential role of sperm competition as a force in human evolution would be substantially diminished.’ (SCH 68).

It leads us to the model I call, from a graphic word used by Dr Baker, the *springboard model*: ‘Once a woman has a long-term partner, the costs of one-off intercourse are reduced as long as her infidelity remains undetected. Her long-term relationship provides a springboard from which to exploit the genetic benefits of one-off sex with selected men without risking too much. She does not have this freedom, however, if she does not have a partner.’ (SW 260-1)

According to this model, a woman is not much interested in one-off sex while single, because she may end up with a pregnancy and no male support to help her bear the burden. As a single woman she is in search of a lasting relationship, and this can easily lead one to think women are monogamous. However, once she is engaged in a lasting relationship, the ‘springboard’ is provided for extra-pair or one-off sex, with which she may improve her reproductive success with mates whose genes appeal to her. As a single person the woman seeks a partner, and her choice relies on status more than good looks; if need be, she will sacrifice the

latter. As an engaged person she seeks lovers and genetic endowment (BW 131). The genetic traits in favor have been described under the head 'Clear Eyes' above; important notions here are testosteronization (pretty obvious) and low fluctuating asymmetry (a mark of sound genetic endowment).

The broad outlines of the model being given, some details seem to border on inconsistency. If BW 131 is correct ('In choosing a short-term partner for sex...looks are much more important'), the following needs some explanation: 'Some men have a higher chance of being cuckolded than others, and it is those of low wealth and status that fare worst. ... Moreover, the men most likely to cuckold the lower-status males are those of higher status.' (BW 44-5) Both statements (BW 131 and BW 44-5) are rather intuitive, I should say, but still they do not fit quite well taken together. Why short-term lovers –the men who cuckold other men– are mostly of high status, when high status is what is demanded of a long-term partner? Even if all women cannot have a high-status long-term partner, what benefits does one-off sex with a high-status man provide them with? Material benefits of some sorts, perhaps, but what about the genetic benefits implied in the springboard model? Or is it compulsory sex, with pressure being exerted by a socially dominant individual on a socially dominated individual? Similarly, it is not clear why women partnered with high-status men would not be likely to cuckold them with low-status men if the latter possess the required genetic endowment. Baker explains that these women have much to lose if their unfaithfulness is detected, but that means, then, that sacrificing good looks while choosing a long-term partner is detrimental, because in reality the springboard is not even provided.

As we will see later, extra-pair sex with a high-status man also involve an important negative effect for low-status families (see 'Optimizing vs Maximizing').

One way to interpret these findings is to assume that high status and genetic endowment are correlated. In alleged meritocracies, this certainly makes sense, except that the relationship between male beauty and capacity is far from obvious and, in the above list of favored genetic traits, some are intellectual and no doubt contribute to status, while others seem to be completely independent from social capacity.

Homosexuality

Most homosexuals are bisexual: 'The vast majority (80 per cent) of those who have sex with men also have sex with women' (SW 284) and, according to Dr Baker, they reproduce fairly well, somehow better, in fact, than heterosexual men. This means that, among the 10 percent of children not sired by the man who thinks he is the biological father (see 'Conceptions Via Sperm Warfare'), a good deal were sired by bisexual homosexuals, and this, in turn, supplies the clue as to the major engine of the prejudice against homosexuals. Baker has provided part of the explanation with respect to that prejudice by stating that homosexuals are perceived to be significant carriers of sexually transmitted diseases. This implies that they are perceived as being especially prone to promiscuity, and I contend that the basis of the prejudice lies on this latter notion. In fact, monogamous men are prejudiced against all promiscuous men, and if another group, beside homosexuals, were perceived to be promiscuous, then individuals from that group too would be prejudiced against.

It is not simply ideology. I believe people are indifferent, that is tolerant, toward anybody whose behavior does not affect them in any way, even if they do not share their ideas nor understand their way of life; if they are not affected, they simply shrug shoulders. But in the case of promiscuity a monogamous man is at risk. He may have to raise a child not his own, and raising a child is not simply an idea, it means sweat and blood.

One may contend that genes are not the important thing in raising a family, that it is transmitting one's values that matters, and that people adopting children of different genetic makeups are proof enough of it. Adoption is certainly worth mentioning in that respect, but on the other hand it is known that foster children and children of recomposed families suffer much more abuse, rape and murder at the hands of their caretakers, with whom they are not related genetically, than biological children at the hands of their biological parents. It is my prediction that, with the development of the reproduction technologies described by Dr Baker in *Sex in the Future*, adoption will progressively disappear. What will remain is benevolent adoption of babies from deprived or chaotic countries or environments, by well-off parents who already have biological children, but people who cannot reproduce through intercourse will favor technologies that ensure they can raise children of their own genetic makeups, when these technologies become available.

The prejudice against gay men, and promiscuous men, will end as soon as paternity uncertainty ends, with the generalization of paternity tests. Pro-gay rights legislations passed in Western countries, like gay marriage, gay adoption, etc, tend, in the meantime, to tame bisexual gays in ways of life more acceptable for the monogamous citizen – if they are not intended as make-believe, that is.

Rape

In relative terms, rapes conduct more often to pregnancy than routine intercourse. Various hypotheses are discussed by Dr Baker as to the possible reasons, but there is one element he does not discuss, which should make rape much less likely to lead to pregnancy, contrary to the data: 'Insufficient lubrication prior to coitus, as in rape, may result in trauma to the vaginal wall with the discharge of blood into the vaginal cavity. Blood serum contains the spermatotoxic protein gamma globulin and often sperm antibodies as well.' (Robert L. Smith, SCH 105). The reasons that make rape relatively more prolific must be powerful enough to counterbalance these chemical hindrances – and such powerful agency by necessity must entail some strong evolutionary benefits, otherwise it would not have developed as a powerful agency in the first place.

Pornography

Whereas in BW Dr Baker contends that modern societies 'are rapidly becoming, probably the most puritanical and repressive of all' (BW 235), he has this to say in his introduction to the 2006 edition of SW: 'The current batch of American under-thirties has even

been branded 'Generation Porn'. Sex is everywhere, from Web to television, and it would be encouraging to think that it reflects or at least precedes the development of the healthy, informed, and nonjudgmental attitude that *Sperm Wars* is intended to promote.' (SW xxiii). Although this is more the expression of a wish, it seems that, in the meantime, Dr Baker has decided to take things at face value.

There is no reason to think that a 'Generation Porn' would be endowed with more healthy attitudes toward sex than the preceding 'Generations Bordello', and Dr Baker must be aware that a great number of serious studies have dealt with the many unhealthy aspects of pornography.

Although I believe censorship is hardly enforcable in mass media societies (I do not even believe it is enforced with respect to pornography in regimes like China, and I am told, also, that it is not difficult for a Westerner to find child pornography, although it is prohibited), I see nothing healthy about the genre. Pornography was first legalized in Denmark in the 1960s with the blessings of the head of the national clergy. This brave man was convinced in his deepest inner self, based on what data I wonder, that prohibition was the problem and that, once legalized, pornography would cease to appeal to anyone. I am making fun of this man but it is not fair because pornography was legalized in every Western country shortly thereafter, clergymen or not, and this has more to do with the nature of mass media as an externalized central nervous system (McLuhan) than with anything else – but this is not the subject either. As to the clergyman's or similar ideas, here is what Dr Dolf Zillmann has to say: 'The finding of growing boredom, in contrast, seems in conflict not only with the increasing commercial success of pornography (a success attesting to insatiable interest) but with theoretical considerations also ... Massive exposure to standard erotic fare fosters acceptance of not-so-standard forms of pornography. Massive exposure to coital scenes led to diminished reactions of repulsion to sadomasochistic activities and acts of bestiality.' (*Connections Between Sexuality and Aggression*, 1998)

Interestingly, Dr Baker provides the following figures concerning prostitution: 'In the United States in the 1940s, 60 percent of men had inseminated a prostitute at least once in their lives by the time they were about fifty. In the UK in the 1990s, 10 percent of men had paid for sex at least once in their lives by the time they were about fifty.' (SF 279-80). Although the figures are taken from two different countries, if we assume similar conditions in both, they indicate a sharp decline. Clearly, prostitution has receded, and it has not been replaced by more healthy attitudes toward sex, but rather by the 'commercial success of pornography.'

Dr Baker's views on another phenomenon should have prevented him, I think, to ever express positive appreciations of videotaped pornography. As a biologist he knows that in nature the viewing of copulation triggers copulation readiness; the instinctual message is: 'When you see copulation, take immediate action toward copulation.' He explains it in the context of sperm competition. Now, what happens in movie theaters, when people are exposed to sex scenes (as is well known, they have become utterly banal)? The excitement is repressed, energy cannot be released, the spectator stays quiet and silent. The public is compelled to remain impassive in presence of excitatory stimuli. This is what I call *silver screen conditioning*. The message is: 'When you see copulation, do not make a move.' (It is important to note that the difference between real life and media is immaterial; as Reeves and Nass have shown, 'the

media equation' is 'real life = media'. This is another occurrence of an evolved trait turned odd in our society; see 'Penis Shape and Size'.)

It is the same with hardcore pornography when viewed in groups. The boys just sit and watch, perhaps exchanging a few words. When they consume pornography alone in their bedrooms, it is for masturbatory purposes; then the message becomes: 'When you see copulation, beat off.' I do not perceive any likelihood of better reproductive stamina in any of these instances.

A last word on erotica consumption. It is assumed, since Kinsey, to be men only. Recent studies, however, report identical excitatory responses in men and women (Zillmann). Maybe one day we will find that women never ever turned their back on pornography when alone. I believe that the puzzling variety of answers across questionnaires about women's behavior is one dimension of what Baker calls 'female crypsis.'

Optimizing vs Maximizing

At first sight, the demographic transition undergone by Western countries these last decades, with incipient population decline, runs contrary to the idea that people are genetically programmed to enhance their reproductive success. Discarding family planning and contraception as the causes of this shift, for, according to him, such practices have existed from time immemorial, Baker outlines a history of humanity in three stages. In their condition of hunter-gatherers, humans lived in small nuclear families, and it is only with the advent of agrarian societies and a carbohydrate-rich diet inducing massive rates of infant death, that families expanded, both as a way to compensate the death toll and to get more hands for the manual work in the fields. With the advent of new technologies, nuclear families would return to former small sizes: 'The reduction in family size to the levels found in modern industrial societies was not due to improved contraceptive technology, but to women subconsciously planning smaller and smaller families in response to the improved survival prospects of their children.' (BW 141).

Dr Baker explains this in more detail with a distinction between maximizing and optimizing the number of one's offspring. Typically, an individual projects himself on the next two generations, children and grand-children. It is not clever to make many children if they cannot be offered survival conditions that ensure they get a fairly good number of offspring themselves, die too young, or contract disabling diseases, or become vagrants, and so on. Baker tells us the fictional story of two women from a similar social background growing up as friends in the same environment. One made more children than the other but in the next generation she was the loser because her children did not fare as well as her friend's. The former maximized the number of her children and she lost, the latter optimized that number and she won. All this is very nice, but it deserves further review.

Dr Baker believes that world population will stabilize in the future when people learn to optimize, rather than maximize, the number of their children, that is, when their survival prospects are improved. He states that the average number of children will be two – the magic number that is to stabilize world population. Such optimism I deem unfounded, as things are.

If material conditions are the one factor on which depends the reproductive success of one's children, as Baker seems to imply (for instance, nowhere is he saying that the number of parents at two individuals puts an upper limit to the optimum, although he writes that being a single parent is a disadvantage [I am mistaken here: Please proceed to the Addendum at the end of this chapter for a correction]), people who can offer greater material conditions to the children they raise, will make more children, insofar as it raises their own reproductive success without impairing the reproductive success of their offspring. In other words, if the optimum number of children for a middle-income couple is two, the optimum number for a couple earning twice that income, able to proffer double wealth and material conditions to their children, would be (assuming, provisionally, a linear function) four. On the lower side of the scale, people are then expected to make no more than one child, and deprived people to make no children at all because they cannot provide them with material conditions worth the name.

As to deprived people, their tendency is to make many children, and this has been the case from the remotest antiquity. The word 'proletarian' derives from the Latin *proles*, which means 'offspring'; the proletarians are those who make many children – and we do not call proletarians the rich, in spite of Dr Baker. It is not necessarily because poor people do not understand how to use condoms or cannot control their sexual urges, although these defects certainly are to be taken into consideration. When a woman is hopeless as to her prospects and cannot expect bright days in the future unless a miracle takes place, then she might be willing to maximize the number of her children anyway, and place them 'in the hand of God' (this is a metaphor I use: she does not have to be a believer), because, mind the logic, a miracle is more likely to occur for one out of x children than for one child alone. This is what Dr Baker calls low survival prospects, but we see such low prospects in the midst of rich nations, with a so-called underclass of unemployable people on the increase everywhere.

Furthermore, when a high-status man impregnates a low-status woman (see 'Cuckoldry'), he contributes to widening the gap between the actual and optimum number of children in this family. Taking no financial responsibility for his act, he impairs the future prospects of these children. Even if a high-status male multiplies *ad infinitum* the number of such extra-pair children, it does not improve his reproductive success in regard to the number of children he is raising. If below optimum, it remains so, and his female partner bears the consequences: she fails to reach her optimum.

Several studies tend to show that high-status families are below reproductive optimum. In fact this has been the contention of many scholars since Galton's, and as Dr Baker must know of these studies I am surprised he is not discussing them, since they run contrary to his own predictions. In his book *Dysgenics* (2011), Dr Richard Lynn provides a table (by Lynn & Harvey, 2008) with fertility rates and IQ by country for year 2000, showing an inverse relationship between number of children and IQ at international level. Whether IQ measurements are relevant in the discussion I do not decide, but I perceive a robust correlation between these IQ measurements and GDPs, so there would be also an inverse relationship between fertility and wealth. Worse-off individuals and nations make more children than better-off; this must involve some consequences upon the survival prospects of all.

Promiscuity and Culture

Optimizing rather than maximizing may require some insight connected with genetic endowment, and so it cannot be expected to occur, in the absence of compulsion or incentive, in the population as a whole.

Insight may also lead some people –males– to evaluate uncertainty, and its cost, associated with the parenting effort that would be required of them, as too great, and consequently to relinquish all attempts at paternity (some others, only at parenting). There is a trade-off here, which has been finely expressed by Ferdinand Lundberg and Marynia F. Farnham, who, although they make allegiance to the exploded psychoanalytic school and have, besides, remained rather inconspicuous names, deserve to be quoted: ‘The cultural formula is: In proportion as one has children, all other things being equal, one will be handicapped in the competitive struggle for ego recognition, prestige and economic well-being. The psychic formula, however, is: In proportion as one feels oneself unable to have children, for whatever reason, one is handicapped in obtaining psychic gratification and general psychic stability.’ (*Modern Woman: The Lost Sex*, 1947).

It exists, I contend, a relationship between culture and promiscuity, but not with the causal direction usually thought of. It is not culture that debases mores, as claimed by philosophers like Ibn Khaldun or Rousseau, it is debased mores that enrich culture, because, with increased paternity uncertainty, more males relinquish all efforts associated with procreation. Where women are tightly controlled, males are relatively sure about paternity, and culture does not progress.

ADDENDUM

Under the head ‘Optimizing vs Maximizing’ I have misstated one of Dr Baker’s ideas. I wrote, in parentheses, that according to him a single parent is at a disadvantage. What he says, in fact, is that, although the data show that single mothers’ children fare less well, the cause has nothing to do with singleness but with material conditions, and that single parents with financial means do no worse than couples having the same means.

My misstatement being corrected, I would like to add that one more insightful view of Dr Baker’s allows me to buttress another of my points. Under the same head ‘Optimizing vs Maximizing’, I have attempted to cast doubt on his optimism as to world population stability in the future. Assuming there is no upper limit to reproductive optimum, and that as long as social classes exist there will be different reproductive optima, I have written that a population poise supposes that the lowest classes make no children. The case, however, is even worse because, as Dr Baker shows, a single child is not even an option, for no one. A single child strategy is not viable, for if something happens all is lost. The lowest number of children for a woman (for a couple, if you like) is two. In consequence, the average number required for a poise is the same as the lowest possible number. Such conditions make an equilibrium most unlikely, I should think.

(Years ago, when I was, briefly, a student in economics, a professor tried to explain to his students –who had asked nothing– why it was rational to make only one child, as he had done. He explained that he could spend more on his child’s head and thus offer him greater material conditions and prospects. I thought the same as Dr Baker then, that his was a very risky strategy, but of course I kept it to myself, because it would have been grim to hint at accidents possibly occurring to his child – besides, he may have resented my contradicting him. However, as he was making his point, he looked at me, and he must have perceived my incredulity, and resented it, because at the end of the session he scored my essay rather meanly. He was only one of several economics luminaries I have had the chance to meet in my life, another one being a professor who wondered aloud why old people saved money, he just had no idea.)

ANNEX TO CHAPTER TWO

With Dr Baker's permission, here are his remarks on the chapter.

Dear Florent

Wow! I never expected a treatise of that length! It is very gratifying though to know that my books gave you so much food for thought and the motivation to put those thoughts down in writing. I appreciate that your main incentive was to point out what you consider errors in my logic and to put me straight, but that's fine by me. I'm sure you won't be surprised though if I say I still stick to my original viewpoints.

I'm afraid I cannot possibly answer your points one-by-one. I have a book deadline to meet and need all the writing time I can get. So I'm going to take the easy way out. Most of the problems you raised Mark Bellis and I did consider during our early working out of human sperm competition and I think you'll find they have been addressed in one or other of my/our books and early papers. In fact, most of our arguments along with tables, diagrams and references are in the academic book – HUMAN SPERM COMPETITION – on which Sperm Wars and Baby Wars are based. Everything there is presented in much greater detail.

After years of wrangling with the publishers of the hardback version we last year gained the rights to publish this book in a cheap digital form.

As just one example from the many points in your blog covered in that book, the following is the way we reconciled a 4% conception rate via sperm competition with a 10% non-paternity:

“8.4.1 What proportion of children are the result of sperm competition?

“Another way of approaching the question of the pay-off to sperm competition via live births is to examine the frequency with which children are not the genetic offspring of their putative father (= cuckoldry; = paternal discrepancy).

“Medical students are usually taught that the level of paternal discrepancy is 10-15% (Macintyre and Sooman, 1992). The figure of 10% is most widely used in DNA studies and is quoted in standard genetics textbooks. As Macintyre and Sooman (1992) point out, however, rather few of these studies have been published in any detail and there is a real need for proper investigation using modern techniques. A number of estimates of paternal discrepancy are given in Box_8.4 together with a brief discussion of some of the problems associated with such investigations.

“Estimated levels range from a low of 1.4% for Caucasians in Michigan, USA, and 2% for the !Kung to a high of around 30%. In Britain, values range from about 6% in a large urban community in London to around 30% for the inhabitants of tower blocks of flats in both northwest and southern England.

“Of course, paternal discrepancy should equal EPC rate, not double-mating rate. Not all EPCs are double-matings (i.e. within 5 days of the last or next insemination by the female's primary partner). According to our survey, only about 50% (Box_8.3) of EPCs not involving contraception during the fertile phase of the cycle are double-matings leading to sperm competition. This suggests that approximately 50% of all cases of paternal discrepancy in Britain are children conceived to the sperm of an extra-pair male after competition with sperm from the primary male partner.

“If we take the most conservative measure of paternal discrepancy for Britain (6%; Box_8.4), which is also the one based on the largest sample, we obtain a figure for children conceived to the extra-pair male following sperm competition of about 3%. However, this should be an underestimation of the incidence of sperm competition for in addition to occasions on which the EPC male wins, there should be other occasions on which the IPC male wins. It is tempting simply to double the figure of 3% (to 6%) on the grounds that EPC and IPC males have equal chances of winning. This, however, is not necessarily the case.

8.4.2 Which male does best: first or last, extra-pair or in-pair?

“One of the few clear conclusions so far to emerge from studies of sperm competition in other animals is that which male wins is not random but depends very much on mating sequence and time interval between matings. In insects, with the exception of for example bees and silkmoths, the last male to mate with the female before her eggs begin to travel down her oviduct invariably has by far the greatest probability of fertilization (Parker, 1970a). That the same is true for birds was first noticed by Aristotle about 2300 years ago (Payne and Kahrs, 1961) and has since been well established (Birkhead and Møller, 1992). For example, the proportion of eggs fertilized by the last male to mate with the female (= P2) is about 80% for the dung fly, *Scatophaga stercoraria* (Parker, 1970b) and 70-80% for the zebra finch, *Taeniopygia guttata* (Birkhead et al., 1989). Across species in birds, the figure is relatively constant at about 80% (Birkhead and Møller, 1992). The precise figure, however, is influenced by the time interval between matings.

“Generally, studies of the chicken, turkey, mallard and zebra finch show that last male precedence is the rule if copulations are separated by 4 h or more. If the copulation interval is less than this, paternity is proportional to the number of sperm inseminated by each male (see review by Birkhead and Møller, 1992).

“Mammals show a much less clear-cut influence of mating order. The first male to mate has the advantage in house mice, the last male in prairie voles, with no clear order effects in laboratory rats or deer mice (Dewsbury, 1984). Equally, there were no order effects with swine. In most cases, however, much depended on the time interval between first and second males as it does for birds.

“In mice, if the time interval is very short (minutes), the second copulation seems to be spiteful and the female may not conceive at all (section 6.4.1). Thereafter, as time interval increases, the proportion of eggs fertilized by the first male increases. Longer time intervals also favour the first male in hamsters, *Mesocricetus auratus* (Huck et al., 1985). In 13-lined ground squirrels, *Spermophila tridecemlineatus*, short time intervals swing paternity strongly in favour of one or other male, medium time intervals in favour of mixed paternity, and longer time intervals in favour of the first male. Success of the second male depended critically on the length of copulation (Schwagmeyer and Foltz, 1990).

“Poultry breeders have long interpreted the second male advantage shown by birds in terms of stratified sperm storage (see review by Birkhead and Møller, 1992). Females are receptive well in advance of ovulation and the sperm are stored in blind-ended storage organs. Sperm from later males could thus be nearer the entrance (and thus nearer the exit) than sperm from earlier males. On a ‘last in, first out’ principle, storage organs could promote a second male advantage. However, recent but limited empirical evidence provides no support for the stratification model and Birkhead and Møller (1992) suggest that limited sperm storage coupled with some form of sperm displacement may be a better explanation. This is similar to the explanation preferred for insects (Ridley, 1989; Parker et al., 1990; Rothschild, 1991).

“Whatever the eventual explanation for the fairly consistent pattern of mating precedence in birds and insects, it seems clear that there can be no simple story for the much more variable outcome

in mammals. This outcome probably depends on some variable interaction between sperm number (Chapter 9), sperm removal (Chapter 6), and sperm fertilizing capacity (Chapter 12) as well as on a variety of female influences ranging from sperm retention (Chapter 10) to selective sperm passage through the female tract (Chapter 4).

“Female humans are continually receptive and sperm are fertile (5 days) and alive (8-10 days) a lot longer than the optimum time from insemination to fertilization (2 days). The scope for sperm-sperm and female-male interactions in influencing the outcome is considerable. Essentially, however, we have as yet no idea for humans or other primates whether there is a first or last male advantage, if either. Our prediction would be that in humans, all else being equal, it is the last male to inseminate a female near to 2 days before ovulation who has the advantage.

“Even given an asymmetry between males depending on mating sequence, the relative probability of fertilization by EPC and IPC males may depend on the number of sperm they each ejaculate (Chapter 9) and the number of sperm from each that the female retains (Chapter 10). We have already given some indication that the female may favour the EP male through her differential use of contraception (sections 8.3.3 and 8.3.4). She may also favour the extra-pair male in her timing of EPCs and IPCs relative to the timing of ovulation (Box_6.10). In Chapter 10, we present evidence that the female may even favour the EP male via the relative number of sperm she retains from each.

“Given the possibility that EP males may have a higher probability of fertilization during sperm competition, we may not be justified in calculating the proportion of children conceived via sperm competition by simply doubling 3% to obtain 6%. The figure may be lower (but more than 3%). For the moment, however, we shall be conservative and assume a figure of only 4%.

“Both our Nationwide survey, therefore, and blood group studies, suggest that over the last few decades in Britain at least 4% of children (but perhaps as many as 6-12%) have been conceived to a sperm that has prevailed in sperm competition. In other words, in any group of 25 people, at least one owes their existence to the fact that their father’s ejaculate had the characteristics necessary to outcompete that of another male. Such a level of reproductive pay-off is relatively hefty in evolutionary terms. In Britain, at the present time, therefore, sperm competition is still a major source of selection on the human sexual programme. Whether the figure is higher or lower in other communities elsewhere remains to be determined.”

And I think you’ll find an equally detailed discussion of most of the points you raise.

One of your points I do need to address here: your discussion of ‘clear eyes’ in attractiveness. One or other of us has misinterpreted the meaning of clear eyes by the original researchers. This was not our work. We took it from the literature and it never occurred to us that the authors might mean iris pigmentation because, as you say, it makes no sense. We assumed (and maybe the authors say – I can’t remember) that ‘clear eyes’ referred to the eye-whites and the clear membranes such as the conjunctiva. These make much more sense as a measure of health. Similarly, the skin pigmentation work you refer to is again not mine and I don’t remember (but these days my memory isn’t perfect) ever quoting it.

I hope this and HUMAN SPERM COMPETITION answers a few of your points, but I don’t expect to convince you on them all.

3

Dr Robin Baker's Science of Sex II

In his reply to the previous chapter, Robin Baker pointed out three blunders I made, and for the rest invited me to read the book he authored with Mark Bellis, *Human Sperm Competition: Copulation, Masturbation and Infidelity* (1995), which presents the results of their research in a more systematic and detailed fashion. I then ordered the book and read it. The present chapter is the result. It acknowledges that my non-specialist objections on particular points of Baker's theory have found satisfactory answers in *Human Sperm Competition*, and further expatiates on a few inferences I draw from the theory.

The abbreviations for the book titles have been maintained from the former essay. Further on *Human Sperm Competition* will be found abbreviated as HSC. I am using the first hardback edition by Chapman & Hall, 1995.

Before I tell how my objections and doubts have been satisfied, one word on the blunders Baker pointed out in his reply. They are three: one on method, two on content.

On the method, I had made some quotes from the collective work *Sperm Competition in Humans* (SCH) without naming the authors of the passages quoted. I have since then corrected the slip in the text itself, acknowledging the fact in a further comment.

Another blunder I made, this time regarding the content of Baker's books, was that I construed the expression 'clear eyes' as meaning 'fair eyes'. Hence my questions on this point lacked an actual ground, because they were based on a semantic misunderstanding. Baker made it clear in his reply.

The second blunder on content concerns some figures on the extent of human sperm competition. Baker answered with an extensive quote from HSC showing that my remarks, here again, were groundless. I shall deal with this point more at length, explaining the nature of my blunder, under the head 'Conception Via Sperm Warfare: The Figures'.

I shall now proceed with exposing how my objections have been answered, under the same heads, or subtitles, used in the precedent chapter.

Female Orgasm

Under this head I did not exactly make an objection; it was rather a request for more information. I requested, namely, a confirmation that via copulatory orgasm, as an operation by which the outcome of sperm competition can be slanted, women really manage to discriminate between sperm from different men, and how. I think I now understand the mechanism better.

As I understand things, female copulatory orgasms discriminate between different sperm as long as these are not mixed in one and the same *seminal pool*. It means that copulatory orgasms are of no avail when two successive copulations by two different men occur before a *flowback* (expulsion of sperm from the female's genital tract) has resulted from the first

insemination. Quoth: 'The overall pattern is more or less as predicted by the 'upsuck' hypothesis, female orgasm in some way assisting uptake of sperm from the seminal pool before the remainder of the sperm are ejected in the flowback.' (HSC, 236, box 10.5). & 'Orgasm facilitates the passage of sperm from the seminal pool to the cervical mucus. It could do this in one or all of several ways: (1) dipping the cervix further into the seminal pool; (2) promoting greater mixing of cervical mucus and seminal fluid; (3) lengthening and/or increasing the number of seminal projections into the cervical mucus; and/or (4) lengthening the time that the cervix is dipped in the seminal pool.' (HSC, p. 237). Thus, the mechanism of female copulatory orgasm in any case applies to a *given* seminal pool, and would not be able to discriminate among the content of that pool if composed of various sperm.

As a result, the example I took in chapter 1 of an orgy is an instance where a woman would be least likely to slant the result of insemination, if male participants inseminate her by turns without interruption, because orgasm upsuck would then apply to a multifarious seminal pool in which the favorite male's semen is mixed with other males' sperm. Admittedly, such configuration is likely to be relatively rare (even in the context of an orgy flowbacks may occur between several inseminations if the participants make breaks; quoth: 'Median time to emergence of the flowback after male ejaculation is 30 minutes with a range of 5-120 min' [HSC, 45]) and copulatory orgasms remain useful in the majority of cases of sperm competition, the woman favoring the sperm contained in a homogeneous seminal pool although she may at the moment of orgasm shelter sperm from another insemination in her cervical crypts and/or oviducts (these latter sperm being not impacted by orgasm).

If this is so, it raises a question: What sperm does the penis, in its function of sperm-removal tool, actually remove? Is it only 'flowback sperm', so-called, forming a seminal pool in the upper vagina and due to be ejected very soon? Quoth: 'Backward and forward thrusting of the penis during copulation, combined with the shape of the penis in a distended vagina should successfully remove a major part of any soft copulatory plug or liquid seminal pool.' (HSC, 171). It thus seems that the answer to the question is yes. However, 'The greater the suction, the greater the chance of removing cervical mucus with *perhaps* [my emphasis] older sperm from the cervix itself.' (HSC, 170, box 6.13). I stressed the word 'perhaps' because it makes a big difference whether the penis can remove sperm already stored in the cervix or not; for if it cannot, it then applies to present seminal pools merely, that is, in the context present-day customs, it never serves most of times. In the absence of a seminal pool, if we keep assuming that the penis can't remove sperm stored in the cervix, it can still remove sperm, but it is flushed-out sperm mixed with leucocytes that invalidate them and cells and debris from the female (HSC, 40, box 3.5), that is, sperm unlikely to perform fecundation anyway – sperm that is being removed by the female tract itself (after flowback), without the help of a 'piston penis'.

As we saw from quote HSC, 45, in general flowbacks occur fairly quickly after intercourse. The probability that another intercourse occurs before flowback should in normal circumstances be deemed small as a consequence, and if it is merely 'flowback sperm' that is exposed to the action of the piston penis, it makes the latter's usefulness rather low. This way open to men to slant sperm competition seems fairly inadequate, whereas the corresponding way open to women, their copulatory orgasms, is effective in most cases and can be foiled by very specific contrivances only (above mentioned), which anyway imply a degree of sperm competition.

The picture I have just outlined, based on my understanding of the facts, is that of a radical asymmetry between women and men in regard of their respective physiological endowments for slanting sperm competition. HSC has provided me with a confirmation that female copulatory orgasm can discriminate among different sperm, in the limits above presented, and with the insight that the limits of the piston penis' usefulness are important. Of course, we should not disregard the fact that Baker & Bellis consider that the penis can 'perhaps' remove sperm from the cervix as well, but they give no clue as to how that would happen.

Oral Sex

My objection, under this head, was that the passive gender in an act of oral sex (men in the case of fellatio, women in that of cunnilingus) should have evolved a dislike for the practice, and that, not only have they not, but according to a study by Eysenck et al. it is the active gender that generally expresses a dislike (a few men say they dislike cunnilingus, nearly all women say they dislike fellatio). As Baker, in his trilogy, presents oral sex as a way to collect information (on health and faithfulness), I could have replied to my own objection myself: since it is about exchange of information, if one partner is eager to get information the other may as well be willing to provide it. Which is what Baker & Bellis say: 'The main feature of overt orgasms is that the climaxing individual is giving their partner information. ... If the transference of this range of information is sufficiently advantageous to both male and female, it could be enough evolutionarily to maintain the observed behaviour. The main topic of theoretical interest then becomes the optimum ratio of cryptic to overt orgasms for male and female performers and observers.' (HSC, 115).

For the man, giving information is a straightforward transparency operation, but Baker & Bellis hint at another set of motivations for the woman: 'As far as the climaxing female is concerned, the interplay of cryptic and overt orgasms is a major part of her strategy to confuse the male over levels of sperm retention. Allowing the male to observe a non-copulatory orgasm could be an important element in this strategy.' (HSC, 115)

As to Eysenck et al.'s study, the fact that primates and other mammals practice oral sex (HSC, 101) may cast some doubt on the validity of its results. Otherwise, it could be that the dislike is true generally and that oral sex is performed because of its strategic importance albeit not accompanied by pleasure, but such a view would run contrary to the notion that evolutionary useful acts are predicted to be pleasurable for their performers.

Ejaculates

Under the present head I expressed some doubt on the likelihood of an energetic trade-off model, based on the testes' huge sperm productivity. It turns out the trade-off considered by Baker is not necessarily that which I thought of: 'Such restraint over the number of sperm ejaculated when the risk of sperm competition is low implies that males suffer some disadvantage if they ejaculate too many sperm on any given occasion. Two main disadvantages

have been suggested: (1) that the sperm and other constituents in an ejaculate are costly to produce (Dewsbury, 1982); and (2) that, in the absence of sperm competition, the more sperm a male ejaculates, the lower his chances of fertilizing the egg(s) of the current female (Baker & Bellis, 1993).' (HSC, 24). So, the idea of an energetic trade-off is credited to Dewsbury, whereas Baker & Bellis, quoting their own research, hint at another phenomenon, namely that too many sperm may act as a chemical weapon against the woman's eggs.

My objection taking sperm productivity into account (for the figures, see ch. 2) could still hold against Dewsbury's model, but it is limited to sperm and I have nothing to say about the productivity of 'other constituents' of an ejaculate, i.e. the seminal fluid, which may be much more costly to produce and spend than sperm themselves.

Baker & Bellis do not formally reject Dewsbury's model and in at least one occasion they seem, on the contrary, to rely on it: 'The disadvantage of small testes should be that their possessors produce fewer sperm per day and thus, all else being equal, must either: (1) ejaculate less often and, on average, inseminate older sperm; or (2) ejaculate as often and, on average, inseminate fewer sperm.' (HSC, 111). Such calculations are based on a cost analysis of sperm production and seem to imply the validity of Dewsbury's energetic trade-off as regard sperm themselves.

Furthermore, the idea that sperm competition itself has been selecting big testes for their capacity to produce more sperm and thus give their owner an advantage in sperm competition, fits the energetic model. There is, seemingly, no way to escape the model, no matter how the figures of sperm production make the very idea of a trade-off along energetic lines puzzling.

Accordingly, Baker & Bellis's careful conclusion is not surprising: 'At present, we cannot determine the relative importance of this factor [optimizing sperm numbers according to levels of sperm competition] and any constraint on sperm numbers due to the cost of producing ejaculates (Dewsbury, 1982). Inevitably, ejaculate cost must have been a factor in the evolution of species-specific rates of sperm production. It is possible, however, that at least for mammals ejaculate cost could be less important than the factors discussed here in influencing restraint over the number of sperm inseminated on any given occasion.' (HSC, 227).

Conception Via Sperm Warfare: The Figures

Baker has replied to my remarks under this head by quoting extensively the relevant passage from HSC (Annex to ch. 2). To put in a nutshell I had lost sight of one important possibility, which Baker & Bellis put thus forth: 'a female may be paired to one male, conceive by another (via infidelity, and perhaps sperm competition)' (HSC, 200, box 8.4). When writing that part of my essay, I fancied that no woman would conceive via infidelity without sperm competition, because I overlooked the possibility of breakdowns in routine sex. Given that 'On average, human pairs engage in IPC [intrapair copulation] at median intervals of about every three days' (HSC, 206), and that Baker & Bellis retain a life expectancy of sperm inside the female tract of 5 days (they present this figure as a conservative estimate), in the normal course of events no female infidelity goes without sperm competition. But one must not rule out the

possibility that some men may be crazy enough to neglect routine sex with their long-term partner, or that ‘accidents’ can occur, and that a woman might cheat her partner when he has been lying on a hospital bed for weeks. Because of that blunder of mine, the discussion of the figures in ch. 2 is rather meaningless.

With this head, the discussion of the strictly biological aspects of Baker’s writings is through. I have acknowledged my mistakes as far as I could detect them and I now proceed to some social considerations, where I find my opinions are more solid.

Pornography

HSC does not deal with pornography as such. However, some passages confirm my point of view as to how the phenomenon should be construed. As previously stressed, Baker has evolved from the idea that Western societies are becoming increasingly puritanical to the more optimistic view that the current ‘generation porn’ represent an emancipated and enlightened brand of humanity. My own view is that neither picture is correct, but rather that there is a risk that we become increasingly incapacitated sexually. Puritanism has sometimes been construed as a way to cope with sexual inadequacies, but as an ideal of strict monogamy it cannot, except in marginal cases, be interpreted as such, and Puritans of the past are known among other things for their philoprogenitiveness.

From the evidence of SF 279-80 I have stressed that prostitution in the West has been declining. (Although he provides the figures on which I rely, Baker himself does not construe them in this way; he just offers them as evidence of prostitution in the USA and UK.) In the past, particularly when brothels were legal and widespread, many a young man would have his first sexual experience with a prostitute (of which scores of novels attest, as well as sociohistoric literature). These data make one conclusion pretty tempting, I should think, and HSC buttresses it: ‘Inexperienced male monkeys and chimpanzees, when encountering a receptive female, become strongly sexually aroused but are often so awkward at attempting intromission that the mating is never completed. Adults who have been denied the opportunity to gain sexual experience when younger are often unable to copulate (Ford and Beach, 1952). A level of experience with other males would be of obvious advantage in increasing the success of an individual’s first mating opportunities with a female. There may well be some advantage in using other males as targets for practice rather than females. Females, because of the risk of conception, may less often than males be prepared to allow males the opportunity to experiment.’ (HSC 118). Needless to say, Baker & Bellis generalize the findings to humans. In a nutshell, they credit homosexual practice with the same ‘educative’ virtues evidenced by prostitution in the past.

So, if it is true that prostitution has declined (and let the reader be reminded of recent legal developments in some countries, where paying for the services of a prostitute has been criminalized; this criminalizing occurring at a time when prostitution has already sharply declined, law-makers cannot refrain the lyrical flows of their eloquence against such a barbarous exploitation of women, failing to see, or rather feigning not to see the far more impressive figures of pornography), if, I say, prostitution has declined, and homosexuality has

not increased in due proportion, of which I am not aware (and Baker says it remains stable), certainly one should expect that more men stay virgins for want of experience at the right time.

Do contemporary mores compensate for that? At least two elements should induce us to doubt it. First, feminism has been a strong deterrent to male urgency, as well as the most recent forms of democratism: the vanishing of an utterly dependent servile class has narrowed opportunities for well-off young men to inseminate female servants with the certainty of avoiding unpleasant consequences. Some stories by a Maupassant, for instance, cannot but be met with incredulity nowadays, although they may be more realistic in the context of his time. Second, the mediatic buzz about AIDS, now receding, has certainly played a deterrent role. I have shown elsewhere (in my French writings) that the treatment of this sexually transmitted disease by the French media in the nineties was disproportionate. I have shown that, at the apex of the AIDS razzmatazz, an heterosexual individual was 55 times more likely to die in a car accident, and 10 times more likely to die assassinated; and that drugs-addicts were far more likely to contract AIDS via intravenous injection by contaminated syringes (one out of 25 drugs-addicts was then expected to die from AIDS) than gays via sexual intercourse. The buzz must have had a powerful deterrent effect, especially since the only known way to prevent AIDS apart from abstinence, the condom, could never be deemed 100% safe. On this last point, I reminded my reader of the failure rates generally acknowledged, but HSC brings forth even higher figures: ‘condoms retain a high chance of fertilization. Although, when used properly, the risk of conception with a condom may be as low as three pregnancies per 100 woman years, in normal usage the risk varies from 5 to 30 pregnancies per 100 woman years. This is up to about half the risk experienced by a fertile couple with no protection.’ (HSC 178). A risk of conception means a risk of contracting STDs as well. With such a miracle weapon against AIDS –and AIDS, for a long time, has meant certain death at the end of ghastly sufferings– I can’t see many a reasoning mind taking the risk lightly, especially when the horrors of the disease are blasted in your ears daily, year in year out.

In such a context, what can pornography do for us? I think I know what it can for its producers, but for the viewers it cannot serve the same ‘educative’ purposes as homosexuality (according to Baker) and/or prostitution. At best it remains theoretical knowledge. At worst, as stressed by sexual ‘educators’ of the past, like Wilhelm Reich, it generates anxiety. Young viewers, especially, might be led to see themselves as inadequately equipped for sex, both physically, with respect to penis size, comparing with the performers’ penises, and psychologically, perceiving that they cannot be callous enough to engage in sexual games.

This is my own interpretation of what Lundberg & Farnham (already quoted) call, with their psychoanalytic lens, an ‘extensive psychological castration of the male.’ It stresses the dismantling of sex-educative institutions for men and their replacement by a counterproductive substitute.

Incidentally, contrary to common belief, pornography may well be consumed by women. I have already hinted, in my previous essay, at studies cited by Zillmann concerning physiological reactions to erotica. In the current belief, held including by some evolutionary psychologists, such as Gad Saad, holder of a chair on ‘Darwinian consumption’ (*sic*) at Concordia University (Montreal, Canada), pornography appeals to male psychology, while women are interested in romance novels à la Barbara Cartland (*The Consuming Instinct*, 2011). No doubt men find no appeal in romance novels, but women’s taste for such books is only one

side of the coin. They appeal to a woman as seeker of a long-term partner, seeker of the gentleman who will help her raise her children and who therefore must be faithful, caring, protective, considerate, earn a lot of money, and so on. But remember that the gentleman in question is a springboard for the woman as seeker of gene-providing lovers (springboard model). In this latter state of mind, any reason preventing pornography from appealing to her may be illusory.

In conclusion, the situation, I believe, is like the French saying '*Ce sont ceux qui le font le moins qui en parlent le plus*' (the less they do it, the more they talk about it), but at the collective level. The fact that 'sex is everywhere, from Web to television' (Baker, in his 2006 introduction to SW) is not reassuring, actually, even from a non-Puritan point of view. To make it clear from an analogy the current tendency, in Hollywood movies, to depict heroines as women of action coping with obstacles with their muscles, is handy. An alien from Mars who would watch such movies would get a very inaccurate picture of our reality. The motives behind such a distorted picture I can only surmise: on the one hand the need to keep making popular action movies for cash, on the other hand the moral imperative to give women a 'fair' share in our symbolic representations.

But I am no prophet of doom and I bring, instead, a message of hope. Hags can take the place of whores! There is already, I am told, a significant trend in pornography depicting female performers far past the age range usually appealing to men in search of mates. Old women, the refuse of sex life, would be attractive enough to inexperienced men (inexperienced past experiencing age) who badly need training to improve their self-confidence – the training men used to have with prostitutes. If one of these men can get his hands on such a one, and they are easily available for the prurience never dies, he will give her the time of her life, being like a starved beast of prey and at the same time having developed severe, and interesting, deviations – imaginations. Hence, the refuse gets the best.

Optimizing vs Maximizing

On this topic I will be discussing also a source of Baker & Bellis, namely *Despotism and Differential Reproduction. A Darwinian View of History* (1986) by Laura Betzig.

My objection was to Baker's prediction that world population will stabilize in the future (at 11 billion individuals around 2100, a fairly precise prediction). HSC details his arguments: 'There is a close relationship (a) between family size and life expectancy ($P = 0.008$, controlled for the geographical areas illustrated) which is not significantly different from the relationship (b) between family size and use of modern contraception ($P = 0.004$).' (HSC 182, box 7.4). Baker & Bellis's point here consists in discarding modern family planning as having played a motor role in the demographic transition. According to them, contraceptive methods 'enhance psychological predispositions and strategies evolved much earlier in mammalian history' (HSC 183), and life expectancy is the key factor. As this factor increases in developing countries, birth rates will diminish, as they have diminished in Western countries with the increase of life expectancy, to stabilize at the number of children that optimizes reproductive success – a number that according to Baker fixes at replacement level, i.e. two children per woman.

This model relies on differential observations about developed and developing countries, rich and poor, and the same observations seem to hold for individuals inside countries: 'A first attempt to model the situation was made by Rogers (1990). The conclusions were that at the lower wealth ranges of a population, long-term fitness is maximized by using the currently available wealth to maximize family size. The more wealthy ranges, however, gain relatively little from increasing family size and thus may benefit, in long-term reproductive success, from limiting family size so that those few offspring raised are reproductively more successful. As Rogers recognizes, the conclusions are sensitive to a number of assumptions. At the very least, however, the model shows that the reduction in family size during the demographic transition could well have been a response that actually increased individual reproductive success.' (HSC 183).

Interestingly, these views seem to buttress my own linguistic argument on the etymology of the word 'proletarian', an argument I used against Baker's prediction. My construction of this word derived from Latin *proles*, i.e. offspring, as meaning those who make many children, is not partaken as such by linguists or Latinists. Generally speaking, the word is construed as meaning those who possess nothing but children, or in the classic Latin-French dictionary by Gaffiot, '*qui ne compte dans l'État que par ses enfants*' (whose worth in the state depends entirely on his children); but both constructions imply some maximizing reproductive behavior, because if one's wealth, or worth, equals one's number of children, then one will maximize one's number of children, for in the case of wealth or worth a distinction between optimizing and maximizing is irrelevant.

So, both Rogers and I agree that lower classes make more children. However, Darwinian theory, as Betzig explains, predicts that the more wealthy and powerful one is, the more women he will inseminate: 'As a rule, the evidence is overwhelming that rich and powerful men do enjoy the greatest degree of polygyny cross culturally' (Betzig, 1986, p. 34), and she quotes Darwin: 'Polygamy...is almost universally followed by the leading men in every tribe.' Baker & Bellis, quoting another book by Betzig, write the same, adding some historical restrictions: 'the advent of agriculture and animal husbandry (c. 15 000 years ago) seemed to herald a universal swing in the human population towards polygyny and extreme reproductive inequality between males (Betzig, 1988). ... The critical factor in this swing seemed to be the clumping of resources associated with agriculture and husbandry and the inevitable increase in differences between males in the resources they could accumulate, defend and offer.' (HSC, 140).

Both sets of data seem hard to reconcile. Why didn't polygynous men of the past optimize their reproduction and why, instead, did they make more children than proletarians? Had they not a higher life expectancy than the subjected populations? If I had read Betzig before, to be sure, I wouldn't have written that proletarians have been making more children 'from the remotest antiquity' on (ch. 2) without further consideration.

Betzig circumscribes yet another time limit in the validity of her 'Darwinian view of history': 'A decline in both despotism and differential reproduction seems to coincide with industrialization.' (Betzig, 1986, 97). She hypothesizes that, in a context of technical specialization, a decrease in differential reproduction is a necessary concession from the ruling classes to the useful specialists (p. 104). In the same way that, at the beginning of the twentieth century, some intellectuals warned that Darwinian survival-of-the-fittest mechanisms did not function any longer and there were no natural checks to the proliferation of defects in industrial

societies, which were therefore doomed to see the burden of defective individuals increase, we here have another cesura in our Darwinian view of history across the industrialization line, with differential reproduction reversing from the haves to the have-nots. (Or is it the same idea?)

First of all, the data presented by Betzig might not impair my position as to the behavioral characteristics of proletarians in the remote past as much as one may think, because rich men's polygyny increases also poor women, their servants and others' philoprogenitiveness, whereas rich women's reproduction may remain suboptimal.

(As a parenthesis, I would like to expatiate on this point by dismissing a possible objection to my statement in chapter 2 that a rich man who cuckolds a poor man contributes to widening the gap between the actual and optimum number of children in that poor family. The objection would be that the poor women having routine sex with their poor partners anyway, children will be born even without a rich man cuckolding the poor man. This is not quite so simple, because a woman is more likely to become pregnant in the course of extra-pair copulation [EPC] than of IPC: 'The more fertile the female (i.e. in terms of stage of menstrual cycle and type of contraceptive), the higher the proportion of copulations that are double matings.' [HSC, 198] & 'Women are significantly more likely to use contraception during IPCs than during EPCs, particularly double matings.' [*ibid.*] & 'There is a clear increase in the incidence of EPCs, including double-matings, when the risk of conception is greater.' [HSC, 197, box 8-3]. Statistically, my remark must hold.)

Second, one should perhaps distinguish, even before industrialization, between sex warlords and bourgeoisie. Sex warlords, due to their military way of life, might have had a life expectancy that was hardly higher than their subjects'. As a result, they too maximized their offspring. Bourgeoisie, on the other hand, is the shrewd and prudent class; they optimize. Baker & Bellis talk about those suboptimal men in sperm competition who are most willing to take a wife as a long-term partner and as a consequence must specialize in parenting skills. What are these parenting skills if not the self-same skills that enable men to provide for the needs of a family in the long run? This is bourgeoisie biologically speaking.

Finally, even before industrialization, there must have existed in the very social structure checks to extreme reproductive inequalities. Especially in despotic societies, the social pyramide (▲) is the inverted picture of the alleged reproductive pyramide (▼). In the Ottoman Empire, at the passing away of the sultan, one of his numerous children was placed on the throne at the end of shadowy court intrigues (in which women would play a great part) and all his siblings exterminated, so the sultan's reproductive success must be regarded as not so very great after all. In Western feudal aristocracies, among which property was indivisible, only the first-born male inherited the land and title. The second-born was destined to become a sterile cleric in the Church, the other ones making a career in the military or disappearing altogether from the scene, in the commonalty. Property being indivisible, feudal interests are disconnected from the number of children; besides the biological urge, there is no social incentive to make many children. Conversely, among classes or under regimes in which conveyances are divided, the interest of the family is clearly to reduce the number of children; dynastic (family) success is impaired by transmission to many siblings.

These several considerations tend to promote the idea that data from primitive tribal societies as regards reproductive inequality ought to be taken with a pinch of salt when discussing other types of societies, civilizations namely, however remote.

I shall now proceed to a few other considerations that the reading of HSC has newly triggered.

Ejaculation

Under the head ‘Ejaculates’ in my previous essay, I described a theoretical model of female mate-guarding I had designed based on a number of assumptions, particularly concerning male ejaculation. The idea was that the volumes ejaculated by a man depend only on time elapsed between ejaculations, and that this allows the woman, in a context of routine sex, to detect, through interoceptive evaluation of the volumes ejaculated, unfaithfulness (or cryptic ejaculations outside her). I have found in HSC that such an assumption (volumes depending on time) has been made by biologists too. Baker & Bellis call it the ‘physiological constraint model’: ‘This model assumes that, at each IPC, males inseminate all of the stored sperm mature enough to be ejaculated. On this model, number of sperm inseminated at each IPC will be a function of time since last ejaculation and the rates at which sperm mature (minus those which are shed or destroyed.’ (HSC, 208). They dismiss it, based on laboratory evidence, and propose instead their own ‘topping-up model’, of which I have already talked.

However, another consideration could save my own model, because I have discarded it first-hand on a certain misunderstanding and confusion. What the topping-up model is dealing with is the number of sperm ejaculated, not the volume of seminal fluid, and in my own story the important factor is the volume of seminal fluid inseminated in the genital tract, because it is that volume that would be sensed, and evaluated or measured, by an hypothetic interoceptive sense of the woman (not so hypothetic, perhaps, because we will all agree that the genital tract is sensitive; the question is whether its sensitivity would allow the woman to perform the evaluation I surmise).

HSC confirms that the volumes of seminal fluid and the volumes of sperm are two different stories: ‘In principle, a female could also gain from stimulating her partner to ejaculate without copulation in order to observe the amount of seminal fluid ejaculated by the male. This could give some information on how long it is since last ejaculated. However, as seminal fluids recover relatively quickly (Mann and Lutwak-Mann, 1981), the female could probably only tell whether the male had ejaculated in the previous 12 hours or so. Within the context of her partner’s infidelity, however, this could still be useful information.’ (HSC, 115) Baker & Bellis come to the same idea of female mate-guarding through information got from the amount of seminal fluid ejaculated, but they apparently do not think such estimates possible inside the female genital tract: the information has to be gathered from ‘ejaculates without copulation’, be it through masturbation or fellatio. This being said, they explain how such information from seminal fluid works, and what kind of assumptions it allows.

Perhaps the data could be further refined and correspondences established between volumes of ejaculated seminal fluid and sperm, to see if any correlations exist (if such studies exist, I pray the reader to forgive me for being a layman.) Let us assume for a moment a strong correlation between the amounts of both elements, seminal fluid and sperm, during ejaculation (although we’ve just seen the story is different for each). That would allow my model to stand on its feet, beside the topping-up model, with only one further restriction. If the volumes

ejaculated depend on (1) time elapsed since last ejaculation and (2) time spent together by the partners (topping-up model), the woman could still detect the man's infidelity via estimates of the volumes he ejaculates in her tract, thanks to an hypothetic interoceptive sense, if the partners have regular routine sex and if at the same time they have adopted a regular, routinized way of life by which they spend the same amount of time together from one week to the other. Such conditions being fulfilled, any variation of the volumes would warn the woman that something is afoot. A process of extreme routinization in every aspect of life is implied in successful mate-guarding.

Male Opportunism

Under the head 'Male Masturbation', I expatiated on some views I had published elsewhere, the gist of which was that the young man refraining from the practice would be sending signals to women that he is sexually 'on'. 'So what?' a biologist might reply, 'Don't you know that males are urgent and females coy (HSC, 13, box 2.7)? Even if the woman gets signals, being coy she can't make nothing of it. A male sending signals, that makes no sense; the man just takes action.' It is true that such views of mine at first sight do not quite fit the urgent-coy dichotomy, nor the more popular one of active-passive. To my mind, the male is an *opportunist*: not so much active as 'activated'. Truly active men are sexual predators and rapists; the bulk of us is not in search of preys but of opportunities. Absent certain signals, the male remains passive. I contend he can force the woman to send signals to him, by pleasing her. The idea of opportunism is of course implied in male urgency, but it qualifies it. Unqualified urgency is predation.

Another way to get at the idea of opportunism is, indirectly, through the notion of coquettishness and of a coquette. The word has fallen into desuetude, but Henry James's stories and novels, for instance, give us a clue as to its importance in not so remote a past. A coquette was not a fallen woman yet but she could not be regarded as a lady any more. In a nutshell, the coquette would send deceptive signals to opportunist men, she would 'activate' them for the mere fun of it, and that was a disgrace.

A man who gets signalled at by women everywhere he goes is what I shall call, for the sake of simplicity, an alpha male. Beta or zeta males often enough admit they suffer from woman's choosiness (a consequence of her coyness), but they know what an alpha male is; when they spot one, they do their best to become one of his close acquaintances. It's the best way they can find to get access to women, because an alpha male is bound to create much disappointment among the feminine crowds that signal at him madly (there is just not enough time in a man's life to enable him to lavish his assiduities in all directions whence the signals come), and, either by despair or resentment, many broken hearts will let the zeta boys bring them a much-needed solace. It's the well-known story of Elvis's hairdresser and of the inconspicuous bassist of the Rolling Stones. (I hope these examples will not appear too trivial. I know many a savant book on the market proffers abundant trivialities, but I have always thought they come from the editors of the publishing house's staffs rather than from the authors themselves.)

Penis Size

But let us return to our favorite subject, on which Baker & Bellis provide us with new insights.

Quoth: ‘when the lineage leading to the genus *Homo* began to evolve large brains and hence large vaginas, selection was imposed, via sperm competition, on males with larger penises.’ (HSC, 174) Here I perceive some circularity in the reasoning. Baker & Bellis say that large penises are better able to remove alien sperm from large vaginas. As we have seen, a large penis is a significant advantage only in the context of rampant promiscuity, for we have expressed some doubt on the possibility that the penis be able to remove sperm stored in the cervix (although Baker & Bellis say it ‘perhaps’ can). If it cannot remove cervical sperm, its action is limited to *flowback sperm*, so-called, that is sperm forming a seminal pool in the upper vagina, after insemination and before flowback. Which means, its utility is limited to cases of intercourse occurring shortly after another intercourse has taken place with the same female. Thus, a significant selective pressure towards large penises could not exist outside rampant promiscuity (perhaps circumscribed to limited mating seasons). But rampant promiscuity, like among chimpanzees, goes with large penises. Chimpanzees have the highest penis size to body size ratio among the principal primate species; are their brains particularly large? 275-500 cm³, compared with small-penis gorillas: 340-752 cm³, please find the brain size to body ratio for both, and tell me which species has the greatest. If chimpanzees do not have large brains, large brains are not causative in any sense among them.

Another insight I would like to discuss under the present head: ‘If penis size is an important factor in sperm competition, it would be surprising if males and females did not have some reaction to penis size. First, males should perceive males with a penis larger than themselves as more of a threat if they ever show a sexual interest in the same woman. Second, females should prefer to mate with males who will give them male descendants with a penis more efficient at removing a rival’s sperm.’ (HSC, 174)

It has been remarked (among German *völkisch* circles), based on the evidence of Greek statues, that small-penis men have been selected against among Caucasoid populations. It would not be a waste of time to collect penis measurements on an appropriate sample of Greek statues, treat them with tables of correspondence or a formula converting penis size at rest into size during erection, and then compare the results with the data provided by HSC on contemporary penis sizes: for Caucasoids 14-15 cm on average (HSC, 169, box 6.12, from Rushton & Bogaert, 1987). (Incidentally, I remember that, in high school and college, a persistent rumor was that the average size of an erect penis was 18 cm. The adverse effects of such an evil rumor on the self-confidence of inexperienced young men are easy to imagine. The psychologic warfare waged in the field of sex notions is endless. Another fiendish rumor construed testicular asymmetry –the normal case– as an abnormality that required surgical intervention.) No doubt the results of such a study would confirm that small-penis men have been selected against from antiquity to modern days. One cannot rule out, of course, some artistic convention. Ithyphallic satyrs, for instance, are represented with huge, disproportionate penises. The convention would then reflect the notion of a trade-off: testosteronized hormotypes are beastlike unspiritual beings. One could also contend that, as most of these statues were orders from the upper classes, from priests for temples and from wealthy individuals for private altars and

esthetic enjoyment, they reflect these classes' hormotypes. That is, Greek upper classes were not particularly testosteronized. Which leads to the incident question as to how testosterone is distributed in the society. Given the manner in which I describe the bourgeoisie, above, I am not expecting upper classes to be highly testosteronized as a rule.

Sexual Indifference?

Another of my previous contentions I would like to discuss further: I talked about a possible sexual indifference arising with time from restraint, but as I did not expatiate on what I meant some may find the statement bold and oppose me with the medical evidence that shows that on the contrary sexual restraint provokes perversions and other forms of mental trouble.

I always found baffling the idea that Puritans, who are married men, should be deemed better examples of moral 'self-conquest' than Catholic clerics, who, normally, are sexually abstinent. Max Weber, for instance, calls Puritans 'virtuosi of asceticism', as if it were more ascetic to live monogamously with one wife than to abstain from sex altogether. The conclusion I have drawn from the ubiquity of such a judgment, if this judgment be unprejudiced (to be sure, it is absent from such a profound book as *The Varieties of Religious Experience* by William James), is that it is more difficult not to be a lecher when having sex routinely than to remain consistent and firm in one's abstinence, and that it must be because over time abstinence creates an indifference to sex –rather than perverted impulses– becoming a habit, maybe not too unpleasant nor too uncomfortable, and thus not so praiseworthy as the resisting temptation of extra-pair intercourse by a married man engaged in routine sex year in and year out. Even more so if abstinence leads to impotence in the long run, because then a eunuch has no merit at all abstaining from sex. It is perhaps more difficult also for the routine-sex man to refrain from consuming alcoholic drinks and other intoxicants, from seeking base entertainments and other things associated with a worldly unascetic life, from anger, envy, resentment, whereas overriding these would be a mere trifle for the no-sex man (*qui peut le plus peut le moins*) and not so meritorious as a consequence. – Unless the whole affair is a misunderstanding on my part, and in the above statement by Weber is implied, rather, that Puritans have succeeded in their ideal of monogamy whereas the Catholic clergy has failed in their own ideal of sexual abstinence and thus has always been a community of frauds.

The Pill

From the quotes HSC 197 and 198 above, it must be clear that a woman taking the pill is less likely, all other things being equal, to cuckold her partner, because a woman normally cuckolds her partner during the fertile phases of her cycle. So much so for the sexual adventurism of contemporary women.

Paternity Tests

In *Sex in the Future*, published in 1999, Baker lays great hopes on the paternity test technology; his visions of the future are grounded on the basic idea that the technology will become widespread. Fifteen years later, why are paternity tests not a common feature yet? Why have smartphones become in a few years, or even months, a staple of the Western world, and not paternity tests? Why such inertia? The market exists; over the last couple of years, there has been 3.9 million births each year in the US alone, 10 700 births per day.

The answer is that free access is not enough. The state must make tests compulsory for each birth. Otherwise, the technology will never spread, it will remain restricted to litigation as it is today and has always been since it has become available. Why, if the man asks his partner to take a test, she will be disgusted by his suspicion, or terrified at the idea of being exposed, and she will miscarry. No man can ask for a test in free-market conditions. I suppose no man has ever asked for it.

Consequences of a generalization would be far-reaching indeed, notably in one direction untold by Baker. The polygynous is a kind of parasite of the monogynous. The monogynous can (and had rather) live without the polygynous, whereas the polygynous needs the monogynous in order to cuckold him in his back. No doubt, often enough do crop up in the monogynous' mind fantasies of uprooting. Is he to blame for that? No more than the polygynous for his cuckolding. With paternity tests generalized, the wheat would be separated from the chaff – in *this* world.

Mutations

'It is a mathematical inevitability that populations come to be dominated by those heritable characteristics that impart greatest multiplication power to the descendants of the lineage founder.' (HSC, 7, box 2.2). This is the fundamental of 'behavioral ecology' and what allows her to speak of reproductive 'success' and 'failure'. To complete it, 'Thus, when we come to examine the sexual behaviour of humans or other animals at the present time, we are seeing populations that are dominated numerically by heritable characteristics that imparted the greatest multiplication power on generations of past possessors. This statement has the certainty of all mathematical axioms and as such is immune to any further philosophical or ideological discussion.' (*ibid.*) I certainly do not wish to discuss a mathematical axiom, but in case it would serve as a call to 'multiply and replenish the earth,' that is as a moral rule of conduct, I may have some objections to present on philosophical grounds.

As Oscar Wilde said, 'The only thing one really knows about human nature is that it changes. Change is the one quality we can predicate of it. The systems that fail are those that rely on the permanence of human nature, and not on its growth and development.' (*The Soul of Man Under Socialism*). At the root of change in living forms, we find mutations, so the future belongs to mutants. If the future belongs to mutants, it doesn't matter in the least whose offspring it is that mutates, the mutant of the future does not look any more like his ancestor than like any sterile individual of our days.

When a mutation procures a sustainable advantage and creates a mutant species, it is not the qualities my descent and I do share that are important to my descent but those they and I do not share. Were my descent not my descent, but another's, it would be the same; my mutant descent and I are strangers to each other, in virtue of that very minority rule that is at the ground of inclusive fitness or kin selection: 'Any two members of a species, whether they belong to the same family or not, usually share more than 90 per cent of their genes. What, then, are we talking about when we speak of the relatedness between brothers as $\frac{1}{2}$, or between first cousins as $\frac{1}{8}$? The answer is that brothers share $\frac{1}{2}$ of their genes *over and above* the 90 per cent (or whatever it is) that all individuals share in any case.' (Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene*, 30th Anniversary Edition, p. 288). If the genes I share with a few are of more paramount importance to me than the genes I share with many, then the genes I am the only one to possess are the top of the top, and the rest is so much rubbish. Thus could speak the mutant's body.

By the way, remember what I said about those hopeless low-status women, who would maximize their offspring in any case because they can expect nothing but a miracle. Here the miracle is the mutation. If we aim at giving birth to the founder of the mutant lineage of the future, then we *must* maximize the number of our children. Away with optimizing!

Technology vs Biology

Biologists occasionally report the attacks they are subjected to, because of their writings, by mystics and philosophers, but they fail to see, seemingly, that their most dangerous enemy is not those metaphysicians and literati, but technology – not because technology would prove biologists wrong, but because it is going to make their knowledge unimportant, at best anecdotal, when intelligence becomes independent of any genetic support.

No doubt biologists can explain technological developments in Darwinian terms, and I would be delighted to read such treatises, but one cannot help smiling when reading phrases such as 'if the recent...technological environment stays stable long enough' (HSC, 186), for this 'long enough' must indeed be a long time, the authors dealing with evolutionary scales. The phrase is naive, and it was already a little bit naive in 1995. In 1997 the computer Deep Blue beat the world champion at chess; today no human chess master can beat a computer. Exponential trends in the development of computing and other technologies have led some scholars to forecast a 'singularity' in the future, although I strongly object to the name because it compares something that has never happened yet under the conditions of our experience, namely an intelligence independent from genetic support, with things that cannot happen under no condition of our experience, namely infinite density in relativistic black holes and infinite heat in the relativistic Big Bang, so-called singularities of physics.

Elsewhere (in my French French) I have stressed that genetic reproduction is a hindrance to knowledge transmission because every new individual must be taught from scratch, and the loss of time and energy this state of affairs generates is tremendous. This, linked with certain characteristics of mental activity, has convinced me of an autonomous movement of technology towards the making of a new kind of being. Let me add the following. By responding to needs technology has made the biological mechanisms that respond to those needs an encumbrance. It creates the need to get rid of these biological mechanisms, even though they are connected to

the recipient organs of the service. In contemporary urban settings, people are compelled to devote significant portions of their time to futile physical exercises such as jogging on treadmills, with the sole aim of preventing their bodies to impair their activity. Our bodies are not suited any more to the life we're living.

To illustrate the autonomy of technological development, let's take leisure. Technological conditions have been fulfilled for decades to put an end to most of human toil, but humanity keeps toiling. 'Leisure is a condition for which the human species has been badly prepared, because until very recently it was enjoyed by only a few, who contributed very little to the gene pool.' (B. F. Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*)

Only a collapse of the technological civilization could preserve genetic transmission. By reading writings such as those of Baker's, one is primed, in a way, to see any achievement outside reproduction as 'castles in the air' (however transient the priming may be and the final impression always that science must go on). This, in Ibsen's famous play *The Master Builder*, is of what Hilde convinces the master builder Solness – he dies before eloping with her, by the way. Technology, however, is no castle in the air if its definition is: the making of a new being. DER GEIST is awakening.

ANNEX TO CHAPTER THREE

Please take cognizance of Dr Baker's reply.

Dear Florent

Thank you for the link. I have now read your essay and applaud the way you have taken on board the extra information that was in 'Human Sperm Competition'. Many, if not most, would not have been so open-minded. As you rightly say, though, there are still many valuable things for you to cling on to from your earlier essays, as well as all of your wider ranging speculations in the second half of this essay which go into fields I have not involved myself in too much in the past.

Sticking to the more biological side, you are right that the interpretation of penis design in terms of sperm competition depends in part on whether the thrusting penis removes some of the lower cervical mucus and hence some of its contained sperm which are blocking some of the mucus channels. We shouldn't overlook either the advantage to a male not involved in sperm competition, having a second copulation with the same partner pre-flowback, who can then remove his own previous seminal pool (from which some sperm have already escaped into the cervix) before depositing a second, smaller pool, but containing younger sperm which would then have easier access and live longer. Such a 'monogamous' male, of course, would not gain much from removing cervical mucus as well, but this can be avoided by reducing the vigour of thrusting. Recently I saw an article, I think by Todd Shackelford, who showed that the vigour of thrusting fitted nicely with sperm competition/non-sperm competition situations.

I also agree that we should beware of circularity in the argument about penis size and the size of the neonate head. A good starting point would be to see if there is indeed a correlation between actual (i.e. not relative to body size) erect penis WIDTH (rather than length) and the width of the neonate head within phylogenetic groupings. If there isn't then the whole idea is a non-starter anyway. I'm not aware of such data, but then I no longer keep up with the field as I used to.

Please feel free to use this e-mail as a comment if you think it adds anything.

Further remarks on Dr Baker's Science of Sex

Male Masturbation: Is Self-Control Advisable?

After having presented Baker's view on masturbation, I would like to stress that the model I have outlined on my side is not, to the best of my knowledge, alternative to his view but rather complementary. Baker explains the strategic value of male masturbation in the context of sperm competition, that is mainly for men already involved in regular sexual activity. On my side, as I was thinking on this matter I had in mind some particular view I had met several times expressed by representatives of the medical institution (for instance in the media), namely that, generally speaking, masturbation stops when people start having regular sexual activity. Keeping this notion in sight, I was led to limit the scope of my reflections to young men masturbating during the period from puberty to regular sexual intercourse.

The first thing to stress here is that, if Baker is right, then the medical discourse alluded to is far off the mark and no accurate picture of reality. According to Baker's results, male masturbation does not occur much, in fact, if the time elapsed between two intercourses is short, for instance three days, which is the median interval for couples having routine sex, but when the interval increases the likelihood that the man will masturbate increases also. So, in the mean statistical condition, it is true that men having regular sex do not masturbate as a rule, but we are not entitled to translate such a statement into the generalization that men do not masturbate as they engage in routine sex, because, first, not all couples have sex at the rate of the mean interval, and, second, a couple that tends to follow the mean pattern yet may vary in intercourse frequency, so the situations predicted by Baker to have the man masturbate must be numerous enough.

We are confronted here with two different views emanating from scientific authority. Knowing what has led Baker to his conclusions, I tend to adopt his point of view. I am even willing to explain the diverging opinion by relying on Baker's own theory. The medical discourse that I have many reasons to consider, at least in my country (France), as mainstream, for having met it expressed several consistently, with no objection from nowhere, could be another, and most awful, instance of that spiteful hypocrisy at the root of the popular prejudice against masturbation. That it is expressed from men of science should come as no surprise – although it is much regrettable – because men of science are still men, often enough. The profound thinker Bakunin said: 'We recognize the absolute authority of science but reject the infallibility and universality of the representatives of science.' (in *Dieu et l'État*; my translation from the original French).

In the same way as Baker did not hesitate to hold his views against what I perceive as a scientific consensus (but I may be mistaken as to the extent of that opinion among physicians and biologists), I for the present stick to my own view that the popular prejudice against masturbation is not altogether devoid of reasonable ground. First of all, let us stress that popular morals, as Kant call it, is, as the philosopher said himself, the very same as practical reason, and as a consequence one is allowed, provisionally, to regard its prejudice against masturbation

as practical reason too – not to mention the fact that Kant expressed negative views on masturbation explicitly. We shall not discuss Kant's views here, however, because he and I may differ in our reasons. As I believe I made clear, my advocacy of some masturbation refrainment is not intended as a norm for living an ascetic life but as a practical advice to reach one's sexual objectives more quickly and efficiently in an environment where no whorehouses are left.

The main point is that temporary constraint makes good effect on surrounding women. I tried to put it in biological terms reminiscent of pheromones and like phenomena. However, another reason may come in handy, because it is consistent with findings of evolutionary psychology, namely that refraining from masturbation would indicate to women a capacity to self-control and hence likelihood of high status in the foreseeable future. Indeed, one fact that seems to hold true is that women, as they look for a mate, are particularly receptive to status. This, by the way, has a number of implications: 'Males have the potential to reproduce at a much faster rate than do females, and the reproductive success of males (unlike that of females) is limited mainly by mating opportunities. Because mating opportunities benefit males more than females, and because higher status males get more mating opportunities, selection on males tend to strongly favour the ability to succeed in status competition.' (Price & Johnson 2011)

According to the longitudinal Stanford *marshmallow experiment*, children capable of self-control, later in life get higher SAT scores and better educational attainments, which means higher socioprofessional status. In this experiment, several children were asked to wait a few minutes alone in a room, with a marshmallow conspicuously displayed on a table. They were told they would be given two marshmallows if they did not eat the one on the table before the adult returns. This is a measure of self-control. Those who delayed gratification, and got two marshmallows instead of one, got higher SAT scores and so on later in life. The experiment is a confirmation of a preconception deep-rooted in popular morals.

If a woman, therefore, can perceive that a young man, whose later status in life can only be guessed so far, is capable of self-control, then, due not only to the recent results of the marshmallow experiment, which she may know, but also, and perhaps primarily, to a deep-rooted popular conception, then she would evaluate his future status as being high and thus be more willing to become his girlfriend in the present – as a good investment for the future, perhaps. Of course, there must be many different clues of future high status, being the son of a nabob representing another rather safe bet for instance, but none is to neglect, I suppose.

As to self-control, there certainly exists many ways for a person to assess it in another person, and had the designers of the marshmallow experiment been smart they would have collected as many data on the children's psychology as possible, which they perhaps did. It is my belief that a young man able to withhold masturbation for a while distinguishes himself in other ways, but he would not distinguish himself as much were he not withholding masturbation for a while, because then he would be... just a wanker. Sorry for the circularity... You know what I mean, don't you?

And, again, as I already warned, there still is the risk for the young woman that the self-controlled guy turns a Kantian philosopher rather than a smart organization man. Well, but maybe she can do something about it.

High Status, Reproductive Success, and the Organization Man

As Baker, and other behavioral ecologists, assure us, high-status men make more children than low-status men: ‘Even in contemporary Western society high-income men have more biological children than low-income men, whereas among women the opposite is true (Hopcroft 2005; Nettle and Pollock 2008).’ (Buunk, Pollet, Dijkstra & Massar 2011). & ‘Men worldwide exhibit more risk taking, promiscuity, and dominance behaviors, and those who achieve positions of status have superior access to mates and enhanced reproductive success.’ (Browne 2011)

Before we turn to other Darwinians holding a diametrically opposite view (and ‘tis a bit strange that I should have to talk of views when trying to determine what lies before our eyes, which should only call for sight, and not views), let us be precise. According to the first of the two quotes above, high-income men are siring a significant number of children that single low-income women and/or low-income couples are raising, presumably at the latter’s own expense.

In Chapter 3, I quoted the scholar Laura Betzig stating that industrialization put an end to extent reproductive inequalities in favor of high-status men – as a consequence, she surmises, of technical specialization. Another instance can be found in Deirdre Barrett (Harvard Medical School): ‘Despite our instincts to claim yet more objects, land, and possessions, the wealthy and powerful no longer have more offspring.’ (*Supernormal Stimuli*, p. 170). Barrett advances birth control as a cause, a hypothesis Baker has extensively discussed and disproved. She adds: ‘The controversial 1994 *The Bell Curve*...outlined research indicating one indisputable fact. People doing less well by most criteria –IQ, years of education, money earned, a stable family unit, and the like– now produce the most offspring. In the developed world at least, the vast majority of children who are born will survive. If their parents aren’t able to provide for them, people with more resources will contribute or outright adopt them. The offspring of the less successful survive to reproductive age, and pass along their genes at a faster pace than anyone else.’ (*ibid.*, p. 171). That book, *The Bell Curve*, by Herrnstein and Murray, is called by Barrett controversial because, beside some discussions on racial matters, it is a reformulation of a view that I believe used to be commonplace among Darwinians decades ago as they described their own time, namely that society would be jeopardized by its own impediments to natural selection; and it is controversial because twentieth-century totalitarian regimes are alleged to have drawn practical conclusions from that view. This is not what we shall discuss presently. I wanted to call the reader’s attention to two diverging ways of construing our current reality by scholars otherwise holding the same Darwinian tenets.

I have already brought a few elements to this discussion, to which I refer the reader. What can be added here is that as, according to the marshmallow experiment, self-control correlates positively with educational attainments and high status, the view that high-status men inseminate relatively more women unlawfully (if not illegally) than low-status men, more lacking of self-control, strikes one as a little odd.

What definition exactly the authors of the different studies cited give to high status may be a point to consider in the present confusion. Another line of argument in *The Bell Curve* is that college degrees have become the major accessway to status in today’s societies, contrary to the past. Other studies show that our economies are organization-driven, and high-status men

are for the most part organization men, selected for their degrees. Cut-throat competition is now the specializing of the shadowy middleman or small businessman, some of them indeed making fairly considerable earnings without a college degree, but for many an observer this class of man is under threat of extinction, and at the very least does not represent current economic elites.

Among these small businessmen one is likely to find a fair deal of uneducated and at the same time well-off men – because uneducated, likely to lack self-control, and because well-off, likely to take advantage of status differences in order to increase one's reproductive success. But the organization man is another kind of breed: he could not have got his degree without some ability to defer gratification, and he could not work in a pyramidal, hierarchical, gregarious organization without maintaining self-control at a fairly high level. The organization man has much in common with the Jesuit (*perinde ac cadaver*).

As I write these lines I am asking myself in what fairyland I think I'm living, so I'll stop here because I have not enough data to keep slandering small businessmen and extolling corporate executives as I did.

As to the small-business scale, many a startup nowadays is the offshoot of some university professor or student, or of a clique of such, who took advantage of the cocoon provided by their academic institution to develop their ideas and business plan completely proof to market pressures and then enter the market to bust competing businesses. Such cynicism I have dubbed *varsity capitalism*. Even on this scale, degrees tend to be the norm.

What can be said as a parenthesis is that if self-control is a clue of high status in the foreseeable future, then the theory of the two swords, by which medieval Papacy claimed all power on this earth, that is the legitimicity that both the mundane and spiritual swords rest in her own hands, is not unwarranted. Out of the world, which is the monk's place, means at the top of it: by controlling your passions, you rise above the world of passions, and above is a dominating position. The solid chain of philosophers that have discredited political claims by the Church makes it foolhardy to try to justify these claims today. Yet these philosophers themselves, as far as is known from their biographies, practiced the same passion- and self-control relied upon by Church clerics, and some of them extolled the virtues of monastic contemplative life. Their indictment bore upon the doctrine rather than upon the ethics. As to the doctrine, it probably evolved in part from the natural need of strong incentives in order to tread the way of asceticism, incentives not needed by more strong-minded philosophers. An early form of such incentives may be the claim to charismata and magic powers, which in turn might be nothing but the inner strength evidenced by the man capable of self-control.

A last word on these mystical objects. Why asceticism, in the first place? It may be that it was important in the past, as resources were scarce, to be able to delay gratification and develop self-control, that is to be able to put up with scarcity. But, make no mistake, if it was advantageous in the past because of scarcity, it is still advantageous today, because of abundance. It is a new breed of ascetics that will survive the obesity epidemics.

Sex Conditioning

Whatever may be the true relationship between high status and reproduction in our societies, Darwinians, as a rule, very much minimize the possibilities of conditioning. Yet the very idea of ‘conditional strategies’, that is of the genetic program displaying different behaviors depending on the characteristics of the environment, warrants, as it is in men’s power to modify their environment, extreme voluntarism and interventionism in the political field, rather than the laissez faire seemingly advocated by the great bulk of Darwinians. A quote from Jean-Paul Sartre will provide some light in the matter: ‘[The antisemite] being, like all other men, a liberty in situation, it is his situation that must be thoroughly modified: it suffices to change the perspectives of choice for the choice to alter ... liberty decides upon different bases, according to different structures.’ (my translation from *Réflexions sur la question juive*). Compare with Baker’s definition of conditional strategies: ‘Conditional strategies are the main causes of differences in behaviour, not only between individuals but also between cultures. Different geographical regions, different periods of history, provide different environments with different opportunities and risks –such as variations in risk of disease– thus triggering different behaviour. As a result, cultures differ in what are considered to be societal norms for parenting. Natural selection was in fact the architect, but culture is a plagiarist and invariably claims to have thought of the rules for itself.’ (BW 291-2). I do not know whether Baker read Sartre but had he not I wouldn’t blame him, for it is evident that what Sartre calls liberty is, no matter how much in situation, determinism. But the idea is the same, and Baker’s own conclusion, on plagiarist culture, is not quite warranted, I believe. We have at our disposal a power on our environment (not to mention purposeful breeding or genomic intervention), the environment that will determine in the last resort, through the mechanism of conditional strategies, our behaviors. How we shall use this power we are bound (or free, if you prefer) to decide in the abstract.

Human agency itself is environment and shapes human behaviors, especially through conditioning technologies. In the sixties, Stanley Rachman allegedly conditioned people to be sexually aroused by the sight of boots, and *sexual fetishism* is a well-known phenomenon. Some of these deviations may be so overpowering on the human psyche that they completely impair reproduction. It is my belief that we are living in a media environment contrived as a conditioning technology impairing human reproduction. Under one of its guises, I have named it silver screen conditioning. The contrivance has a momentum of its own and leads to the overriding of genetic life. The main impetus is provided by our production apparatus and its reliance upon the satisfaction of secondary needs beside primary, biological needs. Basically, our media, as a sales force, advertise products and services that satisfy secondary needs, via an appeal (including subliminal) to primary, namely sexual urges, with the effect that a massive sexual fetishism is induced toward gadgets and logos. It is not, as many evolutionary biologists and psychologists will contend, that Rachman’s guinea-pigs want the boots because the boots will enhance their mating success: they want the boots because they are aroused by them and they do not care about their mating success at all. Current Darwinian view on the motivations of consumption is far off the mark, or rather it is already superseded. We have been conditioned beyond reproductive purposes.

In the precedent chapter I contend that only a collapse of technological civilization could preserve genetic transmission. Such a collapse in the future is not to be excluded, due to the influx of populations extremely averse and hostile to the mass-conditioning which the Western man is subjected to. Alternative scenarios may involve ‘structural overloading’ (Stoddard) and blackout. – Otherwise, the medium is the message, and the message is: Goodbye, humanity.

ADDENDUM

«As, according to the marshmallow experiment, self-control correlates positively with educational attainments and high status, the view that high-status men inseminate relatively more women unlawfully (if not illegally) than low-status men, more lacking of self-control, strikes one as a little odd.»

It strikes one, in a way, but in the other hand this passage does not make much sense because I have mixed two distinct notions, that is 1/ self-control and 2/ renunciation to self-serving bias. Yet, when self-control is exerted to get two marshmallows instead of one, the ability to exert it tells us nothing, in the abstract, about the child's later sexual life, in the course of which he may well exert the same kind of self-control as in the laboratory in order to maximize his ingestion of marshmallows, this time with a view to maximize his inseminations. I have already provided a clue on the relevance of the distinction in my advice on masturbation, as it amounts to proposing a little self-control on solitary pleasure in order to achieve insemination more quickly.

Moreover, even if self-control, as measured by the Stanford experiment, predicts future status in society, it cannot serve as a confirmation of what I call the Puritanical delusion regarding ruling classes of a community, according to which delusion, the worthier the man the higher his status. Literature offers many a healthy counterpoise to such delusion by depicting people of the elite as they often are in reality: self-serving pigs.

In spite of the objections and doubts I have raised against the view that high status men inseminate more women and cuckold more men, all in all I am not so sure of their relevance.

But, why in the world do not these men ask for a legal right to mate with several women rather than just one (at least at a time), and keep creeping in the dark for their purposes, sneakily? The answer is, they do not want to pay. They are free riders through and through.

The rich man is free-riding on the poor. Revolutionaries have always looked for a proof of the fact but they were told that what they call injustice, in the economy, is progress, is for the good of mankind. I wish I were told what good it makes to mankind that the poor man has to raise the rich man's genetic offspring and bear all expenses, rather than the rich man himself.

Some may reply, the poor mother gives her children the genes that will allow them to rise above her low status. She certainly has this in mind (in the body) when having intercourse with a rich man, but do not forget, when dealing with such reasons, the pressures of environment. Never have geneticists denied that, with lack of proper care, a hack can be made of a thoroughbred (albeit they stress the limits of the reverse attempt). And, as the rich man, when impregnating a poor woman, obligates her to scatter her scant resources among a greater number of children, he increases the adverse pressures of the environment on their future status. The rich man's children would be better off if brought up by him.

In the abstract, providing the number of wives be a positive function of the man's wealth, legal polygyny is more egalitarian than monogyny, because the rich man's resources are spent on a greater number of children (his legal children).

As the high status man's self-control is directed by a self-serving bias, he's a free rider and deservedly hated, to the point of bloodthirsty revolutions. The philosophical underpinning of these data has been provided by Schopenhauer in *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, with the trade-off between *Wille* (will) and *Vorstellung* (representation, insight) – a trade-off that biology is beginning to discover. Self-serving will is associated with at best mediocre insight, and this leads to the important notion of self-serving mediocrity, which is the true ruling class of this world.

ANNEX TO CHAPTER FOUR

Dr Baker's remarks.

Dear Florent

An interesting read, as always. Three comments:

I think perhaps that in your self-restraint argument you overestimate the ability of women to know how often a man masturbates. Whether by male or female the act of masturbation is enough of a secretive business for nobody to really know how often anybody else indulges. Certainly not enough to make any life decisions over mates on that basis.

The question over the number of children (and grandchildren) produced by high and low status/income males is one that is desperately in need of real data, data that even now is impossible to obtain. But until we do, the discussion will continue and everybody can hold their different views.

I see the evolution of conditioning is one of the most important elements of adaptive behaviour. Powerful, too – and although most of the time it is a brilliant way to fit an animal (not just humans) to their circumstances in an adaptive way, at other times, because it is so powerful, it can sometimes (as in sex with boots, or geese thinking a man is their mother) produce the most bizarrely non-adaptive behaviour.

Feel free to use this if you wish.

5

Money and Size

‘Even in contemporary Western society high-income men have more biological children than low-income men, whereas among women the opposite is true (Hopcroft 2005; Nettle and Pollock 2008).’ (Buunk, Pollet, Dijkstra & Massar, in *Evolutionary Psychology in the Business Sciences*, ed. G. Saad, 2011).

The rich man is free-riding on the poor. He is married to one woman (at a time), have one or two children with her, his legal children, who receive all their parent’s care and support as they grow up, but that man is also a cryptic impregnator of many other women, of whom the society recognizes no bond with him. The statement above, highlighting the difference between high-income men and women and the difference between low-income women and men, could not hold true otherwise.

It is talked time and again, in our contemporary Western society, about the plight of single mothers. Most of these women are low-income. One should be careful not to indict too quickly, for these women’s plight, men of their own status and treat these latter as callous and irresponsible individuals who do not accept to take responsibilities for their behavior. What came first, egg or hen? a poor man’s irresponsible behavior or a poor woman’s tendency to let herself impregnate by rich men? Let the facts be known and who shall accuse a low-income man of irresponsibility if he doubts his paternity? He has got every right in the world to doubt it.

The plight of low-income single mothers is the rich man’s deed. It is the rich woman’s also, because, in some other societies, rich men marry several women, and all these women’s children are his legal children, to whom he is bound by law to provide support during their bringing up. In our society the rich woman does not want resources to be scattered among so many children. She wants that only her children benefit from the man’s resources. At the same time the man’s resources do not always benefit his own genetic children, but those desired by the woman from such and such men with whom she cuckolded her partner – which plight, again, is that of low-income and not high-income men. This is the situation under our laws.

A number of the rich man’s children, perhaps most of them, are thus raised in low-income homes or by low-income single mothers. When a single mother finds a partner who wants to live with her, the children she had before they met are more likely than other children to suffer abuse from the partner. A child raised by a single-mother is also more likely to become a delinquent (cf *The Bell Curve*). With the acuteness of deprivation rises the likelihood of abuse, molestation, rape, and murder of children by their ‘parents.’ So, we have that rich man here, creeping in the dark, like a sneaky pest, in order to inseminate women because of a biological urge to multiply his offspring, and he cannot even insure that they receive proper care, whereas he is spoiling the few children of his one long-term partner with an overabundance of goods.

Meanwhile, the consequence of his unlawful inseminations is that the poor’s scarce resources are scattered among a greater number of children, and what could have been moderately comfortable homes and neighborhoods cannot escape been shanties and slums (women use contraceptives with their partners much more than with their lovers: see ch. 3). The

poor woman, poor because, if I understand the logic, in our meritocracies her merit is nought, and craving for the genes of success in the guise of a successful man ready to impregnate her, plunges herself and her family in ever direr straits.

Such a polity must over time become so unequal, merit so unevenly distributed among two sharply segregated social castes, wealth and power accumulating in an ever shrinking number of hands, it is a blessing that our school system so much impairs the success of intelligent children by boring them to death. School-teachers, in their own hypocritical way, are laming the rich and avenging the poor as far as they can, which is, however, not very much, to say the truth.

Still, as free riders, the rich must be sanctioned. No better established moral norm has ever cropped up from the biology department that free riding is to be prevented and/or uprooted (read, for instance, philosophy professor Patricia Churchland). (Free markets themselves are supposed to be a contrivance to prevent free riding. Alas, as evolutionary psychology has demonstrated, there are no impersonal market forces: it's either pal or pigeon!)

A free rider is a parasite. Biologist Richard Dawkins has talked about parasites in the animal world thus: 'Animals might at times behave in ways that are not in their own best interests, manipulated by some other animal. Actually, in a sense they are acting in their own best interests ... they theoretically could resist manipulation but it would be too costly to do so. Perhaps to resist manipulation by a cuckoo you need bigger eyes or a bigger brain, which would have overhead costs.' (*The Selfish Gene*, 1976). I wish to tell the poor that they ought to think on the matter in *actuarial* terms, and compute the gain of uprooting the rich having in mind the infinity of time in the future compared with the costs incurred via a revolution of a few days. There just cannot be too great a cost when it is about eliminating free riders. If you can convince yourselves there is the slightest good in your raising, by depleting your own scarce resources, the children of the rich, then, fine, away with the idea of a revolution.

Dr. Robin Baker said of late: 'The question over the number of children (and grandchildren) produced by high and low status/income males is one that is desperately in need of real data, data that even now is impossible to obtain. But until we do, the discussion will continue and everybody can hold their different views.' (Annex to Chapter 4). He had written earlier: 'Some men have a higher chance of being cuckolded than others, and it is those of low wealth and status that fare worst. ... Moreover, the men most likely to cuckold the lower-status males are those of higher status.' (BW 44-5) (already quoted). He wrote this latter statement in 1998; the statement I have quoted at the beginning of the present essay is from 2011 and confirms his 1998 picture. Although I have no idea what the methodology used in the latter studies is, the consistency of both sets incites me to see the picture as accurate, and I shall not put too much weight on Dr Baker's recent comments. As a concluding remark on this point I must stress that Baker envisions the end of reproductive inequalities in the future as a result of *laissez-faire*.

From my earlier discussion of Baker's works it should be clear by now that women orgasm with large-penis men because they want to favor these men's semen in sperm competition: 'If penis size is an important factor in sperm competition, it would be surprising if males and females did not have some reaction to penis size. First, males should perceive males with a penis larger than themselves as more of a threat if they ever show a sexual interest in the same woman. Second, females should prefer to mate with males who will give them male

descendants with a penis more efficient at removing a rival's sperm.' (HSC, 174) To be precise, the passage states that women prefer to mate with large-penised men because they want large-penised boys, but the inference is clear, as on the other hand female copulatory orgasm is a way to favor one man's semen over others', that they orgasm with large-penised men – no matter how vehemently women usually deny that size matters. (Later I will tell why they deny it.)

Some are mocking White racists as in fact resenting Negroes for their large penises and their racism as sexual jealousy. How could it be otherwise, may I ask? (Data on penis size by race can be found in Baker & Bellis, *Human Sperm Competition*.) Small-penised men must thwart this preference of women by subduing large-penised men socially. They've got no choice, there must be something which they be preferred for. Today, in contemporary Western society, due to Negro emancipation, White working-class men can be preferred on no basis at all: they don't have large penises compared to Negroes and they don't get high incomes comparing with high-income men. As a matter of course, racism is rampant among them. Some will say the problem is that workers are too ignorant to be tolerant but I rather think they know too well, and something must be done to make them forget what they know – because they could become embarrassing, as a patently doomed species, and we all know that we are going, I mean humanity, to leave room for another being better suited to explore the universe, and it is just a question of time, after White working-class men have vanished from the scene, that the rest of us take the same exit.

ANNEX TO CHAPTER FIVE

Please take cognizance of Dr Baker's reply after I had asked his approval before publication of the above.

Hi Florent

By all means publish your words: they are of course yours to do with as you wish. As long as you do not misrepresent my meaning or intention (and as far as I have noticed you haven't), I have no reason to disapprove or otherwise of how you use my words. I do prefer to distance myself from your more judgemental and 'campaigning' passages and to stick to the evolutionary biology of it all, but otherwise it is your blog and I assume you have your own agenda. Having said this I perhaps need to explain myself a bit better over the two evolutionary areas you have picked up on.

Like you, I haven't read the papers on children produced by high and low status males and females that you reference. I like the conclusions (because they fit my expectations) but cannot comment on how convincing the data are on which they are based. But my comments which you highlight still stand. The advantage to high-status women of producing fewer offspring with high status males is that by making a higher investment with his help in those fewer children she eventually benefits through the succeeding generations (how many generations we cannot say) by eventually producing more descendants than high status women who initially produced and tried to raise more children. So my comment that the data do not exist to prove the matter one way or the other in evolutionary terms is still valid. To my knowledge, no one has yet been able to follow survival and reproduction through enough generations to make the necessary tests. It will need to be over more than one generation and the more the better. I cannot see how this can be done at present.

Regarding large and small penises (and testes) I simply refer back to my conclusion in Sperm Wars and Human Sperm Competition. The size distribution of both in the population is fixed by evolution at the stable situation where each gains the same advantage. In which case there is no need for anybody to be envious or gloat. The average and distribution of sizes will differ in different populations because the selective pressures are different, thus shifting the ESS in one or other direction accordingly. But each size distribution should be adaptive to the local conditions. Everybody is equal except during phases that the pressures change and evolution starts shifting the equilibrium point. Only during those phases is there an advantage in being larger or smaller.

And here is what I replied:

Dear Dr Baker,

You're right: I am free to draw any conclusions from your works or any other person's works, and you can't be held responsible for the conclusions I draw.

The word 'science' you may find inappropriate, now I'm threading a more 'campaigning' path; however, I believe my conclusions are logical, given what you and others wrote. I was even wondering why you didn't write it yourself (even if in a cooler style), because, as I had just written it, I felt it gave the final touch to your work.

Your first comment, here, may be off the mark. We only want to know if women sleep with rich men as a rule, a conduct that is both acknowledged and usually blamed by common sense (or popular wisdom). As they say in my country, 'She dates the wallet not the man.'

Same with your second comment. We want to know if women prefer large-penis men. If I am envious of large penises, there's nothing your tentatively reassuring exposé on how equilibrium is reached can do about it, partly because common sense cannot understand the mathematics behind it. As I quoted you saying, the view of a large penis must elicit some psychological response.

Here is another mail bu Dr Baker:

Hi Florent

Our interests clearly overlap a great deal otherwise our correspondence wouldn't have lasted so long, but they also differ in fairly fundamental ways – which is why my writing didn't extend in the way you thought it could have done. I think we can see how we differ in your two final points (about my two comments).

I would say that we already know that, all else being equal, women prefer richer men to poorer. My interest is in understanding why this is so in an evolutionary sense, yours is in trying to change or even to condemn the situation. It is there that our interests part company, so to speak.

I'm not so convinced, in that I haven't seen any good data, that women actually do prefer men with a large penis. In this I don't mean data just gained by women answering the question, but data on whether, all else being equal, they would choose to pair up or just have sex with a man with a larger penis. The fact that the range of penis sizes is as it is suggests to me that a clear behavioural preference doesn't really exist. Whatever the truth, my interest ends at trying to understand the evolution of the situation. Again I can see you would like to extrapolate further.

And my reply to it:

Dear Dr Baker,

Thank you for sharing your views. I think this exchange makes the series far more interesting. Thank you for saying I don't misrepresent your meaning. I acknowledge your right to distance yourself from the direction my thinking is taking, but I am not so convinced of the impartiality of scholar work in general (even though its motto is, in general, interest in pure understanding). How do you explain interest in pure understanding in evolutionary terms? Does pure understanding pay? All humanity, present and future, is free-riding on the pure thinker, so he must be crazy to be what he is, and university is too well-established an institution to be a bedlam of some sort.

I wish to add the following. From Chapters 2 to 4 I took rather great lengths to explain why I thought (what I held to be, after reading your books,) your view on the linkage between status and reproductive success was perhaps not accurate. Among other things, I quoted from various sources, namely L. Betzig, D. Barrett, Herrnstein & Murray, and eugenicists of the past collectively, that posit the inverse relationship. Then I stated the relationship probably takes a different turn depending on our looking at women or at men, and I found both this view and a positive relationship between high status and reproductive success for men supported by the quote from Buunk et al. I used this quote to write Chapter 5, but I was not expecting that you

would take its content to be my firmly grounded belief, given I had just tried to explain why I held the contrary to be true.

Chapter 5 is hypothetical by nature: If quote is true, then... It's correct that it is lapsing from pure understanding, or pure understanding of evolutionary mechanisms; it was a speculation as to possible consequences of the facts been known some time.

It seems to me that by writing "I would say that we already know that, all else being equal, women prefer richer men to poorer. My interest is in understanding why this is so in an evolutionary sense," you somewhat misrepresented your true position. It appears, instead, that we are not so sure, even though the understanding is clear. We already understand what makes females prefer high-status males, in an evolutionary sense (and I quoted a chain of reasons, from differential parental investment on) and, I surmise, such preference has been observed in hierarchical primate groups. We are searching the same clear-cut evidence in our contemporary societies, but contrary to what holds true for more primitive human societies it looks like the evidence of a positive relationship between high status and reproductive success is not so clear in that case.

Some even deny it. Among these, some (Barrett) invoke contraception as an explanation, but I think you provided the evidence that this is not so. Some others (Betzig) invoke economic specialization, that is they may potentially deny Darwinism the character of a unified theory of human behavior, because a prediction based on it has failed so far (unless they can explain economic specialization in Darwinian terms, that is, not the kind of specialization found among sterile insects nor that division of labor observed among primate groups, but the very division of labor that would alter the relationship between status and reproduction).

Given the strong credits of Darwinism, I would find its failure as a unifying theory disappointing, and I have noticed your own attachment to a unified system of knowledge, as a regulative idea of reason.

6

Springboarding the Mogul and Other Facts

‘Springboarding’ the Mogul

Despite the alleged evidence brought forth by several scholars that low-status men are more likely to be cuckolded by their partners than high-status men, I shall presently explain why the reverse is likely to be true or, at least, why high-status men, i.e. moguls –known collectively as the joking class– are equally exposed to cuckoldry than men from the working class.

In Chapter 2 I wrote, quoting Baker:

It leads us to the model I call, from a graphic word used by Dr Baker, the *springboard model*: ‘Once a woman has a long-term partner, the costs of one-off intercourse are reduced as long as her infidelity remains undetected. Her long-term relationship provides a springboard from which to exploit the genetic benefits of one-off sex with selected men without risking too much. She does not have this freedom, however, if she does not have a partner.’ (SW 260-1) According to this model, a woman is not much interested in one-off sex while single, because she may end up with a pregnancy and no male support to help her bear the burden. As a single woman she is in search of a lasting relationship, and this can easily lead one to think women are monogamous. However, once she is engaged in a lasting relationship, the ‘springboard’ is provided for extra-pair or one-off sex, with which she may improve her reproductive success with mates whose genes appeal to her. As a single person, the woman seeks a partner, and her choice relies on status more than good looks; if need be, she will sacrifice the latter. As an engaged person, she seeks lovers and genetic endowment (BW 131).

Then I added:

If BW 131 is correct (‘In choosing a short-term partner for sex...looks are much more important’), the following needs some explanation: ‘Some men have a higher chance of being cuckolded than others, and it is those of low wealth and status that fare worst. ... Moreover, the men most likely to cuckold the lower-status males are those of higher status.’ (BW 44-5) ... it is not clear why women partnered with high-status men would not be likely to cuckold them with low-status men if the latter possess the required genetic endowment. Dr Baker explains that these women have much to lose if their unfaithfulness is detected, but that means, then, that sacrificing good looks while choosing a long-term partner is detrimental, because in reality the springboard is not even provided.

Since then, I made a quote from Buunk et al. that support Baker’s statements, but Baker, in a footnote to his published books he sent me (of which I am very honored), took, at least as I interpret it, some distance with these, stressing their somewhat hypothetical nature and the lack of data:

The question over the number of children (and grandchildren) produced by high and low status/income males is one that is desperately in need of real data, data that even now is impossible to obtain. But until we do, the discussion will continue and everybody can hold their different views. & Like you, I haven’t read the papers on children produced by high and low status males

and females that you reference. I like the conclusions (because they fit my expectations) but cannot comment on how convincing the data are on which they are based. But my comments which you highlight still stand. The advantage to high-status women of producing fewer offspring with high status males is that by making a higher investment with his help in those fewer children she eventually benefits through the succeeding generations (how many generations we cannot say) by eventually producing more descendants than high status women who initially produced and tried to raise more children. So my comment that the data do not exist to prove the matter one way or the other in evolutionary terms is still valid. To my knowledge, no one has yet been able to follow survival and reproduction through enough generations to make the necessary tests. It will need to be over more than one generation and the more the better. I cannot see how this can be done at present.

As I am convinced of the relevance of the springboard model, I shall present evidence that the very model does not allow us, provisionally, to retain Buunk et al.'s statement ("Even in contemporary Western society high-income men have more biological children than low-income men, whereas among women the opposite is true") as valid.

1/ First, that "the men most likely to cuckold the lower-status males are those of higher status" is contradicted by the following (from David Buss, *The Dangerous Passion*, 2000, p. 164):

The contrast between the minimums women express for regular mates and for one-night stands is especially striking because women relax their standards for many qualities when seeking brief encounters. For degree of education, for example, women required husbands to be in the 61st percentile, but for one-night stands they required only the 47th percentile. In sharp contrast, women became more exacting in a one-night stand on precisely the qualities one would expect according to the theory of sexy sons. Whereas they wanted their husband to be in the 58th percentile on sexiness, they wanted their brief flings to be in the 76th percentile. On physical attractiveness, they required husbands to be only in the 54th percentile, but demanded the 77th percentile for one-night stands.

Based on this study, women's expectations as to their lovers' degree of education are fairly moderate and, as is well known, in our meritocracies degree in education predicts status accurately.

2/ Second, as both Baker and Buss talk of one-night (one-off) stands, I am led to assume this is the most common method of cheating adopted by women and, since Baker also writes that one-off flings are hardly detectable, his line of argument according to which women married to high-status men have more to lose if detected, is unconvincing.

3/ Third, high status nowadays being linked to long studies (cf *The Bell Curve*), high-status men must be called, plain and simple, eggheads. How do eggheads score on sexiness and physical attractiveness? According to some line of research (Helmuth Nyborg 1994), there exists some hormonal trade-off that tends to make brainiacs not particularly studly, hence not quite adequate to one-off flings.

What is, by the way, the function of the pervasive office of spin doctors, in politics, if not to turn eggheads and geeks into manly men and womanly women in the eyes of the public?

4/ Fourth, if a large penis is of any relevance for a man's attractiveness as a short-term partner, which after reading Baker ("females should prefer to mate with males who will give them male descendants with a penis more efficient at removing a rival's sperm (HSC, 174)") I believed

was the case, then the same trade-off as just exposed makes high-status men uncompetitive on the short-term partners market.

Baker has corrected me on this point as to his real meaning: “Regarding large and small penises (and testes) I simply refer back to my conclusion in *Sperm Wars* and *Human Sperm Competition*. The size distribution of both in the population is fixed by evolution at the stable situation where each gains the same advantage. In which case there is no need for anybody to be envious or gloat. The average and distribution of sizes will differ in different populations because the selective pressures are different, thus shifting the ESS [evolutionarily stable strategy] in one or other direction accordingly. But each size distribution should be adaptive to the local conditions. Everybody is equal except during phases that the pressures change and evolution starts shifting the equilibrium point. Only during those phases is there an advantage in being larger or smaller.”

One explanation for the size distribution and equilibrium evoked by Baker in this remark could be provided by the springboard model itself: If women marry small-penised brainiacs for their status and resources and at the same time look for large-penised studs in order to give birth to “sexy sons” (Breiling & Buss), such dual behavior would maintain some fairly constant size distribution among any given population, if children are sired by both husbands and lovers.

One confirmation of the hormonal trade-off alluded to is provided by a comparison of both penis size and IQ for Mongoloids and Caucasoids. According to Baker & Bellis (HSC 169), average penis size is 10-14 cm for Mongoloids and 14-15 cm for Caucasoids (with a difference also noticeable as to testes’ weight). Now, world records on IQ are: Singapore (108), Hong-Kong (108), South Korea (106), North Korea (106), Japan (105), China (105), and Taiwan (105); compared with US (98), UK (100), France (98), Germany (99), Spain (98), Italy (102) (Lynn, 2011).

(Baker writes, as quoted above: “each size distribution should be adaptive to the local conditions.” Does it imply that a difference in penis size should be found between Northern and Southern Mongoloids? Except Singapore, Southern Asian nations score less well on IQ measurements than Northern Asian nations. Environmental conditions certainly play a role. If we take Singapore, world record at 108, for instance, the country’s ethnic background is as follows: Chinese 76%, Malay 12%, Indian 9%; IQ by country for these populations: China (& Taiwan) 105, Malaysia (& Brunei) 92, India (& Pakistan & Sri Lanka) 82; expected IQ for Singapore based on ethnicity alone would be $105(.76) + 92(.12) + 82(.09) = 98$. If IQ really measures intelligence as the capacity to learn (cause) and not a level of education (effect), then it is not education that can play the major environmental role, but other things such as nutrition, climate...)

Some great minds, based on the medical knowledge of their time, already had the notion of a trade-off between penis size and intellectual capacities. Strindberg, in his book *Vivisections* (a book he wrote in French – a rather clumsy French), said: « *les organes générateurs se rétrécissent, lorsque l’homme d’élite n’est pas un animal reproducteur et que le besoin sexuel doit être un passe-temps pour lui, vivant sans famille. Hürtel : Anatomie II : 69. « Chez des hommes forts il est très petit ; chez des poltrons et onanistes bien grand. D’une longueur remarquable chez les Crétins. » Les statues antiques semblent prouver cette théorie. Dans la France, le pays culturel, cet organe est plus petit que chez les autres nations. Voir : les dimensions des préventives. »* (“The organs of generation shrink in the case of the elite man who is no longer a reproducing animal and for whom, living without family, sexual needs are

only a pastime. In his *Anatomie* II: 69, Hürtel states that ‘strong men have it very small; cowards and onanists quite large. It is remarkably large by cretins.’ Statues of the antiquity seem to prove this theory. In France, the country of culture, that organ is smaller than in the other nations, as attested by the dimensions of preservatives.”)

5/ Fifth, May-December marriages, so-called, certainly occur more frequently for high-status men. Some of these men marry late because they want to achieve status before, and that takes long years of studies and a strong commitment to one’s career. Some marry at the same age as others but they may divorce and remarry later. Whatever his age, a high-status man has the financial means to attract a young wife. However, “when a man is substantially older than his partner, he may be especially vulnerable to being cuckolded and abandoned for two reasons. First, women usually want men who are only a few years older than they are, not men substantially older. Women married to much older men may therefore have a desire that remains unfulfilled. Second, a young wife is likely to elicit more interest from other men, opening up more frequent opportunities to switch mates.” (D. Buss, pp. 126-7). If a man much older than his wife is more likely to be cuckolded, and if it is true that a man much older than his wife is more likely to be a mogul, then credence to Buunk et al.’s assertion is further undermined. (As to the first reason advanced by Buss here, it is consistent with common sense but all the science of sex I have absorbed makes me find it difficult to see the reason behind it – being observed that Buss offers no explanation at all. It may be a consequence of evolved “mate insurance” strategies.)

All this hints at high-status men standing high on the wedding (springboard) market but being discarded as possible short-term lovers.

6/ Now, that “some men have a higher chance of being cuckolded than others, and it is those of low wealth and status that fare worst,” should depend, according to what has just been said, on low-status men’s sexiness and physical attractiveness, and, in fact, according to the same trade-off alluded to above, these men may score rather high on both, as well as on penis size and manliness in general, so they would be much thought-after by married women for one-off flings. Provided, that is, they be not gangrened by too high levels of cortisol (the stress hormone).

In any case, when looking for (or falling for) a short-term lover, women are not after the same traits that make the ideal husband, so if it is high status that makes the ideal husband, the only way for the fact that low-status men be more cuckolded than high-status men to be true would be that the same set of men possess all the required endowments for both marriage and one-night flings.

7/ Last but not least, cuckolding a poor devil does not seem as evolutionarily sound –because the possible offspring is more likely to be raised in a dysfunctional home that will impair their prospects in life– as cuckolding a mogul, because then the lover’s offspring will benefit from the mogul’s wealth. So, even if in general unlawful inseminators are high-status men, there still is that incentive to cuckold men from the same set, which would contradict the second part of the assertion. The more I think about it, the more I rate the incentive as very strong.

Spousal Rape As Legal Object

Imagine for a moment you're a mogul and married to a beautiful young woman, the jewel of her sex. The only problem is: She has made a springboard of you. And not only that, but also: There is nothing you can do about it. You may divorce but if you remarry the situation will be the same: There is nothing you can do in the bonds of matrimony. Please follow my reasoning.

"Women, of course, can experience sexual desire at any phase of their cycle. Nonetheless, they are five times more likely to experience sexual desire when they are ovulating than when they are not." (Buss, p. 21). Furthermore, "Women who stray tend to time their sexual liaisons with their affair partners to coincide with the peak of their sexual desire, when they are most likely to conceive. Sex with husbands, in sharp contrast, is more likely to occur when women are *not* ovulating, a strategy that may be aimed at keeping a man rather than conceiving with him." (*ibid.*) These conclusions are the outcome of "the most extensive study of ovulation and women's sexuality," in the course of which "several thousand married women were asked to record their sexual desires every day for a period of twenty-four months." (*ibid.*, p. 20).

No need to take great lengths of rhetoric –for the results talk by themselves– to make it clear that the only way at your disposal to impregnate your legal wife is to force copulation on her. Because if you always let her choose, and never ignore a refusal, then you will be stuck inside the infertile phase of her cycles and the children she will beget and you will raise will not be yours. (Buss is only talking of the "women who stray," of course.)

For all the good intentions that may lie at the core of spousal rape legislation and the chilling stories of domestic battering and abuse that have prompted such measures, one cannot help thinking they happen to be a fine tool for the enslavement of men. The creation of spousal rape as a legal object makes women's strategy unbeatable and the man utterly defenseless against it.

Orgasm Again

The topic has been treated at rather great lengths in previous chapters. Baker's view runs contrary to a firmly grounded popular notion in a radical way. According to him, copulatory female orgasm allows the woman to privilege, in sperm competition, the man with whom she orgasms by insuring a better retention of his sperm inside her tract. The question I have so far failed to ask is: What is man's role in the operation? In such a depiction, it seems that, contrary to popular belief, the man does not 'make the woman come,' but rather that she makes up her mind beforehand that she wants to advantage that man in sperm competition, that is to improve his chances of siring a child with her and that this requires that she 'come.' In other words, if the woman wants to privilege one man she orgasms with that man, otherwise she does not orgasm. Male performance vanishes from the scene.

Is premature ejaculation, then, not a problem? Imagine that, after a few preliminaries needed to lubricate the genital tract and penetrate it in proper conditions of moisturization (that may be via kissing merely), you ejaculate five seconds after intromission. Does it leave the woman who wants to favor your sperm enough time to orgasm? One would be tempted to conclude, following Baker's view, that women cannot be willing to privilege such men, that by their very nature they cannot help wanting to privilege copulatory performant men – a sort of pre-established harmony. Otherwise male performance must play a part, which remains undefined in Baker's picture. The decision to favor a man may occur during intercourse, the woman considering (consciously or not) that his performance entitles him to be favored in his reproductive goals. In this way, orgasm would be a tool in the woman's hands but its usage would depend on the man's performance – needless to say, such interpretation leaves no room for the notion of copulatory orgasm as a female strategy: the man makes the woman come and forces her to retain more of his sperm. Baker's findings would then amount to this: Performant men's sperm gets pole position inside the female tract, and his own interpretation, about female strategies, would be unwarranted.

Baker probably discarded such interpretations as mine because, if correct, the question as to how female orgasm evolved in the first place would be quite complex, the whole matter quite puzzling. However, this would not be the first case of this kind: "The hymen is one of the great unsolved mysteries of human anatomy. I know of no plausible hypothesis for any physiological function it may serve, and I know of no other organ in the animal kingdom evolved inevitably to be injured. ... Historically, male dominated-societies have universally evolved politics that reinforce individual anticuckoldry adaptations and have instituted a variety of new practices that serve this function. Very recent social institutions evolved in the context of sperm competition may even have selected a female structure, the hymen, that is unique to humans." (R. L. Smith in SCH 103 & 110). With hymen, then, we would have a female body part evolved as dictated by mate guarding requirements, i.e. for the sake of male control. Similarly, female orgasm could be a female function evolved for the sake of performant males' success and control.

Sperm-Improving Pornography

Research on sperm competition has shown that viewing hardcore polyandrous pornography results in sperm improvement. "Interestingly, even though men will often state that one of their most frequent fantasies is to have sex with multiple women simultaneously, many pornographic movies are just as likely (if not more so) to show multiple men sharing one woman ... Evolutionary psychologist Nicholas Pound provided a compelling explanation for this otherwise recurrent image in pornographic movies. He argued that males in numerous species become sexually aroused at the sight of another male mating with a female. In other words, the presence of other males serves as an excitatory visual clue. It would appear that the possibility of sperm competition between rival males gets men to rise –literally– to the occasion. ... It seems unequivocal that men find sexual images laden with implications of sperm competition to be visually arousing. That said, if one were to discover that such images actually have an effect on men's sperm motility... now that would be something to get excited about! This is exactly what Sarah J. Kilgallon and Leigh W. Simmons found. They provided men with sexual images that cue sperm competition (two men with one woman) or alternate images that

did not (three women). The men masturbated while watching the images, and subsequently provided the researchers with the fruits of their manual labor. Two key semen metrics were analyzed: sperm motility and sperm density. Amazingly, Kilgallon and Simmons found that the sexual image that cued sperm competition yielded sperm samples that possessed greater motility (though sperm density was lesser in those samples).” (Gad Saad, *The Consuming Instinct*, 2011, pp. 248-50).

A good news for the industry, doubtless, for it now can advertise and sell its most hardcore productions as sperm-improving merchandise. As sex in an evolutionary sense is competition and pornography consumption may provide a manifest advantage, unsuspected so far, what man will dare dispense with it?

I have already exposed my views on the phenomenon, centered about the notion of silver-screen conditioning, for movie screens, the same as crystal-screen conditioning (from a Thai name for television, จอแก้ว, tjo-keo, crystal screen), and sexploitation, subliminal or otherwise, by advertisers as conditioning a form of fetishism, *in the true psychiatric sense*, for merchandises. I would also like to refer to Deirdre Barrett’s book *Supernormal Stimuli* (already quoted), which explains how pornography fits in the category of such stimuli. She talks of a “wanker nation” (the US) and of the increasing number of men who consult therapists in the hope to be freed from an addiction to porn. In the same way that cheap fatty and/or sweet food is responsible for the current pandemic of obesity, easy access to pornography is triggering a mental pandemic. Like obese men and women, the most affected from a young age on will remove their genes from the surface of this earth, stuck to practices of hours-long stop-and-go masturbation in a universe of surgically improved (supernormal) sex attributes. Their sperm’s motility will have been improved in vain.

P.S. The book by David Buss here quoted is *The Dangerous passion: why jealousy is as necessary as love and sex* (2000). Robin Baker’s name and works are cited on several occasions: pp. 17-8 (notes), 170-2, & 216 (notes).

7

How To Make Successful Children Without Parenting & More Data

How To Make Successful Children Without Parenting: A Practical Guide

1/ Cuckold rich men so your children will benefit from the men's wealth. Cuckolding poor devils is not as advantageous and should only be done for the fun of it (too much of that, though, can damage your reputation of seriousness).

2/ Impregnate daughters of wealthy liberals, who will not disown them when you send them back alone and pregnant (with or without your compliments), so your children will benefit from the parents' wealth.

3/ Impregnate –and leave at once– career women (organization women), if you can bear the tediousness of courting them in the first place.

4/ Donate regularly to sperm banks attended by wealthy people. In this manner you will write an evolutionary success story without incurring the costs of parenting, which are as follows:

i/ Parenting is an expense of time and resources.

ii/ Parenting decreases testosterone levels. “Testosterone levels go down when a person gets married, and they decrease even further after the birth of a child.” (Kenrick & Griskevicius, *The Rational Animal*, 2013). You need your testosterone for every situation in life except parenting.

iii/ Parenting leads to cowardice and conformism. In part this is due to the decrease in testosterone levels (ii), but it also exposes you to permanent blackmail regarding your children's interests.

iv/ Parenting in the nuclear family freezes men into routine – cattlelike routine, as the German philosopher would say: “The reason why the habits of another man elicit our loathing is that the animal transpires too much in a person led instinctively by the rule of habituation as if by another (non-human) nature and who thus runs the risk to fall in one and the same class with cattle.”† (Kant, *Anthropologie*, I, 1, § 12, my translation)

v/ Parenting, via the institution of matrimony, is aimed at the enslavement of men. As implied in Chapter 6, marriage in the past was tacitly understood as the contract by which a man was free to force copulation on a woman in order not to be stuck in the infertile phase of her cycles – being stressed that the Ogino-Knaus method of natural contraception, endorsed by the Catholic church as an alternative to mechanical or chemical contraceptives, cannot work: “the human menstrual cycle is nowhere near as predictable as many people think” (Baker, SW 112).

The legal invention of spousal rape has suppressed –or is at the very least deterring– the possibility of forcing copulation on one's wife thanks to which the man would make his best to insure he raises children of his own. Moreover, a woman's infidelity is not always recognized as a breach of contract incurring the sanction of the law: “a divorced man is, in many

jurisdictions, required to continue making child-support payments, even if DNA tests establish that he is not the biological father of a child born during his marriage.” (Kenrick & Griskevicius 2013) Given these, one wonders whether Kenrick & Griskevicius here quoted were right to name their book “the *rational* animal.” Men who marry are dupes and suckers.

vi/ Parenting is largely detrimental to paternity. We have already seen that women who stray are more likely to conceive with their lovers than with their long-term partners. Another factor to take into account is the woman’s immune system: “Conceivably, antibodies produced by married women may be specific to husbands’ sperm. This raises the discomfiting possibility (for married men) that the gametes of facultative mates may enjoy a competitive advantage over those of husbands’ handicapped by wives’ immune systems. Significantly, ‘condom therapy,’ [for the treatment of infertility] that shields wives from exposure to husbands’ sperm for a period of several months, apparently halts production of antibodies and causes reduced female titers of sperm agglutinating and immobilizing factors (Kay 1977).” (R. L. Smith, in SCH)

The figures of children raised by a man different from their biological father (without the latter being conscious of it) have been already given: between 10 and 15 percent in industrial societies. There may be a problem with the figures because other sources state that, in societies where promiscuity is high (extramarital sex is common), such as the !Kung of Botswana or the Yanomami of the Amazon, the figures, according to the same researchers who stress the promiscuity prevalent in these societies, are 8-9% (R. L. Smith, SCH 80). If 8-9% is a valid figure in promiscuous contexts, how should we interpret a 10-15% figure?

An appraisal of the opportunities of female polyandry in our societies appears useful. David Buss considers that these opportunities have increased from man’s environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA) up to the present day, with respect to 1/ housing and 2/ woman’s independence.

1/ With respect to housing: “We inhabit a social landscape that is forever changed from the Stone Age world in which our sexual psychology evolved [the EEA]. The anonymity of large city living creates more opportunities to carry out affairs undiscovered, compared with the small group living arrangements of our prehistoric ancestors in which it was hard to conceal a sneeze, much less a torrid affair.” (D. Buss, *The Dangerous Passion*, 2000). The passage’s scope is more general than just housing, but “the small group living arrangements” alluded to refer to living in caves or on small tracts of land, perhaps with enclosure. As far as I’m concerned, I hear my neighbors sneeze through the walls, and this has been the case in all the apartments I have been living in after I left my parents’ house twenty years ago. Furthermore, the flat above my head is rented to occasional tourists and I am aware, as they have no clue or do not care, when the people getting in are having a “torrid affair,” like in a hotel room. Long-term neighbors are compelled to discretion (no screaming, no moaning) in order to avoid drawing their neighbor’s, just the same as their children’s attention (and their neighbors’ children’s), and I believe the situation is the same for virtually all flats older than fifteen years in this town (Paris). (Perhaps not including apartments permanently exposed to strong traffic noise.)

This empirical and limited evidence is confirmed by the study on American suburbia by William H. Whyte in his deservedly famous *Organization Man* (1956): “Personal morals? The court is the greatest invention since the chastity belt.” The reason for this lies in thin walls common to row houses (semi-detached). Such arrangements are very cavellike: people hear each other sneeze all the time. The question then turns out to be: Is Dr Buss pulling our leg?

Among ancient Greeks, a common wall for two houses was a forbidden arrangement. Overcrowded compounds developed among the Romans to lodge an ever-increasing, permanently unemployed urban proletariat, while the patricians maintained the Greek tradition of isolated manors in the country (villas). The present-day megalopolis is a further development of proletarian compounds, and cavelike.

2/ Whatever the housing, sexual intercourse still can take place unnoticed, due to either stealth or secluded and/or impersonal settings. Contemporary women's independence may well offer numerous opportunities in this respect, especially the fact that they have entered the workplace (when the economy had already ceased to create jobs): "In the modern sexually integrated workplace, men and women who share similar interests work side by side for eight or more hours each day. Repeated workplace flirtations flower into perilous passions." (Buss 2000)

Another consequence of women working is the drastic decline of breast-feeding. An argument of opponents to breast-feeding is precisely that it is incompatible with the pursuing of careers by women. When a woman returns to work after a pregnancy, she cannot breastfeed her baby while she is at work. Overlooking this reason behind the widespread opposition to it, in his book *Baby Wars* Dr Baker makes a strong case for breast-feeding, given its many advantages: "Studies that have divided breast-fed babies into categories based on length of breast-feeding have found that those breast-fed the longest did best in terms of avoiding diseases such as gastrointestinal illness, upper respiratory illness, multiple sclerosis, diabetes and heart disease. Also, the babies nursed the longest scored the highest in IQ tests." (BW 90) & "One benefit of breast-feeding...is its influence on a woman's ability to regain her pre-pregnancy weight, shape and attractiveness. Even more seriously, breast-feeding influences a woman's chances of developing breast cancer." (BW 98)

Seduction or Hysteria?

The present section is an annex to the appraisal of infidelity opportunities. Its title consists of two archaisms. The first (seduction) was sometimes used in the sense of rape, especially in the legal jargon. The second (hysteria) refers to a discarded pathology.

A not so remote affair in France (the 2004-05 Outreau trial) involved several children accusing a number of adults of repeated pedophilic acts (a pedophile ring); after a first judgment convicting several adults, the public learnt that the children had lied. A similar topic was already hot in the nineteenth century, as the sex war raged in tribunals by proxy of rapist males and blackmailing or fantasizing females. It was claimed that manipulation by adults, hysteria, as well as personal interest and spite, would provide the ground for frequent false accusations by children and women against innocent men.

In England, Dr Lawson Tait was commissioned to produce a report on false accusations of rape (published in 1893). His conclusions were that women had a powerful weapon at their disposal and so were to be expected to use it: "Matters are such...that however men may laugh at it and make jokes, they do not willingly travel with single unknown female companions in railway carriages. They know very well that for a man to have the finger of a woman pointed at him with a charge of a sexual offence is to secure that man's extinction, no matter what the

verdict of a jury may be.” (Quoted in *The Legal Subjection of Men*, 1896, by Ernest Belfort Bax, who adds: “A woman can accuse a man of sexual irregularities with absolute impunity. But it is not to be supposed that he is to have a like privilege. A special statute (Slander of Women Act) passed a few years ago, makes such slander of a woman actionable.”) This report, and the book which quotes it, by a Socialist essayist†† who also authored a manifesto jointly with William Morris, may be a case of male chauvinism at its worst, covering the acts of rapists – or it may not.


What the society thinks of herself (let us give it the feminine gender) and of the practices in her bosom, the way she apprehends and analyses them, retroacts on her. When she publicizes the idea that women have an interest in making false accusations, she incites men to commit rapes because the probability to escape condemnation increases (juries and judges are “primed”). On the other hand, when she publicizes the idea that man is a sexual predator, she incites women to make false accusations (e.g. as blackmail). When one priming is stronger than the other, the opposite tendency takes advantage. When one tendency is stronger than the other (men are more predators than women are blackmailers or vice-versa) and at the same time the society is convinced that the other tendency is stronger and must be thwarted, or even the society remains neutral, then the stronger tendency maintains its position to the detriment of victims, because juries and judges are rarely above holistic perceptions of the society on herself, even in the presence of evidence.

In his time, the revolution in Sigmund Freud’s thinking, abandoning his “seduction theory” for the view that hysterical and neurotic women’s memories of seduction from childhood are fantasies (and symptoms), may have been influenced by this debate and by the extant documentation on false accusations of seduction (including by hysterics, as reported by French Dr Brouardel: cf Ernest B. Bax).

Woman’s Anatomy

Evolutionary biology has explained the function of the different parts of woman’s anatomy and why men are attracted toward some traits rather than others: these traits are markers for fertility and good child-rearing. For instance, “Whereas the babies of other primates can cling to their mother’s body hair as they travel, human babies and infants tend to perch on their mother’s hip, supported by a restraining arm. Hips *are* perches. This is why the ideal female shape...gives a waist considerably small than the hips and why males have been programmed to find such a shape attractive.” (Baker, BW 101). And female breasts are made of soft tissue because they serve as airbags (BW).

Hips are perches and *steatopygia*, a characteristic of (among others) prehistoric Venus figurines, is a driver’s stand (see picture below).



Footnotes

† „Die Ursache der Erregung des Ekels, den die Angewohnheit eines andern in uns erregt, ist, weil das Tier hier gar zu sehr aus dem Menschen hervorspringt, das instinktmäßig nach der Regel der Angewöhnung gleich als eine andere (nichtmenschliche) Natur geleitet wird und so Gefahr läuft, mit dem Vieh in eine und dieselbe Klasse zu geraten.“

†† No less than George Bernard Shaw recommended the man to me: “I hardly noticed Schopenhauer’s disparagements of women when they came under my notice later on, so thoroughly had Bax familiarized me with the homoist attitude, and forced me to recognize the extent to which public opinion, and consequently legislation and jurisprudence, is corrupted by feminist sentiment.” (Preface to *Major Barbara*, 1906)

8

The Science of Porn and Other Stuffing

We prefer our pets to other people and that's fair. You know what it costs you to take care of a pet, but you don't know what it may cost you to let another man live.

Pornology

The present section is dedicated to my friend X (an appropriate pseudonym), famous in the whole seventh arrondissement of Paris for having said: "I'm not interested in sex, only in porn."

Dr Robin Baker wrote: "Sex is everywhere, from Web to television." It will be our privilege to see that, when he wrote this, in 2006, sex was almost nowhere. It is us who will know what it means to say that sex is everywhere. (One major reason can be found in "Sperm-Improving Pornography," Chapter 6). In the same way that exposure to commercial messages rose from 1,000 per day in 1989 to 10,000 per day in 2007 (a 900 percent increase in about twenty years)[†], we shall witness an exponential increase in exposure to pornographic material in the next decades. (Those complaining that they just can't turn their eyes somewhere without being flashed porn, will be instructed to respect people's choice and freedom.)

Porn is free (just type "porn" in your browser and enjoy). As advertisements on porn websites are still porn, in a way porn is even ad-free: You could watch the ads merely and still be enjoying porn. Porn is free and ad-free. What economics is that?

Product placement in porn: You could have the male performer wear nothing during the performance but a conspicuous pair of Nike sneakers for instance (the red ones). Masturbation conditioning is very efficient (cf Rachman, Eysenck). Let a man masturbate to ejaculation repeatedly on porn scenes with product placement and he will afterwards "salivate" at the mere sight of the products on store displays. But brands don't do that, I am told. Although they often enough rely on sexploitation in their advertising –with sycophants warning us to refrain from ejaculating outcries because there is no such thing as bad publicity–, they are very shy, then, when it comes to making use of the possibilities open to them with porn. What are they waiting for? Are they not after the money?

Mass media civilization means psychoticism, because mass media are conditioning maladaptive sexuality (crystal screen sexploitation conditioning), and psychotics, according to Eysenck, are the least conditionable.

"Research suggests that sexual content in still pictures elicits automatic attention in viewers." (Annie Lang et al., in *Sex in Advertising*, 2003, ed. Tom Reichert & Jacqueline Lambiase) Evolution theory predicts that this will be true for men more than for women: "Symons proposed that the primary adaptations responsible for the occurrence of rape were the mechanisms involved in *the human male's greater visual sexual arousal* [my emphasis], greater

autonomous sex drive, reduced ability to abstain from sexual activity, much greater desire for sexual diversity per se, greater willingness to engage in impersonal sex, and less discriminating criteria for sexual partners.” (Thornhill & Palmer, *A Natural History of Rape*, 2000) Given these adaptations, porn is a male-impacting conditioning technology from which women are largely immune. The more porn addiction is consuming men’s time, the more men are removed from the social process, a tendency consistent with the idea that, as social progress means furthering the eradication of war and violence in human relationships, it implies the subjection of the most violent sex of the two.

“Rankings by Internet audience-tracking services ignore the popularity of such sites [porn sites].” (J. Lambiase, in *Sex in Advertising*). However, “Alexa Research found *sex* to be the most popular search term between March 1999 and January 2001, based on more than 42 million search pages viewed in aggregate by users at 10 portal or search engine Web sites.” (*ibid.*)

Sex is everywhere? We have seen nothing yet.

When my friend X (an appropriate pseudonym) said “I’m not interested in sex, only in porn,” I told him he couldn’t make babies by simply watching porn. He answered: “I’ve always fancied making children was something people had to be induced to by state help. As a rule the state taxes success. Progressive income tax is a tax on natural endowments, you know. We are a meritocracy that likes to load merit down. Here, however, by giving family policy money to all but the childless, the state remunerates reproductive success and taxes failure. This is madness.” Something along those lines. I think he’s barney.

Caciquismo and Reproductive Inequalities

More data on the question of who’s having the greater number of children, the poor or the rich (men). For the previous discussion of this topic, see, among other stuff, Chapters 5 and 6.

“A study that matched men and children based on seven blood types documented precisely how much more risk men lacking resources run of being genetically cuckolded. Of men in the highest socioeconomic bracket, only 2 percent of the children had fathers other than the putative father. Among the middle class, the genetic-cuckoldry rate rose to 12 percent. And among the lower class, the genetic-cuckoldry rate rose to 20 percent. Since genetic cuckoldry can only occur when women have affairs, it’s clear that men lacking resources experience more paternity uncertainty.” (David Buss, *The Murderer Next Door*, 2005).

The source is a study on a Mexican population (Cerdeña-Flores, Barton, Marty-Gonzalez, Rivas & Chakraborty, “Estimation of Nonpaternity in the Mexican Population of Nuevo Leon: A Validation Study with Blood Group Markers,” *American Journal of Physical Anthropology*, vol. 109, 1999). Apparently, Buss has no hesitation in generalizing these findings to Western societies. Mexico is an interesting country (I lived there as a child) but personally I would be more cautious about generalizing the results, if “developmental causes” (causal input from genes *and* environment) make any sense. Truly, Nuevo Leon is a rather advanced state in the

country, with the same standard of living (according to Wikipedia) as Croatia or Poland, but the wealth and activity are concentrated in the state capital, Monterrey, the remaining parts being rural, poor, and probably very traditionally minded; so, much depends on the sample.

By traditionally minded, I mean traditional Mexican *caciquismo*, where high-status men must not be expected to be more literate nor articulate nor knowledgeable than other men. In traditional societies IQ is more widespread across social classes, in advanced societies more concentrated in the upper classes (this is “meritocracy,” cf Herrnstein & Murray 1994); and high IQ associates with traits such as restraint, conscientiousness, etc. Convincing data would be the correlation between symmetry (low fluctuating asymmetry) and status: if negative, or insignificant, I must be right because the springboard effect (see Chapter 6) must then be strong, the duality of women’s strategy must be great, they would cuckold the rich with the poor. In any case, developmental causes should make us cautious about generalizing results from one population to another.

My expectation as to the correlation between symmetry and status is that it is negative, but it seems that evolutionary psychologists’ expectation is the reverse. For instance, when Thornhill and Palmer equate symmetry with “greater social dominance,” one is led to think that symmetry means high status, but here is what they write: “That symmetric men appear to engage in more fights with other men than asymmetric men do may be due to their greater social dominance and their larger body size.” (*A Natural History of Rape*). Seemingly, Thornhill and Palmer equate social dominance with fistfight. As fistfight, however, is a clear sign that the endowments enabling one to cope with our societies’ high-status requirements are lacking, I cannot equate social dominance, in that case, with high status. We would be dealing only with the fringe, with gangsters and the like, people whose peculiar talents may enable them to secure resources and (what kind of) women, but not in the daylight nor in the broad arena.

If, now, by “fight” is meant economic or political competition, then as nowadays both take place in the context of cooperative organizations whose recruitment is based on academic degrees and where the characteristics of symmetric men are at a disadvantage –are simply not welcome–, the contention makes no sense at all. The myth that aggressiveness and “maleness” are requirements of top-management activities is a relic of a vanished past, sustained by media spin. Top managers of our private-public technostructure have solid records of geek compliance from Ivy League, Oxbridge, *grandes écoles*, and the like. Seeing them, based on spin and old adaptations, as *caciques* will not help understand the world we live in.

Rape and Recantations

In Chapter 7, I dealt with the debate regarding false accusations of rape by women in nineteenth-century Britain. With awe and shivers, I even stated that the whole affair might not merely be the display of rancid male chauvinism expected from such ages of darkness. Even evolutionary psychologists have not dared go that far and, tormented by guilt, I was about to recant.

The main point in my doubt was that those male chauvinists did not seem to be at all aware of the fact that it is costly for a woman to advertise herself as having being raped. For

instance, “Many men whose partners have been raped express the feeling that they are now left with ‘damaged goods.’ They report that they cannot bear the thought of remaining with a woman who has been sexually violated by another man. According to one study, more than 80 percent of couples in which the woman was raped during the relationship end up breaking up.” (D. Buss, *The Murderer Next Door*). That, among other things, would make a false accusation of rape very costly to the woman, whatever her goals may be for lying.

However, new data came to my attention which shows that such false accusations are still frequent. “A careful study of 109 rape cases in the United States found 41 percent of rape accusations to be false as evidenced by the women’s own recantations (Kanin 1994).” (Thornhill and Palmer, *A Natural History of Rape*). The lie could be the recantation itself rather than the accusation, when the woman becomes aware afterwards of the cost to her fitness of being known or perceived as a rape victim. Still, these numerous recantations cannot all be lies (can they) and we remain with a significant number of false accusations, so much more puzzling because of their cost to the women themselves. Thornhill and Palmer go on saying: “The women studied gave three reasons for their false reports: providing an alibi for a consensual encounter that might have led to pregnancy, seeking revenge against a rejecting consensual male partner and obtaining sympathy and attention from kin and/or friends. Kanin emphasizes that false rape allegations ‘reflect desperate efforts to cope with personal and social stress situations’.” (*ibid.*) In the face of this new evidence, there is no recanting possible.

According to Thornhill and Palmer, 13 percent of American women over eighteen report having being raped at least once in their life (from Kilpatrick et al. 1992, for the National Victim Center, Arlington, Virginia). They add: “Kilpatrick et al. estimate the percentage of rapes of women not reported at between 66 and 84.” This leads to vertiginous figures for, if 13 percent is correct, then, with a 84 percent figure of rapes unreported, the percentage of women actually raped would be 81.25; with 66 percent unreported, it would be 38.2††. Thus, the number of women raped in America would lie somewhere between about four and more than eight out of ten. In comparison, the *International Statistics on Crime and Justice* (2010) by the United Nations give a reported rape rate for US of 28.6 per 100,000 people (source Wikipedia), that is, 0.0286 percent. Who’s pulling our leg? Such fantastic discrepancies in official sources are very disturbing.

Footnotes

†“According to the industry house organ *Advertising Age*, the average North American perceives some 1,000 ads daily.” (W. B. Key 1989) & “People are inundated daily by an average of 10,000 sales messages” (Renvoisé and Morin 2007).

††If 84% of rapes are unreported, the 13 women out of a hundred who report having being raped are only 16% of all actual cases of rape, and in reality $1,300/16 = 81.25\%$ of American women would have been raped (with some degree of correction for women being raped several times over their lifetime). If 66% are unreported, the actual number of raped women is $1,300/34 = 38.2\%$. (Maybe this little calculation is in fact irrelevant. If a young woman is raped, under threat not to talk, once every other day by her stepfather for years, that makes thousands of

rapes but one victim. But, in that case, the supposed figures for unreported rapes are not much relevant either.)

Dr Satoshi Kanazawa's Intelligence Paradox

According to Dr Satoshi Kanazawa (London School of Economics) in his book *The Intelligence Paradox: Why the intelligent choice isn't always the smart one* (2012), general intelligence is, in evolutionary terms, the faculty to deal with “*novel and nonrecurrent* adaptive problems.” He argues that in the African savanna where humanity's ancestors evolved till the relatively recent (at evolution scale) advent of agriculture, the use of general intelligence was limited to such one-off, isolated problems, and consequently selection pressure upon the development of intelligence did not exist in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA). He further contends that in our modern man-made environments the capacity to deal with novel and nonrecurrent problems has become of utmost importance, yet this capacity, i.e. general intelligence, is not the best way to solve the general adaptive problems mankind still faces. The most important of these general adaptive problems is optimizing one's fitness via mating, the coping with which relies on specific regions of the brain different from those in charge of intellect: namely, those in charge of emotions, or instincts.

There is something quite intuitive in the idea. Often enough people perceived as extremely intelligent tend to be derided by their peers as geeks or eggheads. Culture and mass culture frequently display funny characters who are very intellectual and at the same time awkward in many respects, such as Murray in the TV series *Riptide*; among my circle of school friends, to call someone “Murray,” based on the series, was one way to mock an awkward guy, especially one who would fail to achieve anything outside the classroom.

Yet, no matter how intuitive, such a view runs counter to one tenet of evolutionary psychology (EP) –a field to which Kanazawa's book belongs–, namely that high-status males are more reproductively successful than other males. In the view of EP, the Murrys of the world are the greatest womanizers, because it is general intelligence that has become the principal highway to status in our modern man-made environments.

By presenting Kanazawa's intelligence paradox in the terms above, I don't do him justice, although that would render rather well his book's subtitle “why the intelligent choice isn't always the smart one,” but I have found myself in a quandary since I have wished to discuss his book, because of several inconsistencies.

The intelligence paradox is based on what Kanazawa calls “the Savanna-IQ Interaction Hypothesis,” that reads as follows: “Less intelligent individuals have greater difficulty comprehending and dealing with evolutionarily novel entities and situations that did not exist in the ancestral environment than more intelligent individuals. In contrast, general intelligence does not affect individuals' ability to comprehend and deal with evolutionarily familiar entities and situations that existed in the ancestral environment.” (p. 56)

Given this hypothesis, the intelligent choice is out of reach for the smart brain whereas neither the smart nor, by definition, the intelligent choice is out of reach for the intelligent brain, although the intelligent brain may or may not make smart choices (smart is defined as the way to cope successfully with “evolutionary familiar situations”). So far, so good. But the negative relationship I have been talking about (that intelligent people are geeks wanting in smartness) is clearly alluded to in the title of chapter 12: “Why Intelligent People are the Ultimate Losers

in Life.” Relying on the Savanna-IQ Interaction Hypothesis, intelligent people should not be the ultimate losers, since their intelligence “does not affect their ability to comprehend and deal with evolutionarily familiar entities.” Moreover, if the hypothesis is true there should be no “intelligence paradox” at all, because smartness and intelligence would then be two uncorrelated abilities, whereas both the notion of a paradox and the idea that intelligent people are the ultimate losers in life imply a negative relationship. Let us look at some of Kanazawa’s contentions in more detail.

Homosexuality

According to Kanazawa, the intelligence paradox predicts that more intelligent people are more homosexual than the general population because homosexuality is not natural, it is not common among animals nor among contemporary tribes of hunter-gatherers: “Even though some form of homosexuality is observed in many species, the basic biological design of all mammalian species is heterosexual reproduction, and exclusive or predominant homosexuality is rare in nature.” (p. 127) Kanazawa then says the data shows homosexuals are more intelligent.

He does not say, unless I’m mistaken, that it is the exclusive homosexuals that are more intelligent, which is in fact what the paradox predicts, not that occasional homosexuals, or bisexuals, are more intelligent, because such behaviors being observed in many species, as Kanazawa acknowledges, one may argue they’re natural. This is what Robin Baker says: Homosexual behaviors are quite common among animals. Moreover, most homosexuals, Baker argues, are bisexual, only a minority of them are exclusive homosexuals (see ch. 2). The reason why exclusive homosexuality even exists is the same as why schizophrenia (according to Baker) exists, both at about 1% of the population: Both occur, namely, inside a process of *mutation-selection balance*. A gene mutation occurs that makes people exclusive homosexuals or schizophrenics and, as most of these individuals do not reproduce, selection prevents the mutation from being forwarded.

Other than exclusive forms of homosexuality are in fact strategic, they are a way to deal with familiar adaptive situations, and one finds these behaviors among animal species quite frequently, so the intelligence paradox would not predict that people engaged in such behaviors are more intelligent. In fact, the intelligence paradox cannot even predict that exclusive homosexuals are more intelligent if it does not predict at the same time that schizophrenics are more intelligent, nor that any people affected by severe genetic mutations that would make them unfit for the ancestral savanna are more intelligent.

Addictions

Certainly Kanazawa’s most astonishing contention is that the intelligence paradox predicts that intelligent people consume more drugs, alcohol and cigarettes because such consumption is not natural. On this score, he finds the results “somewhat equivocal” (p. 176),

still he is inclined to consider the prediction realized. On this particular point, I would first like to quote one of Kanazawa's mentors (named twice in the book's acknowledgments), Dr Richard Lynn, in his book *Dysgenics* (2011): "Cigarette smoking...is, like alcohol consumption, an expression of weak self-control over immediate impulse gratification." As I explain in Chapter 4, the Stanford Marshmallow Experiment shows that children with self-control are more intelligent for they get higher status later in life and intelligence is the principal highway to high status today. So, if the intelligence paradox predicts that intelligent people drink, smoke and take drugs more than others, it can safely be dumped.

However, does the paradox really predict such a thing? According to Kanazawa, smoking did not exist before the culture of tobacco, nor drinking before the advent of brewery and distillation, nor taking drugs before the development of refining techniques, in a word they could not exist before agriculture and were nonexistent in the African savanna. Yet, many tribes of hunter-gatherers are familiar with psychotropic substances they encounter in the course of their foraging activities, such as hallucinogenic mushrooms, so the dependence on agriculture seems erroneous. I am not categorical that our ancestors in the savanna knew such substances and consumed them; I am merely doing what EP scholars do when they try to describe the life of our ancestors, taking contemporary tribes of hunter-gatherers as the closest approximation.

The vocabulary of psychotropic and stimulating substances used by hunter-gatherers is quite extensive. In the Spanish language alone, I know the following terms, most of them being taken from the vernacular languages of Amerindian tribes: *achuma*, *ayahuasa* or *ayahuasca*, *bacuey* or *macuey* (aphrodisiac), *chamairo*, *chamico*, *cochizpacle*, *cocoyome*, *cojoba*, *colorín*, *curupa*, *frijolito* ("little bean"), *gasparito*, *jabí*, *jícure*, *masacoate* (name of a Mexican boa which flesh was consumed by Indians as an aphrodisiac), *ñorbito* (aphrodisiac), *paricá*, *peyote*, *pillunchuca*, *sumarique*, *señí*, *tacualispacle* or *clacualispacle* (aphrodisiac), *xtabentún*, *yagé*. (For more details on some of these words, see my blog glossary of Americanismos.)

If taking such drugs predates agriculture and was familiar in the EEA, the intelligence paradox cannot predict what Kanazawa says it does.

Mating

Kanazawa predicts that "more intelligent men (but not more intelligent women) value sexual exclusivity" (p. 97) –"having one sexual partner in a committed relationship" (p. 101)–, and the data proves him right. More intelligent men value sexual exclusivity because it's not natural since polygyny was rampant in the savanna, whereas for a woman, sharing her man with other women or not, she was supposed sexually exclusive to that man. Intelligent men are decent Murrays. So far, so good.

Yet, Kanazawa also finds that more intelligent men have more extramarital affairs (figure 7.2, p. 108), and here is his explanation: "Note that the Intelligence Paradox is about individual preferences and values, what people *desire* and *want* in their heads; it's not necessarily about what people actually do. If people have complete choice over their behavior, they are expected to pursue what they desire and want, but they do not always have such complete choice. And, when it comes to sex and mating, men have very little choice." (p. 109)

In other words, Dr. Kanazawa is telling us intelligent men desire to be monogynous but women force them to be polygynous.

He means that a man “has no realistic choice to say no” to a woman (p. 105). This is a rather audacious step from the finding of evolutionary biology regarding the differential biological costs of reproduction which imply males’ somewhat indiscriminate sexual outlook compared to females’ choosiness. I say it’s audacious because evolutionary biology also posits that males are urgent and females coy, which is not altogether the same proposition. In biological terms, if a male is not urgent –not proactive– no female will choose him. A man, thus, may be thought to always have the choice either to enter the arena (the lek) in the hope of being chosen or remain outside and attract no attention at all. Still, a man can desire to be monogynous, i.e. faithful, yet be induced into temptation and succumb to it in the course of his social interactions with many persons of the other sex, occasions allowing for the succumbing, without our being justified to call his behavior proactive in the proper sense. That would be, then, the lot of intelligent men, namely to be seduced by women, to be chosen by women without wanting to be chosen, and succumb because of males’ universal urgency.

So the question is: Are more intelligent men, although they desire to be monogynous and as a consequence are not urgent with women once they have got a partner, more likely to be chosen and induced into sex by women? According to Kanazawa, the answer is yes. As to this, I repeat here what I have said under the head of addictions, that more intelligent men also have more self-control, so if to begin with they desire to be monogynous although it’s not natural, they also are in a better position to resist succumbing, albeit that, too, is not natural.

But a more important question perhaps is about the attractiveness of intelligent men. According to Kanazawa, they are more attractive: “More intelligent individuals –both men and women– are on average physically more attractive than less intelligent individuals.” (p. 106). The source of this assertion is Kanazawa (2011) and Kanazawa & Kovar (2004), that is, papers from the same. As a complement, “more intelligent individuals –both men and women– are significantly taller than less intelligent individuals. And, once again, women prefer taller men as mates.” (p. 107) (Note that Kanazawa elsewhere says Asians are “slightly more intelligent than other races.” [p. 124]. As Asians are also shorter than other races, his findings on the relationship between height and intelligence must apply inside one race and not across races.)

As to intelligent women’s attractiveness, here is another distinct statement by Kanazawa, which he does not relate to the previous assertions even though they likely bear on the discussion: “modern British people are not very endogamous on intelligence [the talk is about the British because one of the three studies used by the author is the British National Child Development Study (NCDS), the other two being from US; these studies sometimes contradict one another, like in the case of correlations between IQ and smoking already mentioned]. More intelligent men do not appear to marry more intelligent women in the contemporary United Kingdom.” Given the fact that more intelligent men are supposed to be more attractive and that at least their status is no obstacle to attracting a partner (when it’s not the very reason that attracted the partner in the first place) because it is more likely to be high than not, one is entitled to conclude from this study that intelligent women are not physically attractive on the whole, contrary to quote p. 106 from the previous paragraph.

As to men’s attractiveness, I remind the reader of Chapter 6 of the present book, adding two remarks.

1/ Kanazawa et al.'s papers on attractiveness are based on judgments on photographs, "by two different judges." I suggest that such minimal tests may not be very convincing, especially since it is known that women's appreciation of men's attractiveness varies during the course of their menstrual cycle. Thornhill and Palmer write in their *Natural History of Rape* (2000): "Perret et al. (1998) report that women in their study found men's faces that were slightly feminized more attractive than men's faces that were highly masculine. Highly masculine faces show greater effects of testosterone. This is interpreted by the researchers as a female preference for men who will invest in women. However, the same research group found that women who are not on the pill (i.e., are having ovulatory cycles) and are at the fertile point of their cycle prefer the most masculinized faces." (203-4). The study alluded to posits a cyclic variation of individual women's preferences through time.

2/ Kanazawa finds more evidence for his stance in the following: "The evolutionary psychologist Geoffrey F. Miller has consistently argued that women preferentially select men with higher levels of intelligence to mate with. ... There appears to be some evidence for this suggestion. ... more intelligent men are significantly more likely to have ever been married and to be currently married at age 47 than less intelligent men." (184-5) This overlooks the irrelevance of marriage (or any other form of pair-bonding) to assess women's sexual preferences, according to the springboard model and the phenomenon of cuckoldry. Among Darwinian scholars, I have found so far that only Robin Baker does not overlook the predictable consequences of human sperm competition and female sexuality. Especially when intelligent men "are not very endogamous on intelligence" are they likely to be cuckolded by their partners because, as we shall see next, intelligent women are less eager to want children, consequently less eager to look for sexy sons' genes outside their pair.

In this discussion, Kanazawa surmises that more intelligent men value sexual exclusivity because it's not natural, but I think it depends more on how a male fares in sperm competition. If a male is uncompetitive, he would waste his time and energy in affairs, so he'd better invest in mate-guarding and parenting, as the good Murray he is. The fact that more intelligent men value sexual exclusivity proves my point right, that more intelligent men are meagerly endowed, virilely speaking.

Incidentally, when EP scholars talk of high-status men in the past they show us an emperor with his harem, in the present for aught I know they may be talking of a restaurant manager, who is perhaps more likely to cuckold his employees than the reverse. Perhaps, then, one should not equate high status with elites; these would be two radically distinct concepts. In the classic of sociology *The Children of Sanchez* by Oscar Lewis, we have the example of a "high-status man," Sanchez, whose job is to buy food for a restaurant in Mexico City. Hardly a high-status job, in fact, yet this man provides resources to three women living in different places of the same squalid *barrio*.

The overlooking of elite men's poor virile endowments by most EP scholars so far may be due to some kind of sycophancy, the will (probably unconscious) to avoid presenting elite people in an evolutionarily unpleasant light. The sycophancy derives from certain notions about virility and manliness. If a high-status man fails to take advantage of his high status by inseminating many women, why care about status to begin with? Why be rich rather than poor, since it's so much more trouble earning money than feeding on charity or welfare? The "unpleasant" is that high-status men are not emperors with harems like in the past; a good deal of them are (but sometimes I've got my doubts, especially after reading EP books) quite decent fellows, and that's a shame, you see.

As to the question of why be rich rather than poor, I think the intelligence paradox predicts that, all men on the savanna having to hunt and forage, intelligent men are slackers.

As we have already seen, more intelligent individuals have more homosexual partners than less intelligent individuals (although I have contended this is not predicted by the intelligence paradox). They also have, on a declarative basis, more heterosexual partners (p. 137). The figures are: very bright Americans ($IQ > 125$) (5% of the US population) have had 9.98 heterosexual partners; bright ($110 < IQ < 125$) (20% of the US population) 9.79; normal ($90 < IQ < 110$) (50% of the US population) 8.9; dull ($75 < IQ < 90$) (20% of the US population) 7.92; very dull ($IQ < 75$) (5% of the US population) 7.10. Murray Bozinsky is a myth. You may call him a geek, or any person who looks like him a “Murray,” but he cuckolds you in your back. There are the haves and the have-horns!

Yet, as the figures here are based on individual statements, some of the statements may be deceptive. I should think the dull and very dull especially may have a tendency to under-declare their numbers of mates, because, as Kanazawa explains in chapter 5, they tend to be more conservative in politics, so under-declaring would be a way for some of them to display greater consistency between conservative ideas and their behavior. Same thing, perhaps, for intelligent people, who would think they would appear as lacking consistency if they did not over-declare their numbers of mates.

Male urgency patterns also depend on one's time allocation. Men who work more have less time to court women (outside work, that is; please let me know if the workplace is the greatest sex club available, I need to know for productivity choices). Who works more: organization men or the leisure underclass?

A Parenthesis on the Clark-Hatfield Experiment

The Clark-Hatfield experiment is dealt with by Kanazawa (pp. 102-4) to explain female choice and men's taking it as it is. It shows that 75% of male college students approached by an unknown attractive woman (a confederate in the experiment) who ask them if they would like to have sex with her the same night respond “yes,” comparing to 0% of female students approached by an unknown attractive man making the same proposal. I find the experiment silly. Men with a little knowledge of life, a little knowledge of women and courtship would have much reason to suspect the woman's motivations. Some of the guys surely thought it was a hidden camera TV show. Some others may have been thinking the woman was a prostitute (I know a couple of streets in the city I live where unknown women ask you to get laid with them), some others that she was a schizophrenic intent on killing them, some others that it was a third-type encounter with an extraterrestrial, and all these were the least nincompoops of the batch. Apparently, none of the guys tried to embrace or kiss the woman on the spot, whereas she, if deemed sincere, would have been eager to respond.

Reproduction

Intelligent people are the “ultimate losers in life” because they fail more often to have “as many children as one can potentially raise to sexual maturity so that the children themselves can reproduce,” (178), which is the definition of optimizing one’s fitness, “an evolutionary familiar goal.” In the discussion, Kanazawa only deals with data of children raised by the respondents, so all children begot by men outside their bonds are ignored, which is by itself problematic since it has been argued that more intelligent men have more affairs and presumably beget more children outside wedlock.

The picture below shows figures 12.3 and 12.4 (pp. 182-3).




Figure 12.3 Association between mean childhood IQ and parenthood at 47: women




Figure 12.4 Association between mean childhood IQ and parenthood at 47: men

Before dealing with the intelligence component in these tables, some general considerations on fertility. According to Baker (*Baby Wars*), in industrial countries about 10% of people are infertile, roughly the same number of men and women. I’m not sure if this includes people who could have children but decide not to; the present figures show a greater number of childless people, so the sample must be warped or Baker’s figures must be wrong — or alternatively the number of people who remain deliberately childless, if not included in the 10%, must be high.

As a matter of fact, on these tables 444 women out of a sample of $(444 + 2210) = 2,654$ have not had children at age 47 (which means, for all practical purposes, that they will never have: “99.7% of women and 96.5% of men complete their lifetime reproduction by the time they are 45” p. 181). Cross-calculation gives the proportion of 16.7% of women being childless. For men, the figures are 475 men out of 2,319, which gives us 20.4% (same remark as for women). One woman out of six, one man out of five remain childless.

If we follow evolutionary psychologist David Buss, the difference in figures between childless women and childless men should be greater, with much more childless men than childless women: “The primary reason men are so much more given to violence, and specifically to the violence of murder, is that the stakes of the mating game are so much higher

for men than for women, because there is much more *variability* among men than among women in reproductive success.” (*The Murderer Next Door*, 2005). The present figures do not seem to support this statement, because if the variability does not depend on the number of childless people, men and women as pairs, taken broadly, have the same numbers of children respectively: If a woman has two kids, the man has two kids. If variability does not depend on childless individuals, it depends on putative fathers who are not the biological fathers of the children they raise (10-15%), on the number of single mothers (X), and on the number of men who remarry and make more children (X). I don’t know if these latter phenomena can account for a much greater variability among men than among women in our societies. In any case, there (still) is more variability among men.

Two other tables (pp. 179-80) show answers to the question “Do you ever want children?” (asked at age 23). According to these tables, 10.6% of women and 10.95% of men say they do not want to have children. Seemingly, physiological causes of infertility (infections etc.) and failure to attract mates account, thus, for only half cases of childless men.

Among the individuals who say at age 23 they do not want to have children, more intelligent individuals, both men and women, are in relatively greater numbers. Kanazawa shows that intelligent men change their minds before they reach 45 and make as many children as other men (so they’re not “ultimate losers” after all), but intelligent women don’t change their minds (or they do but men don’t want them!).

The reason more intelligent men do not, at age 23, desire to have children may be due to the high costs of parenting I exposed in Chapter 7 and the reason they change their minds, whereas intelligent women do not, perhaps is because men don’t want status to get a mate (and children) but rather they want a mate (and children) to get status – they fear ostracism (see the Cyberball experiment: no matter how trivial the context and how low the stakes, ostracism generates great stress).

In the case of intelligent women, if it’s not only that men, no matter how intelligent, are not particularly interested in them (and we have seen that men may not be endogamous on intelligence), it might be due to some particularity of female sexuality. No matter how you take it, the burden of parenting is greater on women (although it has become absurdly heavy on men these days – but then, again, men will accept the burden if they think it can help them avoid ostracism). Now, something evolutionarily advantageous (or required) is pleasurable. Sex is. People derive enjoyment from sex in order for their genes to replicate (routine sex is hardly pleasurable because it is a by-product of sperm competition), but reproduction (gene replication) can be thwarted by contraception. If having children and having to have routine sex is viewed by a hedonistic intelligent woman as likely to prevent her from enjoying sex, she will not have children. Intelligent women are not reproductively successful because they’re more polyandrous. Studies show they’re indeed more testosteroneized (cf Nyborg). There is truth in the conservative view that a life of pleasure alienates the individual from family life. This being said, many other considerations beside sexual “emancipation” may conduce one to deliberately avoiding parenting, and, considering the above figures, it seems that such a deliberate choice is not so rare.

All in all I do not think Kanazawa is justified, because a few intelligent women remain deliberately childless, to end his book by the question: “Why is the tendency [intelligence] to commit the greatest crime against nature [voluntary childlessness] the ultimate gauge of human worth?” He has not shown with sufficient clarity that such a breach against nature is really the


crime of the intelligent; he has even brought forth data to the contrary. As to his questioning the value people place on intelligence, it is all the more irrelevant given that intelligence has become the main highway to social status.

Intelligence has become the main highway to social status – to a point. Very intelligent people may easily be barred from every opportunity by coalitions of less bright people as it is more difficult for them, due to sparse numbers, to form coalitions with as intelligent people as them.

Pure science does not pay as much as applied science, so the applied scientist must be more intelligent than the pure scientist because the former's status is higher.

Deirdre Barrett

Another stimulating book that I recommend is *Waistland: The (R)Evolutionary Science behind our Weight and Fitness Crisis* (2007) by my friend Dr Deirdre Barrett from Harvard Medical School. (I call her my friend because I wish her well.) I am not going to discuss the book's content, though; I just want to show its jacket.



On this jacket you can see a prehistoric man standing on a big, bright-colored double cheeseburger. The book deals with the fact that we are not prepared to cope with an environment of abundantly available fatty foods and that this has provoked a major fitness crisis. The picture of the prehistoric man on the burger appears both on the front cover and the spine, so you can't put the book in your library without seeing the flashy burger, even if only peripherally, when you look at your library unless you drop the jacket before.

This troubles me a lot because Deirdre writes: “Even more analogous to Tinbergen's dummies, the exaggeration of visual elements in addictive foods often plays a role in hooking

us” (p. 33) and “Food ads increase both immediate and long-term consumption of junk food.” (p. 90)

As I repeatedly say in my blog series on advertising, advertisers today rely heavily on the effects associated with peripheral vision, in which peripheral stimuli are not treated by regions of the brain involved in conscious processes, so even if you think you never look at the burger in your library it will not escape your peripheral attention when you look more or less in the direction of your library, and you’ll be the more easily hooked that you will not be mobilizing rational defenses.

At the same time that Deirdre warns against exaggerate visual elements and visual food ads that make us addict to junk food, she flashes gaudy burgers at her readers in this fashion! How is this possible? How can publishers treat their authors with such disregard and contempt? How can authors accept it and let their message be drawn in the dirt by publishing houses’ marketers? I am dissatisfied with my friend because she now looks like a fool.

ANNEX TO CHAPTER NINE

Dr Kanazawa and I exchanged on one particular point. My remark to him was: “It occurs to me that if sexual exclusivity is natural to women, the paradox would perhaps predict that intelligent women value the contrary of sexual exclusivity. The idea would fit what I say toward the end of my essay concerning intelligent women.”

Dr Kanazawa replied: “Yes, you are correct. The number of sexual partners is positively correlated with intelligence among women and negatively correlated with intelligence among men.”

To which I say here: Unless I’m mistaken, in “The Intelligence Paradox” Dr Kanazawa brings forth gendered data for affairs, but the data for numbers of sexual partners which I have quoted are aggregates, and, as I understand things, these objects are not one and the same: Affairs are having a partner unbeknownst to one’s main partner, whereas numbers of partners are just partners. I treated the latter set of data as applying to men, or to men and women alike, but his email points to a difference.

One more remark. I called his findings on drugs the “most astonishing” of the book, but I probably used to think along such lines before reading some scholars he names in the book’s acknowledgments, like Herrnstein and Murray. These scholars have a “squarer” view of things. I wonder whether marijuana smoking by more intelligent students would not create a motivation problem for these students that may impair their academic achievements and accordingly their status later in life; and if the phenomenon was significant enough that would question the validity of the concept of “meritocracy” in societies, pretty much like ours, where marijuana smoking has become commonplace. On the other hand, the practice may or may not create a motivation problem, and may or may not be a hinderance to successful careers.

ii

Robin Baker has corrected a blunder of mine, in the following passage:

“According to Baker (Baby Wars), in industrial countries about 10% of people are infertile, roughly the same number of men and women. I’m not sure if this includes people who could have children but decide not to; the present figures [one woman out of six, one man out of five remain childless at 47] show a greater number of childless people, so the sample must be warped or Baker’s figures must be wrong – or alternatively the number of people who remain deliberately childless, if not included in the 10%, must be high.”

He writes (private email):

“The figures tie up fine. If 1 in 10 men and 1 in 10 women are infertile then 2 in 10 (almost), in other words 1 in 5, couples will be childless. This means that if monogamy is perfect with zero infidelity and only one partner per lifetime then one in 5 men and women will be childless. Of course, monogamy is not perfect, but still in modern society the number of men and women childless will be nearer 1 in 5 than 1 in 10 –as they are, even without trying to include the almost impossible to estimate figure of how many people ‘deliberately’ have no children.

Even 1 in 10 is above the random drift/unselected level (1%)– but don't forget that most infertility is caused by other organisms acted on by selection to overcome the selection on humans not to be infertile. It is an arms race.”

My sincere thanks to him for not letting me err.

The Evolutionary Roots of the Clash of Civilizations

The relations between Islam and the West have been hotly discussed for decades. Milestones in this debate have been books such as *The End of History and the Last Man* by Francis Fukuyama (1992), *Jihad vs McWorld* by Benjamin Barber (1995), *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* by Samuel Huntington (1996). In his work *Conflicts of Fitness: Islam, America, and Evolutionary Psychology* (2015), Dr A.S. Amin (MD) brings new insights in the discussion by making fruitful use of the findings of evolutionary psychology (EP), and I will review his ideas at some length while broaching the evolutionary roots of the clash of civilizations.

Although “Jihad vs McWorld” has become a kind of catchphrase, in the 1996 afterword of his book Barber explains that it is a misnomer: “I made clear that I deployed Jihad as a generic term quite independently from its Islamic theological origins ... While extremist groups like Islamic Jihad have themselves associated the word with armed struggle against modernizing, secular infidels, I can appreciate that the great majority of devout Muslims who harbor no more sympathy for Islamic Jihad than devout Christians feel for the Ku Klux Klan or the Montana Militia might feel unfairly burdened by my title. I owe them an apology, and hope they will find their way past the book’s cover to the substantive reasoning that makes clear how little my arguments has to do with Islam as a religion or with resistance to McWorld as the singular property of Muslims.” So much for the catchphrase.

By opposing these two objects, Barber sometimes appears to mean an opposition between globalization and parochialization; yet Islam is hardly a good example of parochialism, since it is itself a globalism. In fact, all civilizations, inasmuch as they possess an inherent tendency to expand, are global; it’s just that some are more global than others, and the Western world is to date the more global of all inherently global civilizations. In some other places, Barber explains that he is defending democracy against both McWorld and Jihad, against “globalizing commerce” and “the populist reaction” to it – “Demopoulos vs McJihad’s” could be the phrase – but I do not find in his book convincing evidence that would allow us to dissociate democracy from McWorld; the inevitability of their connection has not been disproved, and the democracy Barber is talking about looks more like another Utopia, a Lubberland for the intellectuals, if the discourse is not Pavlovian appeal plain and simple. Barber means that, McWorld being far from humanistic, it deserves not to be associated with the concept of democracy, because, if I understand well, anything that has something wrong about it is undemocratic. If this does not build on Pavlovian conditioning, I don’t know what does.

This is not to say that more humanistic tendencies should not be encouraged in the society, but perhaps clinging to the word “democracy” is not the best way to prepare for a humanistic future, since historically democratic institutions have contributed much in preventing counter-powers to commercial interests from being more effective, and if the future is different from the present, then new words are needed to describe it. As far as I am concerned, deeming the existence of a political class, even appointed by universal suffrage, as exploitative, and suggesting that people vote for ideas, not for men (just vote on your computer and let the administration apply the programme), I am rather inclined to drop the name altogether.

In the present essay I draw a double-entry matrix of civilizations (picture). Entry 1 is reproductive climate: long-term (“committed”) / short-term (“hedonistic”). Entry 2 is material wealth: affluent / nonaffluent. These concepts will be explained. The Western world is defined as affluent and short-term. The Far East, and especially the continuum China-Korea-Japan, is defined as affluent and long-term. For practical purposes, Islam is defined as nonaffluent and long-term. We shall not deal with wealthy Gulf states, which I call “leisure nations” due to the extreme forms of welfare state they provide their nationals with; no matter how important on the world stage, they owe many of their current attributes to the accident of the oil rent. Black Africa is defined as nonaffluent and short-term.

	Short-Term	Long-term
Affluent	Western World	Far East
Nonaffluent	Black Africa	Jihad / Islam

Reproductive climate and wealth are considered independent. A certain tendency present in the West sees in short-term (“hedonistic”) mentality the engine of affluence. The idea is that, as the constraints on production, hence scarcity, have been overcome by technology, the sustenance of abundance and of the affluence that abundance makes possible now depends on mass consumption or hedonism, the lack of which would provoke the collapse of affluence. If our assumption that East Asia is both affluent and long-term (“committed”) is correct, the preceding reasoning, albeit cogent, is unwarranted (the main impetus of mass consumption may well have nothing to do with hedonism, even broadly defined.)

The matrix is descriptive and applies to the present instant only. It does not imply, for instance, that the West is inherently affluent and short-term; in fact, the West used to be poor and long-term – and the historical conjunction of its newly accrued affluence and short-term outlook is the reason some people hypothesize a relationship of causality.

Institutional vs Cryptic Polygyny

To understand the evolutionary roots of the clash of civilizations, one must keep in mind three basic ideas grounded on the Darwinian theory of evolution.

1/ Humans, like other animals, are designed by their genes to aim at reproduction. This is an axiom of the theory of evolution and of evolutionary psychology (as the theory applied to human behavior specifically). As a consequence, humans are involved in sexual competition, by which they intend to maximize their numbers of descendants. Maximization is said to happen usually through optimizing one's number of children and their rearing according to the level of one's resources, in order that the children grow up in environments that allow them to reproduce successfully in their turn.

2/ In sexual and reproductive matters, men and women are not alike. The biological costs of making a child are higher for women. It costs women a nine-month pregnancy whereas it costs merely an ejaculate to men. After parturition the woman feeds the baby, whereas it costs nothing to the man if he decides so. In some animal species, males are not involved in parenting at all. In humans, the burden of parenting is shared by both sexes.

3/ Men are sexually less discriminate than women because the cost of reproduction and the consequences of mating are not as great for the former.

Institutional polygyny, as practiced for instance in Islam, is limited polygyny, that is a departure from unlimited polygyny by which one dominant male inseminates all women in a given group. Gorillas display such unlimited polygyny. The alpha male lives with most females in the area and he is the only one to inseminate the females in the group. Other adult males live alone at the periphery of the group; their aim in life is to seize the first occasion to kill an infant gorilla belonging to the group, because then the grieving female leaves the group after a few days and mates with the killer of her infant (see Wrangham & Petersen, 1996). Groups expand and shrink according to the results of this endless infanticide. Amin explains that, in human societies, limited, as opposed to unlimited, polygyny deflates occasions for violent behavior: "Unrestricted polygyny increases the likelihood of a situation where it becomes next to impossible for even an average man to find a wife. Having many men who are unable to find a mate can be a destabilizing force in society, and it may be important that a marriage institution works to insure this type of situation does not occur." (pp. 6-7). By insuring access to mating to a greater number of men, restricted polygyny benefits the group overall.

Considering this, it would be logical to go one step further and postulate that, as monogyny insures access to mating to the greatest possible number of men, it is the one best solution. It is perhaps the best solution for men, but Amin claims that monogyny does not benefit women overall and that limited polygyny is the best compromise. We must here take into account the notion of a man's desirability. There is a flavor of objectivity about this notion that may put off some readers, for whom in matters of love and passion desirability would be the most subjective thing in the world. In fact, as far as evolutionary theory is concerned, things are not as subjective as they are usually fancied to be; people's choice is determined by objective preferences and competition, i.e. one's ranking and value on the mating market. We can therefore assume men's desirability to be something objective. Men of a given group or population can be ranked from most to least desirable, and the same is true of women. For a man, capacity to secure resources and status is deemed particularly important; for a woman, markers of fertility and health (beauty) are.

If a woman's fitness optimization depends on her mating with a richer and more desirable man than the man whose value equals hers on the mating market, she will mate with that man rather than with her equal. As to the more desirable man, he will mate with the less desirable woman willingly because men are less discriminate (basic idea #3 above), and as long

as he has got the resources, he can provide for both (or more) women and the children they give birth to without jeopardizing their fitness. Admittedly, the most desirable woman is the loser in this scenario – she is the one loser.

As Amin explains (5-6), with polygyny a greater number of women have sexual access to men more desirable than they are; conversely, a greater number of men must accept mating with women less desirable than they are (some men even having none). Polygyny thus benefits women more than men overall, and it is advantageous to a woman as long as the advantage of mating with a more desirable man exceeds the drawback of sharing him –and his resources– with other women. The latter provision allows us to predict that polygyny is more advantageous where social inequalities are greater.

The West practices institutional monogyny, Islam has institutional polygyny, but perhaps the real difference is between institutional vs cryptic polygyny. In order to compare the two systems, we should add to the picture the advantages or drawbacks of cryptic polygyny. On which point I quote Chapter 5 of the present book: “The plight of low-income single mothers is the rich man’s deed [as a result of cryptic polygyny]. It is the rich woman’s also, because, in some other societies, rich men marry several women, and all these women’s children are his legal children, to whom he is bound by law to provide support during their bringing up; in our society, the rich woman doesn’t want resources to be scattered among so many children.” In terms of Amin’s thought, the more desirable woman doesn’t care to share her mate’s resources with less desirable women – and, yes, under institutional polygyny the most desirable women fare less well than their counterparts under monogyny. & “A number of the rich man’s children, perhaps most of them, are thus [as a result of cryptic polygyny] raised in low-income homes or by low-income single mothers. When a single mother finds a partner who wants to live with her, the children she had before they met are much more likely than other children to suffer abuse from the partner. A child raised by a single-mother is also more likely to become a delinquent (cf *The Bell Curve*). With the acuteness of deprivation rises the likelihood of abuse, molestation, rape, and murder of children by their ‘parents’.”

Cryptic polygyny increases existing social inequalities. The man’s urge to reproduce is largely wasted for those of his children born out of wedlock after acts of unlawful insemination, because even if they inherit his genes their bringing-up in deprived or worse-off environments is likely to be harmful†. As polygyny is predicted to be greater in unequal societies, and as inequalities in Western societies have increased during the last decades with the globalization of markets and the development of the knowledge-based economy (see, for instance, Brynjolfsson and McAfee, *The Second Machine Age*, 2014), one may assume that cryptic polygyny has been on the rise in the West.

Whereas cryptic polygyny is triggered, in an institutionally monogynous society, by social inequalities and at the same time further increases inequalities, on the contrary institutional polygyny is more egalitarian. On this point I have found my intuition confirmed by Amin. I have written: “As the rich man, when impregnating a poor woman, obligates her to scatter her scant resources among a greater number of children, he increases the adverse pressures of the environment on their future status. The rich man’s children would be better off if brought up by him. In the abstract, providing the number of wives be a positive function of the man’s wealth [which is the case, as we have seen while dealing with a man’s desirability], legal polygyny is more egalitarian than monogyny, because the rich man’s resources are spent on a greater number of children (his legal children).” I have then found the following under Amin’s quill: “Polygyny [institutional polygyny] enables a society to utilize a man’s desire to

maximize his reproductive fitness to achieve a more balanced distribution of wealth. For example, a man who makes \$500,000 a year can provide financially for ten women twice as well as a man making \$25,000 can for just one woman.” (p. 7)

Whether or not there is also cryptic polygyny in Islamic countries where institutional polygyny exists I cannot say based on data, but the following section about the concept of reproductive climate will show that these countries are earnest in their attempts to prevent it.

Reproductive Climate: Long-term vs Short-Term

Based, again, on the evolutionary basic ideas presented above (1-3), Amin explains how “the reproductive ideal for women” is best served when men’s commitment to their pair is strong: “Forbidding men to have sex while offering little or no commitment is to their reproductive detriment. Furthermore, forcing men to make a commitment to their mates and to support any children that result approximates the reproductive ideal for women.” (p. 4). The notion of patriarchy is far off the mark, given that matrimonial bonds serve women’s reproductive interests rather than men’s; of which Schopenhauer already had a clear notion, concluding on the subject by these words: “By reason of the unnaturally advantageous position conferred to women by the monogamous arrangement and corresponding laws of matrimony, because they posit the woman as the man’s whole equal, which she is in no way, intelligent, prudent men are very often wary of committing so great a sacrifice and of engaging themselves in so unequal a compact.”†† (*Parerga and Paralipomena*).

A reproductive climate, that is, the overall outlook of mating and parenting practices in a given population, can be defined as long-term when males are committed to raising their children together with their female mates, and short-term otherwise. Rather than separate worlds, the two notions are in a continuum; when we ascribe one of the two to a given group, it is only in relative terms. In this view, gorilla males (mentioned above) are long-term strategists, whereas tigers, for example, are the most short-term possible insofar as tiger cubs never meet their father, unless by accident.

Among humans, one adaptation evolved to cement the bonds between a pair, so that both partners provide good cooperative care to the children, is love, and the more enduring the more efficient, hence the romantic (but nevertheless true in an important sense) view that love is everlasting or it is not love. Another saying is that love is blind. To be more precise, love is blind to opportunity costs; when in love, a man does not leave his partner for a more desirable woman when given the occasion. (Hence the universal idea that desirability is something subjective.) I say ‘a man’ on purpose, for a man in love is more important to a woman than a woman in love to a man, because the problem this adaptation solves is how to pair-bond men, whose instincts incline them to remain free from bonding and parenting.

In order to maximize their fitness, each person needs to assess the reproductive climate in which they are living, because their success depends on it. The more long-term the climate, the more advantageous it is, as a rule, to adopt long-term strategies, and vice-versa. Sex being secretive, one needs to rely on cues. Hence gossip: “Although far from completely trustworthy,

gossip can offer at least some information on the reproductive strategies being employed by others” (26). Clothing, makeup, and behavior also serve as clues (26-7).

Amin then goes on explaining the dilemma women are facing: “Before a woman can hope to get a man to commit to her, she must first attract him. Attracting a man is made easier by displaying sexual receptivity, thereby appealing to his need for promiscuity and low commitment. On the other hand, getting a man to commit is made easier by displaying sexual restraint, thereby appealing to his need for paternity confidence.” (29). In long-term climates, commitment is a given, for women, but they have to attract a partner. Considering what has just been said about cues, in long-term climates at the same time women’s clothing and makeup are conservative, so if a woman takes the step to make her clothing and/or makeup slightly more appealing to the sexual urges of men, she gets an edge over her female competitors (30). This fact triggers a seduction arms race between women, in the course of which women’s behavior evolves towards more and more encouraging men’s shorter-term strategies, and men are given an ever greater number of opportunities to access females without committing to them. Amin contends this is what has been happening in the US these last decades (32-3). The arm’s race is reinforced by the media, advertising, and pornography. Catering to women’s need to attract men, at the same time advertising is permanently spreading cues that a woman’s reproductive interest lies in appealing to men’s sexual short-term urges. Same with pornography, “providing the brain with false information which it then uses to come up with an inaccurate assessment of the prevailing reproduction climate” (43). As the race goes on and on, the levels of paternity certainty that women are able to offer decrease and men are consequently ever more incited to decline commitment since they naturally expect paternity certainty must be part of the deal (evolutionarily speaking, it does not make sense to provide resources to a stranger’s offspring; and studies show that stepfathers are many times more abusive with their step-children).

Hence, according to Amin, the media and pornography exert a reinforcing effect. I have argued elsewhere that this effect could be more warping than reinforcing, but for the time being I will stress that I find Amin’s description of what is occurring in the West plausible. If the role of mass eroticism in the media is consumption first and foremost, consumption itself, in the EP view, is ancillary to reproductive pursuits, such as when women buy clothing and makeup to attract men. In short-term climates, part of conspicuous consumption on the part of men is aimed at making known to women who are not expecting commitment that they will receive great amounts of resources fast during the short time of an uncommitted relationship.

That the West has become short-term may be confirmed by current divorce rates in the US: “American divorce rates now approach 67 percent for those currently getting married, up from the mere 50 percent figure that alarmed many over the past two decades.” (David Buss, *The Dangerous Passion*, 2000). Given such figures, why people even keep marrying is difficult to understand if that is not make-believe for women’s expectations of commitment.

Another characteristic of long-term climates that is addressed by Amin are matchmakers and arranged marriages. The practice is used as an indictment against Muslim countries (and against the past of the Western world), but all long-term patterns of behavior for which Islam is being blamed from a Western point of view exist in the long-term, affluent Far East (see Matrix) as well, as we shall see. Quoth Amin: “In a long-term climate, being shy benefits both men and women when dealing with the opposite gender [men’s shyness advertises commitment, women’s shyness advertises paternity certainty]. Obviously, a situation such as this makes the formation of new relationships quite difficult. Arranged marriages offer a solution to this problem. Rather than meddling interference, matchmakers play a vital role in bringing

together couples whose long-term reproductive strategies act as an impediment to starting a relationship by themselves.” (50-1). This insight can help us assess the reasons why numbers of Westerners renege on their civilization and convert to Islam and even to Jihad – having being dismantled, in the Western short-term context, the very institutions that would allow shy men to find a partner. No matchmakers, no whorehouses (where one can gain experience and confidence, see ch. 3), and sexual competition and pressure as high as ever: You can expect a good deal of men to understand they will not be able to thrive in our “emancipated” society.

Two other characteristics Amin ascribes to short-term climates are: a/ less concern for women’s age; b/ women’s careers.

a/ “Men in short-term reproductive climates do not put the same emphasis on youth than men in long-term reproductive climates do. This is often viewed as enlightened, since such men seem to be focusing more on the woman herself rather than her baby-making abilities. However, the real reason men in short-term climates do not place the same emphasis on youth is they have less reason to concern themselves with long-term reproductive utility. Instead of focusing on long-term reproductive utility, men pursuing short-term strategies are more concerned with signs of immediate fertility.” (48-9)

b/ “The more short-term a reproductive climate becomes, the less likely it is that men can be relied on, making it extremely important for women to be economically independent. Therefore, women in short-term climates place a huge value on their careers, feeling sorry for women who do not have the same opportunities that they do. Women in long-term climates tend to see things differently. Such women are often glad they have husbands who provide them with the opportunity to stay home and take proper care of the children, pitying women who are forced to play the role of provider and caretaker at the same time.” (51-2) The role of provider is all the more to be pitied that in many cases it is a dehumanizing one; and there is something frightful about business experts’ demanding ‘passion’ for his or her repetitive toil from a worker.

Now that we have familiarized ourselves with the concept of reproductive climate, let us see how it applies to current civilizations.

The Double-Entry Civilization Matrix

We will say a few words on 1/ Islam; 2/ the West; 3/ Black Africa; 4/ the Far East.

1/ I have defined Islam as both long-term and nonaffluent. That it is long-term is evidenced by institutional polygyny, whereby a man commits to all his wives’ children, by its stance against eroticism and pornography, by standards of decency for women that impose conservative clothing, makeup and behavior, by relative eviction of women from the workplace, and in some cases (perhaps as an inherent tendency) by seclusion of women. According to Amin, the Quran has been in several instances interpreted in a manner that suits the interests of extremely long-term male mentalities, to the point of distortion (56). For example, passages from the Quran on women’s share of inheritance would be ignored because they might promote women’s independence and thus trigger the seduction arms race that leads to short-term climates. Moves

towards a greater independence for women are resisted because they are perceived as jeopardizing long-term climate.

As to affluence, many Muslim countries belong to the developing world, and recent international events in several Arab countries, which have plunged them into chaos, are reinforcing this situation by impoverishing them further. The Gulf states are a different case, which, however interesting, we shall not discuss here. (For those interested, and fluent in French, see my essay "Saudi Arabia the Leisure Nation")

I suggest with Amin that Jihad is not only the hostility of the have-nots against the haves, but also of the long-term against the short-term. The current appeal of Islam to some non-Muslim young people in the West (among whom many young women), and to formerly secularized second or third-generation immigrants, lies in its extreme long-term stance, as opposed to the short-term ideologies of these young people's countries of birth and residence. The appeal of Islam lies first and foremost in his advocating of long-term strategies, not in the daily prayers nor in the ritual slaughtering, etc. The best way to dry up the stream of Westerners' conversions is consequently to liberalize Islam and make a ritualistic empty shell of it, to which fundamentalists, of course, are firmly opposed; this opposition is predictable in the framework of sexual competition and reproductive climates.

2/ With respect to the West, as already said I intended in previous chapters to cast some doubt on the depth of our promiscuity, bringing into the picture a possible warping media effect, but Amin's approach is convincing enough.

Another objection can be raised in case reproductive strategies were *inborn*, which is the contention of J. P. Rushton, based on sociobiologist E. O. Wilson's *r/K model*. According to Rushton, blacks would be more short-term (r), mongoloids more long-term (K), whites being in the middle. The trouble with aggregating clues and data from various groups if their reproductive differences are inborn is that it makes an accurate assessment of reproductive climate impossible. A person is advised to assess the behavior of people from his or her own group, because assessing people's behavior from other groups is misleading (you don't want to mimic the behavior of a person whose idiosyncrasies are inborn). Mere aggregation would tend, if Rushton is correct, to make believe the climate is more short-term than it really is as far as the white subgroup is concerned and conversely more long-term as far as the black subgroup is concerned.

3/ This leads us to the Black African civilization in the Matrix. I have defined it as nonaffluent, which can hardly be denied, and short-term relying in part on Rushton's use of the *r/K model*. Black men's virile endowments (penis and testes size) suggest greater sperm competition, lesser paternity certainty, and shorter-term strategies.

To the credit of this classification, Senegalese scholar Cheikh Anta Diop describes ancient black civilizations, and their contemporary rests, as matriarchal and matrilinear, which suggests a lesser commitment from men. In short-term contexts, the woman's brother is more committed to her offspring than the father himself; according to C. Anta Diop, that is the case in sub-Saharan Africa: "African men designed matriarchy in accord with African women with a view to the greatest might of the clan. ... Contrary to the social order of the Indo-European clan, it is progressively with the dislocation of the clan that lineage through males has been admitted in African matriarchal societies. In these societies this kind of lineage has kept up to the present day the character of a weak kinship, less strong than that derived from women. ...

Among Indo-Europeans the patriarchal family structure excluded any alternative notion of authority deriving from the maternal uncle; the latter term did not even exist originally.”†††

Incidentally, given the basic ideas 1-3 above, such a situation is a bit of a puzzle. The current view is that our ancestors were very polygynous and a little bit (if at all) polyandrous – albeit I have stated elsewhere (ch. 9) that this overlooks sperm competition. Yet it really looks as if black men were not much concerned about paternity certainty (the reason is “the greatest might of the clan”?). Usually, short-term men adopt mixed strategies; even rap singers, whose lifestyle and lyrics exemplify, according to Amin, the most extreme forms of short-term mentality in the West, have a ‘wifey’ (75) from whom they expect certain standards of behavior upon which they can build a sense of paternity security. Conversely, the Quran allows for concubines, mostly slaves, that is, for men’s indulging their short-term urges; however the practice has fallen into disuse, although it seems to have been restored by newcomers such as Daesh.

4/ The Far East, namely a continuum China-Korea-Japan, including Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, offers the example of an affluent and long-term civilization. To describe it I will make use of the book *Order by Accident: The Origins and Consequences of Conformity in Contemporary Japan* (2000) by Alan S. Miller and Satoshi Kanazawa. (For a discussion of Kanazawa’s “Intelligence Paradox,” see ch. 9.)

Japan has long been an industrialized, affluent country. Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore all belong to the NICs (newly industrialized countries), and China, formally a communist country, is on the verge of becoming world power number one.

The continuum China-Korea-Japan is built on Miller & Kanazawa’s model. China is the oldest civilization in the world, they argue, and its institutions are characterized by high levels of cooperation. Its culture has spread; in the process it is the most cooperative groups from China that have taken the culture abroad, first to Korea, then to Japan: “the social institutions that the Korean inherited from the Chinese were more cooperative than the average social institutions in China, because some groups in the latter, still in the process of being replaced, had less cooperative social institutions. ... These social institutions were later transmitted from Korea to Japan by the ascendant and dominant groups in Korea. Then, by the same token, Japanese social institutions should be slightly more cooperative than Korean social institutions at any given point in history.” (p. 131). Accordingly, we can see Japan as the purest example, in the sense of most thorough, in the continuum.

That Japan is a long-term country is clear from the place Japanese women occupy in the workplace. In the main, Japanese women do not work; to be precise, the workplace is replete with women employed on short-term jobs up to about age 25, when they are supposed to marry and leave (p. 47). This allows companies to provide their male employees, much overworked comparing to Western standards, with a pool of potential partners, in which they actually find a partner. This reminds one of what Amin says on “arranged marriages” and the role of third parties in long-term reproductive climates: here the matchmaker is the company. “This, of course, provides a very practical solution to an otherwise difficult problem. With men spending all of their time at work or in the company of coworkers, they have no time to actively search for a spouse. By hiring a large number of young, single females, the company can provide their single male employees with potential mates and can also exercise some control over the types of women their male employees meet and eventually marry.” (48). Moreover, divorce rates in Japan are very low (p. 57).

By comparison, in a rather rigorous Islamic country such as the Sultanate of Brunei Darussalam, women make up 40.3% of the workforce (Marie-Sybille de Vienne, 2012). This is perhaps not representative of other Muslim countries, especially where an extreme long-term mentality actively pursues women's dependence, but I mean that, if some are truly concerned about the improvement of women's position on the workplace, they would do well to broaden the scope of their indictments, for Japan holds a prominent position among long-term nations that evince women from work. I expect the same to be true, perhaps not to the same extent, though (given what has just been said about the cultural transmission inside the continuum), for South and North Korea and China.

Japan has been flooded with its own pornographic production (videos and manga comics) for decades, without its long-term mentality seemingly being altered. This could cast doubt on Amin's view about the media's reinforcing effect.

More recent than the West's, East Asia's affluence has fueled among these countries' elites a discourse on Asian values, typically contrasted to the 'decadent' West, like when Singapore's prime minister Lee Kuan Yew told Australians they would become "the white trash of Asia" (cf Huntington). Huntington advises Australia to coalition with Western countries, specifically with US, Canada, and New Zealand, rather than trying to define herself as an Asian nation – the latter move was all the more awkward, by the way, that Australia had only recently abandoned her decades-long "White Australia" policy (1901-1973) barring Asian immigrants from entering the country. The 2005 Cronulla riots, where rioting flaxen-blond surfers could be watched on TV beating up immigrant Lebanese pushers who had been dealing dope on the beach, has perhaps confirmed the white trash image in the eyes of Asians – yet, to my knowledge, you don't find Lebanese pushers in Singapore (3rd richest country in terms of GDP per capita). In fact, Asian authoritarians are likely to have been confirmed in their views about the weakness of Western institutions, and on how weak institutions lead to riots and the Lynch law, among other unwanted turmoils. Undemocratic states in East Asia at the date of today are: China, North Korea, Singapore (debated), Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Brunei Darussalam, Burma.

In conclusion, evolutionary theory has provided us, thanks to Dr A.S. Amin, with a theoretical model for categorizing current major world civilizations, in terms of reproductive climates. The roots of the clash of civilization are the same as those of human violence; what is new in Amin's thinking is his treatment of these groupings called civilizations.

Footnotes

† "Even in a developed country like Britain, a child born into a low socio-economic group has twice the chance of dying during childhood than one born in a high socio-economic group. Wealth means health, both at the individual level via diet and lifestyle and at the national level via medical services." (Robin Baker, *Fragile Science*, 2001, p. 166)

†† „bei der widernatürlich vorteilhaften Stellung, welche die monogamische Einrichtung und die ihr beigegebenen Ehegesetze dem Weibe erteilen, indem sie durchweg das Weib als das volle Äquivalent des Mannes betrachten, was es in keiner Hinsicht ist, tragen kluge und

vorsichtige Männer sehr oft Bedenken, ein so großes Opfer zu bringen und auf ein so ungleiches Paktum einzugehn.’’ (Parerga und Paralipomena)

††† « *L’homme l’a conçu [le matriarcat] en accord avec la femme pour la plus grande puissance du clan. (...) À l’inverse de l’ordre social du clan indo-européen, c’est progressivement avec la dislocation du clan que la parenté par les hommes sera admise dans les sociétés africaines matriarcales. Aussi dans ces sociétés cette parenté garde jusqu’à nos jours le caractère d’une parenté affaiblie, moins forte que celle issue des femmes. (...) Chez les Indo-Européens, la famille patriarcale régnait à l’exclusion de toute notion d’autorité découlant de l’ordre maternel ; ce terme n’existait même pas à l’origine. » (Antériorité des civilisations nègres. Mythe ou réalité historique ? 1967)*

ADDENDUM

Love in a man's heart is the ruin of polygyny, cryptic and institutional, because if, as the romantic definition goes, love is everlasting and a man cannot love more than one woman, then he will not tolerate that the share of the woman he loves is diminished by a second wife.

Let us consider the statement made in the French documentary film *Salafistes* (François Margolin and Lemine Ould Salem, 2016) by one of the Mauritanian Islamic scholars from Nouakchott. These scholars in particular were interviewed because they openly consider Daesh a legitimate Islamic state. One of them, asked about the status of women in Islam, said that men and women are not alike (this is evolutionary idea #2 above), giving among other examples that women are sentimental and men are not. Women may indeed be supposed to be more sentimental, as their interest is to attach men to themselves to share the burden of parenting and to this end they perhaps would rather feel strong attachment themselves, but among humans the burden as a rule is shared and this could not be so if men were impervious to sentimentality.

ii

“American divorce rates now approach 67 percent for those currently getting married, up from the mere 50 percent figure that alarmed many over the past two decades.” (David Buss, *The Dangerous Passion*, 2000)

When I read this figure, I see child's blood being spilt. Why? High divorce rates mean relatively high numbers of 1/ single mothers and 2/ recomposed families. High numbers of recomposed families mean high frequency of stepparent-stepchild relationships, and a stepchild is seventy times more likely to be killed by a stepparent than a biological child by a biological parent (Daly & Wilson).

Besides, among biological parents who kill a biological child, some do it because of the dislike the new partner feels for the child. David Buss tells the grievous story of a little girl, Tiffany, who was feeling so insecure in her new home, between an abusive stepfather and a detached mother, that she had regressed to urinary incontinence; one day she urinated on a sofa and was beaten to her death by her own mother.

ANNEX TO CHAPTER TEN

Comment by Dr A. S. Amin (private email):

I would like to thank you for your in-depth and insightful review of *Conflicts of Fitness*. It is very exciting to see my ideas reaching people throughout the world, and being thought of as worthy of discussion. I was especially pleased to note your application of some of the theories in the book to the Far East and Africa, as this represents a novel application of concepts I mainly applied to the West and the Muslim world. (...)

“Another objection can be raised in case reproductive strategies were inborn, which is the contention of J. P. Rushton, based on sociobiologist E. O. Wilson’s r/K model.”

I would argue that even if an r/K spectrum among different human populations exists and predisposes different groups to adopt different reproductive strategies, this predisposition would not substantially diminish the importance of environmental factors as far as the development of local reproductive climates, and that all groups of humans can be found throughout the reproductive spectrum. For example, the reproductive climates in present-day Egypt or Sudan are more long-term than those in Scandinavia. Having said this, with regards to another point in your article, the r/K theory suggests a possible solution as to why Japanese reproductive norms seem to have been comparatively less affected by the ubiquitous nature of pornography in Japanese society.

Sincerely,

A.S. Amin

11

The Evolutionary Roots of the Clash of Civilizations (Continuation)

Suicide For Sex

The precedent chapter started by recalling the hot discussion on the relationship between Islam and the West. Regarding this relationship, evolutionary psychology book *Why Beautiful People Have More Daughters* (2007) by Alan S. Miller and Satoshi Kanazawa attempts to provide an explanation of Muslim suicide bombings that I wish to discuss.

According to Miller and Kanazawa, suicide bombers are 1/ always Muslims, because 2/ Muslim societies are polygynous, which means that some men remain without mates throughout their lives, and 3/ Islam promises virgin mates to the martyrs in the afterlife, which is bound to be appealing to men without mates.

1/ “While suicide missions are not always religiously motivated, when religion is involved, it is *always* Islam.” (p. 165)

The emphasis on the word “always” is the authors’; they seem to be confident there is no exception. Yet the statement is incorrect. Even if we dismiss WW2 Japanese kamikazes as a religious phenomenon, although the Japanese government of the time was implementing a policy of State Shintoism that emphasized the divine descent of the Emperor of Japan and thus infused patriotism with a sense of the divine, so much so that one of the first moves made by the Americans after Japanese surrender was to demand that the Emperor publicly declared to his people that he was no god, we find ‘militant’ suicides in other religions too.

Albeit the following examples, from Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism, are not strictly speaking suicide *missions*, that is, acts aimed at provoking casualties to an enemy while sacrificing one’s own life in the very act (of which I see no other historical example beside Japanese kamikazes and Muslim Jihadists), those other suicides are similarly intended to promote the cause and interests of a religion in a confrontational context, and nothing in the evolutionary interpretation of suicide missions by Miller and Kanazawa explains per se why the *suicide* takes the form of a military mission rather than of something else. The promise of *haur uljanati*, the houris of paradise, is actually made to all male believers and not specifically to human bombs.

Martyrs are well-known characters of the earlier times of Christianity, especially the Roman times, and the suicide-like indifference to death displayed by these people during their ordeals became propaganda for the nascent religion, which certainly contributed to its success. That these martyrs did not die with weapon in hand while Muslim martyrs die with weapon in hand or rather being themselves the weapon (human bombs) is not to account for by polygyny and/or by the promise of houris but rather by the warrior ethics contained in the Quran and Islamic tradition.

This being said, Muslims can also be martyrs in the Christian sense, that is, allowing enemies of the faith to take their lives without resistance rather than in the act of fighting. Some hadiths tell how idolaters used to submit Muslims to the test trying to force them to pay homage

to idols, which is against the will of Allah, and that the Muslims who, being firm believers, refused were put to the sword. This is the same as the Biblical (Catholic and Orthodox) story of the Maccabees.

Fundamentally, contemporary suicide missions are only a variant of such past acts of martyrdom. Knowing that allegiance to one's God will be, with more or less certitude, cause of one's death at the hands of God's enemies and accepting it, is a form of suicide that the history of several or all religions can attest. Again, that this allegiance takes the form of a suicide commando mission rather than more passive or acquiescent forms of suicide is accounted for by the warrior ethics that is present in the Quran and Muhammad's example, whereas it is absent from the Gospels and the life of Jesus.

In Hinduism, the *jauhar* was a form of collective suicide sanctioned by Brahmins; it was especially frequent among Rajputs during their wars with Muslim conquerors. When all chances of victory had vanished, the women first took their own lives, slaughtering their children on the occasion, and the men then went to fight to death on their last battlefield. The custom insured that no prisoner was taken by the enemy. We find a similar episode in the siege of Masada during the first Jewish-Roman war (73-74 AD): according to classical accounts, the besieged Jews eventually committed mass suicide rather than surrendering to the Romans.

Finally, there is the practice of self-immolation in Buddhism, of which recent history provides a few examples, the best-known being the self-immolation through fire by the Vietnamese monk Thich Quang Duc in 1963, in protest against the religious policy of the American-supported South-Vietnamese government. The legend says the monk's heart did not burn and is now kept as a holy relic in the vaults of the Vietnamese National Bank.

So, although suicide missions as such are only found in current Muslim Jihadism and WW2 Japanese kamikazes (who could well have been performing a religious act), the will to sacrifice one's life for one's faith is a feature common to the history of many and perhaps all religions.

2/ "Across all societies, polygyny increases violent crimes, such as murder and rape, even after controlling for such obvious factors like economic development, economic inequality, population density, the level of democracy ["obvious factor"?], and world regions. ... The first unique feature of Islam, which partially contributes to the prevalence of suicide bombings among its followers, is polygyny, which makes young men violent everywhere." (p. 166)

The reason polygyny increases violent crime is that it exacerbates male competition for females. As the sex ratio is roughly 50-50, by allowing some men to mate with several women to the exclusion of competitors, polygyny forces some other men to remain without mates.

Miller and Kanazawa go on: "However, polygyny by itself, while it increases violence, is not sufficient to cause suicide bombings. Societies in sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean are much more polygynous than the Muslim nations in the Middle East and Northern Africa ... Accordingly, nations in these regions have very high levels of violence, and sub-Saharan Africa suffers from a long history of continuous civil wars, *but not suicide bombings*. So polygyny itself is not a sufficient cause of suicide bombings." (p. 166).

The authors are not dealing with institutional polygyny but with what I have called cryptic polygyny, that is, the practice of polygyny no matter what the legal arrangements

regarding matrimonial bonds are in the society. Among the most polygynous nations in the world, as they appear listed in note 31, p. 210, we find, for instance, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Haiti (all these with the “maximum polygyny score of 3.000”). These are countries which populations are largely Christian and where the institutional form of pair-bonding is monogamous marriage and institutional polygamy is outlawed and criminalized. So bear in mind that, although the authors do not make it explicit, it is not institutional polygyny that is at stake. Other forms of polygynous practice, that is, cryptic polygyny is not in the least “unique” to Muslim countries; as Miller and Kanazawa write, “All Humans Societies Are Polygynous” (subtitle p. 91).

The violence alleged to be caused by polygyny relates to a “polygyny score” that has nothing to do with institutions and legal systems. Were we to examine these polygyny scores by country we might find that Muslim countries do not stand particularly high. Among the twenty most polygynous countries listed page 210, I find the following to be predominantly or significantly Muslim: Morocco, Nigeria, Niger, Chad (53%). That makes four countries out of twenty.

Besides, Miller and Kanazawa overlook the fact that a good deal of Jihadists do not come from Muslim countries at all. Some of them come from Muslim communities in Western countries; many of these communities have been secularized in the course of acculturation, and the Jihadists had to undergo a sort of reconversion process from a materialist, secularized lifestyle to radicalism. Some others are even autochthonous converts from these Western countries with no previous family or any other links with Islamic traditions. The number of foreign fighters combatting today in the ranks of Daesh would be about 30,000.

Before conversion or radicalization, these people had the same access to women as other men, that is, in an evolutionary perspective, the same access as other men at the same status level. (Given that a lot of Jihadists had a delinquent career, it may even be argued that their access to mates was in fact greater than that of other men from the same city parts, thanks to the fast money such careers allow.) If the number of people from Western countries willing to resort to terrorist violence is great, then, following Miller and Kanazawa’s idea, polygyny in Western countries –by which more men are prevented from mating– must be high. By stressing polygyny as a factor in violence in general and in terrorism in particular, the authors, again, are not saying that institutional polygyny is the cause.

Institutional polygyny might in fact contribute to reduce the prevalence of actual polygyny in a society. The idea has been broached in the previous chapter of this book by using the concept of reproductive climate along A.S. Amin’s lines. Institutional polygyny is a long-term institution that promotes men’s commitment to their mates and children. So is institutional monogamy, albeit the data (current divorce rates in the West, polygyny scores in Christian Caribbean and African countries) seems to indicate it fails to curb short-term strategies in some regions.


3/ “The other key ingredient is the promise of seventy-two virgins waiting in heaven for any martyr in Islam. This creates a strong motive for any young Muslim men who are excluded from reproductive opportunities on earth to get to heaven as martyrs.” (p. 166).

There is no denying that such a belief can serve as motivation. Even more than the warrior ethics I have invoked in (1/), belief in houris is doctrinal. Hence, whereas polygyny as such is not associated uniquely to Islam (see 2/), the belief in question clearly is, because you

cannot rewrite the Quran, can you? Yet houris, unless I'm mistaken, are no privilege of the martyrs but are promised to all believers, so the reason some Muslims choose death and others acquire sex slaves as war spoils, as allowed, I am told, by Daesh, remains to be explained. Suicide missions suggest that obedience is extreme in these movements, but so it is in any fanatical group.

Religions promising afterlife describe it as everlasting bliss, and although this bliss does not always explicitly entail incarnated virgins available for sexual acts, it can be appealing enough to induce the sacrifice of one's life for one's belief.

As far as Hinduism and Buddhism are concerned, the varied existing heavenly abodes where souls may spend some time during the course of their transmigrations are described in picturesque details, some of them quite erotic, a fact that suggests the existence of a similar motivation in these religions. The way Apsaras, or celestial dancers, for instance, are depicted in ancient art is unmistakable (picture: Curvaceous Apsaras from the well-known Khajuraho temple in India). They are spouses of the celestial musicians Gandharvas, and it is possible to reincarnate as a Gandharva or as any other minor deity.



Not only these heavenly abodes entail sexual representations, but the very idea of reincarnation may serve sexual motivations. A Buddhist might be willing to commit a suicide attack in order to be reincarnated as a playboy; what would prevent him, as a playboy, from mating with 72 virgins or more? For the time being, Buddhist clerics do not promise next life in the incarnation of a womanizer in exchange of a suicide mission, although they could do so inside the very frame of their creed, and the reason why it is only Muslim clerics who promise afterlife sexual gratifications as a reward to suicide attacks is not explained by our authors here.

Buddhists are not known to play this card, although some believers certainly aspire to a more gratifying sexual life after their next birth, as some are wearing so-called charm amulets to improve their sex life in the present already. In Thailand these amulets often depict the legendary character Kun Paen in the company of multiple nude women; other charm amulets represent women in acts of bestiality, some others are in the shape of a penis, at times anthropomorphized (penis man). Thai monks routinely bless such talismans.

As to the idea that Jihadists, on the Iraqi theater of operations, kill more Iraqis than they kill Americans because they are “unconsciously trying to eliminate as many of their male sexual rivals (fellow Iraqi men) as possible,” it borders on the ridicule. As stated above, Daesh counts some 30,000 foreign fighters, for whom Iraqis are no more fellow men than Americans, and that would be half of Daesh’s army. A simpler explanation is that it is more difficult to kill an American than an Iraqi in Iraq – not only because of numbers, but also because American soldiers are certainly better trained and better equipped, and they also probably station their Iraqi allies on the most ‘strategic’ positions.

These elements suggest that Miller and Kanazawa’s explanation is quite shallow.

Jihad vs Panda Express

As explained in Chapter 10 Jihad is not parochialism but globalism. I define it “Islam as globalism.” If you want to give Barber a better example of parochialism, I suggest you name France to him. He could have titled his book “La France vs McWorld” or “La France vs Jihad,” and that for sure would have been a better illustration of the opposition he makes between parochialism and globalism. Need I expatiate?

Islam is a global power. Some people deny the existence of “Panislamism,” arguing Islam’s diversity. They do not seem to notice the current movement toward homogenization at work throughout the Muslim world, albeit they know the movement’s name as they appropriately call it Wahhabism or Salafism or fundamentalism.

Islam is a global power. They’ve got human bombs. They’ve got petrodollars and sovereign funds. They’ve got migrant communities throughout the Western world and beyond. They’ve got sympathy among scholars and intellectuals round the world. About this last point, let me tell you the story of Professor Subramanian Swamy from Harvard Summer School.

Prof. Subramanian Swamy taught Quantitative Methods in Economics and Business at Harvard Summer School from 2001 to 2011. As an economist he wrote papers together with Nobel Prize Paul Samuelson. He is also involved in Indian politics and was India’s minister of commerce and industry from 1990 to 1991. He was president of the Janata Party from 1990 to 2013, until the party merged on with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The party is labelled Hindu nationalist.

After the 2011 Jihadist bombings in Mumbai, Swamy wrote an article in an Indian paper that was deemed Islamophobic by a few readers. After a campaign of denigration, he was dismissed from Harvard Summer School, in America, the same year. It turns out I took his class in Summer 2004. I did not know his credentials at the time and I can testify that, as a professor, he never talked about these issues, so I would never have guessed the truth about him had I not discovered it by chance years later on the Web. I disapprove of his dismissal.

Swamy and other Indian politicians are for example accused in the West of demonizing Mughal rule. There is one funny argument in the views of those who defend the Mughals as tolerant rulers. They say Mughals promoted *intercommunity marriages*, but Hindus claim these

marriages amounted to sequestering Hindu women, their war booty, inside Muslim harems. If the latter are correct, then intellectual defenders of the Mughals would be praising as enlightened tolerance and benevolent wisdom the age-old practice of all ruthless conquerors throughout history.

Here is how Swamy envisions India's relationship with the country having the largest Muslim population in the world, namely Indonesia: "Over 90 per cent of the economic world powers' commercial sea-traffic passes through the narrow (90 miles) Malacca Strait. If we can develop naval power to the point where we can police this strait, it will give India enormous power and leverage to influence international events. This has diplomatic implications. It is obvious, for example, that we cannot control the Malacca strait without the active cooperation of Indonesia. However through proper diplomatic moves we can obtain Indonesia's cooperation and forge a strategic relationship with that country because we have long historical links with these islands through our cultural links of the past." (*Hindus Under Siege: The Way Out*, 2007, p. 97).

Swamy is perhaps overconfident, because Indonesia, albeit often advertised as a model of tolerant Islam (*Islam warna-warni* or "multicolored Islam," as the phrase goes), is undergoing the same process of homogenization through radicalization at work round the Muslim world. One example will suffice to buttress this contention.

The following passage deals with the current situation in Thailand's three southernmost provinces, whose population is prominently Muslim (>80%), in an otherwise overwhelmingly Buddhist country (92%). "As of September 10, 2008, there were forty-one beheadings according to the *Bangkok Post*. Terrorism experts argue that the style of many of these southern Thai beheadings is influenced by Muslim militant actions in the Middle East. However, there is more evidence to suggest that Thais are being trained in Indonesia or that the expertise comes from Indonesian-trained Thais who have stronger regional and local connections than countries in the Middle East. According to the Thai newspaper *Isrā*, in one instance a Thai *ustaz* (Islamic teacher) who teaches Islam in Yala Province had trained as a commando and studied Islam in Aceh, Indonesia. Among the Thai *ustaz*'s commando training were techniques for beheading people." (M.K. Jerryson, *Buddhist Fury: Religion and Violence in Southern Thailand*, 2011, p. 92).

What is striking in this piece of information, besides the gruesome facts and the trial for incompetence the author is making against "terrorism experts," is that Thai Jihadists do not train in Malaysia but in Indonesia, although (i) Malaysia is the closest neighboring Muslim country, (ii) whose policy is more Islam-oriented than Indonesia's. It seems Jihadists find a safer shelter and/or better logistic support in Indonesia, which hints at the latter truly being the soft underbelly of the region with respect to fundamentalist plans, in spite of the showcase of Muslim tolerance. Indonesia is a poor country, ranking 100th as to GDP per capita (at purchasing power parity) (10,517 INT\$), compared to 44th for Malaysia (25,639 INT\$) (World Bank 2014). In 2002 Indonesian government allowed Aceh province to enforce Sharia law and is now under pressure from other provinces to extend this policy. To summarize, it is in tolerant Indonesia that Thai (Patani) Jihadists learn beheading techniques.

Savanna Park Virtual

As my friend X says, “A life among people who fancy themselves in the savanna is not worth living.” He means that people live in a virtual savanna; they believe in the reality of an environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA) that is no more. To discuss the present point, let us return to *Why Beautiful People Have More Daughters* by Miller and Kanazawa.

“Since the advent of agriculture about ten thousand years ago and the birth of human civilization which followed, humans have not had a stable environment against which natural selection can operate.” (p. 26). This is why intelligence, that is, as the self-same Kanazawa defines it in his book *The Intelligence Paradox* (2012), the capacity to deal with “*novel and nonrecurrent* adaptive problems,” has become important in human societies: Human civilization, our man-made environment is unstable and requires dealing with novel problems on a much more frequent basis, almost on a daily basis. Yet our instincts often stand in the way and prevent us (the less intelligent of us) from dealing adequately with our current environment. For instance, abusing one’s mate is an instinctually adequate behavior to intimidate her into complying and shying away from close contacts with other men that would jeopardize the man’s position; yet this behavior is criminal and may result in incarceration, ruining entirely the position that the man intended to secure (p. 24).

Therefore, intelligence can be construed as a non-emotional path to knowledge, because our emotions have been shaped in the stable environment of the ancestral savanna in order to make us behave in the ways adaptive to that environment. In spite of some scholarly attempts to discard the dichotomy reason-emotion, no matter how you take it emotions are in the way when you try to solve an equation. This is why for all abstract problems machines will do a better job than humans in the future.

Machines would already have replaced human toil and work if humans were not intent on preventing this evolution as much as they can, out of emotions designed in the vanished savanna. In 1941 already, James Burnham contended: “Using the inventions and methods available would, it is correctly understood, smash up the capitalist venture. ‘Technological unemployment’ is present in recent capitalism; but it is hardly anything compared to what technological unemployment would be if capitalism made use of its available technology.” (*The Managerial Revolution*). Given the pronounced tendencies toward crime attested by the current, already massive, permanently unemployed ‘underclass,’ decision-makers are doing their best to have low-productivity industries and services subsidized in exchange of the latter maintaining the highest possible figures of human toil, which, with the advent of division of labor through the assembly line and bureaucratic procedure in organizations on, has become unbearably monotonous and machinelike.

It would be unbearable too, in the service sector, to interact as customers with humans playing the role of machines if that would not satisfy some inner savagery and cruelty keen on seeing other people degraded and at one’s mercy – a savanna emotion. The usual person, placed in such a situation as a waiter or shopkeeper, talks back to customers, whereas machines are always well-behaved. Do not bring savanna apes to confrontation when you can have these functional operations processed by machines.

The managerial revolution that has taken place and is the real engine of our affluence has nothing to do with old-days capitalism. Entrepreneurs are gone or they stand in the way. For aught I know, the entrepreneur today is the cleaning lady I pay. The engine of economy is elsewhere, amidst organizations contracting with the state, organizations offered foreign contracts through diplomats' bargaining, oligopolistic markets, contractors entirely dependent on organizations, organizations that are shareholders, organizations filled with interchangeable organization men whose personal value is nil as measured by their departure or removal or passing away having no effect whatsoever on the company's market value. The human factor there is the problem – what can make the machine go awry some day or the other. So-called experts sustain the myths of capitalism, but that is spin.

Spin is the word for politics too. The spoils system is over, ended by the Civil Service Reform (USA) and the “rise of the technician bureaucracy” (*Aufstieg des fachgeschulten Beamtentums*) (Max Weber). Recalling the so-called Monicagate in their light-hearted fashion, Miller and Kanazawa explain that other politicians (men) have affairs too. Do they? “It would be a Darwinian puzzle if they did not.” (p. 144). I suggest another “Darwinian puzzle”: Why does not “the most powerful man in the world” (p. 143), as some journalists, and a few light-hearted scholars, like to call the president of the United States, have the largest harem on earth? It looks like the most powerful man is a nice and decent functionary who's doing as he's told. He's there for the cameras, making believe, by his presence, in the savanna tribe. This is monkey dance. Entertainment for the savanna brain.

The profound meaning of democracy, as most high civil servants do not come and go with elections (which is spoils system) but serve any elected person and apply, each in his or her sphere of competence, any program that comes out of the ballot box, is either that bureaucrats, because they put themselves at the service of others' ideas, live an ignoble life (construing living for one's ideas as noble), or that ideas do not matter in the least and our societies follow an inevitable course.

When the once most powerful man in the world named Bill was faced with impeachment proceedings for his whoopees in the White House and his lies, he said please not to make him waste his time because he's got *a job to do*. May I ask who appointed him to the job? It's no job at all. At most we'll have to call it an office, and one is not appointed there by competent persons for one's competence but by the people as a good monkey dancer or a good person, depending on how you see things.

Do journalists investigate politicians' private lives or not? If they do, do our authors mean that most affairs escape these investigators' attention? Well, well... Why not assume that journalists are good investigators, when this assumption, precisely, is made about them in other fields? Because the scarcity of affairs would be a Darwinian puzzle...

12

Big Brother Is Peeping You

Eyes of Blue

Fair eyes are depigmented eyes, the fairer the more depigmented, with blue the most depigmented, then grey, then all shades of green and hazel and brown to the most pigmented dark eyes. In the world population at large pigmented irides are the rule rather than the exception. In fact fair eyes are rare, they are virtually inexistent outside the white Caucasian race, which includes Arabs and Indians of India, among whom fair eyes are rare too.

According to Alan S. Miller and Satoshi Kanazawa, people have a preference for fair eyes: *Why Beautiful People Have More Daughters* (2007), p. 61. A preference that would be “both universal and undeniable.”

These authors’ hypothesis is very interesting. To be precise it is not their hypothesis but that of an undergraduate student, Lee Ann Turney, “in her term paper for a class that she took from one of us (Kanazawa) in spring 2002.” According to Mrs Turney’s very interesting hypothesis, as the pupil dilates and contracts according to one’s emotions, blue-eyed people are more trustworthy because their pupil is more salient, being seen on a fair background.

That supposes that the eye be wide enough. Many Slavs, albeit blue-eyed, tend to have slanting eyes, so the preference cannot extend to them. This is a way to confirm or disprove the hypothesis.

Twenty years ago, when I started dabbling in physical anthropology, they said blue eyes were recessive (now they say “mostly recessive”). If blue eyes are recessive, and there is a universal preference for blue eyes, then I think the math foretells the extinction of the trait. On a global market, that is. Many a woman, and a man too, will sacrifice their preference for blue eyes when offered sufficient compensation, and if high-status people from all over the world are in search of blue eyes on the mating market, then, the proportion of blue-eyed individuals among these high-status people being small in absolute terms (see first paragraph), generation after generation the recessive trait will find fewer possibilities to be expressed in the offspring. Expect for slant-eyed Slavs, because no one cares about them. Yes, you have read it right: These latter will thrive because of the very contempt they inspire on the mating market.

This is to suggest one should consider recessiveness and dominance in studying behavior. *A recessive (selfish) gene has nothing to gain from globalization.* On the other hand a dominant (no less selfish) gene must struggle with such a concept as *miscegenation*.

To be sure, there is globalization and globalization. In the times of the British Empire, a world empire, in that empire high-status men, to be frank, were all Britons. Local (colored) rulers, local elites were precisely that, “local,” and so were their mating markets. Blue-eyed English ladies were not to be touched by locals. The mating market of the British imperial elite was also local but, given a universal preference for the traits present in *their* market, their situation is more properly described as having being a *monopoly*.

Perhaps women in northern European cultures have always been freer than in other parts of the world because, being most of them fair-eyed, men feel they can trust them. The Nordic phenotype is also characterized by fair skin, and blushing, on a fair skin, may play the same role as the salient pupil of a fair eye. *Ceteris paribus*, deception is harder for individuals of the Nordic race.

This leads us to the fact that contract politics as opposed to despotism, that is, societies relying on interpersonal trust rather than top-down power, originated in the same European regions where women have been the freest. For such societies to be able to thrive, trust must be more than a vain word. (On the geographic origins of political freedom, see Montesquieu.)

To all intents and purposes, the Wahhabis' way to deal with their women seems sound from an evolutionary perspective.

ii

Blue eyes are dealt with by Miller and Kanazawa after they discuss a universal preference in men for blonde hair. Because generally blonde hair is blonder when the individual is younger, it's seen as a marker of youth (hence of high female fertility).

Turney's hypothesis on blue eyes allows the following inferences as well. If blue-eyed people are more trustworthy, they get a larger representation among high-status people (than their representation in the population at large) because people are more willing to make business with them and to bestow responsibilities on them, and that share of theirs in the power structure is the result not of a freemasonry of scoundrels but of a freemasonry of genes; they have it (it's not an 'ought' but an 'is') as a birthright.

Talking of freemasonry, one is reminded of Sartre's coining for gays the phrase "freemasonry of pissoirs" (*franc-maçonnerie de pissotières*). Some evolutionary psychologists' ideas on the subject amount to the same. Most gays are bisexuals: They learn to overcome scruples with multiple male partners and then apply the lessons to inseminating women, leaving to these and their long-term partners the burden of parenting. Male homosexuality is not a safe strategy, as the rates of STDs among gays show, but still it's an "evolutionary stable strategy."

Has the gay community reached true acceptance? There is for sure a mass media effect with a message of tolerance toward that community blurring all the negative from the picture such as the high rates of STDs, so in a society mediated by mass media the picture must be that of wide acceptance. Yet that 'straight' people would really trust gays and have no second thoughts interacting with them is another matter, and doubtful. As long as paternity uncertainty exists, gays' lifestyle must be perceived, even if unconsciously and as a repressed thought (because inconsistent with the medium), as threatening to the man who takes the responsibility of raising a family (which most gays do not).

After the Orlando shooting (June 12, 2016), I came across an article in a newspaper stating that what the bigots really hated about gays was that they had true lasting love relationships between them, and could live, so to speak, like good husband and wife of old. That was the highlighted part of the article. Yet most gays do not live like this and, instead, promiscuity is high among them, as studies show: "gay men tend to have significantly more sex partners and have sex significantly more frequently than straight men do: because there are no women in their relationship to say no." (Miller & Kanazawa, p. 133)

Yet there may be a subgroup in that group, which are men who come out as gays because they fail to bond with a woman (women are choosy) and think it's better, socially speaking, to be gay rather than a failure. Such men, perhaps, are no more promiscuous than the average. That would be a masculine equivalent of so-called *Boston marriages* among women – lone women being prone to be targeted by all sorts of evils (probably more than lone men), if they cannot find a suitable man they will bond with another woman, but that bond is not necessarily sexual (because no sperm competition is involved that would make routine sex 'compulsory'). Yet such women are likely, in our social context, to come out as lesbians.

These comments are consistent with a few other things I wrote in the present book, such as the fact that in our short-term, permissive context a good deal of men are doomed to fail to bond – more men, I believe, than in a long-term context of institutional polygyny of moderate scope, such as Islam provides.

A Call To Exceptional Men

In his *Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex* (1871), Darwin writes: “for with man when the beard differs in colour from the hair of the head, as is commonly the case, it is, I believe, almost always of a lighter tint, being often reddish. I have repeatedly observed this fact in England; but two gentlemen have lately written to me, saying that they form an exception to the rule. One of these gentlemen accounts for the fact by the wide difference in colour of the hair on the paternal and maternal sides of his family. Both had been long aware of this peculiarity (one of them having often been accused of dyeing his beard), and had been thus led to observe other men, and were convinced that the exceptions were very rare. Dr. Hooker attended to this little point for me in Russia, and found no exception to the rule. In Calcutta, Mr. J. Scott, of the Botanic Gardens, was so kind as to observe the many races of men to be seen there, as well as in some other parts of India, namely, two races in Sikhim, the Bhoteas, Hindoos, Burmese, and Chinese, most of which races have very little hair on the face and he always found that when there was any difference in colour between the hair of the head and the beard, the latter was invariably lighter.” (Chap. XIX)

I am brown-haired and black-bearded and hereby make a call to all men in the same exceptional situation to reach out and share their experience for the purpose of forming a club. There's not even a word to name us. One of our first tasks will be to invent one.

To think that it has been more than a decade since I read this in Darwin and I never had the idea to make a call to such exceptional men before! (Darwin's calling it a “little point” is wrong!)

13

Random Thoughts & Singlism

Admission of the *naturalistic fallacy* (the tendency to grant indicative statements the value of injunctions) implies that our aims are determined outside natural life. Darwinian theory, thus, gives no account of our aims, and Darwinists who warn against the naturalistic fallacy downgrade their own work and pursuit. And those among them who, like R. Thornhill, do the same while insisting on applying the experimental test to all propositions are inconsistent in the bargain.

I have a doubt on Ronald Fisher's ultimate explanation of equal sex ratios. *Fisher's principle* states that, when females are scarce, siring a male will be selected against as more males will not mate, and vice-versa. It is the vice-versa that disturbs me, because males are polygynous. 'Whichever sex is in excess will have lower reproductive success, in average,' yes: for two sexes having equal reproductive strategies...

I have a doubt also on some claims about parasites and evolution. Predators do not weed out the genetically slower individuals but those individuals that are made slower by parasites (for instance, susceptibility to predation is increased thirty times for infected fishes, according to one study). Being free from parasite indicates a better immune system, but I should think parasite infestation has a random dimension too: in some cases it depends on where the individual has been (the wrong place at the wrong time), what he has eaten, etc. If randomness is high, how can selection mechanisms, in the predator-prey interaction, generate adaptations?

The world is not within man's reach – the world in the physical sense: stars and galaxies. Our thriving on a speck of dust lost in infinity cannot conceal its (our thriving's) indecorum. We must leave room to a one better suited than us to explore and know the world: *Der Geist*.

Biology will become anecdotal because the most important for *Der Geist* will be to know Itself. In biology *Der Geist* will find what It is not, not what It is.

The profound meaning of political freedom is that political ideas do not matter in the least. The program will apply and *Der Geist* will awaken.

Crime novels are read by practical people who have no time and no patience for things remote from their self-interest. Not because these novels are easier to read – they are not – but because practical people always keep in a corner of their minds the more or less conscious idea that one day to kill someone will be necessary to safeguard their interests.

Lucretius's 'unalloyed empiricism' (Milord Matt Ridley): yet the idea that the world is made of two things only, atoms and void, was not empirical but speculative.

*

In *Hormones, Sex, and Society: The Science of Physicology* (1994) by Helmuth Nyborg, I find a paradox. It seems to me that a male androtype-1 should not choose an estrotype-1 as a spouse, since the latter will have, as Nyborg describes it, "higher libido" and the androtype-1 is not particularly well endowed in this respect. Hence, he should make a more "sex-stereotypic

choice” with respect to finding a spouse, that is, he should depart from what Physicology predicts (that he will not be sex-stereotypical). What I mean by ‘should’ is what he would do if he knew Physicology a bit. This is the paradox. The only solution to it, as far as I can see, would be that Physicology predicts that androtypes-1 do not object to their spouses’ promiscuity, nor to bringing up children sired by other men. A rather odd prediction in terms of evolutionary genetics.

Also, I would like to stress that our current “managerial elite” is recruited on personality criteria amongst which extroversion is perhaps the most important in the organization recruiters’ eyes. Which means the hormotype index of the American/European managerial elite is not likely to be 1 or 2 (maybe not even 3), nor it is this likely to be otherwise in the near future, whereas Nyborg claims that loner, intellectual androtypes are called to make up the elite.

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Singled Out: How Singles Are Stereotyped, Stigmatized, and Ignored, and Still Live Happily Ever After (2006) by Dr Bella DePaulo (Harvard).

For a ultimate cause of ‘*matrimania*’ (marriage mania), I’d be tempted to look into evolutionary psychology. Bella DePaulo uses a meaningful phrase: ‘*intensive coupling*,’ or ‘*intensive nuclearity*,’ and I think it is key to understanding matrimania. Intensive coupling is the current form of *mate guarding*. Women’s emancipation has made it necessary that both partners couple more intensely than ever in the past, when the relative social isolation of the woman would guarantee some stability to the couple, as *mate poaching* would be obstructed by women’s reclusion and minority status.

The corollary of intensive coupling is the emotional value attached to coupling, which, as DePaulo observes, has not always been so exclusive in the past. Another corollary is the delusions she describes under the word *singlism*.

What she says about the fifties in America (“Consider...the Americans who were newly wedded in 1956. No Americans on record married at a younger age than they did, before or since. Half the 1956 grooms had not yet reached the age of 22.5, and half the brides were 20 or younger”) also triggered various reminiscences. I see the American fifties as an era of profound change marked by ‘hidden persuaders’ (Vance Packard), ‘affluence,’ ‘reversed sequence’ and the rise of the ‘technostructure’ (Galbraith), ‘managerialism’ (Burnham), and I am led to hypothesize the intervention of technocratic power (more efficient than that of churches!) in *normalizing marriage* in the American society. There may have been two incentives in that direction for these technocratic ‘persuaders.’ One is *social control*, as by and large single males would be seen as sexual predators and single females as feebly-inhibited nomads (from eugenicist Charles Davenport – and my understanding is that eugenics was still okay at the time). The other is *consumption* at the levels required by the newly achieved affluence. DePaulo stresses the response already made to Japanese scholar Masahiro Yamada’s contention that ‘single parasites’ consume less, yet I am not quite convinced that singles consume as much as couples; data should not be too hard to find on that score.

Yamada’s indictment of singles based on their consumption patterns or consumption levels is revealing of a tendency of capitalist societies toward *democratorship*.

Evolutionary psychology postulates that we are replication machines for our genes (Dawkins): the goal of life is reproduction. EP scholars insist that the phrase ‘struggle for life’ is actually a misnomer, since survival is in fact at the service of reproduction. The phrase *reproductive success* is key to their understanding of social relations. Now, as DePaulo says, some singles have children (and more and more people with children are singles); but this is still a way to maximize/optimize one’s reproductive success, if one’s partner turns out to be abusive, violent &c. She underlines that many singles and their children are better off single than in pair. But then they are in a typical EP pattern, whereas childless singles are not, and are rather, in that view, well, if the former are successes, then the latter are – the contrary of successes (and unhappy).

One EP scholar (Kanazawa) has come with an ‘intelligence paradox,’ trying to explain why intelligent people tend to commit ‘the greatest crime against nature’ (in his own words), namely voluntarily not to reproduce. Having read his book, in fact I can say this doesn’t even describe intelligent men by and large, only (or more likely) intelligent women. Still, in one other book (*Why Beautiful People Have More Daughters*, 2007, Kanazawa & Miller), he points to a productivity peak for scholars happening later in life in the case of singles than in the case of marrieds. He sees it as a confirmation of the EP view that once you reproduce you have done what you were called for in this life (by your genes) and you now concentrate on giving your children the opportunities to reproduce in the best conditions in their turn.

iii

With *Singled Out* Bella DePaulo almost made me think good of Oprah Winfrey, whom she extols (I can’t say I know Oprah Winfrey well, it’s just I have no warm notions of TV personalities generally speaking). But I have just been reading she is involved with a cult called A Course in Miracles (a course allegedly dictated by Jesus to a female medium, starting in 1965) and has put her large notoriety at its service. No doubt this has contributed mightily to the cult’s affairs.

In *Order by Accident* (2000), Miller & Kanazawa claim that, faced with unemployment, women evidence a tendency to join cults. I am pretty sure that cult membership also counts singles in larger proportions.

iv

DePaulo sends a pique to those Americans who see themselves as adventurous and yet dare not go alone at the restaurant. Well observed!

In my experience, in restaurants that ambition to be fashionable, service to singles is extremely poor and as customers abandon themselves to the goodwill of the waiters the experience can be quite unpleasant. It is as if these restaurants had an anti-single policy that they implement through bad service. They do their best to spare their ‘normal,’ or ideal, paired customers the inconvenience of being seated near a single – looser by definition in the dictionary of singlism.

Alternately, it may be no policy from the management but come from the staff themselves. As union is strength, waiters might hesitate to be inconsiderate and mean to pairs, while it’s fair game with singles, and they release it! If the waiter intends to be mean with a pair, Madame will insult him in soft voice while talking to Monsieur and making sure the waiter

hears and his pride is hurt, while the singles remain silent, don't even whisper, because then they're looked upon as having bats in the belfry.

Try the burger parlor.

14

Contra EP

Does the idea of too high a price to pay for achieving one's biological goals make any sense? In Ibsen's play *A Doll's House*, the main character Nora has achieved reproductive success, she has three kids and her husband has just become head of the bank so together they will bring up their kids in the best possible conditions. She nevertheless leaves house, husband, and children to work on her own because she does not want to fail her "duty to herself" any longer. Can a "duty to oneself" be jeopardized by the pursuit of biological goals?

According to biosociologist Brant Wenegrat, "motherhood in societies like ours does predict an increased risk of depressive disorders" (*Illness and Power*, 1995). Some scholarly confirmation of the playwright's insight, then, as motherhood and parenting, i.e. biological success itself would lead to increased biological risk in the shape of dysfunctional conditions for the children raised by a depressive mother. Or is it nonsense? This prediction is not confirmed in the book *Darwinian Psychiatry* (1998), by McGuire and Troisi, which states that male celibates are the most at risk of depression, precisely because of their biological failure (failed reproductive machines). Two opposite conclusions, then, from scholars of the same school of thought: For McGuire and Troisi women's mental health is not as dependent on the success of biological reproduction as men's, whereas for Wenegrat successful biological reproduction tends to affect negatively women's mental health and not men's.

Modern work, now, is not an evolved biological media for male competition (contrary to what evolutionary psychologists Tiger and Fox, 1971, claim), as for millenaries slavery was the rule and dominant males did not work (savanna-activity, i.e. hunter-gatherer environment of evolutionary adaptedness EEA-like hunting was aristocrats' hobby throughout the world in the past of civilization). In this way, and, again, contrary to the views of some EP scholars, modern work goes against biological tendencies. If a duty to oneself exists and, if we take Nora's example, opposes the mere pursuit of biological goals, then modern work may be the way to fulfill one's duty to oneself instead of biological goals. Yet in evolutionary terms I see nothing that warrants nor could even possibly warrant this 'literary' conclusion.

*

Contra EP (Evolutionary Psychology)

i

Several studies seeking to verify Devendra Singh's result on a universal preference for *waist-to-hip ratio (WHR)* of .7 could not confirm it. One was carried out in Peru and another in Tanzania among hunter-gatherers, whom EP claim are behavioral copies of our Pleistocene ancestors (although behavior of different groups of contemporary hunter-gatherers can vary greatly on many essential counts).

ii

In *Adapting Minds* (2006), David Buller shows convincingly that most of the main EP studies are based on sloppy reading of the data. For instance, Daly and Wilson (*The Truth about*

Cinderella, 1998) amalgamate physical and sexual abuse (!), yet obviously sexual abuse by a stepfather is no confirmation whatever of their view that stepparents tend to be hostile to stepchildren because the latter are only an evolutionary cost to them. Reading the data attentively in fact disproves their view. Buller presents the alternative hypothesis that marriage offers mating opportunities rather than paternity certainty; in such a case evolution would not have selected an aversive feeling toward stepchildren, which Daly & Wilson's data do not even show. Buller also says social workers have a bias against stepparents when they fill child death certificates. So the data D&W examined, mostly from social services, in fact is biased against stepparents, and even then these data do not show the overrepresentation of abusive stepparents D&W claim to have found. Most likely, now, their work has reinforced, if possible, the social workers' bias, and I have done the same here on my blog, as I followed on D&W's steps, taking their conclusions with no grain of salt.

I might as well let Buller talk. On anecdotal evidence from infanticide among mammals:

"the discussion of infanticide-as-adaptation turns to be nothing but a red herring in the end. ... Daly and Wilson state the record straight ... 'Human beings are not like langurs or lions,' they inform us. 'We know that sexually selected infanticide is not a human adaptation because men, unlike male langurs and lions, do not routinely, efficiently dispose of their predecessors' young. ... Child abuse must therefore be considered a non-adaptive or maladaptive byproduct of the evolved psyche's functional organization, rather than an adaptation in its own right. ... All told, we see little reason to imagine that the average reproductive benefits of killing stepchildren would ever have outweighed the average costs enough to select for specifically infanticidal inclinations.'" (p. 411)

On mating as paternity opportunity:

"if a male can secure paternity opportunities from a female by providing care to her children, even if those children are the offspring of another male, the male enhances his chances of having children of his own and thereby transmitting his genes to future generations. So, another male's child can make a contribution to a male's fitness via the opportunities for paternity provided by that child's mother in exchange for parental care provided to the child. The possibility of such fitness payoffs, however, means that we should not expect male psychology to be so unconditionally averse to investing in unrelated children." (p. 390) (Paternal care is primarily a mating effort and second a parenting effort: p. 393)

iii

One of Satoshi Kanazawa's main claims, and all the other EPs (hippies?) with him, is that high-status men have more sex partners than low-status men. Yet Kinsey has shown the exact opposite in his famous, pioneering surveys. Something happened in the mean time?

In fact, all this BS about high-status males being like gorillas males in gorilla harems is an regression of Western scholarship. A few decades ago, Darwinians used to talk of the "*fertility of the unfit*" (that's the title of a book). There's a Darwinian contradiction in terms in such a phrase (fertility, of course, means high fertility here), which a Darwinian could not fail to see and yet they (eugenicists) fully endorsed the paradox. They saw something to which EP boys, with their gorilla model, are blind. What they saw, and what solves the contradiction, is *homogamy*. Call it unfitness homogamy, if you like.

The EP view of "powerful and famous" males is based on primatology and misleading.

1/ From the longitudinal Stanford Marshmallow experiment, we know that children high on self-restraint have high status later in life. How does it square with having more sex partners than people low on self-restraint?

2/ Polygamy tends to be in the form of serial marriage (powerful and famous men tend to have as a matter of fact several spouses serially, but the number of their affairs is gossip and, as a matter of fact again, unknown). (A view held, among others, by Robert Wright.)

3/ Traditional types of philanderers now make the news as rapists, à la Harvey Weinstein.

4/ Even the highest rates of cuckoldry known (30% in some working-class compounds – number of children whose biological father is another man unbeknownst to the man at home) do not support the view that high-status males have greater access to females. In fact, all these 30% ‘bastards’ may have been sired by working-class neighbors for all we know. Also, Buller relevantly points that in countries where dowry exists the fact that wealthy men have more wives hardly supports the idea that this is a female preference.

iv

The Fertility of the Unfit, 1903, by Dr. William Chapple (New Zealand)

First thing to take into account is the unprecedented fact of *demographic transition*. A phenomenon unknown in nature, human populations have started declining as goods became more widely available (whereas in nature animal populations decline due to adverse environmental factors). This is seen as a confirmation of the moral restraint check on fertility posited by Malthus beside the two ‘natural’ checks, vice and misery. Quotes: “A rapid and continuous decline in the birth-rate of Northern and Western Europe, in contravention of all known biological and economic laws, has filled demographers with amazement.”

Whereas: “The tendency in the races of history has been to over-population, or to population beyond the food supply”

“The very qualities, therefore, that make the social unit a law-abiding and useful citizen, who could and should raise the best progeny for the State, also enable him to limit his family, or escape the responsibility of family life altogether; while, on the other hand, the very qualities which make a man a social burden, a criminal, a pauper, or a drunkard –improvidence and defective inhibition– ensure that his fertility will be unrestrained, except by the checks of biological law.”

“If moral restraint with the consequent limitations of families is the peculiar characteristic of the best people in the state, and the absence of this characteristic expressing itself in normal fertility is peculiar to the worst people of the state, the future of the race may be divined”

“Vice and misery are more active checks amongst the very poor, and abortion is practised to a very considerable extent, but the appalling fact remains, that the birth-rate of the unfit goes on undisturbed, while the introduction of higher checks amongst the normal classes has led to a marked decline.”

&, as another way of phrasing the above: “The defectives are more fertile than any other classes because of the very defect that makes them a danger to society. The defective restraint that allows them to commit offences against person and property, also allows their provocative impulse unrestrained activity.”

Please note that the phenomenon, also described as “rise of the Criminal,” predates mass immigration.

Chapple also alludes to *homogamy* among the unfit “which their circumstances necessitate.”

Last but not least, Chapple discusses mechanical contraceptives and considers that the least invasive technique is tubo-ligature, far preferable than vasectomy, as the latter “unsexes” males, leading to atrophy of the testes and impotence after some years. Ironically, today it is vasectomy that is more widespread (1 Englishman out of 5 is vasectomized). I have no doubt these vasectomies are practised on law-abiding citizens, according to their own will, as a moral restraint check on their fertility.

A consequence of demographic transition may be that marriage as paternity opportunity is now weak and that abuse of stepchildren has increased *as a result* (not as evolutionary adaptation)! Stepparent violence, if it’d be the result of demographic transition (stepparenting two kids from another bed entails a significant probability that the stepfather will have no kid of his own in a society characterized by the demographic transition, whereas it would have been no obstacle to siring a lot of children in the past), would be neither the result of evolutionary ADAPTATION nor, as in Daly & Wilson, a BYPRODUCT of evolution, a so-called ‘spandrel’.